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वर्ग संख्या.....

आगत संख्या.....

पुस्तक-वितरण की तिथि नीचे अंकित है । इस तिथि सहित ३० वे दिन तक यह पुस्तक पुस्तकालय में वापिस आ जानी चाहिए । अन्यथा ५० पैसे प्रति दिन के हिसाब से विलम्ब-दण्ड लगेगा ।

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## MICHAEL DUMMETT ON TRUTH

Michael Dummett subscribes to a verificationist<sup>1</sup> theory of meaning for natural language which is a generalisation of the intuitionist's theory of meaning for the language of mathematics. Again he advocates intuitionistic logic which, he thinks, is a consequence of this antirealism, a semantic theory, as described by him. In all of these three different aspects of his philosophy of language [i.e., (a) in the theory of meaning, (b) in logic and (c) in the semantic theory] the notion of truth plays a very important role. Dummett's views in these different fields is ultimately rooted in the notion of truth introduced by him as opposed to the classical notion of truth. There are some serious misconceptions about the Dummettian notion of truth and its place in his philosophy of language which are again roots of many other misconceptions about his philosophy of language. My aim in this paper is to explain what exactly the Dummettian notion of truth is and the role it plays in his philosophy of language.

A popular reading of Dummett's theory of meaning and the place of the notion of truth in it is that Dummett advocates a verificationist theory of meaning - a theory of meaning in which the central place is not occupied by truth but by verification. But we shall see that this reading is suspect.

While criticising the truth conditions theory of meaning (henceforth TTM) Dummett says, "The question before us is whether the concept of truth is the right choice for the central notion of a theory of meaning...."<sup>2</sup>. The TTM in which the notion of truth is the central notion has been vehemently criticised by Dummett. To understand Dummett's real charge against the TTM we should start with what Dummett thinks about the interrelation between the different aspects of the philosophy of language - the theory of meaning (sense), semantics (or the theory of truth/reference) and logic, because the significance

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of his charge lies in some results from this interconnection and this interconnection constitutes the background for comprehending the role of truth in his philosophy of language. He emphasises that part of semantics to which he thinks the question of realism is related. So, let us put, very briefly, Dummett's semantic interpretation of it first and then come back to the interrelation between the different aspects of his philosophy of language in the background of which Dummett's charge against TTM can be understood. His critique of TTM leads him to advocate the view he advocates regarding the nature of the notion of truth and its place in his theory of meaning.

Dummett thinks that the term 'realism' is not a blanket term. The question of realism arises only with respect to a given class of something<sup>3</sup>, allowing thereby a possibility of one's being realist in one field and not in another which is almost undisputed in recent thinking. The traditional metaphysicians want to regard them as entities and dispute over the question whether or not they really exist in the world. So it may be labelled as 'entity realism'. This class may consist, on this view, of material objects, mathematical entities, universals and so on. They used to say that realism concerning a given class of entities is the belief that these objects exist independently of our knowing them. This is a material mode of presenting the matter. The formal mode which is also in vogue is that this class consists of terms. So, realism concerning a class of terms is the belief that the elements of this class have genuine references. Dummett contends that this formulation of realism in both of these modes is inadequate and misleading. There are some fields where the dispute arises meaningfully but the dispute over realism cannot be formulated in these fields if realism takes the form of entity realism. Realism in morality, realism about the past are among such fields. We cannot conceive of moral entities or past entities which could constitute the references of the terms of the concerned disputed class. Again, there are some fields where the real issue will be deflected if realism is characterised as entity realism, e.g., realism in mathematics and realism about mental states. This critique has been elaborated by Dummett<sup>4</sup>.

Dummett prefers to say that the disputed class consists of statements, and not of entities or terms. This, he thinks, enables him to overcome the difficulties encountered by entity realism. He characterises realism as the belief that every statement of the disputed



class is either (determinately) true or (determinately) false (i.e., the principle of bivalence applies generally to these statements). Dummett's formulation of realism may be referred to as statement realism or semantic realism.

We see that Dummett quite significantly characterises realism in terms of the semantic principle that every statement is either true or false. Although in his earlier writings Dummett equates realism with acceptance of bivalence, in his later writings he takes this acceptance of bivalence to be only one of the necessary conditions for realism<sup>5</sup>. Anti-realism is accordingly characterised as the denial of any of the necessary conditions for realism.<sup>5</sup> Since, the principle of bivalence involves the concept of truth, Dummett calls the realism/anti-realism issue a semantic one. The principle of bivalence with respect to a disputed class is a peculiar feature of the classical conception of truth. By 'the classical conception of truth' I mean the Tarskian conception of truth of which two remarkable features are (i) A statement is true by virtue of the things as they are in the world. (ii) Truth is recognition transcendent.

The realist is a propounder of the classical notion of truth. If one is to be a realist concerning a disputed class of statements then one must admit the classical objective truth for the statements of that class. Given a statement A of the disputed class, A is either true or false only if truth neither depends on our recognition nor on our recognisability. On the other hand, to be an anti-realist one must deny at least a particular feature of the classical notion of truth associated with the principle of bivalence, viz., the feature of recognition transcendence. In other words, he must admit a non-classical conception of truth.

Let us now explain, after Dummett, the interrelation between a semantic theory (or a theory of truth), a theory of meaning and logic. According to him, a semantic theory forms the base of a theory of meaning<sup>6</sup>. What shape would a theory of meaning take depends upon the kind of theory of truth which forms the base of it. So the acceptability of a theory of truth depends upon the acceptability of the theory of meaning of which it forms the base. If a classical notion of truth forms the base of a theory of meaning then the theory of meaning may be called a classical truth conditions theory of meaning (henceforth, CTTM). If a non-classical theory of truth, i.e., a theory of truth which does not



capture the classical conception of truth as specified above, forms the base of a theory of meaning then the theory of meaning may be called a classical theory of meaning. It can further be said that if a non-classical theory of truth, where truth is defined in terms of verification/falsification, forms the base of a theory of meaning then the theory of meaning may be called verificationism/falsificationism. Although from the point of view of constitution the theory of truth leads to the theory of meaning, the acceptability or justification of a theory of truth depends upon the acceptability or justification of the corresponding theory of meaning. Dummett holds that which notion of truth is appropriate for a class of statements depends upon which theory of meaning exploiting a notion of truth explains satisfactorily our understanding of those statements<sup>7</sup>. Thus we see that acceptance of the CTTM leads to the acceptance of the classical conception of truth, and so to that of the principle of bivalence. On the other hand, acceptance of verificationism leads to the acceptance of the non-classical conception of truth and so to the denial of the principle of bivalence, i.e., antirealism. So, Dummett justifies the theory of truth on the basis of the theory of meaning.

Regarding the relation between a semantic theory and logic, on the other hand, Dummett has explicitly stated that acceptance of the semantic principles determines acceptance of the logical laws<sup>8</sup>. Dummett seems to borrow this idea from Frege<sup>9</sup>. He has stated some semantic principles and the corresponding logical laws some of which are given below :

1. Every statement A is either true or false - this semantic principle is called the principle of bivalence.

The corresponding logical law is :

(1') A or not A, in symbols,  $A \vee \neg A$  —this is known as the law Excluded Middle.

2. No statement A is true nor false.


—this semantic principle is called by Dummett the principle of tertium non datur.

The corresponding logical law is :

(2') It is not the case that neither A nor not A, in symbols,  $\neg(\neg A \vee \neg \neg A)$  —This logical law has been called by Dummett the Law of Excluded Third.



We can note first that there is a use/mention difference in the formulation of a logical law and the corresponding semantic principle. In stating logical laws the schematic letter 'A' has been used while in stating the semantic principles the schematic letter 'A' has been mentioned. However, the important thing in that Dummett contends that acceptance of semantic principles entails acceptance of the corresponding logical laws, but not vice versa<sup>10</sup>. In a semantic theory truth may be defined in such a manner that the principle of bivalence holds. If such a semantic theory forms the base of a theory of meaning then the resulting theory of meaning will be the CTTM. The logical counterpart, i.e., the logic determined by this semantic theory will include the law of Excluded Middle. This logic is called the classical logic. Contrariwise, if truth is defined in such a manner that the principle of bivalence does not hold in general, and if such a theory of truth forms the base of a theory of meaning then it is called the non-CTTM. If truth is defined in terms of verification so that the principle of bivalence does not hold in general and such a theory of truth forms the base of a theory of meaning then the resulting theory of meaning is called the verificationist theory of meaning. The corresponding logic does not include the law of Excluded Middle. The logic resulting from the verificationist theory of meaning is, says Dummett, intuitionistic. The interrelation between the different aspects of Dummett's philosophy of language, as explained above, can be represented through a diagram<sup>11</sup>.



Here '→' designates the order of justification and the visible physical position suggests the order of determination or constitution of the different aspects. Here it is to note that a theory of meaning justifies a theory of truth in the sense that only that theory of truth is acceptable which enables us to construct a right theory of meaning. A theory of truth justifies a logic in the sense that only that logic would be accepted if it is grounded in a right theory of truth.



Now we should come back to the original issue - the notion of truth in the theory of meaning as viewed by Dummett. His view about truth in a theory of meaning has got two parts - the negative and the positive. In the negative part we find some major points - (i) refutation of realism or at least putting realism at stake. (ii) refutation of the principle of bivalence (iii) refutation of the feature of recognition transcendence of the classical conception of truth and (iv) refutation of the classical truth conditions theory of meaning. In the positive part either he replaces truth by verification or he gives a new definition of truth. In the negative part he first proves (iv), then on the basis of it (iii). Here his general thesis is that a semantic theory is justified by the corresponding theory of meaning. Proof of (ii) depends upon the proof of (iii). Here it is presupposed that bivalence is implied only by the classical conception of truth. By definition of realism, (i) is established immediately after the proof of (ii) is given.

(iv) is established with the help of a reductio.

### **The informal reductio proof**

Dummett derives a contradiction from the supposition that meaning is truth condition where truth is conceived classically and that we know the meaning of undecidable sentences in the following manner :

First of all, he takes as a premiss, the truth of which will be proved later, that knowledge of truth conditions of sentences is the ability to recognise that the truth conditions have obtained when they have obtained. The second premiss is that meaning consists in truth conditions. Now, if meaning consists in truth condition and the first premiss is true then to know the meaning of a sentence is to have the ability to recognise that the truth conditions have obtained when they have obtained. In particular, the knowledge of the meaning of an undecidable sentence must also consist in the ability to recognise that the conditions which make it true have obtained when they have obtained. But undecidable sentences are, ex hypothesi, such that we can not recognise that their truth conditions have obtained when they have obtained. This is a fact admitted by the truth condition theorist and so can be admitted as a premiss. So we are to say, on this theory, i.e., the theory that meaning consists in truth conditions, that we do not know the meaning of undecidable sentences. But it is a fact that the



meaning of undecidable sentences too are known by us. This too can be treated as a premiss because it is admitted by the truth condition theorist. Thus, we are to say that we know and do not know the meaning of undecidable sentences which is a contradiction in terms. So, meaning does not consist in classical truth conditions.

In this argument the crucial point is that knowledge of truth conditions consists in the ability to recognise that the truth conditions obtain if and when they do. Dummett has established it separately. Let us explain this point in some more detail. Dummett holds that CTTM cannot be a theory of understanding, i.e., the CTTM cannot account for the knowledge of truth conditions of all sentences. The recalcitrant set consists of undecidable sentences. For Dummett a satisfactory theory of meaning is a theory of understanding, i.e., it can account for, among other things, the knowledge of that in which meaning consists of any sentence. But CTTM cannot explain the knowledge of meaning of undecidable sentences. For knowledge may in principle be either explicit or implicit. Knowledge is explicit when the person can state what he knows, i.e., when he can assert some sentences that express the content of his knowledge; and then, of course, it is implied that he knows the meaning of the sentences that he asserts. Dummett thinks that knowledge of truth conditions must be implicit. Since to explain all knowledge of truth conditions as explicit knowledge would necessarily be circular, because any such explanation presupposes what it is to know the truth conditions of some sentences. An ascription of implicit knowledge must always be explainable in terms of what counts as a manifestation of that knowledge, viz. the possession of some practical ability. When it is a knowledge of the meaning of a sentence that is in question, the practical capacity which constitutes the knowledge must itself be a linguistic ability. Now, if a person knows implicitly the truth conditions in knowing the meaning of a sentence then the practical ability to which this knowledge is correlated would be the ability to decide that the truth conditions of this sentence have obtained, when they have. The undecidable sentences are such that we can never devise any effective procedure for deciding the truth of them. Since we cannot have any practical ability for deciding whether or not the truth conditions of those sentences have obtained in a particular situation, CTTM fails to be a theory of understanding in the case of undecidable sentences.



It is obvious that this failure on the part of CTM is a direct consequence of a particular feature of the classical conception of truth, viz. the feature of recognition transcendence which is associated with the principle of bivalence. So, this particular feature of the classical conception of truth is to be rejected, because for Dummett a semantic theory is justified by the theory of meaning of which it forms the base. Thus (iii) is proved. It has already been shown that the principle of bivalence can be accepted only if this particular feature of the classical conception of truth is admitted. Since this particular feature is rejected by Dummett, consequently the principle of bivalence is also rejected. This establishes (ii). Now, since the principle of bivalence defines realism and bivalence fails, realism is refuted or at least realism has been put at stake by Dummett. So (i) is also established.

Thus, we see that Dummett explains the failure of the principle of bivalence on the basis of the failure of CTM (i.e., the truth conditions theory of meaning of which the classical conception of truth forms the base). This has been possible for him because he thinks that a semantic theory is justified by the theory of meaning of which it forms the base. Consequently, the Law of Excluded Middle cannot be accepted as a logical law in our natural language, since for Dummett semantics determines logic and the Law of Excluded Middle is the logical law corresponding to the semantic principle of bivalence. Dummett's refutation of realism is extremely important because this refutation in its turn suggests revision in the classical logic.

In his earlier writing<sup>12</sup> the arguments for rejecting bivalence were not made explicit. The arguments have been made explicit in his later writings. One of these arguments has already been put forward. Another argument, very close to the one given above, is that if meaning is given in terms of the classical notion of truth conditions then the obvious fact that meaning is always communicable will be neglected. "An individual cannot communicate what he cannot be observed to communicate"<sup>13</sup>. So the meaning of a statement is determined solely by use. But if CTM is adopted for natural language then meaning and use will be segregated in the case of undecidable sentences. This concludes the negative part of Dummett's view regarding the notion of truth in the theory of meaning.

Before coming to see what Dummett says in the positive part of the view about the notion of truth in the theory of meaning let us now



concentrate on what emerges from Dummett's critique in the negative part including the possible ways out and the solution actually given by Dummett. Dummett rejects the particular feature of the classical notion of truth which is associated with the principle of bivalence - the feature of recognition transcendence. The most direct argument he has given for rejecting this feature is that the CTTM fails to account for the knowledge of meaning of statements of a kind of the natural language, and so is inadequate. This inadequacy is due to this particular feature of the classical notion of truth. So, he rejects this particular feature of the classical conception of truth. CTTM has got two parts. - (i) Meaning consists in truth conditions, (ii) Truth is classical. It seems that Dummett rejects (ii) but retains (i). It is impossible for Dummett to deny the obvious fact that a sentence is true iff what the sentence means obtains, i.e., the fact that the meaning of a sentence and the condition the obtaining of which makes the sentence true are identical. To quote him: "The sense of a statement is determined by knowing in what circumstances it is true and in what false"<sup>14</sup>. Here by 'sense', which he uses interchangeably with 'meaning', he means the content of a sentence, or more specifically the content of an assertion. We have already seen that among the different features of the classical notion of truth two are remarkable ones: (a) Truth consists in correspondence (b) Truth is recognition transcendent. Of these two, the former is for Dummett unobjectionable<sup>15</sup>. He thinks that the Achilles' Heel in the CTTM is the latter feature of the classical notion of truth, i.e., the feature of recognition transcendence which is associated with the principle of bivalence.

The difficulty in a theory of meaning based on the classical conception of truth arises from the fact that the truth (and truth conditions) of many sentences of our language appears to transcend our powers of recognition. The difficulty can be resolved in at least two different ways. One may retain the concept of truth as it is in the classical thought, i.e., as recognition transcendent but replaces it from the central place in the theory of meaning by some other concept. Another possible way of resolving the difficulty is to retain the central position of the notion of truth (truth conditions specifically) which it has in CTTM but revise the notion of truth as understood classically. It has not been clearly indicated as to which of these two ways has actually been followed by Dummett. There are suggestions in his writings which lead us to think that Dummett favours the former alternative. But a large



number of Dummettian scholars tends to interpret Dummett as subscribing to the latter view for the reasons discussed above. The reasons are: (i) Dummett does not deny, rather defends, that meaning consists in truth conditions; (ii) he rejects the classical conception of truth. Let us quote some passages from the different writings of Michael Dummett : "Realism about a given class of statements.... is thus a thesis about the appropriate notion of truth for such statements ...."<sup>16</sup>. Again, "The solution is to abandon the principle of bivalence..... An understanding of a sentence may now be taken to consist in a knowledge of the condition under which a statement has been conclusively established to be true....."<sup>16a</sup>.

The question still remains, on the part of these interpreters, to settle, about the significance of the texts where Dummett categorically dislodges the notion of truth from the central position of a theory of meaning. This problem is resolved in two different manners. Some of these interpreters hold that the texts where Dummett says this represent his earlier view. In his later writings he has changed this view<sup>17</sup>. In his later writings he recognises that in almost any theory of meaning "we can represent the meaning (sense) of a sentence as given by the conditions for it to be true"<sup>18</sup>. The other interpreters contend that these texts only suggest that the classical conception of truth is to be dislodged, not truth simpliciter.

There are at least four possible alternative ways of constructing a theory of meaning: (i) where meaning is given by something other than truth conditions; (ii) meaning is given in terms of truth conditions, where truth is understood classically and undecidable sentences are included in the set of meaningful sentences; (iii) meaning is given in terms of truth conditions where truth is understood classically and undecidable sentences are eliminated from the set of meaningful sentences; (iv) meaning is given in terms of truth conditions, undecidable sentences are not eliminated from the set of meaningful sentences but truth is not understood classically. Dummett rejects (i) because it is counter-intuitive<sup>19</sup>. The argument for rejecting (ii) has already been given, (iii) is not accepted by him because it goes against the fact that undecidable sentences are meaningful. So, he advocates (iv).

Thus, we see that in the positive part of his view Dummett has retained the central place in his theory of meaning for the notion of truth.



So, even for him the core theory is the theory of truth. The role played by the notion of truth in his philosophy of language is very important. Briefly speaking, it makes his theory of meaning (sense) satisfactory<sup>20</sup>, it also makes the construction of a viable theory of force (use) possible although it is not very clear how he proposes to build a theory of force on a theory of meaning. Furthermore, it gives rise to an adequate logic.

Although Dummett has retained the notion of truth in his theory of meaning he has not retained it as it was in the CTTM. We can try to comprehend what the notion of truth is like as understood by Dummett.

First of all, truth is not recognisability transcendent. Every statement of which truth can be predicated is recognisable as true, if it is true. The consequence of this feature is that we cannot accept the principle of bivalence, i.e., the principle that every statement is either true or false. Secondly, this notion of truth does not allow the possibility of a statement's being neither true nor false. In other words, it admits the principle of *tertium non datur*, viz., no statement is neither true nor false. In his famous essay 'Truth' Dummett has shown that violation of this principle leads to the violation of the equivalence thesis, viz., that a sentence 'P' is equivalent with the sentence "It is true that P" which he intends to defend because he thinks that if a theory of truth fails to maintain this then it will lead to infinite regress as suggested by Frege<sup>21</sup>. Again it is admitted that a statement is true by virtue of states of affairs<sup>22</sup>. Besides, it is also to be noted that the states of affairs by virtue of which sentences are true are recognisable.

Dummett observes that an intuitionist can develop a theory of truth for the language of mathematics in terms of proof incorporating all of these features. He extends the intuitionist's definitions at truth to the natural language weakening the notion of proof to verification. Dummett has modified the definition of truth through different stages. In his final version he says that an intuitionist can say that a mathematical statement is true iff there exists a proof of it<sup>23</sup>. Here the word 'exist' is to be understood intuitionistically<sup>24</sup>. While giving the final version of his definition of truth he says that an intuitionist need not say that a (mathematical) proposition A is true iff we have proved A. He should rather say that A is true iff we are able to prove A. If there exists a proof for a statement to the effect that we cannot have a



mathematical construction which counts as a proof of it then the sentence is false. The so-called undecidable sentences which we may call undecidable, are, for the intuitionists really false ones. But we know their meanings, because to understand the meaning of a sentence is to know what counts as a proof of it. We have an ability to recognise such a construction for a so-called undecidable sentence. So, for the intuitionist if a sentence is not true, i.e., if we cannot have a mathematical construction which counts as a proof of it, it is tantamount to its being false. So the principle of *tertium non datur* is preserved. But this notion of truth does not allow the principle of bivalence. Because there are some statements for which we have not yet been able to construct any mathematical construction which counts as a proof of it or under which statements of this kind are assertible. Let us call these sentences undecidable<sub>2</sub>. So, we cannot say that these statements are true, neither can we say that they are false. Because upto now we have failed to prove that we cannot have such a construction. Neither can we assert them, nor can we deny them. So, the principle of bivalence does not hold for them. In this context let us take an example considered by Niel Tennant<sup>25</sup>. The example taken by Niel Tennant is Goldbach's conjecture, viz., that for every even number  $n$  greater than 2, there are prime numbers  $p, q$  such that  $n = (p+q)$ . We know the meaning of this statement. If a construction is proposed for being considered as a proof of this statement, we can determine whether or not it really constitutes a proof of it; we know what counts as a proof of it. A mathematical construction would constitute a proof of this statement if it provides two constructions of primes  $p, q$  such that their addition is 4 (this is the basis); and provides an effective procedure for constructing two primes  $p, q$  such that their addition is  $2k$ , if two constructions of primes  $p, q$  are given such that their addition is  $2(k-1)$  Where  $k > 1$ . But this statement (Goldbach's conjecture) is undecidable<sub>2</sub>. Neither can we show that such a proof can be constructed nor can we show that it can not be constructed. By this is not meant that it is impossible to prove and impossible to refute it. 'Undecidable' means that we do not at present possess (an effective method for finding) either a proof or a disproof of it. Goldbach's conjecture, though undecidable<sub>2</sub>, is meaningful. Since it undecidable<sub>2</sub>, the principle of bivalence does not apply to it, but it obeys the principle of *tertium non datur*, for which the reason is given before.<sup>25a</sup>

Thus, we see that Dummett's notion of truth is not epistemic as it is usually supposed to be, because a statement's being true does not



depend upon a person's knowledge. A statement may be true even if we do not know it to be true. A statement may be true by the existence of a proof of it, a proof which may not be actually known by us. Note that Dummett does not say that a statement may be true even if we cannot know it to be true. Sometimes Dummett hesitates to define truth in terms of the existence of proof. The reason for his hesitation is that to admit the objective realm of proofs would be a betrayal of the principles that lead us to reject the classical truth-conditions theory of meaning in favour of a verificationist one, i.e., it would beg the question. Dag Prawitz removes this hesitation by saying that in the objective realm of proofs there can be no question of the existence of a proof that is not in principle recognizable by us<sup>26</sup>. This is so because a proof is by its very nature something that is related to our recognitional capacities, unlike the classical truth conditions that are understood as possible obtaining although we may be in principle unable to recognise that they obtain.

It is evident from the above exposition that even if Dummett is supposed to say that proof (or verification) is the central notion in his theory of meaning he cannot be said to replace the notion of truth by that of proof, because he defines truth in terms of proof (or in terms of the obtaining of proof conditions). Saying that Dummett replaces truth in his theory by proof is only half of the story. He replaces only classical truth, and not truth simpliciter. So, to say that the central notion in Dummett's theory of meaning is proof or verification in terms of which he defines truth and to say that the central notion in Dummett's theory of meaning is truth which is verificationist are two ways of saying the same thing.

Thus, we can say that it is not quite correct to say that Dummett is banishing the notion of truth from the central place in his theory of meaning. Even in his theory of meaning the notion of truth occupies the central place. Dummett's charge against the TTM is that here the notion of truth is wrongly supposed to be recognition transcendent. Actually the notion of truth is not, says Dummett, recognition transcendent, i.e., the states of affairs, which constitute the content of statements the obtaining of which make them true, are recognisable in principle. Dummett's theory of truth differs from that of Tarski which captures the classical conception of truth to the extent that while Tarski's theory allows the possibility of the states of affairs to be recognition



transcendent, Dummett's theory does not.

If we look at the constraints, as admitted by Dummett, which a satisfactory theory of truth must satisfy then we will see that one of them is the equivalence thesis, i.e., for any sentence  $S$ ,  $S$  is true iff  $S$ . Now the question about the definition of truth as suggested by Dummett is whether it can satisfy this constraint. The final version of his definition of truth is, for any sentence  $S$ ,  $S$  is true iff there exists that which counts as a proof (or verification) of  $S$ . In order to say that this definition satisfies the above constraint we have to admit the equivalence " $S$  iff there exists that which counts as a proof (or verification) of  $S$ ". But this equivalence is suspect even if 'exist' is understood intuitionistically<sup>27</sup>.

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### Notes

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1. Verification is a generalised concept of the concept of proof in mathematics.
2. "What Is A Theory Of Meaning? (II)", in G. Evans and J. McDowell (ed.): *Truth And Meaning*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, p.75.
3. This class with respect to which the dispute over realism arises is called by Dummett 'the disputed class'.
4. Cf. Dummett: "Realism", *Truth and other Enigmas*, Duckworth, 1978 and the preface to it.
5. "Realism", *Synthese* 52, 1982.
6. *Ibid.*
7. See Dummett: "Realism", *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*, Duckworth, 1981 pp. 434-435, 446.



8. Cf. preface to *Truth And Other Enigmas*.
9. See Dummett: "Realism", *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*, Duckworth, 1981, p.433.
10. See preface to *Truth And Other Enigmas*.
11. Cf.(i) Michael Dummett: *Elements of Intuitionism*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, pp. 370-371.  
 (ii) Preface to *Truth And Other Enigmas*, pp. xxviii-xxix.
12. Cf. "Truth", *Truth And Other Enigmas*, pp.14-15.
13. "The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic", *Ibid*, p.216.
14. Cf. Truth, *Truth And Other Enigmas*, p.8
15. "The text describes the principle ....recognisable circumstances determine it true or false" - postscript of "Truth", *Truth And Other Enigmas*, p.23.
16. See Michael Dummett: 'Realism', *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*, Duckworth, 1981, p. 434.
- 16a. Dummett: *Elements of Intuitionism*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977. p.375.
17. Das Prawitz: "Dummett On A Theory Of Meaning", Berry M. Taylor (ed.): *Michael Dummett*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986.
18. Cf. Preface to *Truth And Other Enigmas*, p. xxii.
19. See Note 18.
20. See preface to *Truth And Other Enigmas*, p. xxiii.
21. cf. preface to *Truth And Other Enigmas*, pp. xx, xviii, xix.
22. cf. "Truth", *Truth And Other Enigmas*, p.8 and also see note 15.
23. "Realism", *Synthese* 52, 1982, p.91.  
*Elements of Intuitionism*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977, p.19.
24. For the intuitionist "there exists a proof of a mathematical statement" means that a mathematical construction can be given which counts as a proof of it. To know which mathematical construction counts as a proof of a statement is to know under what condition it is assertible. This is, for the intuitionist, nothing but knowing its meaning. So, for the intuitionist, meaning consists in assertibility conditions, or proof conditions. If such a condition obtains or exists (in the intuitionist's sense)



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then the statement is true and vice versa. Thus, we see that for the intuitionist assertibility conditions, proof conditions and truth conditions are the same.

25. Neil Tennant: *Anti-Realism And Logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
- 25a It is important to note that in the case of undecidable<sub>1</sub>, the intuitionist can give a proof to the effect that no construction can be given which proves it. But in the case of undecidable<sub>2</sub>, he neither can give such a proof nor can he give a proof to the effect that no construction can be given which disproves it.
26. "Dummett On A theory Of Meaning", Berry M, Taylor (ed.): *Michael Dummett*, Matrinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p.154.
27. This point was raised by my teacher, Professor Pranab Kumar Sen, Jadavpur University, while I was discussing with him about the definition of truth as suggested by Dummett.



## Locke's Empiricism and the Opening Arguments in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*

In the analytic trend of philosophy, the German Idealists, and G.W.F. Hegel in particular, are most often represented as metaphysical mystics. Their intricate and often obscure theories are thought to bear little or no relation to the tradition that identifies its modern roots in the works of Bertrand Russell and British Empiricists.<sup>1</sup> This paper is an attempt to bridge some of the chasm that has grown between these two philosophical camps. Specifically, I shall show that the two opening arguments in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* - 'Sense-Certainty' and 'Perception' - are immensely significant to the empiricist programme, and in fact comprise a powerful criticism that empiricists will be hard pressed to answer. To focus this discussion I shall apply what I take to be a charge of explanatory circularity by Hegel to the empiricist theory espoused by John Locke in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

I have chosen Locke as the target for Hegel's criticism for two reasons. First, it is evident from his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* that Hegel had read Locke's *Essay* and thought it worthy of critical attention. He also had read at least some of George Berkeley's and David Hume's works, but he considered these philosophies only to be of interest in that they completed the absurdities implicit in Locke's empiricism<sup>2</sup> Indeed, Hegel devoted a robust fifteen pages in his *Lectures* to the explication and rejection of Locke's work, and only five and seven pages respectively to the writings of Berkeley and Hume.

Secondly, I believe that close examination of Locke's theory, and specifically of his doctrine of simple ideas, will help to reveal the essence of Hegel's position. Traditionally, Locke has been interpreted as contradicting himself on the subject of simple ideas, for



he seems both to describe them as universal properties which are given in experience (and hence are the essential constituents of all objects) and as merely mental properties which are gotten through the comparing and contrasting of different objects (the process of abstraction). This interpretation makes Locke easy prey for Hegel's criticisms as they appear in the first two chapters of the *Phenomenology*. For it is precisely Hegel's aim to show that if consciousness takes itself to be a passive receptor of extra-mental stimuli (which is how Locke characterizes it), it is forced to vacillate between the two contradictory descriptions of properties outlined above. I think that the traditional interpretation of Locke's doctrine of simple ideas is incorrect. I shall therefore offer what I believe to be the correct interpretation, and suggest how Hegel's original criticisms can be altered to accommodate it. I shall further argue that these alterations preserve what is essential to Hegel's position, but show it to be a much more powerful criticism of empiricism than its original form in the *Phenomenology* might suggest.

Before I begin my discussion proper, it is necessary to point out that Hegel's intent in the *Phenomenology* is not merely to refute particular philosophical theories and subsequently replace them with doctrines of his own. For in order to do this he would have to establish his own criterion for the truth of a philosophical doctrine, which he believes would be nothing more than making a bare assertion about what counts as bonafide knowledge. Rather, Hegel suggests that we look to consciousness itself for the standard that knowledge claims are to be measured against. Because consciousness is essentially self-reflexive, it has the characteristic of knowing that it knows. It thus simultaneously recognizes the object of its knowledge and its knowledge of the object. The investigation of what is truly knowledge, then, becomes a comparison of these two moments within consciousness, that is, it becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself. If the two moments do not correspond, consciousness is forced to change its knowledge so that it will conform with the object. But this process is not simply a wholesale rejection of different modes of knowledge, for when consciousness clarifies the notion of its object at a particular phenomenal level, it becomes manifest that only a particular kind of knowledge will correspond to that object. Hence Hegel's insistence that the only true negation is a determinate one. With the negation of each particular claim to knowledge appears a specific direction that



consciousness must follow to achieve parity between its knowledge and its object. The *Phenomenology*, then, is a systematic description of the dialectical movement consciousness undergoes until it reaches the point where its knowledge corresponds to its object. Then, and only then, consciousness will have achieved Absolute Knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

This is not to say that none of the phenomenal levels described can bear affinities to actually-held philosophical theories of the nature of knowledge. It is precisely Hegel's point that all theories preceding his, theories propounded before the time was ripe for philosophy to become Science, are abstract embodiments of natural consciousness being trapped through self-deception at immature phenomenal levels. It is one of the aims of this paper to show that Locke's empiricism is the theoretical encapsulation of the first two levels of natural consciousness. To begin this project, then, we must turn to the description in the *Phenomenology* of the first level of phenomenal consciousness: sense-certainty.

The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is. Our approach to the object must also be immediate or receptive; we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to comprehend it. (*Phenomenology*, p. 58).

These opening lines of 'Sense-Certainty' concisely characterize the theme that runs through this entire first chapter of the *Phenomenology*. The first or beginning phenomenal level must be that in which consciousness knows nothing other than that which is sensuously immediate, the pure 'This'. There can be no description, no interpretation, nothing but passive receptivity on the part of consciousness. Hegel begins the *Phenomenology* with this particular claim to knowledge because he is committed to revealing the process by which consciousness itself comes to realize that its object has being only inasmuch as it is relative to or mediated by Spirit. This can only be done by beginning the investigation with the barest possible characterization of knowledge, one in which the act of knowing in no way determines the essence of its object. To begin anywhere else would be to infect the discussion with a bare assertion concerning the nature of knowledge. If it is to be more than such a bare assertion Science must



prove itself as the truth through the dialectic of natural consciousness (*Phenomenology*, p. 43).

The first thing Hegel has to say about the truth of sense-certainty is that such knowledge would be very poor and scanty. This is because sense-certainty, as immediate knowledge, cannot be aware of distinctions or qualities in either itself or its object. That is, consciousness at this level cannot comprehend either itself or its object, its knowledge cannot be the result of deliberation :

On the contrary, the thing is, and it is, merely because it is. It is, this is essential point for sense-knowledge, and this pure being, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its truth. Similarly, certainty as a connection is an immediate pure connection: consciousness is 'I', nothing more, a pure 'This'; the singular consciousness knows a pure 'This'. or the single item. (*Phenomenology*, pp. 58-59.)

With this in mind, Hegel declares that the truth of sense-certainty must be contained in particular instances of this kind of immediacy. The reasoning behind this is obvious enough. Sense-certainty is knowledge of the immediate, of what is at any given time and place immediately present to it. To say that sense-certainty is true in virtue of immediacy in general would be to introduce the concept of immediacy into a level of phenomenal knowledge where no concepts are possible. As a totally passive form of consciousness, sense-certainty can only apprehend the particular 'This' that is at any one moment available to it.

With what he has at this point established, Hegel has little trouble in showing that sense-certainty cannot have knowledge of its intended object. The basic insight that underlies the remainder of the chapter is that without recourse to individuate qualities contained in either consciousness itself or in the object, sense-certainty cannot be said in any meaningful sense to know the sensuously immediate. The actual argument proceeds in three stages in which the truth of sense-certainty is variously presumed to be contained in the object, the subject, and in the context of an ostensive definition.

In the first stage, then, the essential element in sense-certainty is presumed to be in the pure 'This':

One of the terms is posited in sense-certainty in the form of a simple, immediate being, or as the essence, the object; the other, however, CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



is posited as what is unessential and mediated. Something which in sense-certainty is not in itself but through (the mediation of) another, the 'I' a knowing which knows the object only because the object is, while the knowing may either be or not be (*Phenomenology*, p. 59).

Hegel's approach to this construal of sense-certainty is deceptively simple; he challenges it to say what it means.<sup>4</sup> Because consciousness is prohibited from making reference to qualities, it can only respond to this challenge by using terms which represent the unmediated nature of its object. Thus, it must make use of indexicals such as 'Now', 'Here' and 'This'. But the truth of these terms is in no way dependent upon what is sensuously given at any particular time or place. 'Now', for example, refers indifferently to daytime, night-time, noontime, etc. Hegel believes that this reveals an essential truth about such terms: "A simple thing of this kind which is through negation, which is neither This nor That, a not-This, and is with equal indifference This as well as That - such a thing we call a universal." (*Phenomenology*, p. 60).

So it seems that sense-certainty cannot say (or, for that matter, think) what its object is without the use of universal terms, which terms themselves cannot signify specific objects. And, as Hegel points out in the second stage of his argument, it does not improve matters to suppose that the essential element of sense-certainty is contained in the subject. It does not help, for example, to suppose that the object of my knowledge is isolatable in virtue of the fact that I see it, or that I hear it, etc. For the same considerations that applied to the pure 'This' apply to the pure 'I'. 'I' refers indifferently to all people, and even to all temporal instantiations of myself. Do I mean the 'I' that is looking at a house, the 'I' that was in Tahiti last year, etc? I can no more say what I mean through the pure 'I' than I could through the pure 'This'.

The obvious rejoinder to this line of reasoning by someone waiting to defend sense-certainty would be that just because I cannot say what I mean this does not entail that I cannot specify to my-self or to others what it is that I mean. This introduces the familiar theme of ostensive definition :

We must let ourselves point to it, for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of this 'I' which confines itself to one 'Now' or one 'Here'. Were we to examine this truth afterwards, or stand at a distance from it, it would lose its significance entirely; for that would do away with the immediacy which is essential to it. (*Phenomenology*, p. 63).



Hegel's response to this theme is somewhat cryptic. He claims that unmediated particulars cannot be pointed out because it is never clear just what is being pointed to. When, for example, I point to the 'Now', what is, the temporal present, that which I point to immediately escapes into the past. But if this is true, then in pointing to the 'Now' I am really pointing to something in the past, to something that is not. Therefore, I must negate this second truth, that something was, wherein I will find myself back with my original assertion - that something is Now. Similarly, pointing to a 'Here' does not establish that which is immediate. Do I mean Here as in 'here above this other here'? Do I mean Here as in 'here below the other here'? Perhaps this can be made clearer by means of a concrete example. When I point to an area in the general vicinity of a rabbit am I pointing to its head? - to its tail? - to one temporal slice of the entire rabbit? Pure ostensive definition cannot answer such questions.<sup>5</sup>

As Charles Taylor has pointed out, this stage of Hegel's argument bears a resemblance to Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' in his *Philosophical Investigations* (Taylor, pp. 162-165\*). Wittgenstein's primary aim is to show that if our general concepts are to be useful in reidentifying new experiences that fall under them, there must be criteria for their correct application. The crucial question then becomes: What counts as the correct criteria for identity? (Wittgenstein, para. 251) Wittgenstein answers that such criteria can only be found in the shared meanings of a linguistic community. He therefore contends that any putatively 'private' descriptive term (such as 'This'), unless mediated through the terms of a common terms of a common language, is nothing more than an 'inarticulate sound' (Wittgenstein, para. 261).

What is interesting in connection with Hegel's argument, however, is Wittgenstein's contention that in order even to mean anything by uttering 'This' we must already have an adequate conception of what it is that we are talking about. And this means that, even at the pre-verbal level, we must be capable of applying predicates to the particular experience in question. Thus, in a passage that could just have easily appeared in Hegel's 'sense-certainty', Wittgenstein writes :



- I have seen a person in discussion on this subject strike himself on the breast and say : "But surely another person cannot have THIS pain" - the answer to this is that one does not defend a criterion of identity by emphatic stressing of the word 'this. Rather, what the emphasis does is to suggest the case in which we are conversant with such a criterion of identity but need to be reminded of it. (Wittgenstein, para. 253)

Similarly, what Hegel is getting at is that meaningfully uttering the word 'Now' or 'Here', whether as a verbal expression of what is sensuously given or in the context of an ostensive definition, requires reference (tacit or otherwise) to the object's qualities or characteristics. Consciousness is essentially self-reflexive, and as such must be able to identify its object if it can in any important sense be said to 'know' at all. This requires the recognition of universals. Each object must be seen as a plurality or unity of universals. Thus, "A Now of this sort, an hour, similarly is many minutes, and this Now is likewise many nows (seconds?) and so on." (*Phenomenology*, p. 64). The same can be said for any 'Here'; it must be seen as composed of many 'Heres': colours, shapes, sounds, etc. Once consciousness sees that this is the truth of sense-certainty, it is forced to a new phenomenal level - that of perception.

But what has all of this to do with Locke's empiricism? First of all, it is clear that Hegel has in mind some philosophical doctrine as the theoretical embodiment of sense-certainty. For in commenting on the fact that consciousness itself overcomes this phenomenal level, he says :

It is therefore astounding when, in the face of this experience, it is asserted as universal experience and put forward, too, as a philosophical proposition, even as the outcome of Scepticism, that the reality or being of external things taken as Theses or sense-objects has absolute truth for consciousness. (*Phenomenology*, p. 65)

In this context we may note that Locke's empiricism was in part a reaction to what he saw as the inevitable sceptical outcome of the metaphysical meanderings of the Schoolman:

Thus Men, extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths, where they can find no sure Footing, 'tis no Wonder, that they raise Questions, and multiply disputes, which never coming to any clear Resolution,



are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect Scepticism. (Locke : I,I,6)

It is precisely the existence of 'sense-objects' that Locke believes provides the 'sure Footing' from which to deny scepticism. Furthermore, it is upon these ideas of sensation, and the subsequent ideas of reflexion, that the entire edifice of human knowledge is erected.

Now Hegel was well aware that this was Lock's position, as is evidenced by the following passages from (Hegel's) *Lectures*: "Locke does not get beyond the ordinary point of view of consciousness, viz, that objects outside of us are the real and the true." (p.296), and

The reason that the positive point of view which (Locke) opposes to any derivation from within, is so false, is that he derives his conceptions only from outside and thus maintains Being-for-another, while he rejects the implicit.(p.302)

Whether Hegel's claim is correct as to the falsity of Lock's position, it seems clear that he equates Locke's brand of empiricism with the phenomenal level of sense-certainty.

Are the two positions compatible? Well, there are some undeniable similarities between them. First, it is true that the essential tenet of both sense-certainty and Locke's empiricism that external objects exist and are the basis of truth upon which knowledge depends. Secondly, Locke's position contains, like sense-certainty, a commitment to the passivity of consciousness in receiving sense-objects:

In this part, the Understanding is merely passive... the Objects of our Senses, do many of them, obtrude their particular Ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no... These simple Ideas, when offered to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones in it self, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the Images or Ideas, which the Objects set before it, do therein produce. (Locke: 2,I,25)

It is here, however, that the similarities end. Locke's theory holds that sensory-objects possess, or are composed of, the distinct qualities of 'Sounds, Tastes, Smells, visible and tangible Qualities' which correspond to the appropriate simple ideas received by the mind



(Locke:2,2,3). From these 'very plain and easy beginnings', the understanding can form many different complex ideas. It is through the comparing and contrasting of these original sense data that the understanding forms 'abstract' ideas, that is, it acquires the use of universals.

We can see already that there is a serious point of contention between what Hegel and Locke believe can be recognized by the mind in a state of pure receptivity. Hegel believes that identifying the qualities possessed by sense-objects requires mediation or comprehension by consciousness. In other words, consciousness must actively survey its object to discern its qualities. Locke, on the other hand, is perfectly satisfied that the mind just does passively apprehend objects that are possessed of specific colours, tastes etc. This disagreement is fundamental, and will become the focal point on which this essay will turn. However, to gain greater clarity as to the reasons behind this disagreement we must now turn to the second phenomenal level in the *Phenomenology*: that of perception.

The title of this second chapter, 'Perception: Or the Thing and Deception, is an apt one. For Hegel's intent here is to reveal a basic contradiction inherent in consciousness' new object, which consciousness will try to overcome by attributing this inconsistency to the process of perception itself. Ultimately, consciousness will see that this is an exercise in self-deception, and will be forced to abandon perception as legitimate knowledge.

'Perception' begins with a description of consciousness' new object. In perception the sense-element is still present in the object, but consciousness now realizes that this content is necessarily mediated. So although the object is still conceived as something exterior to consciousness, and hence as something received, consciousness now sees that it must interpret the object as a plurality of universals. Also, as in sense-certainty there occurs a duality between subject and object, a bifurcation between the knowing and that which is known. Here that duality is expressed as the act of perceiving and the object perceived.

The first attempt by consciousness to account for the manifold of properties perceived in the object places this diversity solely within the object itself: "Since the principle of the object, the



universal, is in its simplicity a mediated universal, the object must express this its nature in its own self, this it does by showing itself to be the thing with many properties". (*Phenomenology*, p. 67) Perceiving the object in this manner, consciousness notes that although contained in an abstract medium, that is, the 'thinghood' or "pure essence", the properties are independent of each other for their being. Thus, although whiteness, cubicalness, and tartness all occur in the same cube of salt, each universal, as a determinate, is essentially related only to itself, and is connected with the others only in virtue of the 'indifferent Also'-the thinghood or essence of the object.

But now a tension appears. If the self-differentiating properties are held together only by an indifferent Also, it does not seem as though they can be essential or distinctive characteristics of the object itself. As a universal, each property could just as easily exist in any thing. As a thing in-and-for-itself, there must be something essential about the objects, which 'binds' its diverse properties together. This essential aspect is 'Oneness'-an over-arching property that ensures that the object is utterly self-relating, that is, not dependent on its relations with other objects for its being.

As a result of this tension, we now see the object as:

- (a) an indifferent, passive universality, the Also of the many properties or rather 'matters';
- (b) negation equally simply; or the one, which excludes opposite properties; and (c) the many properties themselves, the relation or the first two moments, or negation as it relates to the indifferent element, and therein expands into a host of differences; the point of singular individuality in the medium of subsistence radiating forth into plurality. (*Phenomenology*, p. 69)

Now it seems clear that the object cannot be all three of these things simultaneously. For the Also is merely an abstract universal medium, a 'This' which is not distinctive to any particular object.<sup>7</sup> Conversely, 'Oneness' differentiates an object's properties from all others, it is what is essential to the object and so cannot possibly exist in another. And yet again, as a mere group of self-differentiating universals, the object qua object ceases to exist- if there exists nothing but properties, there can be no objects.

Consciousness' reaction to these contradictory aspects of its object is to take the inconsistencies upon itself. This seems reasonable as



the object is what is essential, whereas consciousness is unessential, and so can be mistaken or deceived. We therefore have a similar movement as is sense-certainty-consciousness is driven back into itself to account for indeterminacies in the object. However, this time consciousness is not conceived as the truth, but rather as the responsible party for error. In this way the object can be maintained as the pure and essential One, while the illusion - that it contains many self-differentiating and universally applicable properties is attributed to consciousness:

We get the entire diversity of these aspects, not from the Thing, but from ourselves, and they fall asunder in this way for us, because the eye is quite distinct from the tongue, and so on. We are thus the universal medium in which some moments are kept apart and exist each on its own. Through the fact, then, that we regard the characteristic of being a universal medium as our reflection, we preserve the self-identity and truth of the Thing, its being a One. (*Phenomenology*, p. 72)

But now consciousness realizes that an object cannot possess essential being, it cannot be fundamentally distinct, solely in virtue of its being One. For Oneness is simply the relation of self to self, a property possessed by all objects. There it must be the object that is white, tart, and so on, if it is to be distinct from other objects. The object, then, is essentially an Also of many properties.

We have now come full circle. Consciousness has variously placed the One and the Also within itself and within the object. Tired of this vacillation, consciousness attributes both of these characteristics to the object - but with a new twist. It considers the object as essentially One or self-identical, and as only contingently an Also or a thing with many differentiating qualities. In other words, the object is a One when considered alone but is an other (a diversity of aspects) in its relations with other objects. Thus, "The contradiction which is present in the objective essence as a whole is distributed between two objects." (*Phenomenology*, pp. 74-75.)

But this will not save perceptual knowledge either. It becomes manifestly obvious to consciousness that there is no perceivable difference between an object that is distinct in virtue of its having a specific quality independent of other objects, and one which is distinctive virtue of it (and its qualities) being opposed or



compared to other objects. With this final observation consciousness realizes that "the object is in one and the same respect the opposite of itself: it is for itself, so far as it is for another, and it is for another as it is the only aspect that was supposed to be unessential. viz. the relationship to another." (*Phenomenology*, p. 76)

What Hegel has done in this chapter is to show that a form of knowledge that takes extra-mental objects as the Truth is beset with a fundamental interdependence between particulars (objects) and universals (properties). As we saw in 'Sense-Certainty', particulars cannot be identified without the use of universals<sup>8</sup>. But, as we have just seen in 'Perception', the identification of a particular's properties cannot be done independently of its comparison with other particulars. This circularity has resulted precisely because consciousness began with an external object as its truth. The indeterminacy of the bare particular that is mediated by universals<sup>9</sup>.

In the movement from sense-certainty to perception the object of consciousness has been established as something very similar to the object presupposed by Locke's empiricism. We now have a particular that is distinguished from other particulars in virtue of this possessing a unique set of qualities. What remains, then, is to see whether Locke's theory is guilty of the contradiction revealed in 'Perception', and if so, whether Locke might have an adequate reply to them.

For Locke, we first perceive particulars as collection of simple ideas (Locke:2,I2,I). Thus, when I perceive an apple I receive the simple ideas of redness, roundness, opaqueness etc. These simple ideas are produced in us by certain qualities inherent in objects (primary and secondary qualities - Locke: 2, 8, 9 - I0). Each is independent of other simple ideas it might appear with for its being (the redness perceived in the apple just have easily occurred in a tomato, a firetruck etc.). Furthermore, once we have received a certain amount of simple ideas, we can recombine them in any manner we choose to form new complex ideas (Locke:2,I2,I).

Thus described, simple ideas sound very much like universals. However, Locke holds that universals are not to be found in perceptual objects, but rather are 'Creatures and Inventions of the



understanding' (Locke:3,3,2). That is, universals are nothing but abstract ideas, which are gotten through the comparing and contrasting of defferent particulars:

Thus, the same Colour being observed today in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yesterday received from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name Whitness, it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagined or met with; and thus Universals, whether Ideas or Terms, are made. (Locke:2,II,9)

Traditionally commentators have taken Locke here as contradicting himself<sup>10</sup>. For simple ideas are presented both as the 'given' in experience and as the result of a specific action or process of the mind (the process of abstraction). Of course, this interpretation coheres perfectly with the comments Hegel has made concerning the contradictions inherent to perception. Particulars are identified by their qualities (universals), and universals are identified through the comparing of particulars. Moreover, if this interpretation is correct, Locke seems to be playing exactly the kind of games that Hegel tells us consciousness must to avoid the cotradictions of perception :

This course, a perceptual alternation of determining what is true, and then setting aside this determining constitutes, strictly speaking, the steady everyday life and activity of perceptual consciousness, a consciousness which fancies itself to be moving in the realm of truth. It advances uninterruptedly to the outcome in which all these essentialities or determinations are equally set aside; but in each single moment it is conscious only of this one determinateness as the truth, and then in turn of the opposite one. (*Phenomenology*, p.78)

Thus, when speaking of perceptual objects, Locke claims that specific combinations of simple ideas (universals) are given in experience, 'setting aside' his later comments concerning the process of abstraction. However, when speaking of this process, he assumes that he has already established how we individuate particulars.

If this interpretation of Locke is correct, his thesis will have been dealt a devastating blow by Hegel's exposition. I believe the interpretation is mistaken. As Peter Schouls has pointed out, experience for Locke is always characterized by a complexity of simple ideas



(Schouls, pp. 159-164)<sup>11</sup>. Therefore, to obtain individuated simple ideas the mind must perform a process of reduction on its initially complex experience. I have argued that this process of reduction must consist of a series of comparisons between similar perceptual objects. Briefly, the argument goes as follows : Consider a black sphere. Given the perfect coexistence of its blackness aspect and its spherical aspect, what possible basis in experience is there for the mind separating the two (simple ideas)? To obtain a hint that there might be different aspects to consider in the sphere, the mind would have to compare this object with another that is both similar to, yet significantly different from, the original one. Such another object would be a black cube. By comparing these two objects, the mind can see that the blackness aspect of the sphere need not be essentially joined to its spherical aspect. Thus the mind comes to have the simple ideas of blackness and sphericalness. Notice, however, that as far as the isolated percept of the sphere is concerned, the individuated simple ideas do not exist. They appear only after the process of abstraction has taken place<sup>12</sup>.

The major consequence of my interpretation is that while for Locke simple ideas are indeed universals, they are not gotten directly from experience. So, when Locke speaks of perceptual objects as being composed of collections of simple ideas, what he means is that we, so to speak, 'read into' the objects the simple ideas that we have gained through abstraction. Thus, to say that an object is composed of certain simple ideas is to say that the object is classifiable according to a number of these purely mental universals.

We can see that my interpretation makes much more sense of Locke's claim that universals are merely 'Creatures and Inventions of the Understanding'. He can adhere to his nominalist position and contend that perceptual objects are possessed of qualities that are utterly peculiar to themselves. We then acquire universals by comparing resembling objects and abstracting common features.<sup>13</sup> More importantly, he can also claim that we individuate particulars in virtue of their possessing fundamentally distinct qualities. This claim, if true, would seem to overcome the Hegelian objection that without a prior notion of universals we cannot identify particulars. Locke would



insist that every single object has an absolutely peculiar set of properties and as such can be identified as distinct from other objects.

This is the doctrine of perfect particularism, that everything in the world is utterly distinct from all other things. Whether or not this doctrine is correct, I do not believe that it escapes the main thrust of Hegel's criticism. For consider a book. As a perfect particular it possesses a set of qualities utterly peculiar to itself. However, there are many perfect particulars contained within the book itself. It is, for example, a certain shade of colour. It will likely have words on its cover, each of which is composed of perfectly particular letters. In fact, in the instance where a person can be said to see a particular book, all that is actually being 'appeared to' her is a pattern of colours and shapes. How does she decide to focus on just that portion of this pattern that constitutes a particular book? The answer seems to be that she would have to have a prior notion of what a book is before she could identify a particular book. But where did she get this prior notion of what it is to be a book?

This brings us to Locke's discussion of substance. In 2.23.3 of the *Essay* Locke says:

.....we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of Substances, by collecting such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by Experience and Observation of Men's Senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal Constitutions, or unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come to have the Ideas of a MAN, Horse, Gold, Water etc.

If we read this passage on the interpretation I suggested above, Locke is saying that over a course of time we happen to notice that certain objects possess similar (but not identical) sets of properties. Thus, although two apples will be possessed of distinct shapes, colours, tastes etc., the qualities of one apple will bear enough resemblance to those of the other to warrant our calling both objects 'apples'.

However, whether or not a defender of Locke's position could construct a plausible theory of resemblances (contra the realist explanation), he would still be left with our original problem: why focus on just those properties which characterize apples (or any other substance)? As



Hegel puts it in his *Lectures*, apart from recognizing resemblances between substances:

There is another question... Are these general determinations absolutely true? And whence come they not alone into my consciousness, into my mind and understanding, but into the things themselves?... This point of view, the question whether these determinations of the infinite of substance, etc. are in and for themselves true, is quite lost sight of. (*Lectures*, p.311)

Of course we know that this is one question that Locke cannot answer. When faced with the problem of how we know that an object is of a particular kind of substance he is forced to admit that:

every one upon Enquiry into his own thoughts, will find that he has no other Idea of any Substance, v.g. let it be Gold, Horse, Iron, Man, Vitrol, Bread, but what he has barely of those sensible Qualities, which he supposes to inhere with a pre supposition of such a Substratum, as gives as it were a support to those Qualities, or simple Ideas, which he has observed to exist together. (2.23.6)

We can see that the Locke's explanation of how we come to recognize particular objects is inadequate. The concepts (substances) under which we characterize similar concatenations of properties as distinct particulars are no more given in experience than are the particulars themselves. This is consistent with Hegel's thesis concerning consciousness as a passive receptor of sense-objects. As noted above, Hegel believes that the perceptual object possesses two opposing aspects, neither of which can be identified independently of the other. He explains this opposition in terms of universals (simple properties) and particulars, but it is most concisely expressed as the indistinguishability of an object's being-for-itself and its being-for-another (*Phenomenology*, p.76). That is, an object cannot be isolated as a 'one', as an essentially self-identical particular, without its being contrasted with other objects, and vice-versa. This vicious explanatory circle is only made to spin faster by attempting to identify concepts, like Hegel's simple properties, is universal in character, that is, it is applicable to many different particulars. Therefore, a concept can only be arrived at through the comparison of a number of similar



particulars. But then these particulars can only be identified by their subsumption under concepts. The circle again has been completed.

On this construal Hegel's thesis becomes a very powerful criticism of empiricism, for its force is not contingent upon a commitment as to the ontological status of universals. Whether a nominalist, such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, or a realist, such as Russell, the empiricist is subject to the Hegelian charge of circularity. If he cannot offer an independent account of either the manner in which the mind comes to recognize particulars or universals (concepts) he is left without a plausible explanation of two integral components of the empiricist description of experience. Hegel has provided what I find to be a very credible account of why the empiricist cannot do this. One of the basic tenets of empiricism is that the mind is passive in its initial apprehension of perceptual objects. This passivity renders the initial ideas or sense data abstract and ineffable. As such the mind is forced into a position where it must accept a principle of pure or concrete universality so as to individuate its experience. With this commitment to pure universality the mind cannot make reference to particular experiences, because these are precisely the phenomena that the principle of universality was invoked to explain. But since universals and particulars enjoy an essentially symbolic relationship, the empiricist is left with a viciously circular explanation of them both.

I have tried to show in this paper that Hegel's opening arguments in the *Phenomenology* are very much applicable to the empiricist system of philosophy. It is interesting to note that his position on the relationship between particulars and universals has been the one universally adopted by analytic philosophers up until about fifteen years ago. Philosophers as diverse as Wilfred Sellars, Norwood, Hanson, and Nelson Goodman have adhered to the thesis that concepts are a necessary antecedent to individuating experience. Recently, this thesis has come under attack, especially by philosophers of language such as Saul Kripke and Fred Dretske, who claim that we need not stand in an epistemic relation to objects in order to 'see' them. This is not the place to decide whether the Hegelian thesis ultimately is correct. If I have shown that Hegel's philosophy has relevance for the analytic tradition of philosophy, I will have accomplished the task I set out



at the beginning of this paper. Correct or not, the Hegelian charge of circularity demands a response from those who would defend a 'sense-object' theory of perception.

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### Notes

1. Both the German Idealists and analytic philosophers have claimed Descartes' writings as their heritage. That the two traditions have interpreted the importance of Descartes differently is reflected in their widely divergent methodologies.
2. Hegel saw Berkeley's 'crude' idealism as proceeding directly from Locke's difficulties with substance and Hume's scepticism as the fitting and logical end of the empiricist programme. He also thought that Hume's work was of historical significance only in that it became the starting point of Kant's philosophy. See *Lectures*, pp. 364-375.
3. Regarding the above, see the Introduction of the *Phenomenology* pp.46-57.
4. Actually, it is consciousness itself that does the challenging. Because both of the moments where the object is being-for-itself and being-for-another fall within consciousness, it is for consciousness to know whether or not they correspond. We who stand at the time when philosophy is ready to become Science can only "Look on". (*Phenomenology*, p.54)
5. W.O.V.Quine makes this point in *Word and Object*, pp.26-40
6. This abstract universal medium, which can be called simply 'thinghood' or 'pure essence', is nothing else then what Here and Now have proved themselves to be, viz. a simple togetherness a plurality ..." (*Phenomenology*, p.63) As we saw in 'Sense-Certainty' the pure 'This' cannot be used to isolate an object. Hence the need for 'Oneness', that which is distinctive to the object.



7. Of course, for Hegel this is not just an epistemological point. He believes that the unsievable nature of the particular (through pure ostension) shows that the particular's ontological status is that of being a vehicle for universals.
8. This is a poignant example of Hegel's claim in the Introduction that the exposure of an incomplete or immature level of consciousness is a determinate negation, one which has content. (*Phenomenology*, p.57) The move to perception was determined by the failure of sense-certainty to meet its own criterion of truth.
9. See R.I. Aaron, *John Locke* (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1955), pp. III-II2; and Jonathan Bennet, *Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes* (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1971), pp.25-30
10. There are many passages in the *Essay* that suggest that some simple ideas always occur with other simple ideas (2.12.1, 2.23. 1, 2.23.6, etc.) The following passage shows that all sentient states are comprised of at least two simple ideas:  

"amongst all the Ideas we have, there is none suggested to the Mind by more ways.. than that of Unity or one... every Thought of our Minds brings this Idea along with it." (2,26,1).
11. There are several passages in the *Essay* that seem to resist this interpretation. Three such passages are : "Simple Ideas ... are only to be got by those impressions objects make on our minds ..." (3,4,11), "Simple Ideas... are imprinted (on the mind)" (2, 1,25), and "Simple Ideas, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggested... to the Mind by..... Sensation and Reflection" (2,2,2). But as Schouls correctly points out, each of these passages can easily be interpreted as merely reiterating Lock's basic empiricist position that all our ideas must ultimately be founded in experience. They give no indication whatsoever that individuated simple ideas come directly from experience. (Schouls, p. 168)
12. To make this position plausible Locke would have to provide a theory of resemblance, which he fails to do.

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## DUḤKHA : AN ANALYSIS OF BUDDHIST CLUE TO UNDERSTAND HUMAN NATURE

In the present paper an attempt is made to unearth and present an important clue to understand human nature and human life *via* analysis of *Duḥkha* as presented by the Buddha and his followers through especially probing into *Dvādaśa-nidānas* as a symptomatically diagnostic aspect of it and bring out some of the salient features of it. The entire essay has three sections. The first is addressed to marking off philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* from the non-philosophical ones. The second deals with two things : on the one hand, it distinguishes the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* from other major philosophical approaches to it, which were developed in the Indian sub-continent; and, on the other, spells out aspects of the rationale of the buddhist approach, which makes it decisively different. The last section is directed at bringing out some of the crucial implications of the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha*.

### I

#### Different Approaches to Duḥkha

Living beings in general and human beings in particular have an experience of pain and suffering (*Duḥkha*). Since such an experience is not a satisfying state of affairs and makes life unbearable, there is a tendency to seek deliverance or relief from it. Non-human beings also are seen adopting various means to relieve themselves from pain and suffering within their limits. Their modes, however, are reflexive, mechanical and hence, uniform in pattern, although variation on account of climatic, environmental and such other conditions cannot be ruled out. In the case of human beings the case is different. They not only seek to relieve themselves from annoying states of affairs but also of those animals and organisms, the health and prolon-

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gation of the lives of which is not instrumental to human well-being - individual or collective. Even the epistemic enterprise on the part of human beings to study plants and animals as also of treating them medically and therapeutically, is not completely philanthropic and altruistic in character. On the one hand, it enables humans to understand their own anatomy, physiology, bio-chemistry, neurology etc. better and, on the other hand, mode/s of diagnosing and curing, if possible, the various sorts of diseases, disabilities and disfunctions they come to suffer from and relieving themselves of the pain and suffering that comes to their lot as a result of them. Human approach to the phenomenon of pain and suffering coming to the lot of non-humans could, then, broadly be said to be guided by pragmatic and anthropocentric concerns.

The point of annoying states of affairs figuring in the life of the entire organic life and pain and suffering coming to the lot of all living beings is not made merely for academic purpose. In the next section we shall have an occasion to look into its profoundly significant philosophical implication, especially when we shall probe deeper into the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha*. Though, in this way, all organisms experience pain and suffering, human approach to pain and suffering is varied and complicated to fathom into and explicate the rationale by which it is backed. This is perhaps for three reasons. First, human life in its various aspects is too complex. Also, the structure and functioning of human beings is equally complex in nature. Secondly, human life is markedly purposive and intentional in nature and hence differs decisively from that of other organisms. But this also calls for a different approach to understand it in its various nuances and intricacies. We shall have later on an occasion to point out as to why a simplistic and naive approach to understand it is more likely to distort our understanding of it. Thirdly, as human life is complex and complicated to understand, so too the annoying states of affairs human beings are subjected to. That is, pain and suffering coming to human lot is not always the creation of non-human world. Nor could it be said to be determined by conditions exterior to human life - individually or collectively. In fact, it could be held without much controversy that much of the pain and suffering of human beings is of their own creation - individual or collective, deliberate or non-deliberate, direct or indirect. A case could be made out, independently of subscribing to the Law of *Karma*, as it is traditionally understood, that in the short or long run it is



human beings who can come to make their life satisfying or painful and miserable. But we do not wish to get into details of this issue here. Human life also becomes complicated to understand because such an understanding is often backed by a certain conception of human being, human life and human aspirations. And on this count, again, as we shall see, there is no unanimity. Added to this is a further rider, viz. the fact that human life may be sought to be understood holistically and integrally or aspectivally and in terms of various faculties humans are said to be endowed with.

On the above-mentioned background, broadly speaking, two important sort of concerns have been adopted regarding *Duḥkha* experienced by humans viz. the philosophical and non-philosophical. For, it is not the exclusive prerogative of philosophers to understand the nature of human beings and their experience of *Duḥkha*. The non-philosophical approaches to *Duḥkha* basically concentrate on structure and constitutions of human beings-physical and/or psychological -, look for the causes and incidence of suffering through diseases or disorders, symptomatic diagnosis of the disease/disorder, at least present cure/amelioration of the malady and possibly also prevention of its incidence again. As we shall soon see, all this is relative to our knowledge, not only of human structure and constitution, but also of diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive aspects of the entire process. In the philosophical approach, on the other hand, what matters basically is the conception of man, human life and aspirations, and relationship between them. The two prominent non-philosophical approaches to *Duḥkha* are the medical (say of *Āyurveda*)<sup>1</sup> and psychological or psycho-somatic (say of *Yoga*)<sup>2</sup>. As we shall see below, there cannot be any water-tight compartmentalization of them, since, however derivatively it may be, some aspects of them overlap. Yet, it remains a fact that none of them can be mapped onto or reduced to the other without residue. Further, it would also be misleading to hold that while philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* alone is holistic, any non-philosophical approach to it must in principle be aspectival in character.

Let us investigate into some important points of similarity and difference between these three approaches to *Duḥkha*, for better understanding of the uniqueness of each of them without losing sight of inter-connections between them.



(1) The concern at stake - Both in the medical as well as psychiatric approaches concerning pain and suffering there is a twin concern : To seek to understand the present disturbing state of the patient in terms of the physical and/or psychological make up, as incidence of pain and suffering is held to be on account of disturbance of homiostasis or normality,<sup>3</sup> and curing the patient, at least temporarily, of the ailment. In the philosophical approach, on the contrary, it is neither description and understanding of pain and suffering through structural and constitutive and functional condition/s of the patient or the present state he is in that is decisively significant; nor even seeking to cure the patient of his pain and suffering is held important. It rather consists in spelling out what could be held to be a critique of it, bringing out to the notice of the concerned the very condition/s of the possibility of pain and suffering where the condition/s sought to be articulated basically being epistemic rather than structural or functional. It could perhaps also be understood as an attempt to change our perspective and approach concerning pain and suffering rather than seeking to understand it structurally or functionally and the cure of it, temporary or lasting. This is not, however, to say that philosophical approach to pain and suffering is utterly oblivious and neglectful of diagnostic and therapeutic concerns regarding them. For, as we shall see later on, were this so, there would not have been any points of convergence between medical and philosophical approaches. Nothing could be more grotesque to hold that there are none or nothing could be common among them.

(2) Causal or non-causal approaches - As observed earlier, a state of freedom from physical ailment is called homeostasis and so long as it persists, we do not become sick. Even in face of various kinds of bacterial infections and viruses - known or unknown, active or silent - we do not necessarily become sick, so long as our resistance power is able to withstand them. When such a resistance power declines, we succumb to the attack of the former which results into a particular kind of disease and disorder. Similarly, our psychological disorders are indicative of the disturbance of psychosomatic balance resulting into psychic disorders and abnormalities leading to sensitive, affective and/or conative imbalances. Both physician as well as psychotherapist attempt to work out and present causal analysis of the incidence of such disorders. Their therapeutic approach, too, likewise, is governed by adoption of such a causal approach, emphasising that events in the physical or living world could be analysed adopting the same kind of causal approach universally.



In the philosophical approach offering a critique of pain and suffering coming to human lot, although their psychological or psychosomatic aspects are not sought to be neglected or circumvented, and although it is not ignored that many kinds of physical ailments are often psychosomatic in origin, there seem to be at least two decisive features which mark it off from the other approaches :

(a) making a distinction between causes, motives and purposes, and (b) marking off either living world from non-living or at least human from the non-human. As we shall notice, although majority of the philosophical strands that flourished in this sub-continent uphold these considerations, there are at least some which preferred, for reasons to be brought out later, to adopt a uniform approach regarding the entire world, without making distinction between living and non-living, either totally or partially.

(3) Weightage of symptoms - Considered *prima facie* physicians, psychotherapists as well as philosophers seem to attach a considerable importance to the symptomatic diagnosis<sup>4</sup> of pain and suffering we undergo in our life. This way considered, there appears to be considerable convergence in the approaches of all of them regarding annoyance that comes to our lot. It is looking to such aspects that a plea of adoption of medical model in philosophy concerning pain is advanced.<sup>5</sup> There are certain grains of truth in this. They do not, however, exhaust the sum and substance of these different approaches.

Notwithstanding such a convergence/s, there is a fundamental difference in the approaches under consideration. Physicians' and psychotherapists' attention to symptoms is drawn with a view to locating possible causes of the incidence of the disorder, diagnosis, therapy and at least present cure. As we shall see later, broadly speaking, in the philosophic approach greater, if not sole, emphasis is laid on misconception, miscomprehension and misunderstanding as the generic source of pain and suffering coming to our lot. The route to deliverance and freedom from pain and suffering in this approach must pass through altered comprehension and clarity in understanding, not necessarily culminating in physicians' or psychotherapists' mode of their diagnosis, therapy or cure.

(4) Tests and investigations - As can be gauged, whereas investigative and diagnostic techniques and tests, viz. pathological,



radiological, clinical etc. - along with case history are significant in the physicists' or psychotherapists' approach to pain and suffering, they could hardly have any major role to play in the philosophic approach. This is not to say that philosophers have all along been averse to *Āyurvedic* or *Yogic* prescriptions and therapies.<sup>6</sup> But they in themselves do not and cannot constitute core of it. This is more so because the philosophic approach neither concentrates on *Duḥkha* coming to human lot in a certain phase of life, space or time nor does it seek to locate its determiners in the structural or constitutive features of human body or psyche. Should this have been so, humans should have adopted only physicists' or psychotherapists' approach to *Duḥkha*. As we shall observe, although independence and irreducibility of philosophical approach has been questioned adopting positivist or reductionist stance,<sup>7</sup> its very possibility and entertainability has not been deprived on that count.

(5) Curative/therapeutic treatment - In the physicists' or psychotherapists' approach to *Duḥkha*, as there are investigative and diagnostic tests and techniques, so too there are therapeutic, ameliorative and curative procedures and techniques. They are also seen to be changing with the attainment of greater sophistication, and growth and development of technologies conducive to them. Both these approaches concentrate upon present mitigation, reduction and prevention from further worsening of the present malady, if not complete cure of it. In the process, there is no guarantee that a newer malady will not surface or that it may not be worse than the present agony. But this is often blamed on the present level of technological advance or degree of expertise and sophistication available in a given field.

In the philosophical approach, on the other hand, its adoption is not germane to growth and sophistication through modernisation, but rather to depth and profundity of understanding human life in its various aspects - not only structural and epistemic - cognitive or justificatory -, but regulative as well. It is adoption of a particular focus or perspective and comprehension of human life in its complexity in the light of it that is of paramount importance here. That is why it is neither present nor even permanent cure or annihilation of human suffering as a whole that can be its aim. This being so, in a philosophical approach concerning pain and suffering certain paradigmatic modes of analysis of the problem are at stake. And hence being theoretically



coherent, praxiologically applicative and, to the extent possible, neither turning counter-intuitive nor fragmentary are some of the decisive features of it. Also, as we shall see, adoption of a philosophical approach concerning pain and suffering on the one hand and undergoing physical or mental torture on the other cannot, in principle, be said to be simultaneously unsatisfiable. Nor can it be said that freedom from physical or mental annoyance in itself is necessary and sufficient condition of one's adopting an appropriate philosophical approach about it.

(6) Risk element - The element of risk involved in physicians' or psychotherapists' claim of annihilation of and/or control over pain and suffering is indeed twofold in character. On the one hand, they being relative to the degree of sophistication and expertise attained, they may yield unpalatable consequences not only when they are misused and degraded but, on the other hand, even when they are adopted in good faith. This is especially on account of undisclosed and undiscovered side-effects of not only diagnostic but therapeutic, curative or preventive techniques adopted, drugs administered, surgeries performed etc.

In the philosophical approach, on the contrary, there seems to be only one kind of risk involved, viz. its misuse and degradation leading to deepening and proliferation of misunderstanding and misconception. One can claim that such risks of it are far more dangerous than those stemming from physicians' or psychotherapists' approach concerning pain and suffering. This, however, is highly a debatable issue and we do not wish to go into the details of it in this paper for fear of digression.

(7) Preventive care - In order that one should not experience *Duhkha* both physicians' and psychotherapists' attempt to take care to ensure that other things being equal the present patients do not come to suffer from the same disease or at least their present ailment does not aggravate or at least remains endurable. Similar considerations apply to the future possible sufferers and potential carriers as well. At a given time particular ailment might not have grown and manifested to warrant an emergency intervention. But taking into account the prevalent dormant or potent stage of a disease and the risks to which patient may be susceptible on its aggravation, preventive medicines and therapies are adopted. In spite of such measures, there is no guarantee that the disease may not outwit the present level of



competence to hold it in abeyance or that such measures themselves may not adversely affect the patient. There is no medicine or therapy to permanently immunise a human being from susceptibility to ailment throughout the life-span. One is at a risk of coming to suffer from different diseases or recurrence of the same. There is also a risks of virouses and bacteria turning immune to older modes of preventing them from thriving - nay, worse still, they may thrive on them with vengeance. These observations are not at all counter-intuitive as can be seen from the failure of malaria or mosquito menace eradication programme, not to talk of AIDs or cancer prevention efforts.

Thus, physicians' or psychoterapists' approaches to pain and suffering -diagnostically, curatively, therapeutically or preventively - have some important serious inherent limitations, relative as they are to the present level of knowledge, expertise and technological advancement. They seem also to be backed by a misplaced self- confidence that more intensive and wide-spread adoption of them would one day free human race from its susceptibility to ailment and disease - a dream which is often turned into a nightmare!

A philosopher, on the contrary, knows well that there is no mechanical remedy. Nor is there always a possibility to do surgery or adopt a therapy to guarantee prevantion of a disease permanently. One cannot get rid of pain and suffering (*Duḥkha*) totally; nor can one immunise human life from it. One has to confront *Duḥkha* and fight against it. Philosophers in this sub-continent have always held that philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* coming to human lot is distinctive and in its core consists in adoption of an appropriate focus and perspective. Such an approach, further it is held, should be maximally universalisable, irrespective of constraints of spatio-temporal or circumstantial considerations.

Certain convergences and points of contact between medical, psychotherapeutic or philosophical approaches to *Duḥkha*, however, need not blind us to think that divergences between them are either inconsequential or dispensable. Were it so, there would not have been attempts to advance and articulate as well as defend with ingenious arguments various attemts at philosophical approach to *Duḥkha*.

We saw above that inspite of certain points of contact and convergence, philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* differs markedly from



the medical or psychotherapeutic approaches to it, although it cannot be denied apriorily that the former must not at all be modelled after the latter.

Philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* in turn is not unitary, although certain common threads run through their divergence. To see decisively distinctive features of buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* we so far attempted to mark off philosophic approach from the non-philosophic varieties of it. But we also saw that philosophic approach in itself is not something unitary. In the following section, we address ourselves to the task of segregating the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* from other philosophic approaches to it to see the roots and foundations of its uniqueness, so that, in the last section, we would be in a position to look into some of its salient implications.

## II

### Philosophical Interpretations of *Duḥkha*

The philosophical approach to *Duḥkha*, as observed above, is, no doubt, distinct and unique. It is not, however, homogeneous. There is a variety and plurality of it. Different attempts have been made by adherents of various schools of Indian philosophy to articulate the nature of human life together with or independently of the structure of human beings, their legitimate aspirations and the sort of approach they need to adopt about *Duḥkha*. These attempts, even though they differ among themselves, share certain common features and concerns, which make them broadly philosophical in character. The difference in them is due to their respective philosophical frameworks to which they adhered and attempted to explicate the nature of human life. On the contrary, the convergence is due not only to their having emerged and developed in this sub-continent sharing common civilizational thread, but also in refusing to substitute a philosophic approach to *Duḥkha* by medical or psychotherapeutic one. Consequently, their articulation of human life is distinct, not because the human being under consideration is different or the time and place variations had an impact on it, but rather because of their variant understanding of human life and its problems together with different framework of the philosophy to which a particular school was committed. In other words, philosophical analysis of the problem of *Duḥkha* and its particular mode of



resolution is guided, according to the conception of goals and aspirations of human life, the mode of living it, our conception of ourselves, of others - living beings - human and non-human - and things and objects etc., or of the world at large which is at stake. All these aspects and inter-relations between them play an important and decisive role in our understanding of the nature of human beings and *Duḥkha* coming to their lot. In spite of such differences among them at least on three counts various trends of philosophical thought originated in the Indian sub-continent exhibit a common concern that links them with one another.

(a) **Cognition of *Duḥkha* :-** All living beings undergo an experience of *Duḥkha*, although all of them may not be able to communicate it. As we shall see later, undiluted emphasis on this sort of universality is a decisive feature of the buddhist account of *Duḥkha*. All humans also suffer from some pain or ailment. They not only suffer i. e. sense but are also conscious of it, as also communicate it to others. Such a pain may be physical, psychological, social, economic, moral or even spiritual. There is no human being who has never had an experience of annoyance, pain or suffering. We mentioned earlier that one of the important features of the philosophic approach to *Duḥkha* consists in changing our perspective about it rather than putting an end to the fact of it. Although adherents of various trends of philosophical thought that flourished in this sub-continent analysed and explained the phenomenon of pain and suffering coming to our lot differently, yet none of them could be said to have presented an account of it that is *a priori* and regardless of experience. No trend, thus, could be branded to be presenting merely formal and analytic account of *Duḥkha*, although such an extension of it is sought to be worked out in a certain framework and backed by certain rationales, to some of which we shall return in the sequel.

(b) **Satisfaction orientation :-** Granting that in our life an experience of *Duḥkha* is unavoidable; two ways could be envisaged of confronting it, viz. pessimism or optimism. If there is not going to be overall balance of satisfaction over annoyance in our life, it will culminate into a kind of frustration and hopelessness leading to pessimism. Adherents of no philosophical trend of thought in this sub-continent advocated such a course, although it cannot be denied that in course of time distortions of the original insights and stoppage of fresh



rejuvenative thinking did culminate in adoption of fatalism and escapism giving rise to misplaced self-complacency and social parasitism. Prominent trends, on the contrary, advocated optimism, giving hope to the concerned that menace of *Duḥkha* could at least be contained within ourselves without further giving rise to weakness and vulnerability, if not surmounted or eradicated altogether. This optimistic trend manifested in twin direction, although it was accepted that both external as well as internal - understood individually or collectively - factors act as determiners of pain and suffering coming to human lot. On the one hand it was held, together with belief in transmigration and *Karma* theory along with whatever it implies, that pain and suffering in human life is the result of the doings of humans themselves. Understood individually or collectively it amounts to holding that the suffering individual or group alone is responsible for its suffering, and no one else.<sup>8</sup> This trend assured internal coherence of the theory together with application of the law of nemesis uniformly through belief in transmigration. But cashing everything on its anvil and making non-incoherent sense of allocation of responsibility seems to have converted human beings into sorts of robots mechanically following the law of *Karma*, something parallel to the law of *Rta* in the cosmocentric world. We need not go into details of this here. On the other hand, especially the Buddhists, as we shall see, advocated a view, without subscribing to the law of *Karma* in its mechanical sense and yet without giving up optimism and hope, that although it cannot be denied outright that we suffer because of us, nonetheless, we do not necessarily suffer solely because of us.<sup>9</sup> Further, as in the life of any living organism there are risks so too in human life, inspite of the fact that man is not only conscious but self-conscious as well, over and above being at least reasonable if not rational too. In the advocacy of these two important trends, though adherents of both subscribe to optimism, distinction between heterodox and orthodox schools came to be marginalised, if not obliterated altogether.<sup>10</sup> But, as we shall see, it also brings forth certain decisively distinctive features of the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha*, a little deeper probing into which is hoped to be rewarding.

(c) *Morality* :- While attempting to contain, control or overcome pain and suffering - its emergence and continuation - nobody in this sub-continent advocated a view to use unfair and foul means. While advocating the path of ceaseless striving, tireless efforts, self-reliance and self-help, it is not any means - fair or foul, moral or immoral etc.



- which is held to ensure satisfaction and fulfilment in life and order in the society. On the contrary, it was stressed by them all that morality is primarily an important feature of our life, although this is not to deny that their conception of moral life was not the same in all its details. It seems to have been held almost uniformly that cessation of our being moral also marks an end of our being human, such that being moral is held to be desideratum and differentia of being and continuing to be human. This consideration is so pivotal that no stage and phase of human life - individual or social - is held eligible to be free from it. For, its essence being self-regulation and self control, its absence will entail imbalance and onesidedness in personal life or chaos and disorganization in the social. This is not again to deny there were fundamental differences concerning priority of individual over social life or *vice versa*, or the very conception of organization of individual or collective life.<sup>11</sup> We cannot, however, probe deeper into this issue here.

Such points of overall agreement, convergence and commonality concerning the approach regarding *Duḥkha* among the adherents of various trends of philosophical thought which flourished in this sub-continent is just one phase of it. Were this to be the only factor to guide their analysis and approach, there would hardly have been fundamental and decisive differences. But, as we shall soon see, such differences in their respective approaches, determined in turn by various considerations, not only mark off some approaches to *Duḥkha* - say, the one advocated by the Buddha and his followers - from others, but also bring to surface its decisively differentiating and unique features in bolder relief and marked contrast. Hence, this section is divided into two parts. On the background of common considerations, in the first part, we shall briefly concentrate on the non-Buddhists' interpretations of and approaches to the problem of *Duḥkha* and nature of human beings, along with their respective rationales. For, unless the views advocated by different philosophical traditions other than the buddhist are articulated, it would not be useful and rewarding to explicate and warrant the buddhist arguments with regard to the nature of human beings and *Duḥkha* in their life, especially since various trends flourished here concurrently and engaged themselves in prolonged dialogue and controversy with one another. Hence, on this background, in the second part, an attempt is made to analyse the buddhist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and spell out its rationale.



## A

**The Non-Buddhist Interpretations of Duhkha**

Right from the early times, humans are not only curious to know themselves but anything and everything around them as well. Man is interested in discovering peculiarities and uniquenesses, if any, of himself and his relation to all that exists in this world as well as with the world at large. Sometimes possibility and fact of human life beyond this world is also emphasised together with various entities, facts and phenomena which humans - at least themselves - may encounter therein. We need hardly go into details of this issue here, although at least some aspects of it are undeniably interesting and challenging to tackle. In such a process of inquiry, man has indulged into finding out his similarities with and differences from other living entities - animals and trees - and things and objects that inhabit the world. Going along the way of emphasising similarity and making differences, if any, subservient or reducible to it, two trends are noticeable : (a) on the one hand, the same kind of similarity - structural or functional, constitutive or regulative - is emphasised to be operative in the entire world, animate as well as inanimate and hence it is held that nature of and interrelationship between them is explainable in the same way.<sup>12</sup> (b) On the other hand, going along the way of difference two-fold directions are noticeable : (i) It is held that living and non-living differ fundamentally from each other and that there are many points of similarity between humans and other living entities including plants which are of great philosophical significance.<sup>13</sup> (ii) Or else, it is held that humans not only differ from non-living things but also from other non-human living organisms, and that to water down or shade off this decisive difference between them is not only philosophically unilluminative but intellectually suicidal as well.<sup>14</sup>

As can be gauged from the above brief sketch, the similarity that is sought to be emphasised between humans and non-humans is considered to be either physical (including physiological) or psychophysical in nature,<sup>15</sup> depending upon the scope of the universality sought to be extended over the entire world or restricted to the organismic or human world. Thus, on the one hand, everything was sought to be understood in terms of structural uniformity,<sup>16</sup> treating functional differences to be of marginal value; or, on the other hand, certain constitutive and/or functional features of organismic life or



human beings were sought to be highlighted in the light of which the latter could be marked off from anything else. Thus, broadly speaking two principal sorts of paradigms of accounting for human nature and *Duhkha* experienced by man could be said to have been operative in the sub-continent and they could be held to be reductionist and uniformitarian<sup>17</sup> or else anti-reductionist and emphasising uniqueness and differentia of man.<sup>18</sup> Yet, in between these two major trends there are many more of variant shades subscribing to partial reductionism or anti-reductionism or their combination. These tendencies have percolated and manifested into different shades and various levels of intensities of arguments in the philosophies advocated by the adherents of various non-Buddhist traditions in Indian philosophy. The Buddhist approach is, as we shall see, equidistant from the two extremes.<sup>19</sup> At the same time it also refrains from striking such a compromise between them which would either be incoherent or counter-intuitive in character, restricting its analysis of the problem basically to this life - the central bone of its contention. But more of it later.

First coming to one extreme of the resolution of the problem of *Duhkha*, viz. reductionism and positivism advocated by Cārvākas. According to them, it seems, everything, including human beings, in this world, is constituted and made up of the (four) *Mahābhūtas* (elements), viz. *Prthivi* (earth), *Āp* (water), *Tejas* (fire) and *Vāyu* (air). All objects and living beings - plants and animals including human beings - are nothing else but variant manifestations of the same pattern of mechanical combinations of these constitutive elements alone.<sup>20</sup> And hence, the mode of emergence, continuation and annihilation of anything - right from things upto human beings - is explainable and understandable in the same physical and mechanical way. Consciousness, which is claimed to be the essence of human soul, is nothing else but a resultant feature and function of these material elements. And hence, it is explainable in the same manner. The same kind of homogeneous and mechanical building blocks are operative throughout the world, and phenomenon of pain and annoyance experienced by organisms in general and humans in particular being no exception to it. The advocacy of happiness as the sole goal of life is but an inevitable consequence of Cārvākas' empiricism and positivism. Likewise, their universal reductionism is also an unavoidable consequence of their positivism. It is, therefore, quite obvious that according to them the entire world is not only structured and constituted



in the same way but is also governed by the same kind of mechanical laws.<sup>21</sup>

A slightly mitigated version of this sort of naturalism would be to hold that inanimate on the one hand and animate world inclusive of plants on the other, are constituted by similar but heterogeneous building blocks, such that while in the inanimate world there is one kind of continuity, in the animate world of another sort, and yet both these are subject to similar kind of combination in their respective spheres and functional variations are explainable in a similar reductive way.<sup>22</sup> If hypothesis of transmigration is combined with the view under consideration then a human in this birth could be a certain sort of plant, if not stone, in the next life.<sup>23</sup> It may not be out of place to remark that, apart from other sworn naturalists (*Svabhāvavādins*) like Macchali Gosala, in weak moments of their consideration and haste of adopting larger and larger universalistic pattern of explanation of human nature, such a view was also endeared, however sporadically, by adherents of *Nyāya* and *Sāṃkhya*. We need, nevertheless, hardly to probe deeper into this here. This could yet be held to be one mode of opposing Carvāka brand of universalistic and homogeneous reductionism. In spite of this sort of global or non-global reductionism there is, however, an insistence on persistence, perpetuation and unaltered stability of some building blocks - physical or biological. As we shall see, this trait, alike subscribed to by adherents of the so-called orthodox and heterodox schools, is opposed and questioned by the Buddha and his followers.

On the contrary, another strand, advocated by Jains and *Sāṃkhyas* on the one hand and *Naiyaikas* and *Mīmāṃsakas* on the other too is globally anti-reductionistic in character, although in a mitigated sense of the term. The *Sāṃkhyas*, even though they belong to the Brahmanical tradition, advocate a view that in spite of certain similarities between humans and non-human organisms, the former are distinct from the latter, while living organisms in turn are different from inanimate things. On the *sāṃkhya* view analysis of human nature and experience of *Duḥkha* is distinctively different.<sup>24</sup> It holds, perhaps on the model of organisms within the framework of which male-female distinction is clearly discernible, that although living organisms share among themselves various psycho-somatic similarities in differing degrees, being evolutes of *prakṛti* (hence perhaps the importance of *Ayurveda* and *yoga* in this trend), *purusa* (*Sāṃkhya* analogue of *Jīva*)



is distinct from *prakṛti* exhibiting certain oppositional and diametrically variant features, such that the genesis of all pain and suffering is twofold in nature: through (a) contact (though distant) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (male and female? and hence the advocacy of the *Sāṃkhya* mode of asceticism?) and (b) failure on the part of *puruṣa* of the cognition and understanding that it is fundamentally different from *prakṛti* and that all roads and routes to emancipation from *Duḥkha* must culminate in isolation (*Kaivalya*) from *Prakṛti*.<sup>25</sup> In this approach, apart from belief in transmigration, suffering of the self (*puruṣa*) on account of sin and resultant bondage as well as adherence to the overall backing of the vedic lore, it is held that the same kind of *puruṣa* is eternal and common to the entire world of living organism. In the world of *prakṛti* or *Puruṣa*, both everlasting and eternal, left to itself there is neither *sarga* nor *pralaya*, they being outcome of however distant contact between these two halves of the world on account of *Puruṣa*'s failure to keep its isolation unadulterated and uncompromised due to misunderstanding, error, misconception and confusion about its own legitimate nature and status.

Although according to Jainas the world is basically constituted of *jīva* and *Ajīva*,<sup>26</sup> and although *Ajīva* objects which are unconscious are explainable in terms of *Pudgala* (matter), *Kāla* (time), *Dharma* (motion) and *Adharma* (rest), *jīva* differs from them in being alive and sensitive. Further, anything that is real- no matter living or non-living-is subject to threefold features- emergence (*Utpāda*) changeability (*Vyaya*) and permanence (*Dhauvyā*).<sup>27</sup> Insofar as neither *Jīva* nor *Ajīva* is reducible to the other, Jainism too opposes universal mechanical reductionism and homogeneous uniformity. Yet, in its view, not only contact between but even infiltration and pollution of *Jīva* by *Ajīva* is both a possibility and fact of life. This sort of pollution of *Jīva* by *Ajīva* not only becomes possible through ignorance of *Jīva* of its true nature but also through *Karma*, which on the Jaina view is physical in nature. The contact between either the body and *Jīva*, or *Ajīva* and *Jīva* could be understood through the analogy of a cube of salt melting in water and thereby water becoming salty or, say, spreading of light or darkness in an enclosed space - smaller or larger. Although, again, through classification of *Jīvas* along certain physical parameters like possessing one, two, three, four or five sense-organs the Jaina approach cannot be said to be accepting the same *Jīva* transmigrating through the domain of the entire living world, it could be



surmised that, nonetheless, it seems to accept a certain uniformity of all the *Jīvas* within the living world, in so far as infiltration of *Karma* (*Āsrava*) could be purged (*Nirjarā*) and the *Jīva* emancipated from its contact with *Ajīva* and *Karma* - infiltration and thus the *Jīva* ultimately shines in its glory.

Thus, it seems, both Jainas and Sāṃkhyas claim that human beings are distinct and superior to other living organisms in so far as they have a superior kind of lasting or permanent *Jīva/puruṣa* which is subject to the law of *Karma* and transmigration till it attains emancipation from *Duḥkha* through its severance of itself from anything else. Both, again, attach a considerable importance to misunderstanding of its own true nature on the part of *Jīva/puruṣa* which is the basic source of its torment and languishment. Irrespective of the difference between them that whereas *Sāṃkhya* belongs to the orthodox camp, while Jainism belongs to the heterodox, both of them ascribe certain differentia and permanence to *Jīva/Puruṣa*, and oppose its reduction to anything else. Biologically and even psychosomatically, therefore, according to them there are many features which *Jīvas/Puruṣas* have common among them, this being the minimum thread that makes them uniform and paves the way for transmigration over the entire domain of living beings and being subject to the law of *Karma* in the same way. As we shall see, this sort of determinism also is sought to be opposed by buddhists in their attempt to analyse human nature and account for *Duḥkha* experienced especially by humans. The *Sāṃkhya* and the *Jaina* opposition to reductionism, however, is seriously compromised, in order not to turn out to be radically counter-intuitive, in not only in so far as there are certain common cellular biological processes which occur in the entire living world inclusive of plants, but also in so far as certain physical processes occur in the entire world with some mechanical force, determinism and uncompromising character.

The Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas attempt to find out another alternative to the full-scale reductionism of Cārvākas. Thus considered, their approach is anti-reductionist as that of Sāṃkhyas and Jainas, but with a difference. They hold that human beings and other organisms have the same self (*Ātmā*) prone to transmigration and subject to the Law of *Karma*.<sup>28</sup> At the same time they also hold that any individual - say human - is a combination of body and self, and on the



level of bodily and biological make up - i.e. cellular biology - humans and non-humans have many things in common. Likewise, the structure of physical things and physical aspects of organisms including humans have many things in common. Like Jains they thus accept heterogeneous reductionism instead of homogeneous one as accepted by positivist Carvākas, but without accepting classification of selves based on physiological basis as Jains do. Theirs, therefore, is an attempt to strike a compromise between full-scale mechanical reductionism and cosmo-centricism on the one hand and uncompromising uniqueness of humans defended and bolstered up epistemically on the other. They do acknowledge importance of *Avidyā*. But it is always sought to be combined with analysis of human nature with reference to cognition (*Jñāna*), affection (*Icchā*) and efforts (*Prayatna*) on the one hand and theory of *Karma* and the role and significance of Vedas as repository of directives concerning rituals, with or without backing of *Īśvara* on the other. It could also be surmised that their acceptance of partial similarity coupled with partial dis-similarity between living and non-living is influenced by the *samkhya* approach concerning it, although later on it was attempted to be backed up by the *Advaita Vedānta* approach. We need not, however, enter into details of the consideration of this issue here.

While there is quite considerable agreement concerning analysis of human nature between the approaches of *Nyāya* and (*Pūrva*) *Mīmāṃsā*, at least so far as physical aspect of humans is concerned there is a basic difference pioneered by *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* at least on two counts greatly emphasising anthropocentrism. Though this seems later on to have been absorbed by *Nyāya* under the influence of *Mīmāṃsā* as pioneer of tradition, it needs to be emphasised that pioneering credit must be given to adherents of *Mīmāṃsā*. These two counts are :<sup>29</sup> (a) elaborately formulated theory of *Karma* in accordance with which three important points were emphasised : (i) on the count of allocation of responsibility of pain and annoyance that is suffered, the suffering individual or group alone should be held responsible and no one else, through doing or refraining from doing certain action in the present or previous birth. (ii) No action would vanish unless its results and consequences are suffered or enjoyed by the doer - the doer i.e. the self being everlasting and no self can be emancipated unless all the *Karmas* done by the doer are accounted for. And (iii) result of no action undertaken by some one else can ever accrue to me, come what may.



Secondly, (b) they also held that Vedic lore - especially *Saṃhitas* and *Brāhmaṇas* - is the only reliable repository of guidance concerning what to do and what not to do,<sup>30</sup> and that the analysis of human nature together with resolution of the problem of pain and suffering experienced by humans must be in accordance with Vedas for its being viable. Adherents of *Mīmāṃsā* are at least partly in agreement with those of *Nyāya* and *Sāṃkhya* - not to talk of Jainism as well - in so far as according to them the same self is prone to transmigrate in the entire domain of the living organisms, though all of them are opposed to positivistic and homogeneous reductionism of *Cārvākas*. But adherents of *Mīmāṃsā* also emphasise a differentia of humans through insistence upon deterministic application of the law of *Karma* - a deterministic and organismic counterpart of the law of *Rta* understood cosmocentrically - and the backing of the Vedic lore as the basis and foundation of the Brahmanical tradition. As we shall see, the Buddha and his followers oppose both these aspects in their analysis of human nature.

The *Advaita Vedānta* approach, at least as pioneered and articulated by Saṃkara, seeks to strike another extreme, especially as contrasted with the positivistic approach of *Cārvākas*. It holds that the same kind and pattern of self-originating agility and dynamism is operative throughout the world<sup>31</sup> - both inanimate and animate - although in the inanimate world it may be unmanifested, dormant and potential in nature. It further seeks to locate seeds and basis of various sorts of annoyance, dissatisfaction and mortification we experience in the two-fold misunderstanding, error and confusion concerning (a) our own nature (*Jīva*) and (b) nature of world at large in its essence (*Brahman*) and our legitimate relationship with it, holding that the major source of pain and suffering we experience is our misplaced egoism, its independence and resulting unjustifiable arrogance that it can function and operate on its own without any constraint known or unknown. It, thus, holds that cessation or termination of pain and suffering is possible in this life itself and its essence consists in melting away of our misplaced egoism and independence through proper comprehension of the essence of ourselves, the world and relationship between them. It advocates that no sooner we become one with - better put, non-different from - the world at large through proper understanding and comprehension, all determiners of our individuality and uniqueness melt away, leaving no basis whatever for our misplaced egoism and arrogance together with independence. Thus, one becomes



non-differentiable from *Brahman* as a drop of water becomes one with and turns out to be non-differentiable from the water in which it is dropped. In this way, on this view it sees *Avidyā* - misunderstanding, error and confusion -, which is self replicating in character, to be the sole source of misery, annoyance and suffering in our life and at least one aspect of deliverance from them is disappearance of our misunderstanding about ourselves. As we shall see, the Buddha and his followers are broadly in agreement with this stance of Śāṅkara though with characteristic differences on certain other counts<sup>32</sup>.

From the foregoing it would be clear, it is hoped, that adherents of both orthodox and heterodox trends of philosophical thought in this sub-continent formulated views concerning nature of humans, other organisms, world at large and inter-relationship between them and tried to account for the problem of pain and suffering experienced by man. We also saw that reductionist or anti-reductionist approach they adopted, the sort of rationale by which they came to defend it, cuts across the traditional distinction between orthodox and heterodox schools. Many of them, again, irrespective of the traditionally emphasised distinction, hold that the essence of the termination of *Duḥkha* consists basically in the eternal self - in this life or hereafter - living in the state of painlessness, if not positively of pleasure and happiness. Apart from, further, bolstering their analysis and resolution of the problem of *Duḥkha* by subscription to the uncompromising and undiluted or else quasi or mitigated stability and permanence, adherents of some of the trends also tried to support their rationale either through its anchorage in the tradition founded by Vedas and pronouncements in them and their appropriate interpretation or subscription to the reality of God, or canonical literature as in Jainism or something else that was found to be suitable. Analysis of human nature and the mode of resolving the problem of pain and suffering experienced by humans as offered by the Buddha and his followers oppose the strands adopted by non-Buddhists - non-Śrāmaṇic or otherwise. But along with this negative and oppositional stance they adopt, which basically consists in drawing attention to the points of weakness and vulnerability in the approaches adopted by those from whom they differ, the Buddha and his followers also strive to articulate positive aspects of their approach and the sort of rationale by which it is backed, bringing in the process to surface the distinguishing aspect of it. Instead of, therefore, being merely carried away by the superficial impression that adherents of various philosophi-



cal strands addressed themselves differently to the problem of the mode of resolving *Duḥkha* experienced by humans, on the contrastive background of the sketch of the approaches adopted by non-Buddhists concerning the issue presented here, we proceed in the next part of this section to look into the salient and distinguishing features of the buddhist approach, so that on the background of this sort of inquiry we may be in a position to study some decisive implications of it in the last section.

## B

### The Buddhist Interpretation of *Duḥkha*

The Buddha is perhaps the oldest philosopher to have made experience of pain and suffering as the very starting point of his inquiry and drawn a distinction between physical and psychical aspects of *Duḥkha*. Neither, however, the Buddha nor his followers embarked upon such an investigation merely for the sake of opposing reductionist or anti-reductionist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and human nature to carve out their own stand concerning them. The latter rather started from their own honest concern about *Duḥkha* and presenting satisfactory analysis of human nature together with appropriate aspiration of human life. This is not to deny their disapproval, criticism and rejection of the views advanced by others belonging to Śramaṇic, Brahmanical or any other trend of thought. This was, nonetheless, due more to their being convinced of simultaneous non-satisfiability of their own view and that of someone else, rather than for the lure of novelty or attraction of academic deviance. The criticism of the views of others, therefore, at their hands could be said to be directed at achievement of twin objective : to expose inadequacies in them, and, as a fall-out or side effect, articulation of their own view.

The Buddha and his followers consider it to be too simplistic and unilluminative to dissolve the problem of *Duḥkha* through reduction of living organisms to physical things and holding that all of them are subject to the same mechanical forces operative on them cosmocentrically. So too do they resist the tendency to seek to highlight structural similarity among all inhabitants of the living world, as distinct from the non-living, with or without plants, and with reference to organisms advancing a view that all of them reflexly and spontaneously respond



to stimuli operative on them. This would, in their view, bring in a sort of causal uniformity, but always at the cost of denying the distinction between causes, reasons and purposes, so vital in a satisfactory analysis of the problem of *Duḥkha* and human nature.

Likewise, they hold it to be equally indefensible that the problem of *Duḥkha* could only be satisfactorily dealt with and respectable analysis of human nature presented provided tradition founded on vedic lore or any other similar tradition - canonical or otherwise - is presupposed, some kind of supernatural entity like God, *Adṛṣṭa* or the like is brought in, or belief in the world hereafter and transmigration, permanent entity like self and stability, resistance to change on the one hand and a state of absolute painlessness on the other is assured. Even if such views are upheld by majority of persons, this in itself would hardly warrant their honest philosophical defensibility. Subscription to such views may temporarily embolden us to believe that we have at long last got a philosophically respectable coherent clue to the problem of *Duḥkha*. But it is deceptive for the simple reason that it is counter-intuitive.

That is why the Buddha and the buddhists start with the intuitively available data which brings home transparently to the concerned the fact that any organism, however simple or complex and however varied or similar in structure, is sensitive to the phenomenon of pain, suffering and annoyance, however unintended it may be. This universal sensitivity to pain and suffering links all organisms with one another, but without subscription to some kind of permanent self susceptible to transmigration. This universal experience of and sensitivity to *Duḥkha*, as we shall see, is the foundation of the epistemic aspect of the buddhist analysis of the problem of pain and suffering and account of human nature - human especially because it is only man who not only experiences pain, communicates about it but is also conscious of such an experience, attempts to analyse it and seeks non-reflexive and non-instinctive deliverance from it. It goes without saying that such sensitivity to pain is omnispatial and omnitemporal in character such that it transcends boundaries of such kinds of locality.

The Buddha and his followers also put their finger upon another equally universally important aspect concerning *Duḥkha* intuitively made available. It consists in understanding that nothingg



whatsoever - proximate or distant, abstract or concrete, gross or subtle - can be permanently a source and foundation of painlessness and satisfaction, especially because there cannot be any guarantee that anything that has given us joy and satisfaction, however temporarily, would continue to do so perpetually and that it would not itself turn out to be, however unexpectedly and accidentally, source of pain and suffering.<sup>33</sup> Classification of things into pleasurable and painful is misleading and deceptive, not to say that it is counter-intuitive as well in so far as it is anchored in short-lived mischievous memory and is combined with the hope which we do not wish to be belied. That, thus, anything and everything could be source of pain and suffering is as much intuitively obvious and universal in its sweep that no amount of localised countervailing instances can ever falsify it. It is realisation of the significance of these two unalterable and indelible universalities that seem to have made the Buddha and his followers declare unambiguously not only that life is perpetually susceptible to suffering and desire or will to live absolutely painlessly - unless backed by wishful thinking, deceptive rationalisation and self-complacent but counter intuitive approach - is bound to culminate into a nightmare. We shall see later on why this is so. For the present, however, it suffices to note that universal sensitivity to and permanent possibility of pain and suffering are such overwhelmingly all encompassing aspects of life that no philosophical illumination would be worthy of serious attention which ignores or circumvents them. For, in so far as it does so, it can only be at least at the risk of being counter-intuitive.

Does this mean that in face of such a starkly gazing intuitively obvious universal phenomena sense of unmitigating hopelessness and despair should dawn upon us and that we should convert ourselves into a suicide squad prepared to end our lives at the earliest opportunity consequent upon comprehension of the universal sweep of such phenomena? The Buddha and his followers would be far from recommending such a course even locally, not to talk of globally, not only because if understood instinctively it would be mechanical but also because it would be counter-intuitive as well, especially because all living organisms other than human too do not resort to it, though they are no less subject to the sweep of the universal phenomena under consideration. In addition, such a course would be unmanly and unbecoming of man as well, especially because compared to many organisms the fact remains that man is superior to



them in many respects. There is, therefore, no scope for pessimism and hopelessness.<sup>33(a)</sup>

It may, nonetheless, be asked that even if the course of irrationally ending life in despair may not be commendable, can we not attempt to drown the risk we encounter of our coming to suffer in the ocean of some sort of eternity and stability where the footprints of the temporary shocks of pain we experience would not be visible? Or else, can we not attempt to make figures of our experiences of pain recede in the background of some sort of stability, so that the former do not stand out in contrast to the latter and continue to fill our life with anguish, despair and hopelessness? Even if such eternity and permanence may not be directly visible, the argument continues, it could be accepted on some authority - God like or Vedic lore like or it could be inferred on the basis of clues and indications gathered from experience and bolstered up by internal coherence. It is against such a tendency that the Buddha and his followers urge the concerned to consider that such moves, although theoretically attractive, are vitiated on more than one count. First, an appeal to authority of whatever kind itself is questionable.<sup>34</sup> Inferences, likewise, concerning stability, eternity and permanence from the so-called clues gathered from experience too are as misleading and deceptive as clues derived from the cases of blighted ovum or vesicular mole,<sup>35</sup> especially since the data on which they are based are of questionable reliability. The backing of internal coherence also is misleading because if one is unaware of having started from false premises and makes valid deductions therefrom, then one is led to hold that the conclusions one has derived are truthful without realising that although the argument may be valid, both its premises as well as conclusion may not have anything to do with facts.

It might, however, be held that even if uncompromising and unbending eternity unaccommodative of any susceptibility to change and variation may not be entertained on the ground of its being counter-intuitive, partial stability combined with partial change may not be considered to be so. This is because as intuitively we notice change so too do we notice endurance through change, stability resistant of complete mutation, if not of utter annihilation. Such a kind of stability-cum-change, it may be urged, constitutes the very basis of identification, re-identification and recognition both of persons and things alike.<sup>36</sup> Such an approach, it is held further, also does not threaten internal



coherence. Hence in contrast to the former view the present one commands better respectability. Against such a kind of *prima facie* attractive argument the Buddha and the buddhiss seem to advance the view that by urging the concerned to ensure that their philosophies do not turn out to be counter-intuitive they are not recommending them to be welded to commonsense, come what may. As a vigilant philosopher should not sacrifice intuition on the altar of internal coherence of his theory, so too should he not expect everything to adjust to the dictates of common-sense, however this may amount to distort an otherwise defensible theory. It cannot be said apriorily that the partial stability and the so-called resistance to change is absense of change or susceptibility to it. It could very often be a case of slow, dormant or dull change, its pace being negligible and in contrast to very rapid and aggressive one, may appear almost to be stagnant. In contrast to a supersonic plane a walking man or in contrast to a galloping Achilles, a slowly racing tortoise might appear to be stationary. But this is no reason to deny susceptibility alike of all of them to change. Such hypotheses as that of complete permanence, or partial stability, or even of permanence or stability of whatever kind as the basis of continuity might look attractive, their being proximate to and consistant with what we are normally accustomed with and conditioned to believe. But this in itself is hardly the basis to hold them to be philosophically illuminative and helpful in our being able to resolve the problem of human pain and suffering and presenting a satisfactory analysis of human nature.

It is not, however, the attitude merely of deviance and departure from the alternative trends of thought - both Brahmanical or Sramanic in origin and sustenance - that marks the strength and uniqueness of the Buddhist approach to the analysis of the problem of *Duhkha* and human nature. Apart from the twin sort of universality emphasised earlier, the Buddha and his followers seek to draw attention of the concerned to two important aspects of their approach, each accentuating two other sorts of universalities which play significant role in their theory. The first of them, viz. the thesis of *Anityatā*<sup>37</sup> is univarsal in one respect while the other viz. *Anātmata* in another respect.<sup>38</sup> We propose to present a brief sketch of them with a view to coming to the grip of the salient features of the analysis of *Duhkha* and human nature.

*Anityatā* (Impermanence) negatively means nothing whatso-



ever, living or non-living, inclusive of *Duḥkha*, is immune from susceptibility to change and disappearance in course of time,<sup>39</sup> not only because nothing (positive) is *Anādi* (beginningless) but also because anything that has beginning cannot be endless (*Ananta*).<sup>40</sup> This sort of universality, too, is omnitemporal and omnispatial in nature, making no room to any exception. *Anityatā* understood positively could be interpreted rigidly and inflexibly or else flexibly and accommodatively.<sup>41</sup> On the former count, it means to say that anything may last at the most just for a moment. What it means to convey is that even those things or phenomena which last just for a moment do not lose their philosophical significance. On the latter count, it means to say that anything may exist at least for a moment (*Kṣana*), although nothing can equal or cross the uppermost bound of it being everlasting. Thus understood, it amounts to holding that anything may last beyond a moment, never however immune to susceptibility to change. It amounts to holding that whatever be the dimension to which we micro-miniaturise or infinitely seek to enlarge the span of our life, just on that count it cannot be immunised from susceptibility to change and experience of *Duḥkha*. The universality of *Duḥkha* and *Anityatā* are so parvasive, co-extensive and all-encompassing that there would be no justifiable clue to hold either that anything is everlasting or that anything, however evanescant, is not painful; something being both eternal and free from susceptibility to give rise to pain, being counter-intuitive, is untenable.

Another sort of universality that buddhists seek to draw our concerted attention to is that of *Anātmata*. It could be understood within the framework of cosmocentric world at large or organismic world restrictedly. On the former count it amounts to holding that on the level of physical things there is no essence or core that can withstand the shocks of susceptibility to change. On the latter count, on the contrary, it seeks to emphasise that in the organic world there is nothing like self or soul (*Ātmā-Nairātmya*) that is permanent and can brave the shocks not only of susceptibility to change but also of transmigration through a chain of cycle of innumerable lives till it finally comes to be emancipated. The possibility of being emancipated does not hang upon subscription to the existence of enduring self or soul. Likewise, it is philosophically needless and fruitless an exercise to hold that recalcitrant instances like our not coming to enjoy or suffer for the results and consequences of actions performed in this life cannot be



coherently made satisfactory sense of unless we subscribe to the hypothesis of permanent and changeless self that transmigrates through the chain of lives. This is primarily because a philosophical theory of accounting for pain and suffering and presenting analysis of human nature in a non-counter-intuitive way with reference to this life alone should enjoy precedence over any theory that seeks to hide re-calcitrant instances in this life against the background of a coherent theory touching many lives but ignoring counter-intuitivity in this life. Rather, the buddhists insist that taking this life in all its aspects to be paradigmatic, its extension beyond this life should be envisaged only in a way that will not force us to compromise with any data furnished here.<sup>42</sup> Thus, they repeatedly urge the concerned to shun such deceptions which, however theoretically luring and coherently attractive, are nonetheless counter-intuitive. It is this kind of liveliness to intuitively furnished data that forces them to emphasise such facts as our suffering because of someone else and *vice-versa*, and that however strong our selfish hope that we alone should reap results and consequences of our actions, performed individually or collectively, there are instances where such a hope is repeatedly belied. And hence, it is philosophically deceptive to deny this or seek to whitewash such an experience with the point of so-called allocation of responsibility of our actions only to ourselves over the backdrop of series of lives through which one's self or soul as permanently responsible agent transmigrates till it is finally emancipated. The Buddha and his followers urge the concerned to learn not to ignore the elements of risks and contingencies our lives are filled and surrounded with, and the deception we are accustomed to substitute for truth.

Although, in this way, *Duhkha* is a fact of life difficult to be wished away, it does not follow either that our experience of pain and suffering cannot be terminated, however temporarily, or that all the *Duhkha* we experience is due solely to our own making or external forces operative on us. Affirming the first would be tantamount to accepting hopelessness and despair as essence of life and futility of all efforts to mitigate pain in life and make it endurable and livable inspite of odds. To affirm the second would amount, on the one hand, to reduce humans to cosmocentric world and subject to the same mechanical forces, or else, on the other hand, to make human world to be totally anthropocentric, if not subjective altogether. The Buddha and his followers strive to avoid both these alternatives and hold that *Duhkha* that we



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experience is often physical as well as mental, due to external and internal determiners, sometimes first kind of factors having preponderance over the other, while at other times the converse of this, although at no time there is utter absence of any kind of determiner.

But in so far as this is so, there is a certain convergence between the physician's, the psychotherapist's and the buddhist as a philosophical approach to *Duhkha*. It consists in two primary concerns : the diagnostic and the therapeutic. Looking to the presence of the former concern in his analysis of the experience of *Duhkha* the Buddha has been referred to as the greatest physician<sup>43</sup> while looking to the latter as the great surgeon.<sup>44</sup> It is continuity of these concerns that perhaps made many later buddhists also to cultivate their interest in *Āyurveda*<sup>45</sup> and *Yogic*<sup>46</sup> as well as *Tantric*<sup>47</sup> practices and devices over and above the philosophic ones. We need not go into details of them here. Both these aspects also are reflected in their philosophic approach to *Duhkha*. That is why starting with the fact of *Duhkha* of various kinds, they proceed to articulate three aspects in their analysis of it. Apart from the diagnostic, consisting in bringing to the notice of the concerned the chain of factors determining origin and continuation of *Duhkha* (*Duhkha Samudaya*),<sup>48</sup> they also emphasise the hope-generating aspect of the possibility of *Duhkha* being mitigated if not terminated altogether (*Duhkha Nirodha*).<sup>49</sup> It is looking to these aspects that the buddhist approach to *Duhkha* is often characterised to be medical in character.<sup>50</sup> This, however, is half truth concerning it. Much more than this, it also seeks to articulate the philosophic aspect of it holding that certain sort of misunderstanding and confusion is the basis of our experience of *Duhkha*<sup>51</sup> and the possibility of deliverance or emancipation from it in this life itself consists primarily in inversion of it and comprehending it to be an error.<sup>52</sup> The Buddha and some of the older buddhists like Nāgārjuna seem to be pioneers of the thesis that right sort of philosophic comprehension<sup>53</sup> is the only dependable key to the deliverance from painfulness and suffering, although this also is emphasised later on by adherents of other trends of philosophic thought of Indian origin, their difference of opinion basically revolving around the question as to what sort of philosophic comprehension that is at stake and how to gain it, together with the nature of the state in which one gets deliverance from *Duhkha* and misunderstanding that is determinative of it.<sup>54</sup> This is a very fertile area of philosophical controversy in this subcontinent which engaged attention of the concerned for centuries. We cannot, however, go into details of it here.



In the remaining part of this section we wish to highlight one important feature of the two aspects of the buddhist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and analysis of human nature, viz. *Duḥkha samudaya* and *Duḥkha Nirodha*, to bring to the notice of the concerned its decisively significant differentia as compared to other approaches concerning them, so that on their background we can proceed to bring to surface some important implications of it.

Starting from *Avidyā* (misunderstanding, ignorance, error) through *Samskāra* (impressions left of *Karmic* forces), *Vijñāna* (initial embryonic consciousness) etc. to *Jāti* (birth or rebirth) and *Jarāmaraṇa* (old age and death) the twelve spokes<sup>55</sup> of the wheel of *Bhava* (*Bhavacakra*<sup>56</sup> cycle of existence) or *Samsāra*<sup>57</sup> (transmigration or chain of births) that the Buddha and his followers talk of the diagnostic aspect of *Duḥkha*. But beyond this, it also highlights their philosophic insight and its universality together with its profundity. It is often held that the twelve spokes of the diagnostic and operational cycle of existence or transmigration are exhaustive collectively so that no more could be added to them, sequential in order such that their order of sequence cannot be altered or disturbed, and that while the first two of them refer to the past life, the next eight have bearing upon the present and the last two upon the future,<sup>58</sup> and thus they are omnitemporal and omnispatial in nature and embrative of the entire organismic life. These aspects of the cycle under consideration are certainly important. But much more important in our opinion are at least three other aspects of it which bring forth characteristic features of the buddhist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and analysis of human nature. First, the relation between the preceding and succeeding links in the chain is such that the presence - successive or simultaneous - of the succeeding could not have been the case without the preceding, and the absence of the preceding unmistakably authorises us to hold absence of the succeeding as well. In other words, while presence of the succeeding link is a necessary condition of the presence of the preceding, absence of the preceding is a necessary condition of the absence of the succeeding. Thus, the buddhist approach seeks to highlight interdefinability of necessary and sufficient conditions at least with regard to the advent of *Duḥkha* - a point of methodological strength of their approach. This feature also has a bearing upon *Duḥkha-Nirodha* aspect of the buddhist approach. But we propose to return to it later. It could also be argued that the first three *Nidānas* constitute epistemic conditions, the next five constitutive



or structural conditions, while the last four bring forth the fructifying conditions of the emergence of or control over *Duḥkha*. We cannot, for fear of digression, take up this issue here. Secondly, the cycle of *Dvādaśa Nidāna* is also known as *Dharma Cakra*,<sup>59</sup> meaning thereby the way we are subjected to pain and suffering to the extent to which we are passive and surrender ourselves to its impact helplessly. But more we do so, it is bound to pave a way for gloom and despair. In so far as the Buddha and his followers do not merely seek to draw our attention to such passive aspect of the incidence of the *Duḥkha*, but rather boldly wish to emphasise active aspect of its mitigation or deliverance from it, the Buddha is also held to have pioneered active reversal<sup>60</sup> (*Parivartana/Pravartana*) of the wheel under consideration as a gateway to deliverance from its impact through struggling against all odds, contingencies and exigencies. This also has an important bearing upon *Duḥkha Nirodha* and we shall return to it later. Thirdly, starting from *Avidyā* onwards every successive link in the cyclic or recursive series is self-replicative in character such that every succeeding link hereditarily borrows this feature from the preceding one and left to itself the process of self-replication or duplication goes on repeating with vengeance, thereby progressively weakening chances of our deliverance from their impact in so far as we continue to be passive and indolent. This means that the cycle is prone to operate as mechanically as the process of our being born, or a computer in the presence of our passivity, such that other things being equal, it is more than likely that every succeeding link tends to worsen what it hereditarily receives from the preceding, there being nothing in its power and competence to rectify it. This feature also has a bearing upon the *Duḥkha Nirodha* aspect of the buddhist approach to which we now turn.

We saw above that according to the buddhist approach incidence of *duḥkha* is more a matter of our passivity, our turning habituated and insensitive to the impact and influence of the links of the recursive wheel of its emergence. The wheel is cyclic or recursive not in the sense that in every single occurrence of *Duḥkha*, all the links of the chain are seen as repeated mechanically but rather that in such a case the same pattern of either the whole series or a segment thereof is seen to be recursively operative. In the case of deliverance from *Duḥkha* or ensuring to keep the very possibility of it open, on the contrary, it is our passivity that needs to be reduced if not eliminated altogether and the emancipation from pain is proportionate to the



elimination of our passivity. The Buddha and his followers are keen to emphasise that weakness and vulnerability of our passivity cannot be removed through hiding it behind some or the other kind of eternity - this worldly or otherwise. Nor can it be rationalised along the route of transmigration or sanction of the pronouncements in the Vedic lore. Instead, the path of deliverance from pain and suffering must be opened with our initiative, which may not result into complete cessation of *Duḥkha* till we are living, but may at least change our approach and perspective about it in such a way that we might be able to endure it without allowing hopelessness and despair overwhelming us. As we shall see, the *Karuṇā* of the Buddha, following which he is called the *Mahākāruṇika*,<sup>61</sup> brings forth the healing aspect of the Buddha and his teaching.<sup>62</sup>

We saw earlier that in the twelve-linked chain of incidence of *Duḥkha* the possibility of its recurrence looms large so long as the preceding link is not mitigated and its disposition to proliferate our weakness and vulnerability in the form of passivity and lack of resistance is not alleviated to the extent to which we are able to exercise control over it. The *Nirodha* of the preceding link which buddhists talk of as a necessary condition of the *Nirodha* of the following link may not necessarily be understood in the sense of complete annihilation of it. It may rather be understood as its sterilization, making it impotent, through vigilance and control, and thus ensuring that although it may remain as a dispensable appendage, it should not gather strength to proliferate our weakness to take our philosophic toll. It is for this kind of control that the eightfold path of right view (*Samyak Drṣṭi*), right thought (*Samyak Saṅkalpa*) etc. is recommended.<sup>63</sup> It is both purgatory<sup>64</sup> and fortificatory<sup>65</sup> in the former of weakness and the latter of the strength of integration of our personality<sup>66</sup> without adhering to permanent self or subscription to transmigration. Likewise, the reversal and inversion of the wheel of passivity is recommended to make us bold and courageous to learn ways of conquering our weaknesses through progressive fortification of our strength of proper comprehension (*Prajñā*) character (*Śīla*) and greedless satisfaction (*Samādhi*).<sup>67</sup> Thirdly, the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* also seeks to proclaim as loudly and as repeatedly as necessary that one of the most decisively important determiners that stands in the way of our having proper philosophic comprehension is our misunderstanding, confusion and error (*Avidyā*) individual or



interpersonal which is self replicative in character and that so long as we continue to be bewitched by it there is no chance of the fly of *Duhkha* we experience being taken out of the fly bottle and our having proper understanding of ourselves - the key and cornerstone of our properly comprehending the nature of others and the world at large, neither reductively nor non-reductively.

The life as it is, is obviously full of exigencies, contingencies and risks. But, so long as there are exemplars like the Budha, who not only accomplished deliverance from *Duhkha*, but filled with *Karunā* taught the concerned to face it boldly and overcome it self-reliantly without succumbing to despair and hopelessness, there is no reason to believe that we cannot live in a truly human way. The *Karunā* and the healing touch of the Buddha are the great solace and following his advice and leading life on his footsteps would authorise us to legitimately hope for our emancipating ourselves from the despairing aspect of *Duhkha*, no matter whether given rise to by external or internal factors, and integrate various aspects of our personality - physical or psychological-without presuming them to be spinning around any permanence and stability. It is a great asset of buddhist analysis of *Duhkha* and human nature that it enables us to comprehend their nature and relationship between them through consistent and non-counter-intuitive refusal to make sense of linkage and continuity without adhering to any kind of stability - total or partial, external or internal, physical or psychological. Those who are accustomed to and conditioned by modes of analysis and thinking otherwise, may find the buddhist approach to be inadequate and unsatisfactory. But it needs to be understood that it is not on certificate from them that its tenability and respectability rests. In order to discover the latter aspects of it we need more and more to free ourselves from the impacts of such impediments. After all, though the just born child has capability to suck breast for its survival, the mother is required to patiently teach it how to do it.<sup>68</sup> The importance of the Buddha lies in the twin fact : becoming himself truly enlightened and making the path of enlightenment available and open to everybody concerned without discrimination,<sup>69</sup> provided one is concerned and prepared to take up the task of struggling against all odds, freeing oneself from various dogmas and bewitchments as well as lures of various temptations.



## III

Salient Features of the Buddhist Approach  
and its Implications

In the earlier two sections, we analysed the nature of *Duḥkha* and human beings from different perspectives and tried to differentiate the philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* from the non-philosophical ones. We also attempted to bring out some of the major aspects of the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* in contrast to other philosophical approaches concerning it that came to be developed in this sub-continent by the adherents of other trends of thought. On this background, in this section, we hope to focus on some of the salient features of the buddhist approach and bring out some of its important implications. On this count again, we hope to draw attention of the concerned, only to those features and their implications which have not been noted above. Proceeding this way, we shall attempt below to highlight four such aspects of the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* which in our opinion are of great significance.

(1) The Buddha and his followers are aware of the fact that not only experiences are held to be painful but also the circumstances and the situations we find ourselves placed in. Likewise, although it is a fact that much of the pain and suffering that comes to our lot, is due to our own volition or will together with greed and actions prompted by them, not all *Duḥkha* we experience can be fitted into this category. This means, there is at least some—perhaps great amount of—*Duḥkha* for which we could be held responsible only on the proviso that we mistakenly subscribe to a counter-intuitive theory of justification of our actions. We have clarified elsewhere<sup>70</sup> the concerned buddhist perspective and explained the rationale it is backed by. Regarding the painful experiences and circumstances, likewise it needs to be understood that although it may be true to a great extent that very many experiences of pain and suffering we have individually are on account of our misunderstanding, error and confusion (*Avidyā*), a proper mode of ensuring non-recurrence of them is to make impotent or sterilize, if not annihilate altogether, the root cause of them, viz. *Avidyā*. Thus, deliverance from the experience of pain and suffering has much to do with our personal life. But what about painful circumstances, situations, objects and things? Is it not the case that merely by changing



our perspective about them or sterilization of the root cause of such experiences of ours personally - viz. *Avidyā* would not sterilize their annoying impact on others ? Under such circumstances the situations under consideration themselves need to be changed. And they would not come to be changed merely through our passively hoping for their change without our active initiative. But with regard to such an initiative two things seem to be quite obvious: (A) Here the aspiration or the goal aimed at is hardly personal deliverance from the experience of pain and suffering. This is, again, for two reasons: (i) Even if one may not have had such experiences, one may take initiative to save others from falling into the trap of them. (ii) Even if one has had such experiences, the multitude - present as well as future - for the benefit of whom one takes such an initiative is no one in particular, although it in principle includes everyone in general who benefits from it. Nay, the others concerned may not even know and recognise it to be so. Two illustrations may perhaps help to clarify the point we are making. On the one hand, I remove a thorn pricked in my foot and throw it away on the road unmindful that it may prick again someone else. Or, on the other hand, seeing a thorn on the road I remove it and throw it away, although it did not prick me. On the first alternative, I have relieved myself from the experience of pain, but at the same time I am unmindful of others. On the second alternative, I am more concerned about the future possible sufferers. But who exactly could they be ? Here the initiative taken may be characterised as impersonal, especially since it is connected with personal emancipation from *Duhkha* of no one in particular. But is it unconcerned about humanity ? Not the least. Take the second illustration. Widow re-marriage was forbidden till the late 19th century in large section of various communities in this sub-continent. When an initiative was taken to alter this circumstance and consequences which it led to, which widow in particular was the target of emancipation ? No one in particular. The initiative was taken in the interest of relieving widows in general from suffering and helplessness they were subjected to for no fault of them. But could it have been said guaranteedly that the widows, in whose interest the initiative was taken, were aware of the fact that it was in their interest ? Much more importantly, however, could anyone have been able to guarantee that such an alteration in the then prevailing circumstances would permanently put an end to the plight widows were subjected to through their widowhood ? Are there not instances of widows having got remarried and yet subjected to worse kind of suffering and humiliation ? Sure enough they are. But then is there not



a risk in the mode of this way of resolution of the problem? The Buddha and his followers would say, certainly there is. However, the element of chance and contingency was present in the former case as well. But the victimization of the concerned under the former condition could have been blamed on the passive surrender to the circumstances. In the latter case, however, inspite of the initiative to change them. The point we are labouring to make is important in two-fold ways : (a) Perhaps it is in the buddhist perspective concerning *Duḥkha* alone that we get a hint that emancipation from pain and suffering is not merely personal and individual a matter, as it seems to have been accepted to be the case by a large majority of non-buddhist adherents of various trends of thought. (b) Impersonal mode of emancipation is more praiseworthy than merely personal aspect of it, given especially the fact that it is not required to be instructed to be selfish and self-centered. It is, however, a resultant feature of a great *Tapasyā* to learn to rise above it. Thus, at the hands of the Buddha and his followers the fundamental philosophical insight concerning deliverance from pain and suffering on the one hand, and the need and initiative of special reform are so inextricably welded with each other that the former without the latter is form and general direction without the content and hence barren; while the latter without the former is content without form and direction. This means two things : On the one hand, it means that any reform with personal end in view is no reform that is philosophically tenable. On the other hand, it also implies that whatever we do may not necessarily be either philosophically warrantable or conducive to social reform. We do not wish to imply that this insight remained operative throughout the period during which Buddhism remained a force to reckon with - intellectually, socially as well as morally. Its adherents, as history perhaps may reveal, compromised with pressures - willingly or unwillingly. But the fact remains, that in this sort of consideration the Buddha and his initial followers deviated from the prevalent trend to a great extent, and therein lies the distinctive feature of their uniqueness. (B) The initiative which the Buddha took was, however, much more significant than what is stated above. Its decisive aspect consists in self-suffering and self-tormenting, making one's life painful to endure so that others could be relieved of pain and suffering coming to their lot. Buddha's significance could be seen through his being considered to be a moral scientist zealously working to bring about moral transformation in the then decadent India, and Gandhiji having followed in his footsteps to bring about similar transformation in India



of 20th century. For fear of digression we cannot go into details of this point here.

(2) It is a matter of great significance and importance that the Buddha and his followers stood bravely in their analysis of *Duhkha* and human nature without any subscription to the hypothesis of enduring self in this life or hereafter. Perhaps Buddhism is the only trend to stand committed to this struggling against any onslaught on it - be it *Brahmanical* or *Śrāmanic* in its origin and persuasion. On the one hand, combined with the thesis of universal *Anityatā* it implies that whether in the case of external world or anything that inhabits it - irrespective of whether it is living or non-living - there is nothing enduring and permanent that stands and resists the shocks of susceptibility to change and degeneration as well as decay and eventual annihilation. On the other hand, it also means that within the framework of living organisms - or life in general inclusive of plants - there is no stable self or soul that is the fulcrum of identification, re-identification and recognition of anything in this life or hereafter - if there be any - and that subscription to such a hypothesis is a source of great misconception, error and bewitchment. Buddhism, therefore, proclaimed the thesis of *Anāmatā* combined with that of *Anityatā*. If, on the one hand, it implied subscription to no enduring self, although everything is susceptible to perpetual change, on the other hand, it also implied that anything that is real - living or otherwise - is nothing else but a chain of successive links, without anything running through them, such that our experience of continuity is merely epistemic in nature such that it is required to have no anchorage in anything stable, permanent and enduring. As any discerning scholar of Buddhism may discover, the account of anything real that it presented - inclusive of human - seems to have taken basically three strands: (a) that there are bare particulars, without characterising them to be physical or mental, such that in so far as they are bare particulars they exhibit the same kind of features and anything that is real is merely a series of them.<sup>71</sup> Such a position could be held to be neutral or equidistant so far as account of the bare particulars in terms of their being physical or psychical in character is concerned. (b) Emphasising upon not only cognition being private in its incidence but also upon the fact that the sort of data we rely upon in certifying our knowledge claims too is private, another trend of thought came to develop a position of solipsism<sup>72</sup> with considerable zeal and enthusiasm impressing upon the concerned that anything that is real -



inclusive of humans - is nothing else but a train or chain or series of private impressions. (c) A third strand, on the contrary, emphasised upon duality of the physical and psychical nature of the bare particulars.<sup>73</sup> This itself resulted into two further sub-strands : one emphasising that the physical bare particulars are as formless as psychical bare particulars,<sup>74</sup> while others emphasising that even the psychical bare particulars are comparable to the physical ones in their having form.<sup>75</sup> We cannot go into the nuances of the details of this controversy which plagued the subsequent buddhist thought in this sub-continent. The point, however, of great significance in this context to be noted is that the buddhist thought attempted to account for human nature and human experience of pain and suffering without subscription to the hypothesis of enduring self and presented its account from the various angles that could have been adopted. (3) Broadly speaking, *Dharma* in this sub-continent meant a mode of controlling and channelising our personal passions, instincts, emotions, sentiments, lust and greed in such a way that they do not turn out to be a matter of social nuisance and do not deprive someone else from realisation of the legitimate aspiration of human life - viz. deliverance from pain and suffering.<sup>76</sup> But this sort of deliverance did not mean for the buddhists to be merely personal in character but rather social and pervasive in nature.<sup>77</sup> Likewise, *Dharma* did not consist of code of conduct and a series of rituals to be mechanically gone through. The Buddha and his followers convinced of the importance and legitimacy of his teaching held that those like them, who are concerned, being full of compassion (*Karunā*)<sup>78</sup> in their heart, with helping those multitude of innocent, helpless, hapless and unlucky people suffering from pain and suffering in their own lives through arduous effort and tireless striving and being compassionately concerned about others' suffering should function and operate in society in such a way that the innocent sufferers may find it to be a great solace in following them in their examples. That is, they were called upon to function and operate as genuine exemplars - persons worthy of being followed, commanding - not demanding - respect through the very exemplification of the way they lived. The Buddha knew it very well that *Dharma*, however important it is, would be barren without exemplars looking to whom the innocent sufferers may gather hope and courage to seek deliverance from despair, helplessness, agony and pain they experienced. The long forty years the Buddha spent after enlightenment in functioning and operating as an exemplar, teaching the concerned how not to leave hope and the path of self-reliance



and realising deliverance from pain in thier lives following his teaching, must have, in the course of time, led his followers to adopt the maxim : surrender to the Buddha is a great envious solace for the helpless innocent sufferers (*Buddham Saraṇam Gacchāmi*)<sup>79</sup>. Apart from the Buddha, the Bodhisattvas<sup>80</sup> were known to be the exalted persons, who had suspended their own personal final deliverance from pain and suffering till their fellow-beings are elevated at least to their height. It is this kind of impersonal deliverance of multitude of people from pain and suffering for which they strived tirelessly that made them respected and in surrendering and following whom people saw great relief and solace in their lives, otherwise filled with agony and pain. But the followers of the Buddha also did not forget the importance of *Dharma* in self-control and self-regulation as the very basis of not only seeking deliverance from pain and suffering in personal life, but also of laying a respectable foundation of social life without stratification and discriminatory hierarchy. It is this sort of understanding that must have led Buddha's followers to adopt the second maxim : surrender to the path of *Dharma* (*Dhammam Saraṇam Gacchāmi*) as outlined by the Buddha is a matter of great consolation and solace in the lives of innocent sufferers. But, thirdly, they also must have realised that the characteristic feature of human life could never be realised in living in isolation like a Leibnizian Monad and caring only for selfish personal deliverance from pain and suffering- even at the cost of torturing others - but in mutually helping one another in self-reliant emancipation from pain and suffering. Thus, a society was sought to be established such that in it each one is trying to be as much self-controlled and self-reliant without discrimination as possible; but is also willing and prepared to help others to be so, in order that a society of such members may self-reliantly and together accomplish emancipation from pain and suffering. It was designed to be a society of members who are willing and prepared to compute their strength, so that together they may be able to tide over their personal weaknesses and vulnerabilities: It is for this reason that the third maxim : surrendering to such a society (*Saṅgham Saraṇam Gacchāmi*) is a matter of great relief and consolation for the innocent sufferers, who otherwise are more than likely to be discriminated against and exploited, victimising them for their personal weaknesses and vulnerabilities, which, left to themselves, they would never have been able to contain within themselves. It is a matter of great pity and regret that in course of time this original insight and its appropriate rationale was lost and the followers of Buddhism in this sub-



continent came to substitute personal deliverance from pain and suffering for the social deliverance and in consequence became lost to the importance of combination of philosophy and social as well as religious reform, and instead came to engage themselves in rignaroles and prolonged ritualistic practices of Tantrism, thriving at the same time as social parasites unconcerned about the good of society in the face of their own personal glory and importance.

(4) Lastly, in persistently refusing to succumb to the lure and temptation of adopting simplistic account of reals either in terms of universal mechanical causation or through univarsal biologism the Buddha and his followers sought to bring to the notice of the concerned that in the world twin sort of universality is at play. On the one hand, so far as physical world is concerned, inclusive of large extent of animal life excluding human, it is seen mostly to be universally governed by causality exemplified in emergence (*Tadutpatti*) or else set-theoratic inclusion (*Tādātmya*), wherein our account of their nature is the account of the kind of them. That is, what is largely at stake in such accounts is that individual differentiations are more a matter of space, time, size, weight etc. which do not seem to alter their internal structure and composition. On the other hand, so far as human world is concerned, there is stronger case for unpredictability and indeterminacy originating from purposiveness and teleology - misplaced or legitimate - that is at stake. Here an account of their nature in terms of their kind is risky and is wrought with the danger of the ship-reck of facile universality on the hard rock of counter-intuitivity much more strongly than what is the case in the physical world, although even there we cannot arrogate ourselves in misplaced self-complacency that we have fathomed into the nature of things without remainder. Especially so far as human life is concerned, a twin play of causality and purposiveness is noticeable and hence there is not only a need to distinguish between *Sakāraṇatā* (events and phenomena happening causally) and *Sahetukatā* (events and happenings taking place on account of our own volitional - legitimate or otherwise - making) but equally importantly there is a necessity of requisitioning services of both the sort of universalities to understand human life in its intricacies. In doing so, it is also necessary to understand and realise that much of the pain and suffering we experience is basically for two reasons : First, our failure to understand that human life is not governed by unilinear or unipolar kind of universality but rather the bi-polar kind of



universality, and coherent comprehension of their interplay is more likely to furnish an illuminating insight into human nature. Secondly, it is also equally important to understand that we not only make ourselves miserable personally but also socially, and hence the simplistic pattern of allocation of responsibility only individually is blind to the fact that we ourselves make innocent sufferers victims for their no fault. It is, therefore, our foremost duty and concern to help them with priority, even at the cost of our personally suffering inconveniences, annoyances and agonies. It would be a height of carelessness and irresponsibility to leave them to their plight on the basis of a misplaced and counter-intuitive explanation that such suffering of theirs must be the inevitable consequence of their previous deeds - done either in this life or the previous one. Through insisting on drawing a line of demarcation between *Sahetukata* and *Sakāraṇatā* the buddhists were drawing concerted attention of the concerned to this sort of counter-intuitivity, irresponsibility and rationalised escapism from our obligation that had plagued human race shamelessly. It is again a matter of great pity that this insight of theirs came in this sub-continent to be drowned in the ocean of the loud noise of the dogmatic and committed defence of the position they were lonely fighting against.

We cannot claim arrogantly that we have been in a position to take account of all the aspects of the buddhist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and analysis of human nature. But, nevertheless, we hope and trust that the ones to which we have drawn attention of the concerned on the basis of our limited understanding, deserve seriously to be taken into consideration. Even if this much is accepted, our efforts would be amply rewarded.<sup>81</sup>

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## NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. i.e. *Aṣṭāṅga-āyurveda* (eightfold science of life), viz. *Kāya-cikitsā* (medicine), *Śalya-cikitsā* (surgery), *Śālākya-cikitsā* (diseases of the part above the supraclavicular region), *Kaumāryabhr̥tya* (obstetrics and pediatrics), *Bhūtavidyā* (psycho-therapy), *Agadatantra* (Toxicology), *Rasāyanna* (vitalization) and *Vājīkaraṇa* (virilification) - *Caraka-saṃhitā* with *Caraka-panjikā-tikā* of Swamikumara; vol. 1. Shree Gulabkunverba Ayurvedic Society, Jamnagar, 1949, p. 186.
2. Dasgupta, S.N.; *A History of Indian Philosophy*; Vol.1 Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1975; pp. 270-273. See also, Swamikumara; *op.cit.*, p.94.
3. Vṛddha Vāgbhata; *Aṣṭāṅga-Saṃgraha* (AS), (*Sūtrasthānam*); Jalukar, D.S. (ed.); Vaidyaka Grantha Bhandar; Nasik, 1964, p.2.
4. Shreesankara; *Nidanapañcaka*; *Samprāptivijnana*; Athawale, A.D., Joshi, S.G.; and Rajawade, N.s. (ed.); Shreemat Atreys prakasana; Pune, 1962.
5. Isvarakṛṣṇa; *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (SK) with Gaudapada's *Bhāṣya* (SKB); Mainkar, T.G. (ed.), Oriental Book Agency; poona, 2nd ed. 1972, p. 36.
6. A philosopher's advice is not a substitute for medicine or psycho-therapy. Generally, no philosopher *qua* philosopher is competent to cure or prevent physical or psychological diseases and/ or disorders.
7. This is how critical evaluation of the philosophical position of Cārvāka and other naturalists like Makkhali Gośāla at the hands of adherents of various trends of philosophical thought have characterised their positions and launched scathing attacks on them in their treatises for centuries.
8. Dasgupta, S.N.; *op.cit.*; Vol.I, pp. 53-57.
9. Śāntarakṣita; *Tattva-saṃgraha* (TS) with *Pāñjikā* (TSP) Kamalaśīla; Shastri, D.D.; (ed), Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1981, Vol.1, K.537-39; pp. 226-28.
10. Āryadeva; *Chaturśatakam* (CS) with Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* (CSV); Jain, B.C.(ed); Alok Prakasan; Nagpur, 1971, K.265-69, pp.86-91. See also, Nāgārjuna; *Madhyamakasastram* (MS) with his *Akutoḥbhayā*, *Madhyamakavṛtti* (MV) by Buddhapālita; *Prajañāpradīpavṛtti* (PPV) by Bhavaviveka, *Prasannapadā* (PP) by Candrakīrti; Pandeya, R.N.(ed); Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989, Vol.II, Ch.17, K.30, p.45. See also, Chinchore, M. R.; "Kṛtaprañāsa and Akṛtabhyagama : An Analysis,



Defence and Rationale of the Buddhist Theory of Action"; *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*; Vol. XVIII, No.2, pp.231-270.

11. Nakamura, H.; *Indian Buddhism : A Survey with Bibliographical Notes*; Motilal Banarsidass; Delhi, 1987, pp.291-293. See also, TS and TSP *op.cit.*; Vol.II; K.3566-3597; pp. 1111-1117.
12. Sharma C.D.; *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1976, pp.41-42.
13. *Ibid*; pp.62-64, 67-68.
14. *Ibid*; pp. 152-168.
15. The proper study of the physiological nature of plants and animals through veterinary sciences, biology, botany, zoology, etc. originated and developed hoping to make use of such studies in the better understanding of human nature, structure and constitution.
16. Haribhadrasūri; *Śaḍdarsanasamuccayaḥ* (SDS); Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot; Banaras, 1867; K.83-85; pp. 74-75. See also, Mādhavacarya; *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*; Sharma, Uma Shankar (ed.), Chowkhamba Vidyabhavana; Varanasi; 1984, p.9.
17. Like Cārvākas.
18. Like Sāṃkhyas and Jainas. For Sāṃkhya see Vācaspati; *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* (STK) with Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, Dravid, R.S.; (ed.), Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1937; pp. 171-174. and for Jainas see Umāswatī; *Sabdhāsyatattvārthādhigamasūtra* (STS); Bariya, G.D. (ed.); Shreemad Rajachandra Ashram; Agas, 1932; Ch.I. K.4-8, pp. 21-31, and Ch.II, K.24, p.96.
19. TS and TSP, *op.cit.*; Vol.I. K.330, p.156. See also, MS and PP, *op.cit.*; Vol.II, Ch.17, K.32, p.47.
20. Chattopadhyaya, D.P. (ed.); *Cārvāka/Lokāyata*; Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1990 pp. 85-86.
21. It could perhaps be argued that such a kind of unmitigated naturalism was put forth by some as an antidote to misplaced and self-arrogating theory of *Puruṣārthas*, according to which nothing was unachievable through human efforts alone. We need not, however, go into details of it here. See also, Jain, Sagarmal; *Ṛsibhāṣita: Eka Adhyāyana*; Prakṛta Bharati Academy, Jaipur, 1988; pp.42-44.
22. Gautama; *Nyāya-darsanam* (ND); with Vatsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Udyotakara's *Vārtika*, Vacaspati Misra's *Taparyatikā* and Viśvanatha's *Vṛtti*; Amarendramohan (ed.); Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt.



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Ltd., Delhi; 2nd ed., 1985; pp.862-878.

23. An example of cursed Ahalyā from *Rāmāyaṇa* could be held to be of this kind of reductionism.
24. SK and SKB, *op.cit.*; K.1, pp.35-36. See also, STK, *op.cit.*, pp.121-123.
25. STK, *op.cit.*; pp.182-186; See also, SK and SKB, *op.cit.*; K.62-64; pp.193-196.
26. SDS, *op.cit.*; K.49, pp.49-50. See also, STS, *op.cit.*; ch.I, K.7, p.26 and ch.II, K.24, p.96.
27. STS, *op.cit.*; Ch.V., K.29, pp.277-278. See also, Swamīkumara; *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*; Upadhye, A.N.(ed.); Shree Paramaśruta Prabha-vaka Mandal; Agas; 2nd. ed. 9178; k.267, p.168.
28. ND, *op.cit.*, III.i.4; pp.716-725 and IV.i.19-21, pp. 940-57.
29. Mādhavācārya; *Jaiminiyanyāmālā*; Apte, M.C.,(ed.); Anandashram Mudranalaya, Poona, 1892; I.i.1, pp.11-14.
30. Kumārila; *Slokavārtikam*; Shastri, D.D.(ed.); Tara Publications; Varanasi; 1978; K.9-11, p.5.
31. Sankara; *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*; Motilal Banarsidass; Varanasi; 1964, II.i.26, p.167.
32. TS and TSP, *op.cit.*; Vol.I; V.i.330; pp.156-157 and V.i.543; pp.229-230.
33. *Majjhimanikāya* (MN); Bhikṣu Jagadisha Kashyapa,(ed.); Pali Publica-tion Board, Bihar Govt., Nalanda; 1958; Vol.3, pp.334-338. See also, Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-Vārtika* (pv); with Manorathanandi's *Vṛtti* (PVV); Shastri, D.D. (ed.); Bauddha Bharati; Varanasi, 1968; ch.I, K.178; p.62. See also, Johnson, E.H.; (ed.), *Ratnagotravibhāṅga* (*Mahāyānot-taratantraśāstra*)(RGV); Bihar Research Society; Patna; 1950. Ch.II, K.57 p.88. o73
- 33 a. *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* with Haribhadra's *Āloka*; PP. 160, 168. See also, Śāntideva; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*; PP. 163, 277.
34. TS and TSP, *op.cit.*; Vol.II, K.3510, p.1099.
35. Asaṅga; *Yogācārabhūmi*; part I; Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara; (ed.); University of Calcutta, 1957; pp.24-28; see also, Samtani, N.H.; (ed.); *Arthavinīścaya-sūtra* (AVS) with *Nibandhana* (AVSN); K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1971, p.121.
36. PV and PVV, *op.cit.*; ch.I, K.69, p.31. See also, MS and PP; *op.cit.*, Vol.II, Ch.23, K.1, p.167 and PPV, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, Ch.27, K.22, p.274.



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37. MN, *op.cit.*; Vol. I; p.183, *Saṃyuktanikaya* (SN); Bhikṣu Jagadisha Kashyapa, (ed.); Pali publication Board, Bihar Govt., Vol. II, pp. 258-261. See also, AVS; *op. cit.*, p. 108. See also, CS; *op. cit.*; K.258 p.66. See also, Nāgārjuna; *Dvādaśamukhaśāstra*; Shastri, Aiyaswami; *Visva Bharati Annals*; Vol. VI; p.47. See also, Vasubandhu; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AK and AKB) Pradhan, P.; (ed.); K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna; 1967, Ch. VI, K. 16-17, p. 343.
38. MN, *op.cit.*; Vol. I. p. 183. See also SN, *op. cit.*; Vol. II, pp. 258, 295, 409. See also *Dhammapada*; Sankrityayana Rahulabhadra, (ed.); Mahabodhi Society, Samatha; 1933, Ch. XX, K.5-7, pp. 123-125. See also, CS, *op.cit.*; K.292, p.88. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch. I, K.253-257, pp.86-87. See also, TS and TSP, *op.cit.* Vol. II K. 3331-3339; pp. 1051-61.
39. PV and PVV, *op.cit.*; Ch. I, K.178-179, p.62.
40. Jaini, Padmanabha; (ed.) *Abhidharmadīpa* (AD) with *Vibhāṣāprabhāṃṛti*; K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute; Patna; 1977, K.141-142, pp. 106-108. See also, PV, *op.cit.*; Ch. I, K.69, p.31 and Ch. III, K.274-283; pp.344-347; See also, TS and TSP; *op.cit.*, Vol. I, K.484-489, pp.209-211 and vol. II, K. 2314; p. 776.
41. Contrast between *Sautrāntika* and non-*Sautrāntika* understanding of *Anityatā*. See also, Chinchore, M.R.; "Some Epistemological and Social Implications of Kṣāṇikata", *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. I, XVII, pp. 57-76.
42. Cf. Dharmottara; *Paralokasiddhi*; Roehrich; G.N. (tran. Eng.) *Indian Culture*, Vol. XV; No.1-4; pp. 223-228.
43. AVS with AVSN; *op.cit.*; pp.159-160, 258-259. See also, Bagchi, S. (ed.); *Mulasarvāstivādinayavastu*; The Mithila Institute; Darbhanga; 1967, Ch. I; *Bhaiṣajya Vastu*; pp. 1-172.  
In *Aṣṭāṅgasmgraha* Vagbhata also haies the Buddha to be a great physician in the very opening stanza.
44. AVS with AVSN, *op.cit.*; pp. 45, 159-160. See also, Vaidya, P.L. (ed.), *Samādhirājasūtra* (SRS), The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga; 1961, Ch. 32, K.174-177; p.207. See also, Sāntideva; *Sikṣāsamuccaya* (SS), Vaidya, P.L. (ed.); The Mithila Institute; Darbhanga; 1961, Ch.3, K.7, p.32 and Ch.6, K.10, pp.71-79, See also, Ghosaka; *Abhidharmāmṛtaśāstra*; Bagchi, p.c.; (ed.); *Visva Bharati Annals*; Vol. V, Ch.15, Section 21, p.124.
45. For example, Nāgārjuna's *Yogasatoka*, *Aṣṭāṅgasamhita* of Vagbhata along with its auto commentary known as *Vaiduryabhāṣya* and Chandrān-CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



andana's *Vṛtti* on it.

46. For example (Asaṅga's) *Vogācarabhūmi*, *Dasabhūmikasūtra*, *Sravakabhūmi*, *Samādhirājasūtra* and *Aṣṭasahasrikāprajñāparamitā* etc.
47. Among them some are known as *Kriyā-tantras* ( Texts on ceremonies), others as *Caryā-tantraas* (Texts on cults) and some others as *Yoga-tantras* (Texts on Meditations), also called as *Vajrayāna* practices. Examples of the last are *Kāraṇavyūhasūtra*, *Kālacakratāntra*, *Hevajra-tantra*, etc.
48. MN, *op.cit.*; Vol.I, pp.241, 306 and Vol.II, 265, *Dīghanikāya* (DN); Bhikṣu Jagadisha Kashyapa, (ed.); Pali Publication Board, Bihar Govt., Nalanda, 1959. Vol. III, p. 106. See also, Asaṅga; *Abhidharmasamuccaya*; Pradhan, P. (ed.); Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan; 1950, pp. 43-62. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, K.181, p.63.
49. MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, p.323; and Vol.III, p.127. See also, AD, *op.cit.*, K.136-137; pp.93-96. see also, AVS and AVSN, *op.cit.*, p.15. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch. I, K.204-206, pp.70-71.
50. SS; *op.cit.*, Ch.3, Part 7, p. 32 and Ch.6, part 10, pp. 71-79.
51. Aiyaswami Shastri, N. (ed.) *Ārya Śālistambasūtra* (ASS), with *Pratītyasamutpādaḍi Vibhaṅganirdeśasūtra* (PSVNS); Adyar L.S. No.76, Adyar Library; 1950; pp.5-13. See also, SRS, *op.cit.*; Ch.32, K.174-177, p.207.
52. AK and AKB, *op.cit.*; Ch.V, K.7-8, pp. 281-282. See also, Vaidya, P.L. (ed.); *Aṣṭasahasrika prajñāparamitā* (AP); with Haribhadra's *Āloka* (APA); The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga; 1960; p.319.
53. MS, *op.cit.*; Vol.II, Ch.25, K.21-24, pp. 233-242 and Ch.27, K.20, pp. 272-273.
54. AD, *op.cit.*; p.234. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch.I, K.141-143, p.52 and Ch.I, K.272, p.91.
55. *Paṭisambhidha māgga* of the *Khuddakanikāya*; Bhikṣu Jagadish Kashyapa; (ed.); Pali Publication Board, Bihar Govt. Nalanda, 1960, pp.12, 366, 400. See also, MS, *op.cit.*; Vol.II; Ch. 26, pp. 243-256.
56. TS, *op.cit.*; Vol.I; K.496-498, p.213. See also, PSVNS; *op.cit.*; pp.21-27, 61-64. See also, ASS, *op.cit.*, pp.1-13. See also, AVS, *op.cit.*, pp.146-47. See also, AK, *op.cit.*, Ch. III, K.19, p.130.
57. AK, *op.cit.*, Ch.VO, K.54, p.371. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch. I, K.191-194, pp.66-67. See also, *Prajñākaragupta; Pramānavārtikālakāra* (PVA); Sankṛtyayanna R.B.; (ed.) K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna; 1953, pp.119-123, 157-158.



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58. Vaidya, P.L.; (ed.); *Dasabhūmikasūtra*; The Mithila Institute; Darbhanga; 1967. pp.31-34. See also, AK and AKB, *op.cit.*, Ch.III, K. 20-28, pp.130-141.
59. AVS, *op.cit.*, pp.275-276. See also, Asāṅga; *Mahāyānasūtrā-lankāra* (MSL), Bagchi S.(ed.); Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1970, pp.58, 167. See also, AP, *op.cit.*, p.398.
60. Ak and AKB; *op.cit.*, Ch.VI, K.54.; pp.60, 370-71. See also, SRS, *op.cit.*, Ch.32, K.203, p.211. See also, RV, *op.cit.*, Ch.I, K.18-19, pp. 16, 17. See also, Haribhadra; *Abhisamayalankāravṛtti Sphutārthā* (ASVS); Tripathi, R.S. (ed.); Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Varanasi, 1977, lpp.27-28, 27-29.
61. PVA, *op.cit.*, pp.52-53. See also, PVV. *op.cit.*; p.20. See also, AK and AKB, *op.cit.*, Ch.VII; K.33. pp. 414-415. See also, o73 AD, *op.cit.*, p. 207. See also, MSL, *op.cit.*, k K.1, p.1 See also, TS, *op.cit.* m Vol., II K.3566-3573; pp.1111-1112.
62. AS, *op.cit.*, p.1. See also, Asaṅga; *Srāvakabhūmi*; Thakur, A.L.; (ed.) K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1973. pp. 8, 253. See also, *Mūl-āsarvāstivāda vinayavastu*; *op.cit.*; p.194.
63. MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, Ch.9, pp.62-75. See also, DN, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, Ch.9 pp.227-235. See also, RV, *op.cit.*, Ch. I; p.12. See also, AVS, *op.cit.*, pp.15, 231-233. See also, AKB; *op.cit.*, pp. 196-199.
64. Maitreyaṇātha; *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*; Pandeya, R.C. (ed.); Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971, p.177. See also MN, *op.cit.*, Vol I, pp. 74-75, 174, 380.
65. MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, Ch.8-11, pp.54-89.
66. De Silva Padmasirii; *Buddha and Freudian Psychology*; Lake House, Columbo, 1973.
67. *Srāvakabhūmi*; *op.cit.*, pp. 261-262. See also, SN, *op.cit.*; Vol. IV, pp. 222-223. See also, DN, *op.cit.*, Vol.II; pp. 95-96, 233-234. See also, MN, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 62-75.
68. *Yogācārabhūmi*, *op.cit.*, p.49. See also, MSL, *op.cit.*, p.155. See also, AP, *op.cit.* m, p.125.
69. AP, *op.cit.*, p.2-3. See also, *Srāvakabhūmi*; *op.cit.*, pp. 150-151. See also DN, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, pp. 34-43.
70. Chinchore, M.R.; "Kṛtapraṇāsa and Akṛtābhyāgama"; *op.cit.*, Note 10
71. MS, *op.cit.*, Ch. 24, K.11, p. 197 and Ch.27, K.16-23, pp. 269-274.



72. For example, Vasubandhu's *Vijnaptimātratāsiddhi*.
73. Kātyāyanīputra; *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* (JPS), Santi Bhikṣu Shastri (ed.); Visva Bharati; Santiniketan; 1955 pp. 125-126. See also, ASS, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-6.
74. AP; *op.cit.*, pp.479-492. See also, Vasubandhu; *Vimsika* and *Trimsika* with *Vijnaptimatratasiddhi*; Levi, Sylvain (ed.); Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion; Paris; 1925, K. 2-5, p.13. See also, TS, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, K. 1900-1901, p. 653. See also, PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch. II, K.320-325, pp. 196-197 and K.389-393, pp. 214-215.
75. PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch.II, K.341-344, p.202 and K.365-368. pp. 208-9. See also, *Jñānasrinibandhāvali*; Thakur A.L.(ed.) K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959, *Sākarasiddhisāstra*; pp.367-390.
76. PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch.II, pp.216-217, 252-255. See also, MSL, *op.cit.*, pp.37-41, 55-75. See also, DN, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp.1-7.
77. That is whyt we often find expression like *bahujana hitāya bahujana sukhāya lokānukāṃpaya* etc. in the Pali *Tripitakas*. MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.26, 262, Vol.II, pp.38-40, SN, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, p.170 and Vol.IV, pp. 76, 117. See also, RV, *op.cit.*, K.18-21, pp. 16-20. See also, TS, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, K.3485-7, p. 1093 and K. 3639-40, p.1129.
78. It is noteworthy to understand that *Karuṇā*, *Maitri*, *Muditā* and *Upekṣa* were accepted as necessary characteristics of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas. See also, *Anguttarnikāya*, Bhikṣu Jagadisha Kashyapa (ed.) Pali Publication Board, Bihar Govt., Nalanda, 1957, Vol.IV & V, pp.134-135. See also, MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.346-348 and Vol.III, pp.144-148. See also, DN, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 141-142. See also, SN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.103-106. 073 See also, AVS, *op.cit.*, pp. 16, 196. See also, AD, *op.cit.*, pp.426-430. See also, AKB, *op.cit.*, Ch. VIII, K.29-30, pp. 452-453. See also, MSL, *op.cit.*, p. 118.
79. AKB, *op.cit.*, Ch.IV, K.32, pp. 216-217 and VI. K.72-74, pp.386-87. See also, *Dhammapada*, *op.cit.*, K.190, p.86. See also, AD, *op.cit.*, p.125. See also, JPS, *op.cit.*, pp. 37, 49.
80. MSL, *op.cit.*, pp.30, 79-86. See also, ASVS, *op.cit.*, pp. 30-31.
81. I am deeply indebted to Prof.M.P. Marathe who helped me at various stages in writing this paper.



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## KANT'S CONCEPTS OF DUTY AND HAPPINESS

The aim of this paper is to present Kant's concept of duty upon which he seems to have built the whole structure of his ethical theories. We shall also try to determine the place of happiness within the framework of Kant's concept of duty. In evaluating these concepts, we shall also face an obvious question, i. e., what is the place of ends and consequences in his ethics. This is because, the way Kant presents his ideas, it seems that any reference to ends and consequences is incompatible with his doctrine of duty. It is to be noted that it is in this connection that the critics of Kantian morality have levelled the charge of rigorism and formalism against Kant.

For the exposition, we shall refer in the main to his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*<sup>1</sup> and the *Critique of Practical Reason*,<sup>2</sup> but where a more adequate treatment of the same topic is afforded by some other works, we shall take advantage of them when occasion requires.

It should be noted that in his *Critique of Pure Reason*<sup>3</sup> morality has been treated as a given fact. The only thing that remains is to prove its necessity and universality. This is what he does in his *Groundwork*. In his *Pure Reason*, Kant also shows that imperatives are principles of the possibility of experience, and they contain the *apriori* condition of worthiness to be happy.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast with his *Pure Reason*, Kant begins his *Groundwork* from a different point of view. In the *Pure Reason* Kant begins with the empirical elements of experience, where as in the *Groundwork*, he begins with the *apriori* elements in human experience, and finally in the *Practical Reason* he shows the applicability of this *apriori* elements to man. In the last one, Kant tries to answer the question, how pure reason can be practical—the question which he regarded as empirical in his *Pure Reason*, and transcendental in the *Groundwork*<sup>5</sup>.

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Kant's sole aim in his *Groundwork* is "to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality"<sup>6</sup>. With a view to this, Kant, in the beginning of the chapter-I of the *Groundwork*, asserted,

it is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except goodwill.<sup>7</sup>

This means, a goodwill alone is good in all circumstances and unconditionally. By goodwill Kant does not mean a mere wish or ideal willing but "straining of every means so far as they are in our control." If it is then left alone it could accomplish nothing; "it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself."<sup>8</sup>

This means, what counts for moral value is not the results we achieve, but willingness to do our best, the effort of will involved in any action. This notion of inward goodness of will, Kant asserts, is "already present in a sound natural understanding",<sup>9</sup> which cannot be derived from experience.

Now, how do we know that an action done, has been done on goodwill? Kant's answer is that if it is done for the sake of duty. How do we know, again, that an action done, is done for the sake of duty alone? If an action is done in accordance with the formal laws of morality, it will be understood as an action done for the sake of duty. In other words, that an action done from duty derives its moral worth not from the end which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim from which it is done; that duty is the necessity of acting out of reverence or respect for the moral law.<sup>10</sup> Kant asserts that this idea of law is the determining ground of the will and also a pre-eminent good which we call moral.<sup>11</sup>

But the question is, what kind of law can this be, the thought of which, even without regard to the result expected from it, has to determine the will, if this is to be called good absolutely and without qualification? Kant's answer is :

Since I have robbed the will of every inducement that might arise for it as a consequence of being any particular law as such, there remains nothing except the universal conformity of action to law in general, and this alone must serve the will as its principle. That is to



say, I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here bare conformity to universal law as such ... is what serves the will as its principle."<sup>12</sup>

Upto this point Kant has appealed to common experience of moral obligation and has not even questioned the common interpretation of duty. By his example of 'false promise' he was able to show the distinction between prudence and rightness. In the chapter-II of his *Groundwork* he intends to show that this distinction would never have been drawn but for a recognition of duty as implying an *apriori* principle. Kant argues that since "it is absolutely impossible for experience to establish a single case in which the maxim of an action in other respect might have rested solely on moral grounds, and not on the thought of one's duty", we must seek for it something outside experience. And what is not empirical, must be *apriori*. Psychologically, it is a true claim. Because no psychologist can help in finding out one's motive of an action. Kant echoes the same point when he says, 'in fact, we can never, even by the strictest examination, get to the bottom of our secret impulse of self-love.'<sup>13</sup> Kant also says that if we fail to discern the *apriori* character of the consciousness of duty, we shall also fail to distinguish between goodness and enlightened self-interest, as in the case of a shop-keeper who does not overcharge his innocent customers. It is, therefore, Kant argues,

clear that no experience can give us an occasion to infer even the possibility of such apodeictic laws.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, Kant concludes that the concept of duty is *apriori*. He writes :

All moral concepts have their seat and origin in reason completely *apriori* and indeed in the most ordinary human reason just as much as in the most highly speculative : they cannot be abstracted from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent knowledge. In this purity of their origin is to be found their very worth to serve as supreme practical principles.<sup>15</sup>

In chapter - II Kant assumes that the reason can be practical and can of itself alone be the motive of an action. Practical reason, he says, expresses itself as a command in the case of human will (as distinguished from holy will), and the agent feels obliged to obey it. At



this point Kant brings in the term imperative into his argument."The conception of an objective principle", he says, "so far as this principle is necessitating for a will is called a command ( of reason) and the formula of this command is called imperative".<sup>16</sup> And all imperatives can be either hypothetical or categorical. Categorical imperatives are non-moral imperatives. Kant also contrasted them in many ways with different types of predication, as moral imperatives are unconditional, necessary, formal, *apriori*, synthetic, apodeictic, immediate and direct, whereas non-moral imperatives are conditional, contingent, material, empirical, analytic, non-apodeictic, mediate and indirect.<sup>17</sup>

## II

Now the question is, how these imperatives determine our action; since, according to Kant, it is absolutely possible that there could be no counter-part in reality to the notion of an act categorically commanded,<sup>18</sup> how the moral law can of itself be a motive of an action. Kant's answer is that " we shall have to investigate the possibility of a categorical imperative entirely *apriori*."<sup>19</sup> However, in the *Practical Reason* Kant remarks that " how a law in itself can be the direct determining ground of the will (which is the essence of morality), is an insoluble problem for human reason".<sup>20</sup>

In fact, Kant never doubted the reality of morality or that the moral law could be the determining ground of action. He only says that as there is no reference to particular end or purpose in categorical imperative, the agent can *a priorily* determine what ought to be done. The only thing the agent has to see is whether his action or maxim of an action would be in conformity with the Universality of law. Hence, Kant formulates the principle of morality: "There is, therefore, single categorical imperative and it is this : Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."<sup>21</sup> (We will mention it as a formula - I).

With the formulation of this 'single' categorical imperative, one might expect Kant to have completed this part of his exposition. But without stopping there Kant proceeds to a lengthy argument, in which he formulated some other principles. We may list below Paton's identified formula with the level attached to them. (Formula - I above, the formula of universal law).



## (b) Formula Ia (the formula of the law of nature) :

Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of Nature.<sup>22</sup>

## (c) Formula II (the formula of End in itself) :

so act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as means.<sup>23</sup>

## (d) Formuls III (the formula of Autonomy) :

so act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim.<sup>24</sup>

## (e) Formula III (the formula of kingdom of ends) :

So act as if you were always through your maxim a law making member in a universal kingdom of Ends.<sup>25</sup>

By doing this, Kant, in fact, created considerable confusions in his moral theory. Various wordings of these principles caused confusion among the commentators as to the exact number of principles that are contained in the argument. Most widely accepted number is three. H.J. Paton, as I have shown above, identified a total of five principles including the original one, though he admits that there are main three formulas, but Kant showed five in order to show connection among different formulas.<sup>26</sup> Some writers say that there is but only one principle - the supreme principle of morality of which Kant promises in the preface to his *Groundwork*. A.R.C. Duncan holds that the question of number of principles may mean either (a) how many formulas did Kant think he had offered ? or (b) how many formulas can be suggested by an ingenious reader ? According to him, only the former question is relevant in this context. So, he admits only four formulas excluding from Paton's list formula IIIa.<sup>27</sup> According to Caird, there are only three formulations- I, II, IIa.<sup>28</sup> Broad also holds that there are three but he identifies them with I, II and III.<sup>29</sup> Silver points out that these formulations of the categorical imperative cannot be regarded as final. The number is actually indeterminate, because Kant begins with the moral law as a single formal principle and attempts to make its meaning increasingly clear for intuition by a variety of formulations.<sup>30</sup>

But the problem is that Kant himself speaks of three formulas. This is evident from Kant's own wordings on page 98 of the



*Groundwork* where he refers to the principle as 'our third practical principle of the will,' and on pp. 103-4 where he reviews the various formulas, he says,

The aforesaid three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom merely so many formulations of precisely the same law, one of them by itself containing a combination of the other two.<sup>31</sup>

This passage suggests that Kant accepts in all four formulas. Three subsidiary formulas (Ia, II IIIa) are the three ways of representing the principle of morality. These are subsidiary to the universal formula - 'only... single categorical imperative'. They are formulated 'to secure acceptance for the moral law' by bringing the universal formula nearer to intuition - and so nearer to our feelings. The difference between them is not objective but subjective.

But, if above explanation is accepted as being Kantian, the problem arises as to the place of the formula of autonomy in Kant's theory, to which Kant refers as the 'sole principle of ethics'. It seems that the formula III occupies a higher position above the formula I. The place of the principle of autonomy in Kant's theory, thus, poses a special problem for the commentators. Neither Paton nor Duncan could give an adequate and satisfactory account of this problem. Duncan even placed it under formula IIIa as a different wording of the same formula. T.C. Williams argues (ofcourse, with interpolation in the actual text) that principle of autonomy is neither superior nor inferior to formula - I. Two formulas state two separate moral principles. The principle of autonomy, he says, is the principle of presupposition for moral action, and

the importance of the principle of autonomy for Kant's theory lies exclusively in its function as stating the fundamental presupposition of morality - the presupposition on which the validity of the principle of the categorical imperative itself rests.<sup>31</sup>

But, it should be noted, the number of the formulas does not carry as much problem as does the question of their interrelations. More particularly, the question of place and function of the formula-I is a much debated topic in Kantian ethics, and confusion arising out of detemining its actual function leads the commentators to level



several charges against Kant, to which we will return next. Though Kant himself regarded the categorical imperative as a guiding principle for moral action, yet the crux of the problem lies in the kind of guidance it gives. Generally, it is taken as a precise standard or criterion by which the moral value of actual action might be tested.

Now the question is whether it offers a negative criterion or a positive one. Williams expresses doubt as to whether it expresses a positive criterion, as accepting it as offering a positive criterion, "would imbue moral character into very act of breathing and is also so patently absurd that one may fairly question whether it could form part of Kant's doctrine."<sup>32</sup> He considers the categorical imperative as a test of (a) what is prohibited, and (b) what is not prohibited- what is permissible.<sup>33</sup> In order to make Kant consistent Williams rejected the passage which indicates a positive criterion, as being wrong in the early stage of his formulation.<sup>34</sup>

Now let us see Kant's position in this regard. We know that immediately following the formulation of the law of nature, Kant illustrates the common notion of duty. He divides duty into (a) duties to self and (b) duties to others. Further, he divides each duty into perfect and imperfect, making in all four kinds of duties. Let us note the four examples he puts in this regard : not to commit suicide (perfect duty to self), to keep one's promise (perfect duty to others), to cultivate one's gifts (imperfect duty to self) and to help others (imperfect duty to others).<sup>35</sup> These examples have nothing contingent about them; they correspond respectively to four types of end-duties from which the doctrine of virtue will erect the system, based on two fundamental ends : the perfection of oneself and the happiness of others. These ends stem from an anthropology, not empirical but moral, from an anthropology, which does not establish morality but which procures for it a field of application. Because, finally, to take again the four very examples - the 'idea of a 'life' to be preserved, of a "promise" to be kept, of "gifts" to be cultivated, of a "need of love and sympathy for others", these values could not be deduced from the moral law; it's a question of facts which permit it to be applied. Yet, these facts are not contingent; they are constitutive of human nature; culture can vary from one society to another, but man will always have "gifts" to cultivate; a society can replace charity by social well-being; I shall still have to aid others one way or another. Likewise, in the case where the right of ownership



would completely disappear, there would always be a promise to keep, a pledge to honour, were this only towards the socialist society.

This is why Kant has no need of recourse to God to deduce concrete duties; he has recourse only to man. His morality is only formal in its initial movement, when it is a question of determining its supreme principle. Once having laid the foundation, Kant elaborates a "metaphysics of morals", and his first objective is to give it a content, a system of ends for the will, ends which he draws from human nature : not from our empirical and variable nature, but from that ensemble of determinations without which we would not be human.

In short, the value of the moral law would be, above all, of a critical character; it would not tell me what I ought to do, but if what I propose to do is moral or not. Nobody forces me to enter the game; but if I do, I accept its rules and cannot break them, without contradicting myself. Hence, in the same token, if I accept the deposit or make the promise, I cannot logically keep the first and violate the second; I cannot will the ownership while keeping the deposit for myself.

Thus, one could say, an antiracist is immoral when he refuses to sit in the bus beside a coloured-man, because the maxim of his action could not be consistent with that of his antiracism. But the racist? If he remains consistent with his principle, what could one reproach him for? The difficulty of Kant's morality resides precisely in this : on the one hand, it seems to consider the content of the categorical imperative as purely analytical and has recourse only to the principle of contradiction in order to justify it; but on the other hand, it affirms that the imperative, inasmuch as it obliges me unconditionally, is, in fact, a synthetic judgement, and that it is here, precisely, that it is categorical, not hypothetical. In other words, moral principles do not constitute an axiomatique, which one could refuse or acknowledge, on the sole condition of remaining consistent. Without doubt, Kant would condemn both the inconsistent antiracist and the consistent racist. In the name of what?

In the *Doctrine of Virtue*, Kant expresses himself precisely on this. Anticipating the Hegelian critique of "empty formalism", he states that the moral law offers us only a negative principle; in order to give it a content, it is necessary to admit the notion of end, as a motive for free-



will. Not empirical ends, those which each of us pursues in fact, but ends which are at the same time duties. The "end-duty" adds to the law the positive element which it lacks; it does not permit us to legitimize our maxims, but to discern, among our legitimate maxims, the one which fits here and now; thus, we can not only will morally, but will morally something.

### III

In this connection let us mention the views of some commentators of Kantian ethics. Paton's drastic reappraisal of Kant's 'formalism' is considered a very significant contribution in Kant's ethical theory, though he is not, I suspect, free from defects in his *total* approach to Kant's moral philosophy.

According to Paton, the difficulty in understanding Kant's categorical imperative and consequently the charge of formalism against Kant, mainly arises from the identification of 'law of nature' with the formula-I. There is a close proximity between the two; yet there are also differences. In the illustrations Kant has given in his *Groundworks*, Kant is using the subsidiary principles with their imaginative appeal to ends, not the purely formal principle. That is why, in his first illustration, he makes five references to law of nature. Again, in his summary of the illustrations, Kant makes it plain that he has been demonstrating the application of the subsidiary principle of the law of nature with its reference to an end, and not what is presumed to be the principle of non-contradiction, as Kant writes :

Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be *conceived* as a universal law of nature without contradiction, let alone be *willed* as what *ought* to become one. In the case of others we do not find this inner impossibility, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself.<sup>36</sup>

This is one of the few passages in Kant's doctrine which caused confusion among the commentators of Kantian ethics. The first sentence appears to suggest a logical contradiction. But it is difficult to see that they exhibit purely logical contradictions. What is that with which the maxim contradicts ? No plausible answer is suggested by Kant.



Kant was, however, perfectly aware of the difficulties involved in the conception of using the formal principle itself as a practical criterion. In his *Practical Reason* Kant specifically urges that the purely formal principle of the categorical imperative cannot by its very nature be represented in *concreto*. It is, he says, 'an idea of reason' and not a 'schema of sensibility'; hence no scheme can be supplied for the purpose of applying it in *concreto*.<sup>37</sup> Filling the gap between supersensible moral law and a system of nature ruled by moral law Kant introduced an idea of 'type' which symbolically represents the supersensible moral law, and it is only through such a 'type', he says, that the moral law can be applied in practice. It is because,

if common sense did not have something to use in actual experience as an example, it could make no use of the moral law of pure practical reason in applying it to that experience.<sup>38</sup>

Castigating the traditional thinkers Paton exclaims that it is strange that those who regard Kant as a great thinker, attribute to him something which can hardly be considered as anything but silly. Thus, it is commonly maintained that :

good man must deduce all the manifold of duties of life from the bare conception of moral law as such-without any regard for the characteristics of human nature or the circumstances of human life. These doctrines and others equally paradoxical, if they were held by Kant, would not indicate that he had any profound insight into the nature of morality. They can hardly but suggest that his moral philosophy may be dismissed as negligible, if not diseased.<sup>39</sup>

Williams also expressed the same view and said if Kant meant that "the validity of moral rules can be determined precisely and definitely in abstraction by appeal to the purely formal categorical imperative alone without any reference to ends and consequences such a doctrine is to be rejected."<sup>40</sup>

Paton suggests that there are two aspects in Kant's formalism

(a) No action can be moral if we have any natural inclination towards it or if we obtain a slightest pleasure from its performance.

(b) A good man must take no account whatever of the consequences of his action but must deduce all the manifold of duties of life from the bare conception of moral law as such.



Our sole endeavour above was to consider the second aspect. Now remains the first.

The first aspect postulates a rigid dichotomy between moral action as such and action motivated by inclination. If we suppose this was Kantian, it would present morality as joyless affairs. Whereas Kant himself specifically rejected this view, attributed to him by Schiller, Kant called it *misanthropic* ethics. He says:

This *misanthropic* ethics, sets moral conduct in opposition to all pleasures... the ethics of morseness assumes that all amenities of life and all pleasures of the senses are opposed to morality... It goes wrong, ofcourse, in holding that pleasures and morality are inconsistent with each other.<sup>41</sup>

Paton, however, admits that the looseness of Kant's words are partly responsible for this sort of views about him. Paton argues that only for clear demonstration of action, Kant used the method of isolation. Kant's doctrine, nowhere presupposed a dichotomy between:

- (a) action for the sake of duty; and
- (b) action which is based on inclination. Kant rather postulated dichotomy between:
  - (a) action for the sake of duty; and
  - (b) action for the sake of certain ends and consequences.

Kant's point is that end and consequences should not be the determining ground of any moral action if it has to be of any moral worth. "Kant is not so foolish as to deny that an action done for the sake of duty will produce results and will seek to produce results." However, if "Kant had said merely that we must not allow our desire for particular consequence to determine our judgement of what our duty is, he would have avoided a great deal of misunderstanding."<sup>42</sup>

Paton, in short, rejects the notion of the categorical imperative as a precise test of morality of maxim by appeal to their form alone. The value of the principle is capable of being demonstrated only when it is actually used by the agent who is actively seeking to live a moral life.



Duncan distinguishes between two kinds of interpretations that are current in Kant's philosophy. First, the ethical interpretation which is represented by G.C.Field, A.C.Ewing, C.D.Broad, E.F.Carret, A.E.Taylor and T.C.Williams. It holds the categorical imperative as 'prescriptive principle'. Second, the critical interpretation, which is represented by Duncan himself; it holds the categorical imperative as 'descriptive principle'. The 'prescriptive principle' is a law or rule adopted as a guide to action or as a generalized rule of conduct which forms the logical starting point when one deliberates on the rightness or wrongness of a particular action. The 'descriptive principle', on the other hand, is a principle which states the truth which gives the explanation of things' working. According to Duncan, Kant's categorical imperative should be regarded as descriptive principle. It describes the *apriori* element, the form, bestowed by practical reason, the essence of which is the capacity of the maxim to be universalized.

But, by taking this position, Duncan faces two difficulties: First, as Duncan himself admits, Kant also sometimes regarded his principle as prescriptive. Duncan regards this as a misleading stand-point of Kant. Second, Kant formulates the principle in imperative mood, which implies command. Duncan clarifies Kant's position by holding that Kant's object was not simply to describe the form of moral willing but also to characterize the element of command and demand.<sup>43</sup>

#### IV

In the very beginning of the paper I promised, and also the title of the paper entitles me, to consider the place of happiness in Kant's ethics. Some critics of Kantian morality have termed Kant's ethics as a joyless affairs, as nobody, according to them, could perform his duty without hope of any reward, except reluctantly; it is simply a name of a struggle for an unfulfillable end. Is It really so ?

In order to answer this question we should first of all consider Kant's postulates of morality, as the question of happiness is in some way related to his postulates.

Hegel in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* sums up the Kantian morality by three postulates : autonomy of the will, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. Hegel also holds that



one cannot separate the ethics of Kant from the rest of his philosophy. One could not posit the autonomy of the conscience without questioning oneself of the concrete content of the duties that it is supposed to prescribe. One could not affirm duty as an absolute without wondering if man has the power of fulfilling it (second postulate). One could not decree that virtue merits happiness without endeavouring to understand how virtue attains it (third postulate).

The first postulate bears on the possibility of knowing one's duty; the second bears on the possibility of fulfilling it. We know that, for Kant, this possibility requires progress to infinity which leads him to postulate immortality of the soul.

Now, what is the goal of progress to infinity? The end of effort, and accordingly of morality; one progresses towards perfection which is the abolition of that which gives a meaning to progress. One will reply that it is progress itself which matters, not its goal. In that case, morality is condemned to remain eternally in vain, since eternally unfulfilled. Progress to infinity, one can say, is only a "bad infinity", synonymous with what does not come to an end. Kant also refuses us the experience of perfection in order to place it at the end of a progress to infinity.

The last postulate of Kant bears, we know, on the necessity of believing in a personal God as alone capable of realizing the highest good. In other words, the accord of virtue and happiness, the accord of exterior nature and reasonable will.

Hegel objected that Kant poses from the beginning virtuous will and individual happiness as two realities, completely foreign to one another, without any intrinsic movement permitting them to be reunited. On the one hand, an active will, formal and empty, limited to pure intention, on the other, a happiness contingent and passively received from without. The highest good, accord between happiness and virtue, remains, accordingly, a thoughtless synthesis, a blind faith.

In other words, Kant forbids himself, Hegel insists, any understanding of that which renders the highest good possible. Because, he defines, right from the start, nature and freedom as contradictories, essentially exclusive of one another, while positing the moral necessity of rising above the contradiction. Instead of showing how he gives way



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to the happiness of the wicked, a metaphysical scandal, which he surmounts by the subjective belief in a just God.

Hegel has himself claimed to rise above the contradiction between duty and the capability by the concept of objective morality. To Hegel, virtue ceases to be an unattainable ideal; it is "morality in so far as it is reflected in the individual character determined by nature".

Because the individual ought to become moral, not contrary to reality, but in a reality which is already moral and rational; then each can determine and achieve virtue according to his own character. Hegelian virtue has, accordingly, a concrete content; it is wholly realizable and allows the individual to affirm himself in his own particularity as indispensable to his position. In short, we find in Hegel a doctrine of realized moral life, of success, which permits him to reproach Kant for "not having conceived what is moral : a system of the spirit realizing itself."<sup>45</sup>

Let us now examine the above claims, or better, charges against Kant. We have dealt with the question of autonomy above. The critique of the second postulate claims that, in the dualist perspective which is that of Kant, the fulfillment of morality could only signify the end of morality. It is that morality is, according to Kant, eternally unfinished and that this limitation does not signify the failure of morality, but constitutes its very essence. Is it necessary to conclude from this an insurmountable contradiction ? Let us examine the term virtue which gives his meaning of progress to infinite.

In the morality of Kant, virtue constitutes a veritable aporia. If one understands by virtue, like Hegel after Aristotle, "a second nature" a fund of morality is secured and becomes habitual, such that one has no longer to make an effort to do his duty, then virtue properly signifies the end of moral life. For moral habit is fundamentally suspect; nothing proves that it is not at all the fruit of training or of an egoistic calculation; one does not become moral as one becomes a technician. As for the pure practical maxim — to act through duty — it cannot become habit without the freedom to affirm the maxim disappearing, freedom which constitutes precisely its practical character.

If Kant still retains the notion of virtue it is because he admits that there must be a force in us in order that the moral law has in us the



force of law. Only he no-longer defines it in terms of habit, but of courage : courage in a being at the same time reasonable and sensible, to overcome the obstacle that sensibility opposes to reason. Virtue is, therefore, very much a struggle.

Is this to say that it is essentially painful, that man would never be virtuous except reluctantly ? Hegel, after Schiller, interpretes the morality of Kant in this manner : "to do with aversion what duty commands ;" and joyfulness would then always be suspect. Kant, however, had anticipated this kind of objection : precisely because virtue is a struggle which imposes on us the sacrifices of many enjoyments, it requires a courageous and joyful soul; to fulfil one's duty reluctantly signifies the risk of not fulfilling it sincerely. Effort, then, is not the essence of morality, but only the sign of morality in a being at the same time reasonable and sensible. Contrary to what Hegel asserts, intrinsic moral value does not reside in effort, strife, but in autonomy; this autonomy is the source of the dignity of human nature. This is why human progress is directed not towards a suppression of sensibility but towards a strengthening of autonomy.

Nevertheless, human morality, even "in its highest development" would only be a virtue, that is effort and strife. Because insofar as courage is concerned, it is never secured; one can hoard everything save courage. In fact, Kant maintains at the same time that virtue is unceasingly in progress, always starting from zero. Is that the bad infinity ?

One could admit it if progress to the infinite constitutes a reality in itself. But moral man is always in progress towards a goal inaccessible from human view point; but he knows that, in the intelligible world, he has already attained this goal; an *already* which gives to progress its authentically moral sense.

Considered from this angle, morality for Kant is essentially religious.

It is precisely on the relation between morality and religion that the third postulate bears : the existence of God as realizing the harmony between nature and freedom. It is certain that this is what Hegel's critique conveys : Kant makes God the object of an act of faith



on the part on reason, but while denying reason the capacity to understand the how of the realization, of the the reconciliation. To claim to pass from moral faith to absolute knowledge would be, for Kant, not progress but a regression towards precritical dogmatism.

This criticism does not hold good for Kant. Kant never claimed that our action could realize the supreme good and that happiness was immanent in the performance of the action. Virtue is never that which renders us "worthy of being happy" and all that it can admit of immanence is the satisfaction of duty fulfilled. This, wholly negative, does not prevent the expectation of a positive happiness, as the reward of virtue. Moreover, for Kant, effort is only a sign of morality, not its essence. There is, therefore, no contradiction in maintaining that the goal of morality is its fulfilment; in other words perfection.

In other words, if one finds in Kant not only a rational faith but a religious faith, it is because reason, since it passes from the essence of morality to moral existence, runs up against an incomprehensible. It is impossible for it, at least from the theoretical point of view, to resolve the triple human problem: the origin of evil, the possibility of going from evil to good, the certitude that we meet there." Now, is it necessary to see in this inability of Kantian reason the consequence of "empty formalism", in which reason would be confined from start? Is it not, in fact, rather a question of recognition, by human reason, of its own limit? I do not think that man betrays his reason in acknowledging that he is not God.

In short, Hegel holds that Kant would have failed to understand the absolute force of reason. A failure which, in his morality, would take on a triple aspect: the impossibility of understanding what the concrete duties are, how man can fulfil them, how the accord between nature and his will will be realized.

From an historical point of view, this criticism, I think, demonstrates a certain disregard of Kantian thought. It starts off, indeed, from the view point that the *form* alone of the law can furnish an objective moral principle. But all subsequent steps aim at giving to this form an objective content, to the will a real goal, as well as the hope of realizing it. If Hegel knew how to pose the Kantian problem in its



totality, he understood only in partial and biased way the solution that Kant gives to it.

From a more fundamental viewpoint, Hegel relies on the postulate that reason can transgress the limits that Kantianism assigns to it and can understand how spirit realizes itself in nature and the history of the world. But is the postulate lawful : can man put himself in the place of God ?

When Hegel claims to place himself in the viewpoint of the absolute, and accordingly to go beyond the Kantian "formalism", one wonders if this going beyond does not signify *concretely* the abandonment of human reason for the benefit of concrete universal, with respect to which man is no more than a simple means. If reason ceases to be human, it is no longer the force of man. And how can we know it does not act against man ?

## V

In spite of all the defenses of Kantian position we do not mean that Kant is free from all contradictions. The same is true about the place of happiness in his ethics. It is true that if any one can establish the place of end in his doctrine of duty, he walks half the way, atleast, in this direction. If end has a place, and we have seen in a sense it has, we can legitimately claim a place for happiness too. But we find Kant in this respect in a very confusing position. It appears that Kant sometimes regards happiness as little more than the greatest possible amount of uninterrupted pleasure throughout the whole life, as he writes, "A rational being's consciousness of the agreeableness of life which without interruption accompanies his whole existence is happiness."<sup>46</sup> This he considered to be the final end which all men seek considering its influence on our whole of existence :

reason certainly has responsibility from the side of his sensuous nature to attend to its interest and to form partial maxim with a view to the happiness of this and, where possible, of a future life.<sup>47</sup>

Compare this passage with another in the *Groundwork* :

The concept of happiness is so indeterminate a concept that although every man wants to attain happiness, he can never say definitely and in unison with himself what it really is that he wants and wills ..... .



He has no principle by which he is able to decide with complete certainty what will make him truly happy .... the problem of determining certainly and universally what action will promote happiness of rational being is completely insoluble.<sup>48</sup>

This certainly exhibits Kant's inconsistency of thought. Besides, he also confused between ends and means of happiness. He some times considered richness, knowledge, health, etc., as means to happiness and some other times as elements of happiness.

Kant took different view in respect of one's duty to himself and duty to others. According to him, to seek one's own happiness is not direct duty but an indirect duty, for "discontented with one's condition under pressure from many cares and amid unsatisfied wants could easily become a great temptation to transgress duties."<sup>49</sup> He argues that to seek one's own happiness is a contradiction, because, "what each person inevitably wills of himself does not belong under the concept of duty, for this is a constraint to a reluctantly adopted ends."<sup>50</sup> Kant here seems to argue that what already 'is' cannot be made ought as there is no road to 'is' from 'ought'. Again, to be a duty, the thing to be wanted should not be part of 'natural inclination', but should be those which human beings do not naturally want.

Kant never considers among the direct duties one's own perfection and the happiness of others. But this cannot be inverted, because of the fact that "the perfection of another man as a person consists precisely in the fact that he is himself capable of setting before himself his own ends according to his concept of duty, and it is contradictory to require (i.e., to make it my duty) that I ought to do something which no one except himself can do."<sup>51</sup>

As to the reason why we should make the happiness of others as our end a duty, Kant says that as human being does not naturally seek happiness of others, it should be our duty to seek it. As to the reason why we should seek happiness of others Kant loosely argues that "the reason why I ought to promote the happiness of others is not because the realization of their happiness is of any consequent to myself ... but solely because a maxim which excludes this cannot also be present in one and the same volition as a universal law."<sup>52</sup>



But Kant warns us that happiness of others may be the object of the will of a rational being, but it still could not be the determining ground of the maxim.

## VI

Before I conclude, let us have a brief survey of what has been said so far with some remarks, though at the risk of repetition.

Kant started his *Groundwork* with some presuppositions: Universality of human reason, good will, common moral experience, though he also presupposed some other things in the course of formulation of his thought. He says good will is only good, without qualifications, good in itself, the highest good and the condition of all the rest. Reason's highest duty is to establish the good will which is present in a sound natural understanding. That is why it needs no clarification (Kant could say, it is not possible either). From this point Kant abruptly passes on to the concept of duty which includes good will. 'Duty is the necessity of acting out of reverence or respect for the moral law' without any regard to any consequence or end. That is to say only dutiful will is good. Law itself is an incentive for moral living. As there is no counterpart in experience to show that something done is done out of respect for the moral law, and we cannot distinguish self-love, self-interest or prudence from right action by appeal to any experience, we should seek it somewhere else. This 'else' is *a priori*.

Kant maintains that practical reason in its use of human will expresses itself as a command. Here he brings his hypothetical - categorical distinction to set a differentia of moral action against non-moral. With the analysis of categorical command Kant discovered the law of the categorical imperative. He formulated the first formal principle. Agent can a priori determine what ought to be done - whether his maxim (subjective principle) would be capable of being universalized. If it is capable of being universalized without contradiction, it is right to act on it and if it is not, it is wrong to do so. Kant here is talking about the universality of the law, not of its generality. Universality is derived from rationality, whereas generality is derived from experience. This universality-generality distinction is not, however, clear in Kant's exposition.



We have seen that the real problem started with Kant's formulation of different kind of laws and with the illustration of them with reference to different kinds of duties. Some questions have been raised : what do they prove ? Could they prove anything conclusively ? Could Kant prove what he intended to prove ? What was his real intention ? More important, how to apply the formal principle of the categorical imperative in practical life ? Is it possible at all without regard to ends and consequences ? In this connection we have considered the charges of formalism and rigorism brought by Hegel and Hegelian critics against Kant. Kant also was aware of this difficulty of applying the purely formal principle in *concreto*. We have seen that to reduce it to a formalism is only a textbook cliché which does not illuminate but disguises its proper movement. It is true that Kant surmounts ultimate contradiction of his morality only through religious faith. It remains consistent, however, with the absolute requirement that he had started at the beginning : respect for human dignity identified with the autonomy of the will.

Here I would like to add that Kant did not exclude totally the role of ends and consequences from his moral judgements. He only stressed that we should not take any account of them. Kant here seems to apply the method of 'indifference'. Kant also points out that the presence of subjective inclination and desires makes duty, by contrast, more bright and more shining.<sup>53</sup> Again, the concept of end and content is rooted, I think, in the very concept of freedom itself, which is the necessary presupposition of morality. Freedom presupposes at least two alternatives to choose from. If we regard moral law as the only incentive, it jeopardises the very idea of freedom.

I would like to conclude with a remark from A.C. Ewing. He once wrote :

It must be admitted that there is no great moral philosopher whom it is so easy to criticize as Kant. To point out obvious objections to his central ethical doctrines does not seem to be beyond the capacity of even a third-class student.<sup>54</sup>

Ewing had made the remark about a half a century ago without anticipating perhaps that sometimes in future it would be very difficult for even a 'first-class' student of philosophy to point out, not objections as such, but what is 'obvious' against Kant. For what is 'obvious' is itself



a big question now a days. Though everybody wants to give Kant fair run for his money, it is difficult to determine what is actually 'fair'. The whole heap of literature on Kant shows that there is hardly any commentators who could give a consistent account of Kant's doctrines. Some commentators, as we have seen above in case of Williams and Paton, added to, or rejected from, the actual body of Kant's writings some portions which they think necessary to make Kant consistent, or to make Kant to mean what he actually should mean. By saying this I don't dare say that Kant is wholly right or wholly wrong. There is no 'whole truth' in philosophy. For this state of confusion and controversy, partly Kant and partly commentators are responsible. The laconic way of expressing his fundamental doctrines and sometimes repeating some points by Kant, are greatly responsible for the difficulty in understanding Kant. And to read into Kant what one feels right is partly responsible for creating confusion from the side of the commentators. This controversy, however, belittles neither the authors of great originality nor the commentators of good scholarship. In fact, richness, depth and subtlty in great thinkers contributed so much to the difficulty experienced over in understanding their thoughts. Here lies their greatness.

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## NOTES

1. The German title of the book has been translated variously, such as *The Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Thus, whenever I refer to these titles I shall mean the same work. I have used here mostly the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, translated with an introduction by H.J. Paton as *The Moral Law* (London: Hutchison, 1965). Henceforth I shall use the shortened tille of the books cited after the first reference where the details of publication will be mentioned.



2. I have used *The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*, ed. L.W.Beck (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1949). Henceforth referred to as *Practical Reason*
3. Translated by N.K.Smith (New York: St.Martin's press, 1965).
4. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A-302/B-830, A-807/B-835, A808/B-836.
5. *Idem, Practical Reason*, pp.16-19.
6. *Idem, Groundwork*, p. 10.
7. *Ibid.*, p.61.
8. *Ibid.*, p.62
9. *Ibid.*, p.64.
10. *Ibid.*, pp.65-68.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
14. *Ibid.*, p.76.
15. *Ibid.*, p.79.
16. *Ibid.*, p.81.
17. Chin Tai Kim, "Kant's Supreme Principle of Morality", *Kant Studien* 59 (1968), pp. 298-299.
18. Kant, *Groundwork*, p. 87.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Idem., Practical Reason*, p. 180.
21. *Idem., Groundwork*, p.88.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 101.



25. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
26. H.J. Paton; *The Categorical Imperative* (London : Hutchison, 1965), p. 129.
27. A.R.C. Duncan; *Practical Reason and Morality* (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1957), pp. 172-173.
28. E. Caird, *The Practical Philosophy of Kant*, (Glasgow, 19890, p. 207.
29. C.D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (London : Routledge, 1951), pp. 131-132.
30. J.R. Silver, "Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics," *Review of Metaphysics* (1974).
31. T.C. Williams, *The Concept of the Categorical Imperative* (Oxford: The Calaredon Press, 1968), p. 34.
32. *Ibid.*, p.41.
33. *Ibid.*, p.42.
34. The passage to which I have indicated is: "it would be easy to show how human reason, with this corpus in hand, is well able to distinguish in all cases that present themselves what is good or bad, right or wrong." Cf. *Groundwork*, pp. 71-72.
35. Kant, *Groundwork*, pp. 89-91.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
37. *Idem.*, *Practical Reason*, p.177.
38. *Ibid.*, p.178.
39. Paton, *Categorical Imperative*, p.15. o73
40. Williams, *The Concept of the Categorical Imperative*, p.55.
41. Quoted *ibid.*, p.60.
42. Paton, *Categorical Imperative*, p.76.
43. Duncan, *Practical Reason and Morality*, pp. 70-73.
44. Hegel, *Principles de la philosophie du droit* Principles of the Philosophy of Right), Meiner edition (Hamburg, 1955), p.150.



45. Idem, *Vorlesungen Über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Text III, ed. Frommann, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt (Hambourg, 1965), p. 593.
46. Kant, *Practical Reason*, p.133.
47. *Ibid.*, p.170.
48. *Ibid.*, *Groundwork*, pp.85-86.
49. *Ibid.*, p.86.
50. Idem, *Metaphysics of Morals* in L.W. Beck edited *The Practical Reason*, p.355.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Idem, *Groundwork*, p.109.
53. *Ibid.*, p.65.
54. A.C. Ewing; "Paradoxes of Kant's Ethics", *Philosophy* 13(1938), p.40.



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## DISCUSSION

### I

## NEW TRENDS IN RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY

According to historian of philosophy Assen Ignatow there is an interesting new trend in Russian philosophy. Though Marxism-Leninism is still dominant, a few new schools of thought have appeared on the philosophical scene. Who may have thought, though, that Western political philosophies (like Popperism or Habermas/Luhmann's Critique of the postmodern state) would make headway sees himself proved wrong. The major new philosophy is, according to Ignatow, the Russian philosophy of the 1920ies and 30ies - *Russian personalism*, the thought of Solowjow, Berdjajew, Schestow, Bulgakow, Frank, Losskij. Since 1985 about 40 works by these original Russian thinkers have been re-published.

Western philosophy of the enlightenment kind, especially Western individualism and the spirit of capitalism had always been alien to Russian thought. Western influence started with Hegel and some of Schelling's ideas, which paved the way to Marxism and from there to Leninism. Russian personalism was the main reaction against it. It was immensely practical, trying to do justice to the situation of man in an imperfect world.

In what follows we will give a short introduction into what Russian personalism was - and is. We will also undertake to point out what makes it different from contemporary Western thought - and why it should be better adapted to contemporary Russian needs and demands than anything that could ever come from the West.

The re-discovered Russian thinkers are not in favour of the *bourgeoisie*. They have little understanding of capitalist ways. Berdyaev e.g. claims that communism was successful because the political order

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it succeeded was degenerate. Communism become possible, because the Christianity it succeeded was not authentic.

Nor is Berdyaev in favour of Western style democracy. Western-style democracy, he says, helps the power-hungry to achieve their aim. According to him, freedom is not a social category, but an ontological one. In the social sense, freedom means that the powerful can have their way. In the ontological sense, freedom means that everyone can realize him-or herself as a person.

World-famous writer A. Solshenizyn, too, claims that Western democracy's merits are purely negative: it helps to avoid tyranny. What is immensely more important is the respect for the human person. Solshenizyn advocates, therefore, a small-space democracy, a democracy of the village so to speak, a democracy which does justice to the human person without reducing him or her to the status of a 'citizen'. Solshenizyn, unfortunately, does not say how such a state is going to work.

According to Berdyaev, only a community which enables egos to become persons is a community worthy of its name. Berdyaev's community is, then, the direct opposite of what the modern state seems to be. Personalistic communitarianism is based on the Existence of the creative and free individual who realizes his or her nature.

Aim and goal of personalistic communitarianism is "communitarian community", a society based on "love" which alone delivers the framework within which egos can become *persons*.

Soloviov's main idea was that the good is identical with truth, and that each human being has access to the true-and-good by his or her very nature. His argument may remind Chinese readers of Meng-tzu's argument in favour of the good and human openness to the knowledge of it.

It is crucial to get to know the good-and-true in its completeness because incomplete knowledge of it may lead to inadequate philosophies of life, such as there are:

-pessimism in the Schopenhauerian bourgeois sense

-blind activism



-moral amorphism or agnosticism

-aestheticism (Nietzsche).

All these erroneous attitudes stem from the lack of capability or will (!) to perceive and live the true-and-good.

That the good exists and that human beings have access to it (whether they want to or not) can be evidenced in a contemplation of man's emotional life.

-Each and every human being knows the feeling of shame.

-Each and every human being knows the feeling of compassion.

Soloviov quotes from Isaac of Syria:

"Compassion is the burning of man's heart for whatever there is, humans, birds, demons, and everything that has been created. Whenever man is mindful of them and looks at them, his eyes will flow over with tears. The strong and overwhelming pity which fills his or her heart and the great suffering contracts his heart and he will not be able to bear any harm or sorrow happening to any of those creatures".

-Each and every human being is familiar with the feeling of awe.

Compassion means for the individual, that he or she has an individual obligation to feed the hungry etc. If the number of the needy outnumbers my individual capacity to help, then this fact cannot mean that my obligation becomes nil. There is a solidaric obligation to help.

### **The Renaissance of Russian Personalism. A Challenge for Western Individualism.**

Should Russian Personalism become a paradigm for Russian philosophy in the near future, there is no reason for the West to rejoice. Nor is the End of History near. Russian Personalism will in any case challenge and critique Western individualism and bourgeois capitalism - the ingredients of what E. Mounier called 'le desordre etabli' (established dis-order). Russian Personalism will challenge Western individualism at least on three levels:

(1) because it tries to give history a direction, a goal, an aim.  
Western individualism does not give history a goal, a direction, an



aim. Everything is the way it presents itself to us. There is no hope, no faith, no charity. Nor is there person-hood.

(2) because it tries to give dignity to the human *person*. There is no theory of the human person at present in the West. There are theories of the psyche, of the citizen, of the subject of economic conditions, of the believer. But there is no theory of the person *qua* person that has any influence on decision-making.

(3) because it favours solidarity. The Russian personalist thinker do not want to discuss individual rights. Nor does he want to discuss which form of government is best. There will always be injustices. If humans, however, become aware of their person-hood, and the person-hood of whoever lives with them, then they will be able to live complete lives anywhere. Solidarity has two aspects, then: on the one hand, it is a necessary condition for human survival. On the other hand, it is a great chance for humankind-the condition for the possibility of becoming one-self.

From what has been said it seems to be obvious that Russian Personalism - should it become a major philosophical trend - will be incommensurate with Western individualism. It will pose major challenges to it. But then, shouldn't it be challenged?

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## II

### ANOTHER WINDOW INTO ZENO'S ANTINOMIES

Joseph W. Smith, in an astute article in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, January 1990, discussed the important question whether there are really perennial philosophical disputes. As an example of his perspective on that question, he probed the range of comments which have been offered, over the centuries, in regard to Zeno's paradoxes.

I should like to present, in this paper, a way of viewing Zeno's paradoxes which, although it is not entirely new, is, I think, worth considering now, since it has not hitherto been unfolded explicitly, with an adequate exposition of its pregnant ramifications.

1. I shall try to show, in this paper, (a) that Zeno's most famous conclusions which defy common sense are based, or (in order to be valid) would *have to be based*, on a certain presupposition, which I formulate in paragraph 2 below, and (b) that that presupposition is unacceptable. If I succeed in these efforts, it will follow that Zeno's arguments (purporting to prove that motion is impossible and even that a plurality of existents is impossible) *are invalid*.

2. Zeno's arguments are valid only if the following presupposition is correct:

If you multiply an infinitely large number by an infinitely small number (that is, by an infinitely small fraction), the product of the two will be (indifferently) either infinitely large (because you have done an infinite number of aggregations) or infinitely small (because no matter how often you multiply an infinitesimal, you will never get anything but an infinitesimal result).

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3. Our intuitions, I think, lean easily toward accepting the first possible result (that the product will be infinitely large), and less easily toward the second possible result (that the product will be infinitesimal and therefore insignificant). But that is because, over the course of intellectual history, we have in general talked more about infinity than about the infinitesimal. (This does not apply, however, to mathematicians who have dealt with the infinitesimal calculus.)

4. Something close to my contention—that, in Zeno's view the product which results from multiplying infinity by the infinitesimal is either infinity or the infinitesimal—is found in the following passage in Kathleen Freeman's *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers; A Companion to Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 156, where she is paraphrasing Zeno:

"... you are bound to start with either a Nothing or an Infinite, and by ... [means of multiplication] you get only what you start with, either a Nothing or an Infinite."

5. Bearing in mind Freeman's paraphrase, I now want to show that Zeno's arguments *depend* on the presupposition expressed in paragraph 2 above. (Later, I will try to show that that presupposition should be replaced by a better one.)

6. Take, for example, the arguments against the reality of motion and, in particular, the strongest such argument. According to that argument,

6a. If you want to move from A to B (which is, let us say, a distance of forty feet), you must first accomplish the task of moving *one-half* the distance from A to B (that is, you must succeed in moving twenty feet).

6b. But in order to move the just-mentioned distance of twenty feet, you must first accomplish the task of moving *one-half* of *that* distance (namely, ten feet).

6c. Similarly, in order to move the just-mentioned distance of ten feet, you must accomplish the task of moving *one-half* of *that* distance (namely, five feet).

6d. And so forth. That is carrying this sequence of requirements to its logical conclusion, you must carry out *an infinite number* of tasks in order to move from A to B.



6e. But you can never complete an infinite number of tasks.

6 f. Therefore, motion is impossible.

7. But what does the infinite number of tasks amount to? It amounts to your multiplying the following two items together: (a) an infinite number of acts of motion and (b) an infinitesimal distance. (An infinitesimal distance is what you will get down to in the smaller and smaller required distances which you must succeed in travelling.)

8. Actually, instead of saying that you can never complete an infinite number of tasks (which Zeno could have difficulty in showing), he would have been on better ground if he had said:

Even if you succeeded in completing an infinite number of motions, the distances which you would have succeeded in thus traversing are all *infinitesimal* and their sum is infinitesimal too, because no matter how many times you multiply an infinitesimal distance, you will get only an infinitesimal (insignificant) result.

Another way of observing that the infinitesimal is *insignificant* is to think of it as the *limit* (a "point" having no magnitude at all) of the process of constantly reducing a distance.

9. Thus, in this case, the product of multiplying infinity by the infinitesimal would be taken by Zeno to be infinitesimal.

10. I now need to show that sometimes Zeno takes the product of multiplying infinity by the infinitesimal to be *infinity*, in accordance with the first possibility which is listed in the hypothesis set forth in paragraph 2.

11. I shall show this by quoting a passage from Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, where Simplicius says that Zeno argued as follows *against a plurality of existents*;

"[If things are a many, and are divisible into parts,] each ... [part] must have a certain magnitude and a certain thickness, ... and the same may be said of what is in front of it; ... and something will [always] be in front of it ... [ad infinitum]." Translated by John Burnet in *Early Greek Philosophy* (London: A. & C. Black, fourth edition), p. 315.



In Simplicius's summary, what Zeno said is that a plurality of divisible existents requires an *infinity* of existents (which he deemed unacceptable, since there would be no room for an infinity of existents).

12. In the preceding few paragraphs, I have illustrated my contention that (a) Zeno sometimes held that infinity multiplied by the infinitesimal equals the infinitesimal and (b) he sometimes held that infinity multiplied by the infinitesimal equals the infinity. Now I wish to show that, in at least one place, Zeno mentioned both possibilities. He wrote:

"so, if things are a many, they must be both small and great, so small as not to have any magnitude at all, and so great as to be infinite" Burnet, *op cit* p. 316.

13. I shall now offer an alternative to the assumption set forth in paragraph 2. I suggest that, if the infinite is multiplied by the infinitesimal, the product will be *a finite number*. Freeman came close to saying this when she wrote: "Any finite length is infinitely divisible, but it does not cease to be finite" (Freeman, *op cit*, p.161).

14. If the thought that "infinity times the infinitesimal equals a finite number" is acceptable, then Zeno's arguments fail, since they are based on the notion that infinity times the infinitesimal equals *either* infinity *or* the infinitesimal.

15. A possible objection to my proposal that infinity times the infinitesimal equals the finite was voiced by A. J. Ayer in *The Central Questions of Philosophy* (1973; Pelican edition, 1976), p. 20, where he said:

"It is no good our knowing that the sum of an infinite series can be finite if we are unable to explain how the series can never come into existence."

16. Ayer seems to want an explanation of how a series of infinitesimals "can ever come into existence." My comment on such a requirement is as follows: When mathematicians say things like "You



can't divide by zero" or "Any number multiplied by infinity will give you infinity," they are offering *proposed ideas* which they believe will be fruitful in as many contexts as possible. They are not offering propositions which are subject to the kind of explanation that Ayer seems to want. And my *proposed idea* that infinity times the infinitesimal equals the finite will, I think, be fruitful in many contexts. For example, it shows that Zeno's "proof" that motion is impossible does not work.

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## BOOK REVIEW

Kher, (Dr.) Chitrarekha, V., *Buddhism as Persented by the Brahmanical Systems*, Sri Sadguru Publications, Delhi, 1992; pages X + 676; Price Rs. 600/- (HC).

The book under review is a publication in a bookform of the voluminous Ph.D. dissertation of the authoress submitted before many years to the University of Poona. Although unfortunately she is no more, it is on account of active interest taken by her colleagues from the Department of Sanskrit, Prakrit and Pali of the University of Poona and through the hand of cooperation extended by the publisher that the work is published without any modification for the benefit of the concerned. It has nineteen chapters. And, as is evident from the title deals with important and glorious aspect of the controversy, which was carried over centuries, between the adherents of the different trends of Indian philosophical thought owing allegiance to the Brahmanical tradition in one form or the other and those of Buddhism. On the former count, again, it takes into consideration some of the prominent representatives from *Prācīna Nyāya* (four), *Vaiśeṣika* (one), *Sāṃkhya* (four), *Yoga* (three) *Mīmāṃsā* (three) and *Advaita Vedānta* (two). Thus, the compass of the work is fairly broad and inclusive, ensuring that any major trend of the Brahmanical tradition is not left out arbitrarily. Here, too, the work concentrates on one aspect of the controversy under consideration, viz., the stand of the adherents of different Buddhist authors on important issues as analysed and presented by the adherents of the prominent trends of Brahmanical tradition in their respective works. The book brings to the notice of the concerned the analysis of such issues of vital concern in the Buddhist philosophical investigation as *Anityata*, momentariness (*ksanikata*), concept of causality, nature of soul, nature of perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*Anumana*), *Apoha*, *Samanya* (universal), *Abhava* and such other problems as controversy concerning *Pramāṇa-samplva* v/s *Pramāṇa-viplava* or *Pramāṇa-vyavastha*, and reactions of the adherents of Brahmanical tradition to the Buddhist stand concerning them. The book takes note of the important original texts and presents an outline of the different issues



discussed in them. In the process, it faithfully puts before the interested relevant and important source material concerning the central theme under consideration without bringing in any major distortion (*apasiddhanta*). From the point of view of understanding conceptual philosophical growth in this sub-continent during ancient times and contributions made by prominent scholars to bring it about, the book is important and deserves to be studied by every researcher interested in this sort of investigation.

In spite of comprehensiveness of the work and some of its assets noted above, its significance and importance would have been enhanced much more provided the following two points, to which we humbly draw the attention of the concerned, were taken seriously. First, although such prominent representatives as Gautama, Vatsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and Jayanta from the side of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* are taken due cognisance of, one fails to understand omission of Bhāsarvajña and Udayana from the same side. Their contribution to the *Prācīna Nyāya* and Buddhist controversy cannot be marginalised or ignored. Likewise, restricting herself to *Advaita Vedānta* the authoress has rightly taken cognisance of Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara. But one fails to understand omission of Vācaspati and contribution he made through his celebrated *Bhāmātī*. Such omissions also seem difficult to be defended on the basis of keeping length and size of the dissertation manageable, especially because as it stands itself it is quite voluminous in character. Secondly, instead of merely faithfully presenting an outline of the contention of the adherents of different trends of Brahmanical tradition against some of the important views on crucial issues put forth by the Buddhists, it would have been more profitable if the authoress were to explain the rationale by which such considerations at the hands of the followers of the Brahmanical tradition seem to be backed. It cannot be said that adherents of Brahmanical tradition differed from those of Buddhism or that the followers of Buddhism differed from those of the Brahmanical tradition just for the fun of differing and novelty of deviance. Their respective contentions were backed by their appropriate rationales. The controversy they carried on for centuries seems to be revolving around clash of differing contentions backed by their respective rationales and preference of categories. It would have been better if readers' attention were drawn to some aspects of such clash between rationales and some of the crucial consequences



such a clash led to in the course of time. An inquiry of this kind would have brought to the notice of the concerned the points of strength and weakness of their respective stands and the sort of rationales by which they were backed. Such an effort would have considerably increased depth and profundity of the work. Instead, the work seems to have sacrificed consideration of such issues on the altar of comprehensiveness of the treatment of the subject.

The book, nevertheless, is important for the source material it makes available and deserves to be studied by the interested. It is well brought out and supplies bibliography, index etc. which are useful to further researchers.

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IF THERE BE A GOD, FROM WHENCE  
PROCEED SO MANY EVILS?<sup>1</sup>

The title of this paper is put in a question form and any believer in God has to face this question. Perhaps no other theological problem affects our day to day life directly as this problem of evil does. But this is a problem important for both believer and non-believer. To the believer, the problem of evil often gives rise to an internal tension powerful enough to shake his faith causing a perpetual doubt. The non-believer, on the other hand, sees this problem as a proof of inconsistency in different religious beliefs which makes the idea of a loving Creator highly implausible.

Of course, the problem arises not just due to belief in any God, but belief in God who is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. Sceptics claim that if God had these three attributes, then there should not be any evil in this world. But our robust common sense tells us that there are innumerable evils in the world. If God can not prevent those evils, then he is not omnipotent. If God does not want to prevent them, then he is not wholly good. If God could not have foreseen them, then he is not omniscient. Thus, the sceptic claims that it is logically impossible to ascribe all these attributes to God and admit the existence of evil as well.

It is interesting to note that the believer does not deny the existence of evil, he rather emphasizes it. A believer does not see fewer evils than a sceptic. But then how can he fit this evil in his scheme of God possessing those lofty attributes? People have come up with different explanations which gives rise to a new subject within theology known as 'theodicy'. Etymologically it means 'justice of God'. Thus, theodicy is a study which defends God's justice and righteousness in the face of the existence of evil.



Perhaps, one of the classic treatments of this problem can be found in David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. After explaining Hume's position, I will discuss J. L. Mackie's (who can be viewed as a successor of Hume in this respect) attempt to show inconsistency in different theistic beliefs. I will also show how A. Plantinga refutes that charge. In the conclusion I shall mention certain points about what I think to be the right approach to this problem of evil. Let us start with Hume's formulation.

After criticising Cleanthes' anthropomorphism and specially the design argument for the existence of God, Philo (who represents Hume) goes on to discuss the problem of evil. Philo begins by attacking the very concept of natural theology. According to him, by independent human reasoning we can never justify our religious beliefs. The true basis of religion lies on feeling and not on reasoning. The fact of human misery has led people to express these religious sentiments. In order to awaken our religious attitudes, we need representations of misery and wickedness of people,

"and for that purpose a talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of reasoning and argument."<sup>2</sup>

Demea also joins Philo in describing how the whole earth is cursed and polluted. Our suffering has given rise to untold agony and horror. There are distempered conditions of our mind like mental anxieties, disappointment, shame, etc., which constantly haunt us. People can not prefer dying for they are afraid of death too.

Philo contributes to this depiction of human suffering by saying that everyone is surrounded by perpetual enemies. Though man can win over all other enemies, he himself raises his own enemies, like violence, war, injustice, treachery, etc.

After all these reflections, Philo wonders, how can Cleanthes still hold his anthropomorphism to be true and how can he ascribe omnipotence, benevolence and omniscience to God?

We can reconstruct Philo's depiction of the problem as follows:

- (1) There is evil in the world.
- (2) God is omnipotent and omniscient.
- (3) God is benevolent (wholly good).



Now Philo claims that one can not believe in these three propositions simultaneously. Believing in any two of them would lead to abandoning the third one. If we believe (1) and (2), we have to say that God foresees all the evils and can prevent them but does not do so. This means God is not benevolent, for he is not willing to prevent them. Similar explanation applies to our believing proposition (2) and (3) or (3) and (1).

Philo's point is that to think of God as omnipotent and omniscient means to think that he could prevent evils if he wished to. Similarly to think of God as benevolent means to think that God would prevent evil if he could. Notice that denial of either of these two assertions would lead to abandoning at least one of those three attributes ascribed to God.

However, Professor Nelson Pike has made an interesting observation here.<sup>3</sup> He does not think that the claim that a being would prevent suffering if he could follows from the claim that he is perfectly good. He gives the example of a parent forcing their child to take a bitter medicine which might cause a little suffering for the child but would cure him from his disease. What Professor Pike is arguing is that from the mere fact that a being is perfectly good it does not follow that he would have to prevent all evils. He might grant some evils in order to avoid greater evils.

But one might ask here how can we know that God permits little evils in order to avoid greater evils. In other words, we are asking whether God has "a morally sufficient reason"<sup>4</sup> for his allowing evils. In the example mentioned above, I think that we all agree that the parents have "a morally sufficient reason" to allow that little suffering to their child.

What about God? In God's case it is humanly impossible to detect "morally sufficient reasons" for each and every suffering occurring in every individual's life. Even if Philo succeeded in making a long list of a number of reasons for allowing evils and then proving that none of them are "morally sufficient reasons", that list can never be exhaustive. At any point Cleanthes might mention one reason which Philo has not considered and might claim that one to be "a morally sufficient reason". If Philo takes up the task of disproving that,



it would lead to an infinite regress. We can never be sure whether God has "a morally sufficient reason" to allow evils.

Professor Pike mentions five different "morally sufficient reasons" for not preventing any given instance of suffering. All of them are quite interesting and give rise to a host of problems which I am not discussing here. However, a theologian might find two of them especially important. One might argue that God allows suffering because it brings in good which outweighs the suffering. Another proposal might be that God allows evils because they result from goods which outweigh the resultant sufferings.

Needless to say, both these positions are not immune from defects. And Philo rejects both of them. Taking the clue from the design argument, Philo argues that if a house was built wrongly, we would condemn the architect who has built the house. Similarly we would hold the Creator of the world responsible for any inconsistency in his creation (Notice, the design argument uses these types of analogy to prove their point).

But if we can prove the world to be a consistent one, can we infer the existence of a Deity who is responsible for consistency in his creation? Philo perhaps anticipated that question and quickly adds,

"however consistent the world may be, allowing certain suppositions and conjectures with the idea of such a Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence."<sup>5</sup>

From the consistency of the world we can only make conjectures about divine attributes but those conjectures will always fall short of inference.

Philo mentions four alleged causes of evil and argues that none of those causes are necessary or unavoidable. If we could manipulate those four circumstances, we could minimize the ill and misery to a considerable extent. Since the goodness of Deity is to be established only from these phenomena, we can not prove the attributes like omnipotence, omniscience and benevolence of God. As long as there is a single evil in this world, it should puzzle any believer.

On the face of these criticisms, Cleanthes says that Philo's representations of misery are exaggerated. He also goes on saying that



only by denying human misery altogether we can prove the divine benevolence. I think that Cleanthes' denial of human misery echoes St. Thomas Aquinas' theory of "privation" where evil is not a positive entity but the absence of some characteristics in an entity. The consequence of this theory is that God is not responsible for creating evil, he only creates beings. This theory, of course, has its own problems.

We have seen earlier that a theologian might argue that God allows evils, because those evils result from certain goods which outweigh the negative effects of those evils. Following this line, some theologians have tried to show that God creates a world with free autonomous agents capable of making free choices, which is definitely better than the world having no free individuals. Since agents can make free choices, sometimes they make wrong choices and suffering results. The capability of making free choices outweigh the negative results of man's wrong choices. This line of reasoning is known as free will defence in the history of theology.

To put this thesis in a different way, a world having creatures who freely perform good/bad actions is more valuable than a world having automata performing only right actions because they can not do otherwise. If God creates creatures and always causally determines them to do what is right, then actions of those creatures are not performed freely and hence do not have any moral worth. Hence, in order to have moral worth, God must create creatures capable of acting freely, choosing their own course of actions. And in doing so, some creatures choose the wrong path leading to suffering. Hence, God allows evils not because he is not omnipotent or not wholly good, but because he wants to maintain the moral worth of human actions. The existence of evil does not diminish God's wholly good nature, but glorifies it. In this way, some theists have tried to explain the existence of evil by ascribing it to the will of man rather than to the will of God.

I can imagine a sceptic reacting to this position by asking: If God is really omnipotent and wholly good, why can he not make creatures who always freely choose what is good? Then, actions of those creatures will not be causally determined by God and at the same time they will always opt for the right course because of their very own nature. And God's failure to do this is again inconsistent with his being omnipotent and wholly good. This question has been raised by J.L. Mackie.<sup>6</sup>



Mackie begins his paper by claiming that this problem of evil serves as the final death-blow to God's existence where it can be shown,

"not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another....."<sup>7</sup>

He picks up one after another different proposed solutions of the problem of evil and tries to exhibit their shortcomings. Let us see how he tackles the free will defence.

Let us start by making a gradation of different evils and corresponding goods. We will call pain or misery a "first order evil" or evil (1). Correspondingly, pleasure and happiness will be "first order good" or good (1). Now in the case of "second order good" or good (2), evil (1) is a logically necessary component. The more severe evil (1) would be the more heightened good (2) would be. Sympathy, heroism can be examples of the good (2). Examples of "second order evil" can be cruelty, treachery, etc. I think that Mackie wants to call all the man-made evils "second order evils" or evil (2).

Now using this terminology, we can express the free will defence as follows : Evil (1) is justified for being a logically necessary component of good (2). And evil (2) is justified by ascribing it to wrong choices of human beings. God is not responsible for this. To the question, why does God create human beings making wrong choices, it is replied that God wants that man should act freely rather than being innocent automata. Thus, freedom is regarded as good (3) which is more valuable than good (2). And evil (2) is a logically necessary component of good (3) just as evil (1) was a necessary component of good (2).

Mackie questions this assumption that evil (2) is logically necessary for good (3). In other words, why should man's making wrong choices be regarded as necessary for his being free? Since there is no logical impossibility in man's making right choices freely on some occasions, there is also no logical impossibility in man's making right choices freely on every occasion.

If the free will defence argues that making some wrong choices is logically necessary for freedom, then freedom would mean



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"complete randomness of indeterminacy".<sup>8</sup> And if freedom is randomness, it is not related to our will. If the free act is not a result of an agent's will, then how can we attach any value to a free act? Why should we regard it as the most important good or good (3)?

Moreover, if God creates man with free will and if he can not prevent people from exercising wrong choices, God ceases to be omnipotent. If it is said that not that God can not prevent, but God abstains from preventing, then God is not wholly good. In many other theological contexts we do not think that by taking away elements of wrongness from the world God takes away its value too.

This, according to Mackie, leads to "the paradox of omnipotence".<sup>9</sup> God is an omnipotent being and creates certain things which he can not subsequently control. If God can not perform these things (which he can not control), then he has not achieved omnipotence. If God can create those things which he can not control then he has lost his omnipotence.<sup>10</sup>

It does make perfect sense to say that a man has made a machine and then has lost control of it. What we mean in this case is that though the man has built this machine, he lacks the details of how the machine works. He does not foresee the machine's actions. But since God is omniscient, we can not say that God lacks the knowledge of when man will make wrong choices. And this again will lead us to that paradox of omnipotence.

Mackie suggests a possible solution to this paradox by making a distinction between "first order omnipotence" or omnipotence (1) and "second order omnipotence" or omnipotence (2).<sup>11</sup> Omnipotence (1) is the unlimited power of God, while omnipotence (2) is the unlimited power of God to determine what power creatures should have. Then, we can say that after creating the world and distributing powers to the creatures, God ceases to have omnipotence (2).

But, the question still remains that if God continues to possess omnipotence (1), why can he not regain omnipotence (2) and act accordingly to create humans who always freely choose good ways?

The moral of all this, according to Mackie, is that we can not solve this problem until we modify one of the propositions believed



by a theist. But any modification will invite far-reaching consequence in a theist's schema.

Like Mackie, some other philosophers<sup>12</sup> have tried to refute this free will defence along the same line. All these challenges to free will defense boil down to one point: It is not contradictory to suggest that God might arrange laws of nature in such a way that men always freely choose good rather than evil. This assertion rests on two assumptions: i) God as a Creator must arrange the laws of nature and ii) It is not contradictory to say that human actions are done in accordance with the laws of nature and yet they are done freely.

Both these assumptions bring in certain problems. Regarding the first assumption, we can ask that though God creates the world, is he also responsible for the laws of nature? If he is responsible, can he change them at his will? If the laws of nature can be changed, how can we account for the deterministic explanations of natural sciences?

Regarding the second assumption, it would lead us to the age-old controversy of free will versus determinism. This problem arises due to a conflict between requirements of moral judgments and requirements of scientific explanations. One of the basic presuppositions of morality is that human beings are free agents. To make a moral judgment is to imply that the agent could have done otherwise, i.e., he could have performed an act different from what he in fact has done.

Scientific explanations, on the other hand, presuppose that natural events are strictly causally bound. Given the appropriate conditions, those natural events could not have been otherwise. This is why, scientists think that from the relevant causes if we can not predict its effect, we lack a proper scientific explanation of the event concerned.

Now the question is: Can we apply this scientific explanatory model to the study of human behaviour, especially in its moral aspect? Different responses have come up. People who are known as determinists regard scientific explanation as the paradigm and consequently explain away moral responsibility as an illusion. Indeterminists, on the other side, claim that some human actions are not amenable to scientific explanation and moral responsibility is a fact which we can not deny. The third response, which Professor T. Penelhum calls "reconcili-



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ationist position"<sup>13</sup>, denies any real conflict between determinist and indeterminist positions. It claims that if we grasp the true nature of natural laws and that of human moral behaviour, we will see that the ascription of free moral choice does not run counter to the scientific explanatory model.

This very proposition has been asserted in very many different ways by philosophers like Mackie and his sympathizers, who have tried to refute the free will defence.

However, in the face of these criticisms philosophers like Alvin Plantinga have tried to clarify and revive the free will defence. He has dealt with this topic in many of his works, including *God and Other Minds* and *The Nature of Necessity*. In these books he has introduced some techniques of modal logic and tried to come up with a valid version of the free will defence. Let us narrow down our scope and see how Plantinga reacts to Mackie's objections.

We have seen earlier that Mackie thinks if God is omnipotent, then he can create man freely choosing always right actions. To put it in other words, God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good implies no free man God creates ever performs any evil action. To detect the fault in Mackie's argument, let us rephrase his thesis schematically following Plantinga:<sup>14</sup>

- (1) God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.
- (2) If God is omnipotent, then he can produce any logically possible state of affairs.
- (3) Therefore, God can produce any logically possible state of affairs (From 1,2).
- (4) That all free men always perform right actions is a logically possible state of affairs.
- (5) Therefore God can make free men such that they always perform right actions (From 3,4).
- (6) If God can make free men doing always what is right and God is wholly good, then any free man made by God always performs right actions (From 1,5).
- (7) Therefore, no free man made by God ever performs evil actions.



Thus Mackie tries to show that from premise (1) we can deduce premise (7) which denies that in order to be free, man must perform some evil actions. God can create man freely choosing always the right actions.

It seems that in this argument the premise (5) is most important and debatable too. Now premise (5) is true if and only if it is true that "God makes free men such that they always perform right actions" is consistent (5a). If by (5a) we mean that God makes free men and brings about that they always perform right actions, then this is not consistent for if God brings about man's actions then man is not acting freely any more. But if by (5a) we mean that God makes free men and these free men perform always right actions (5b), then it is consistent but gives rise to different problems. So, (5) can be meant to express that the proposition "God makes free men and those free men made by God perform always right actions" is consistent (5c).

But if (5) is equivalent to (5c) then it is also equivalent to the proposition that "If God is all good and the proposition 'God makes free men and free men made by him always perform right actions' is consistent, then any free man made by God performs always right actions" (6a). This is a slightly revised version of Mackie's premise (6). Plantinga doubts the truthfulness of this premise (6a). He argues "whether the free men created by God would always do what is right would presumably be up to them..."<sup>15</sup> He thinks that free agents can perform wrong actions by the way of exercising their freedom.

I suspect, Plantinga is wrong here. I do not think that the truth of the premise (6a) taken by itself can be denied. The premise (6a) is a hypothetical proposition. The antecedent part of this hypothetical proposition consists of two parts; i) 'God is all-good' and ii) "the proposition 'God creates free men and the free men made by him always perform right actions' is consistent." In this case by 'God is all-good' we mean that God always creates free individuals. Thus, if God always creates free individuals, and if that is not inconsistent with free individuals' performing always right actions, then I can not see why it does not follow that any free man made by God always performs right actions. When Plantinga says that free individuals' performing right actions depend on their free choices thereby making room for wrong choices, he is in fact denying the very second part of the antecedent



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viz. that the proposition 'God makes free man and free man made by him always performs right actions' is consistent.

However, Mackie might still argue that since God is omniscient, he can foresee what wrong actions will be performed by his creatures. And since he is omnipotent, he could have created another set of possible persons who would not have committed those wrong actions. For any actual person, there is a possible person who is exactly like the actual person in every respect but does not perform any wrong action.

Moreover, if God instantiates those possible persons ( who are exactly like actual persons but always perform right actions), then God brings it out that those persons perform always right actions and refrain from doing wrong actions. But then these persons are no longer free agents; they could not have done otherwise and also they are not exactly like actual persons. God can not make a person free and cause him to do or refrain from doing certain actions. So, Plantinga concludes that like the property of not being created by god, "God can not instantiate any possible person containing the property *always freely* does what is right."<sup>16</sup>

The main point is that there are some possible persons having certain qualities whom God can never create, e.g., persons having the quality of not being created by God, or being blind and not blind. To this group also belong persons having the quality of freely doing always right actions.

It is to be noted here that people normally make a distinction between natural and moral evils. Natural evils are natural calamities like earthquake, drought, etc. Moral evils are created by man, for example, war, all sorts of human wickedness, etc. Of course, the boundary between natural and moral evil is not always clear and to some extent one is the result of another. Some philosophers<sup>17</sup> have argued that even if the free will defence can explain moral evils, it can not explain natural evils. The free will defence ascribes moral evils to wrong human choices, but natural evils can not be so ascribed.

Plantinga here makes an apparently dubious move. He takes recourse to the traditional theological theory of Satan and ascribes



natural evils to that powerful, non-human spirit who has rebelled against God in creating all sorts of havoc.

Obvious enough, critiques of Plantinga's free will defence will not accept this Satan story. They will ask for independent evidence for this Satan hypothesis. They will argue that we have direct knowledge of wrong human choices done by ourselves and other people in everyday life. We can realize where we or other people have gone wrong. But we do not have any such knowledge of the activities of Satan.

Plantinga makes two points against this scepticism which are worth mentioning. First, the question of independent verification of Satan hypothesis does not arise at all. The charge against theist was that his beliefs are inconsistent, one conflicts with the other. The charge was not that his beliefs are not verifiable or true. If the theist, by introducing Satan hypothesis, can come up with a coherent system, he can very well refute the charge of inconsistency. All that a theist needs is that the Satan hypothesis is not inconsistent with God's existence, which it is plainly not. Whether a theory is true or verifiable and whether a theory is consistent (i.e., whether different propositions in that theory cohere with each other), are two different problems and should be dealt with at two different levels.

Secondly, this whole issue of verification of the Satan hypothesis depends on some version of verifiability criterion which is open to many criticisms and suffer from limitations.

This is why, even Mackie who thinks this Satan hypothesis to be "at best part of the religious hypothesis which is still in dispute..." accepts Plantinga's ascription of natural evils to Satanic acts as "Formally ... possible."<sup>18</sup>

In recent years Mackie renewed his attack against free will defence and clarifies his own position. Mackie is not saying that God makes man freely choose good i.e., God forces man to choose good always. Then man is not free any more. Mackie's claim is that God might have made man such that from his very nature he would perform always right actions. If a man performs an act from his very nature without being compelled by any external force, then his acts are results of free choices.



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When free will defenders argue that it is logically impossible for all men to do freely always right actions, they presuppose that to do an act freely implies refraining from doing that act at some point. "But in so far as freedom *definitionally* involves variations, it is quite implausible to regard it as such a higher good."<sup>19</sup> We have seen earlier that the free will defender takes freedom to be a higher good which outweighs the bad results it brings in. Why should we regard freedom such valuable if it implies abstaining from doing an act (that act might be highly benevolent one)?

But is it logically possible that man from his very nature always freely chooses good actions? Here Mackie seems to side with what we have earlier called "reconciliationist" view. On this view freedom and determinism are not incompatible. Since human actions are causally determined by human nature and if it is logically possible that man always freely chooses good actions, it is also logically possible that man from his very nature always freely chooses good actions. Here God is not bringing out those good actions, nor is there any external compulsion. These good actions arise from the very human nature. We can well imagine a society consisting of such perfect men.

The next question would be: Is it logically impossible that God should create men with such nature that they would freely always do right actions? The free will defender might say that by creating man with such particular nature, God will intrude into the agent's freedom. God creates man without any specific nature leaving their nature to arise from the environment, for example. But if freedom implies God's creating man without any specific nature and if it also suggests that man must abstain from doing right action at some point, then it is not clear why we are attaching such value and importance to freedom and trying to justify it in spite of bad results which it brings in?

We have seen earlier that Plantinga defines the notion of possible worlds in a strict way such that it is not possible for God to create any and every possible world, even though God is omnipotent. He introduces the notion of "trans-world depravity"<sup>20</sup> by which he means that in which ever possible world a man exists, if he is free, he performs some wrong actions. And it is possible that every creature (either in this world or in any other possible world) suffers from "trans-world depravity."



Here, we can ask Plantinga the same question which he has faced before: If God is omnipotent and wholly good, why can not he rectify this suffering from "trans-world depravity"? Is it because he is given a very limited range of materials out of which he will have to make his creatures? Then, he is not omnipotent. Is it because he can not foresee this defect? Then he is not omniscient. If he can rectify it and knows how to rectify it but does not act accordingly, then he is not wholly good.

One might try to solve this problem by weakening the terms involved here. This can be done in two ways: i) By denying that God is omnipotent in an absolute sense, or ii) By denying there is really any evil at all. The first possibility suggests that God is omnipotent but in a qualified manner. God can not create possible worlds containing logically inconsistent characteristics. He can not create a world containing people having the characteristics of not being created by God. This notion of qualified omnipotence might help to solve certain dilemmas. Inability to square a circle does not mean any limitation on the part of God. Omnipotence is the power to perform logically possible actions.

But, I think, this does not solve our problem. Both Mackie and Plantinga agree that God can not create certain possible worlds i. e., worlds which are logically inconsistent. The issue in their debate is whether the world containing people freely doing always right actions is a logically consistent world which can be created by God. In other words, they differ as to which possible world is logically consistent one.

The second possibility denies the reality of evil. This has been envisaged by St. Thomas Aquinas who holds that evil is not a positive element, it is the absence of some proper feature. It is due to "privation". God creates being only, and in so far as it is being, it is good. Evil does not need a creative agent, it is only absence of being.

Following this line, some people might argue that the term 'good' has different meanings when applied to man. God, being God, does always good even if those actions do not adhere to our moral standards. Doing good follows from the very notion of God.

It seems to me that these theologians are guilty of changing the semantics of ordinary language. We use terms like 'good', 'evil' to



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evaluate things and not to decide whether things are real or not. The existence of things is independent of their being good or bad. The former is factual, while the latter is evaluative. It is only after finding out that an object exists, we can think of it as good or bad. An object's being good does not necessarily follow from its existence.

Moreover, when we apply the terms like 'good' or 'bad', we do so according to our standard of using it. This explains the fact that different societies use these terms in slightly different ways. Now a Being (God) whose standard is radically different from ours, who thinks earthquakes, famine, war, treachery to be good, is not worthy of calling good. For, our application of the terms 'good' implies that the thing called good satisfies standards which makes us apply this term to ourselves.

From the above discussion it is clear that the problem of evil boils down to whether it is logically possible for God to create a world containing people freely doing always right actions. Plantinga denies its logical consistency while Mackie does not find it logically impossible. Since God could have created such a world, which implies, according to Mackie, we have to alter our theistic beliefs.

We started our discussion with Boethius, question: "From whence proceed so many evils?" Let us assume that theologians can not give any proper answer to this question. They simply do not know the answer. What follows from this is the fact that theologians do not have sufficient knowledge of their own field of study. This might be embarrassing for theologians. But this does not imply anything philosophically relevant about the cause or justification of evil. There are very many problems in science of which scientists have so far very little knowledge or no knowledge at all. This does not imply anything scientifically relevant about the nature of those hitherto unknown things.<sup>21</sup>

One might argue that if there were some justifications of evil, theologians would have known about it. This is a highly implausible suggestion and goes against our commonsense experience of other fields of knowledge.

People have argued that if a theologian does not know what reason God has allowing evils, then he does not know whether God has



any reason at all for allowing evils and consequently he can not believe in God's omnipotence, omniscience and all-good nature any more. But one can give many examples where we claim to know certain facts without knowing the details of their explanation. I know that there is a greatest cheque<sup>22</sup> (which involves the largest amount of money) right now in the world, though I do not know its exact figure. One can give many similar examples from mathematics where we know that a particular number has such and such property, but we do not know what exactly that number is.

One might argue that we have independent reasons for believing in such numbers in mathematics, but what independent reasons does a theologian have for justification of evil? Let us suppose, a theologian replies that there are reasons for his belief but he does not know what those reasons are. Apparently this might sound paradoxical. But if we analyze the structural pattern of any discussion, this suggestion does not sound that implausible. In any discussion, all the parties involved start from certain given premises which all of them accept as true. Unless this is so, no fruitful discussion can take place. We can not start our discussion from vacuum. Everybody participating in that discussion believes there are good reasons for believing in those basal premises. If anybody questions those elementary premises, two consequences might follow; i) There would be no genuine fruitful discussion, for any disagreement presupposes a vast area of shared beliefs; or ii) The content of the discussion would change, for then participants would be discussing the validity of those hitherto agreed (by all) basic premises. This would have to be done with reference to some other premises and so on *ad infinitum*. If any of those premises in that series is questioned by any of the participants, then the whole chain of discussion would fall apart and the discussion would come to an end. So, we must admit that in order to have a genuine discussion, we must start with certain premises which we accept as true, though we can not tell exactly what reasons we do have for believing in their truth.

Thus, in the theological circle of discussion, people start from certain premises which are accepted by theologians, though they might not be able to state exactly what reasons they have for accepting those elementary propositions. If we doubt any of those basal statements, our discussion with the theologian comes to a halt and no one can learn



anything from each other. I suspect, this is the picture not only in theological discussion but in any discussion on any subject.

One possible way to solve the problem of infinite regress might be that of explaining those basic premises with reference to one another. We can justify premise p with reference to premise q and premise q with reference to premise p. No doubt, this would give rise to the problem of circularity. Here I would like to make two comments. First, theological elementary sentences may be circular, one is dependent on the other, but they are not inconsistent. Notice, Mackie's main charge against theology was the inconsistency in different theistic beliefs. Now we see that the theological statements are circular but not inconsistent. They are interdependent and because of their interdependence they give rise to a system which is at least coherent. Those basal propositions do not conflict with each other. One might start with a set of different premises and one can construct a different system, but this does not show any inconsistency in the previous system.

Secondly, this kind of circularity is inevitable in any attempt to explain the basic elements in any system of knowledge. This would be clear if we look at the history of development of different logico-mathematical systems. People started with some basic elements and defined them tautologically, for at that level they do not know any other element with reference to which they can define those basic elements. They applied certain rules to those basic elements and came up with a whole network of theorems.<sup>23</sup> Thus theological statements are not exceptions in being circular.

This is why to a true believer, the problem of evil is not a problem at all. He starts with the basic theological statements such as God is omnipotent, omniscient and all-good. When he sees evils, he concludes that God must have sufficient reasons to allow evils. He might not explain those reasons exactly. But this matters little to him. For a theologian, the question is not why or how these evils appear. He is concerned with how to justify these evils in the face of God's existence. Thus different theologies came up with different theodicies.

Further, the problem of evil is not merely a problem of logic, i.e., reconciling a number of beliefs as claimed by Mackie. It has another dimension. It has a reference to extremely private subjective experi-



ences of an individual. It might be viewed as a problem of logical consistency by an unbeliever who falls outside the theological system. But for a believer, this problem affects his day to day faith, his world-view, sometimes his very existence. The problem of evil does not arise in vacuum. It affects the very core of our heart. Since every individual occupies a unique position in this world and is affected thereby uniquely, the problem of evil affects each individual in its own way. It is not uncommon to observe that the same experience of pain turns some people to believers while some other people to unbelievers. This shows that it is not a matter of mere logic. These dilemmas can not be solved in abstract, i.e., without any reference to the experience of an individual, which again varies from man to man. We can not expect solutions to the problem of evil which would be accepted by all.

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## NOTES

1. Boethius, *Consolations of Philosophy*, Book 1, Sec. IV. I have taken this quotation from Nelson Pike's Introduction to *God and Evil* edited by him, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1964.
2. Hume, David, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Ed. by Henry D. Aiken, New York, Hafner Publishing Company, 1957.
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10. I will show a possible way out of this paradox in the concluding part of this paper.
11. Mackie, J. L., "Evil and Omnipotence," p.103.
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18. Mackie, J. L., *The Miracle of Theism*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, p.162.
19. *Ibid.*, p.166.
20. Plantinga, A., *The Nature of Necessity*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974, p.184.
21. Some of the ideas expressed in these paragraphs are taken from *Belief in God* by George I. Mavrodes, New York, Random House, 1970, Chapter IV.
22. This example has been used by Professor J. Horne of University of Waterloo during our discussion.
23. There is an interesting problem about the status of these rules, a discussion of which will take me beyond the scope of the present paper.



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## HINTIKKA'S GAME OF LANGUAGE

### 1

Hintikkas break new grounds in their investigations into the 'unificatory' view of Wittgensteins from a 'pure' language point of view.<sup>1</sup> On their view, the two Wittgensteins can be integrated into one another, by looking at the early as having a certain phenomenology of language (symbolism) and the later as expounding a certain phenomenology about grammar (conceptualism), and seeing that the roots of the latter lies in the former.<sup>2</sup> What actually their investigations ultimately show is that a systematic relationship between the early phenomenology of logical form (phenomenological in the exact sense in which all logical forms are built out of the general logical form) which get manifested in the mirror theory of language (which the picture theory presupposes) on the one hand, and the latter multiplicity of logical forms which depend upon the multiplicity of grammatical forms that get reflected in the 'motley' of language-games on the other. The former results in the ineffability of semantics and the consequent distinction between saying and showing, whereas the latter results in the conceptual priority of language-games over the rule-following of language-game and conceptual impossibility of private language, and, thus, the ineffability continues in the form of phenomenology as grammar. Such a phenomenology as grammar is identifiable with physicalistic language, for the simple reason that such a phenomenology as grammar is also part of the physical system, and is also rooted in Wittgenstein's idea of phenomenology as grammar which identifies phenomena with grammar ('phenomenology is grammar'), an idea that dominated his middle period.<sup>3</sup>

Both of the above ways of thinking about language originate with the major premise which takes language as a universal medium (*linguistica characteristica*). Whereas the above transition is to be described as one from the logical to the conceptual, the ineffability itself

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is continuous with both. It is only from these observations that Hintikkas want to recover the theoretical underpinnings of ineffability of semantics from his 'critique of pure language'.<sup>4</sup> A total recovery would only be sponsored by looking at the idea of language-game from game-theoretical point of view of modal semantics. Such a theory is to be located at the deeper layer than the surface layer of therapy, that gets more often highlighted in Wittgensteinian investigations as inaugurating a theory of conceptual investigations into foundations of mathematics or psychology.<sup>5</sup> Thus, Hintikkas' investigations covers a wide spectrum of ideas that Wittgenstein enunciated during his early, middle and the later periods.

## 2

I suggest that there are at least *two* ways one can look at the way the above investigations are carried out; on the one hand, the more controversial part which portrays the corpus of ideas as embodying a game-theoretical model of language (logic) with a formal apparatus for a theory of quantification; and on the other, a less controversial part of the game-theoretical model of language which contains a rich philosophical significance for a study of language. One may take them as complementary aspects of one and the same perspective, in that the understanding of the latter does not centralise the model-theoretical point of view associated with the former, while at the same time, it provides a backdrop for the former. Nevertheless, Hintikkas want to maintain certain 'opposition' between them, and the opposition is between the view of language as a universal medium and language as calculus. In a similar vein, Hintikkas hold that the distinction between them is between the concept of game of language and concept of language-game (see the section entitled 'Game of language vs. Language-game').<sup>6</sup>

Whatever it might be, the merit of Hintikkas' investigations, I think, is to be judged on *three* grounds: (1) the way they explore the continuity between the early (pre-1929), the middle (1929-36) and the consequent later (1936-1953) Wittgensteins, which has its focus on the doctrinal content; (2) the way the continuity is worked out from crystalline logical forms of truth-functions to the fluid logic of language-games which partly answers Wang's question (H. Wang, 1986);<sup>7</sup> (3) the way their game-model (Hintikka prefers the term *sprachlogik* transcends other paradigms of language including the



speech act paradigm in philosophy of language. In this article, we shall focus more on (3) since both (1) and (2) lie outside of such an outline that we attempt here.

As we remarked, the unification of the two Wittgensteins lies in the way his outlook on language is interpreted. The early view is accordingly identified with a phenomenological analysis. Its two major traits are : it is a search for ultimate logical form of the phenomenologically given (Tractarian objects); secondly, it lies midway between the empirical (science) and logical.<sup>8</sup> The later view is said to make a transition to a physicalistic language. The 'transition' here is to be interpreted as embodying a 'backward-looking' model, in that phenomenological language is regarded as the *erste sprache* (primary or first language); the significance of this for a theory of symbolism cannot easily be overlooked. On Hintikkas' reading, Wittgenstein's later paradigm takes this as 'secondary' to a more primary language, namely the physicalistic language. It is physicalistic in the exact sense in which language itself becomes part of the physical reality. The transition may roughly correspond to a transition from private language to one about public language. Public language need not necessarily be identified with the community-language, but the language whose primary purpose is 'expressive' in character. (This notion is of comparable interest to Dummett's).<sup>9</sup>

More exactly, the transition may be described as a passage from one phenomenology ('vertical' phenomenology of language or logical forms) to a phenomenology ('horizontal' phenomenology of grammar), which requires a 'hierarchical' phenomenology of grammar. To describe this would not altogether be wrong within Hintikkas' own terminology, as it is only the latter that completes Wittgenstein's account of language by absorbing the earlier view. It is the phenomenology in the later sense that is called physicalistic that devolves on the public character of language. Now, what is common to both of these views is that both accept the universality of language as its antecedent and the ineffability of semantics is seen as the consequent. This, according to Hintikkas, is, therefore, the benchmark of integrated Wittgenstein.

### 3

Hintikkas' project of theoretical (conceptual) underpinnings of ineffability semantics can easily be mooted by a singular comparison



with a similar theory advanced by Jerrold Katz.<sup>10</sup> Whereas for Katz, the 'principle' of effability must be regarded as embodying the secondary uniqueness (secondary because natural languages are unique in the semantic sense in that its sentences of one language are translational equivalents of some other language, which captures its sense) of natural language, for Hintikka, its theoretical underpinnings of ineffability extend as far as to suggest a surrogate for the semantics of natural languages, in that they generate a hierarchy of language schemes and consequently, they all could be accommodated within a calculus concept of language. We can call Katz's as the *sinn*-based argument for the priority of translation, and the latter simply as a hierarchical view of semantic generativism. Thus, one can make a passage from language as a universal medium to language as a calculus, however tendentious the passage may look at the outset. That is, just as for Katz, effability implies translatability (intertranslatability as he calls it) and not the other way round, for Hintikka, the ineffability of Tractarian view gives way to ineffability between different language-schemes, in the *Philosophical Investigations*. This view yields two consequences: (1) Hintikka's ineffability implies an effability (ineffability is not after all ineffable, as Hintikka says); second, effability, in Hintikka's sense, implies a horizontal growth of language-games. To some extent, thereafter, Hintikka also shares a translatability as trait of natural languages in Katz's sense. (I disregard for a moment the explicit opposition between Katz's translational semantics, which is opposed to any intensionalist account of meaning of the type Hintikka's favour, but in a distinct sense). A larger question here is about the exact sense in which Hintikka can be said to accept essentiality of translation.

If so, even while Hintikka qualifies this by saying that the ineffability of semantics is to be understood rather than overcome, he is at one with post-analytical traditions. Though the idea originates in Frege, it occurs as a 'logical consequence' of the acceptance of universality of logic (inescapability, inexpressibility). The idea of universality of language is, therefore, the lynchpin around which the entire outlook of Wittgenstein is spun. This is also the nucleus around which Hintikka builds their reading of Wittgensteins.

Nevertheless, it is the ineffability of semantics that lies at the heart of Wittgenstein's outlook on language and so, it is a pervading theme in Hintikka's investigations too. With the game-theoretical



paradigm of logic, the ineffability is a trait that is seen as a direct consequence of the relation between syntax and semantics and the latter is again motivated to comprise a neo-critique of (formal) language in which, there appears an asymmetry between 'any' and 'every'. This is called the 'any-thesis' of the quantifiers (I am less concerned with this here, see f.n. 1). It is this which bears a contrast to language as calculus and both stem from a more sharper distinction between *logic as language* and *logic as calculus* advanced earlier by Heijenoort.<sup>11</sup> One interesting way of precisifying this, according to Hintikkas, is to take the contrast to be one that obtains between *language as a universal medium* and *language as calculus*. On Hintikkas' interpretation, the contrast is not as much significant as the preferred interpretation he adduces to the first limb of this idea. Following this, Hintikka might deny that the ineffability implies languages as universal medium; thus, the implication is shown to be one way independent.

Let us see how Hintikkas handle this. Now, the idea of language as universal medium requires fresh impetus more than ever. Following Habermas, we can call natural language as the universal metalanguage, and we can subsume the whole hierarchy of languages under it. To do so would be tantamount to a partial refutation of Hintikkas because they want a hierarchy of languages from the premise that takes language as a universal medium. In a way, they, therefore, reverse Habermas' idea but at the same time mock at their own distinction unless it is formulated as a distinction that obtains between 'language' and 'logic' (calculus). At one place at least Hintikka concedes that a formal and natural language have isomorphic structures, and, thus, completes the circle by saying that formal logical forms are analogical to natural language forms. This also serves as a basis for reducing natural language to a species of formal language. Natural languages are, thus, reducible to predicate logic. Hintikka also denies at the same time any recognition to speech act paradigm of philosophy of language inaugurated by J. L. Austin. This is of comparable interest to Dummett's brisk dismissal of speech act paradigm.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, he takes utterances to constitute one limb of the performatives, the other limb includes non-linguistic or extralinguistic actions or activities (of searching and finding, for example).



As seen above, language as a universal medium is primary idea and ineffability is a direct consequence of this. If we, however, take it in Hebermas' way it means only that everything that could be expressed, could be expressed within a universal metalanguage and this goes against Hintikkas' idea, as shown above. In a sense, Hintikkas' game-theoretical (conceptual) analysis is directly opposed to the formal pragmatic analysis of language which Habermas motivates within his theory of communicative action. Nevertheless, similarities between these two models become apparent in their basic commitments: Both do not favour a Tarskian model of truth in terms of material adequacy conditions. First, against the common understanding that Wittgenstein's picture theory is a transformation of Fregean type of truth-function theory, Hintikka maintains that picture theory of truth is a theory about language-understanding and *a fortiori*, it is not explainable except in terms of model theory, whereas Tarski's theory may not be attributed with this trait (97). According to Habermas, Tarski's truth makes only a weaker claim as against the discourse theory of truth which tries to explain the intersubjective sense of truth (274). The discourse theory of truth gives certain priority to modality (they are hidden structures of ordinary language according to Hintikka) rather than to elementary sentences which carry empirical import. Secondly, Habermas' performative analysis of speech act takes a methodological assumption of three worlds (objective, social, subjective) all of which constitute the vertices of communicative activity; *a fortiori* it takes explicit speech acts as providing a basis for the principle of expressibility. As a consequence, it neutralises the context unlike the speech act analysis of Austin etc. Thirdly, his discourse theory of truth may be said to have a game-theoretical component so long as they adopt a performative analysis of speech acts. This is not so faithful to Habermas' own account. For Habermas, every speech act must be analysed in terms of two major components, one what he calls the 'evidential dimension', of ostensive speech acts and the other 'argumentative dimension', that are governed by 'criteria' in which the truth-claims are defended or redeemed<sup>13</sup> *a fortiori*, the fourth trait of discourse theory of truth is that it does not start with 'basic sentences'. On the contrary, it chooses as paradigmatic cases statements that call for grounding even at first sight hypothecally general and *model* statements, *counterfactual* and *negative* statements, to which the human mind owes its progress



(emphasis added) and lastly, Habermas thinks that temporality has its bearings on linguistic creativity (272).

Ineffability, it follows, does not provide a mere contrast but one of opposition between 'inexpressibility' and 'expressibility' of its semantics; otherwise it remains only at a tenuous level. Moreover, by making ineffability common both to early as well as later Wittgenstein, Hintikkas lose the rationale for expressing a crucial difference that underlies their own interpretation. That is, in one sense, the ineffability of semantics lies more on the vertical side of language-ontology frame, where semantics models itself on logical syntax, and, thus, the ineffability of semantics is only a consequence of ineffability of syntax. It is manifest in Wittgenstein's distinction between 'saying' and 'showing'. Since philosophical propositions are not on the side of saying, they are only shown. The ineffability of basic semantic relations (what is a name, what is an object, how they are related?) leads us on towards the showability of logical forms (64). In sharp contrast to the above, the ineffability of semantics in the second sense leads us on towards the consequence of the ineffability of syntax (of natural language). This also lends the rationale to Wittgenstein's use of grammar (or semantic rules of grammar). This is because language comprises both intralinguistic as well as extralinguistic activity (compare Dummett again). This is what Hintikkas identify with horizontal and vertical development of language, as seen from the language-game account of language. If this is so, then the picture of later Wittgenstein that emerges out of Hintikkas' reflections, is all the more confusing. For it includes ineffability in both of the above senses and hence this double-ineffability vitiates the very idea of language game concept of language. For this simply holds that neither semantics be allowed to be modelled on syntax and *vice versa*. As Hintikkas take the latter, it, however, allows the semantical issue of private language as leading towards a public language, in the exact sense in which it leads to the proof which says that language also has no 'private syntax'. This is the tenor of Hintikkas' reconstruction of Wittgenstein's *reductio* of private language argument. Thus, the latter account of ineffability is claimed to be holistic in that it includes both language - world correction, as well as interlinguistic phenomena, and private, public sub-systems; in addition, they also include the contrast, given as vertical and horizontal languagegames, which is, however, far more significant than the above.



## 5

The exact sense in which its singnificance is understood may be delineated as follows: the horizontal account of language is highly significant in that it stands for the interrelation between different language-games (*satz-systeme*).<sup>14</sup> It is this that presupposes a hierarchical arrangement of language-games raised from 'inside-out', rather than 'outside-in' as it is in the case of Habermas. A hierarchical arrangement of language games requires that we distinguish between 'primary' language-games and 'secondary' language-game. This significance of the hierarchical arrangement lies in the way the primary and secondary language-games is related in a rather unique way. In consistency with the primacy Hintikka has attached to semantics (semantics is a model of syntax), now let us say that the ineffability here demands that our syntax is corrected to other's semantics. This is where Hintikkas locate the origin of what they call as public language. The syntax/semantics distinction calls for several such contrasts like private/public sub-systems of language, besides the vertical and horizontal language-games and intralinguistic and word-object semantics (in the plural). This is actually the basis for Hintikkas' broad-based holism. Unlike other varieties of holism, Hintikkas' is broad based for the very reason it includes the phenomenon of language also, i. e., language as it is experienced. Thus, in a sense, Hintikka is forced to take the stand that the ineffability is not ineffable after all.

An important feature of advancing the hierarchy of languages is to introduce us into the differences and interrelations among the language-games. It is here Hintikkas tread on a new territory wherein typology of language-games are distinguished. The most paradigmatic type here is physiognomic language-games, which Hintikkas regard as the 'most important kind of public framework'.<sup>15</sup> The reason why physiognomic (sometimes it is physiological) language-games are paradigmatic is that it is explainable in terms of a public language system. Wittgenstein's preference for this is due to the fact that it makes learning possible. Learning the semantic use of words (to fix the meaning of words appropriately) is primal part of the game. Private syntax is just a derivation from public semantics. It is only from this Hintikkas develop their eleven theses about the differences and interrelationships between various language-games.<sup>16</sup>



A primary language-game is defined to be about the most primary experience, say, colour experience. Its exact analogue is also a primary but it is called physiological language-game, called visual experience. Such of those primary language-games are incorrigible in that they are not revisable and they provide direct word-world linkage. Now, the relation between primary/secondary language game and the private/public language games is brought out in the following way; the laws governing the private and public language games are so logical as to warrant a 'necessity' at the level of primary, but they are not the same, as they are separated at the secondary language games. It is for this reason that the secondary language games expect us to distinguish criteria and rules, whereas they have no role at the primary level. Another key difference between primary and secondary language-game is that we can deploy our model concepts like knowledge, belief etc. in the secondary rather than in the primary language-game. Doubt, correctness, and mistake are typically modal in this respect and they, therefore, belong to the secondary language-game. In a sense, therefore, the propositional attitudes are not primary. The tenth thesis states the distinction between primary (phenomenological) and the secondary (physical) language is one that obtains between parallel language-games, while at the same time neither one of them can be adjudicated to stand for unique language-games. Thus, the continuity between primary and secondary language-game is made very obvious. Let us try to understand the continuity a little further.

While emphasizing their continuity, we must understand that they can never be separated but at the same time they are *ex-hypothesi* alternative language-games. The continuity is derived from the way the *Bezeichnung-Gegenstand* (word-object) model operates in the realm of private sensation. They are alternative in the sense that one can 'drop-out' without the other. Consider, for example, the sensation and manifestation of sensation which Wittgenstein discusses in sec. 270 of PI. Hintikkas comment :

'In neither language-game is the relation of the external manifestation of a sensation and the sensation itself evidential or justificatory, nor is there room for doubt or mistake in either of the two cases. And not but the least, in neither type of language-game is there a hint that the private experience itself is not real and important' (277).



Hintikka is right in thinking that the above three comments underscore much of the strain of the argument against the possibility of private language argument, as it is conventionally clarified. Further, what Hintikkas tell us here illuminate the following points : that neither privacy nor publicity rely on exclusive criteria; that mistakes (rule-violations, for example) are not explainable as such, and that the real private language argument is one that does not quieten privacy as merely a ghostly counterpart of the public.

## 6

Having explained the relationship between the two language-games in the above way, now Hintikkas pass on to deal with the rationale for the alternativism in the above. Tracing it to the distinction Wittgenstein himself makes between, 'primary' and 'secondary senses of the work' in his PI (216), Hintikka passes for comment. Primary and secondary language-game are alternative in the sense that though primary is incorrigible and the secondary is not, they are, in a sense, on par with each other. They are on par with each other because the primary language cannot overlook the secondary language-game. *Pari Passu*, the relation between word-world relationship is not quite independent of various language-game that occur in a variety of what Carnap calls 'conceptual frameworks'. The point is that the incorrigibility of the primary language-games, in other words, can never be independently motivated from secondary language-games which are not so incorrigible. Thus, the rationale of the above distinctions lies in the way they are alternative to one another-alternative to one another in the exact senses that we can drop that beetle from the box; so a child can be trained to make use of many corrigible moves in language-games. Fitted into part of the learning process, they stand for some sort of foregoing ('abdication' or 'abrogation') of earlier moves. Though 'lying' for example, is conceptually a secondary language-game, one has to learn it any way.

A hierarchy of languages is constructed by 'superimposing' one upon the other, in as much as a secondary is superimposed on a primary language-game. If so, then the exact relation between them becomes a question of crucial importance and also it has immense bearings on the interpretation of Wittgenstein. Thus, when they are superimposed one upon another, it does not mean that we have worked out in *toto* a



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complete identity between pain (inner, psychological and internal event) and painbehaviour (outer, overt, and external manifestation). Nor is it possible for us to say completely that we have tried to drive a wedge between them. The relation between them is the relation between two language-games, one superimposed upon the other, and hence the problem that is focused here is not easily resolvable by means of evidence, justification, criteria and symptoms. The point that should be borne in mind here is that the primary is not justified without the secondary and *vice-versa*; or simply that each one is a move in a language-game. It is only such a move between one language-game to another that is conceived in the thought-experiment in PI (203). Hintikkas are not alone in pointing this to us. As Stuart Shanker, in yet another context, focuses on a very similar problem in the context of Wittgenstein's critique of Hilbert's metamathematics (is called a mathematics in disguise) and the critique of incompleteness theorem (is called a bogey).<sup>17</sup> However, we shall look into the relation in a little more closely in the context of Hintikkas' reading.

## 7

One must try to read a deeper significance into Hintikka's manoeuvre: that is, what he is developing here is a version of the argument against the individuality of languages, versions of which one comes across in Quine, Davidson and Dummett (Elsewhere I have identified this as a distinct post-analytical trait).<sup>18</sup> I stop short of arguing here for the above though. It is briefly explained as follows: it subscribes to the possibility of one language within the other (Habermasian form). It can take yet another form with an inverted image of the above: this yields a sort of Russell-Tarski hierarchy of languages. In Hintikkas' terms, this is what exactly that should be christened as the concept of language as a calculus. We need not spend time on this as a trait of languagehood, except noting that this is what Hintikkas' implicitly aim at (compare Davidson's translationhood as the trait of all languages). It is easy to show that these are all certain family-resemblance concepts about language, translation, and the priority of one over the other.

One can easily guess why Hintikka does not prefer to deduce the relationship between primary and secondary language-game as a direct consequence of the ineffability thesis. The reason is to be sought in the



way Hintikkas allow a transition from one language to the other, which is seen as an alternative to the original. Thus, seen in conjunction with the above point made in the last sentence of the previous paragraph, we are not making a transition to yet another important way of conceiving language simpliciter, but only another way of conceptualising about language, which is not entirely different from the one above. I read this as a crucial significance of the distinction that Hintikka has drawn between language as a universal medium and language as calculus, notwithstanding the exact distinctions that do not come apart.<sup>19</sup>

The relationship between the primary and secondary language-games now does in no way strengthen any inductive 'move' to one more modicum of certainty but only to depict the character of a new language-game. Hintikkas' point is that abrogation is not generating a 'gameless situation' but a new language-game. Nevertheless, Hintikkas' emphasis on an alternatism could only be thought of as minimal. Such a minimalist position, according to my reading, evokes a corresponding constraint on the paradigm of later philosophy. The reason for this is that it does not explain the exact relation that prevails between two alternative language-games that is in a sense philosophically illuminating. Shanker perceives this as the underlying problem of later Wittgenstein, but his proposed solution is much more complicated to foster a comparative study within the compass. That should await yet another occasion. So also his exposition drains off the therapeutic strain in him which probably stands in the forefront of current research on Wittgenstein, taking ever so many new forms. Hintikkas quote similar remarks from his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* in support of the above point.<sup>20</sup>

What kind of game one plays, thus, assumes semantical significance and the relationship is not epistemic in any sense which requires justification. From Hintikkas' point of view, the way to find a niche for semantical phenomena requires us to see the inseparable conceptual tie as one that is analogous to 'searching and finding' a counterexample within the ambit of particular language-games. One can elucidate Wittgenstein's idea of criteria by saying that the hierarchy of language requires a hierarchy of criteria without overlooking its primary association with incorrigibility, since we do not need criterion *per se* for a primary language-game. We do not need them, as they are not applicable to them. So, the secondary language-games are to be



correctly located at the space of possibilities, where the possibility of 'error' (*satzsystem* violations) are not ruled out. Hintikka comments that there is no such possibility in the semantical state of nature *before* or even in primary language-games'.<sup>21</sup>

Since there is no 'private syntax', doubt, correctness, mistake all belong to the secondary language-games. Similarly, paradigmatic first person statements (especially propositional attitude statements given in the form of 'I hope', 'I expect', 'I know' etc.) also belong to the secondary language-games. *A fortiori*, the syntax of these statements are analysed in terms of the semantics of language-games in which this has public references. The modalities as they are called are properly analysed as not in the way non-modal components stand in logical relations to one another, but in the way the different modalities occupy their respective in the public language-game. Hintikkas conclude their comparative investigation of language-games by generalising the above framework for the specific analysis of modal statements involving propositional attitudes. That is, he says that both the descriptive (that *p*) as well as the modal part (e.g. I believe) require a public language framework but at the same time they fail to comment on why they are, then, to be syntactically distinguished and what exactly their ultimate significance for understanding Wittgenstein's (Hintikkas') reading of this type of analysis.<sup>22</sup>

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## NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1. Jaakko Hintikka has both a formal (game-theoretical model of logic) as well as an informal *sprachlogik* (game theoretical model of language) that appear in a mixed form throughout his writings. My aim is restricted to the latter rather than the former. I have made an attempt to study the former or their actual relationship in my 'The Significance of J. Hintikka's *Sprachlogik*' (Ms.). Much of the material for this present quest is dictated by Hintikka's recent appeal to an integrated Wittgenstein as evidenced in his *Investigating Wittgenstein*, Co-authored by M.B. Hintikka (Basil Blackwell, 1986.)
2. The label 'symbolism' takes the representative character of language with or without its affiliating relation to reality, and the label 'conceptualism' refers to the conceptual content that is associated with the semantics of natural language. It is this combined characteristic that Hintikka calls the 'ineffability of semantics' and centralises in the whole of his investigations.
3. See Appendix to Chapter 6 ('Wittgenstein in Transition') for part of the German version of Wittgenstein's section entitled 'Phänomenologie ist Grammatik' from the *Big Typescript* No. 213 (von Wright's Catalogue): pp. 159-160 of Hintikka (1986).
4. See p. 17ff. Hintikka identifies this with the discovery of theoretical limits of language in the Kantian way, but adds two essential qualifications. That is, on the one hand, he makes it applicable exclusively to language exactly in the way Wittgenstein did it, in that it circumscribes the paradox of transcendental knowledge (p.5) while at the same time removes another Wittgensteinian dimension away from it, namely the therapeutic. Hintikka makes this explicit: 'Its primary function is theoretical and *not* therapeutical' 189) (emphasis added).
5. If Hintikka's investigations are contra-therapeutical, then one thing becomes obvious: that is, it contrasts with other approaches which make much of the therapeutical dimension. Stuart Shanker, for example, in an avowed neo-therapeutical approach traces it to the very nature of philosophical analysis. See his *magnum opus*, titled *Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in Mathematics* (Croom Helm, 1987).
6. See especially section 4 of Chapter 9 ('Language-games in Wittgenstein's Later Thought') entitled 'Language-Games vs. Games of Language': p.217.
7. H. Wang's question appears in his recent book titled *Beyond Analytical Philosophy* (M.I.T. Press, 1986). He is concerned with the way the same 'logic' that informs the 'rigour' and the 'fluidity' of the early and later Wittgenstein respectively.



8. See L. Wittgenstein *Remarks on Colour* ed. and translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, 1977) esp. II sec. 3.
9. There are many traits that seem to be common between the approaches made by Hintikka and Dummett. For example, Dummett notes it as a 'contest' (199) between two conceptions of language, namely, language as communication ('code' theory of language) and language as an expressive vehicle of thought, a distinction that moves in the direction of regarding language of thought as having a representative character but at the same time without committing itself to it completely, thus coinciding with the above view of symbolism (see f.n. 2 above). But Dummett is certainly something more which cannot be unloosened within the compass here. It is only from here Dummett proceeds to take philosophy of language as foundational to philosophy of thought. A contrary view holds them to be isomorphic and is prevalent among many thinkers. See for example, Christopher Peacocke, in his 'Metaphysics of Concepts', *Mental Content* (Vol.C.No.4) 1991, pp. 525-546.
10. For a more interesting articulation of such a view, see Jerrold Katz, see esp. his contribution entitled 'Effability and Translation' in *Meaning and Translation: Philosophical and Linguistic Approaches* ed. by F. Guenther and M. Guenther-Reutter (Duckworth, 1978) pp. 191-234: esp. 219, 220 and 223.
11. Heijenoort, 'Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus' in *Synthese*, 17 (1967) pp. 324-30. In my opinion Hintikka alters the above distinction in a substantial way.
12. According to M. Dummett, since the Gricean approach to the speech-act paradigm of language is 'no more than a sophisticated version of the code conception of language' (198) it should be considered only as a 'misconceived strategy' (197). I think the alternative model is Dummett's but at present it is hazy and unclear: see also f.n. 8 above.
13. For this and the remarks that follow here, I am indebted to J. Habermas for the clarification he has made but which still continues to be misinterpreted. See his 'Replies' appended to the volume on *Habermas: Critical Debates* ed. by J.B. Thompson and David Held (M.I.T. Press, 1982) pp. 219-283.
14. S. Shanker introduces two significant locutions in this connection, namely *satzsystem-following* and *satzsystemviolation* to explain the 'inter-play' (*Wechsel-spiel*) between two alternative mathematical (conceptual) frameworks. See esp. his *Gödel's Theorem* (Croom Helm, 1988): pp. 155-256, esp. 204.



15. See p. 272; Hintikka (1986).
16. The eleven theses are elaborated in Chapter II of Hintikka.
17. S. Shanker discusses Wittgenstein's reaction to Hilbert; his (1988) discusses Wittgenstein's reaction to Gödel in a very extensive way while focusing on the 'interplay' between two alternative systems; see f.n.14 above.
18. I am not alone in calling this as post-analytical; Nancy Murphy's 'Scientific Realism and Post-Modern Philosophy' nominates W.V.O. Quine as a 'a post-modern epistemologist' (294); See *Philosophy of Science*, 41 (1990) 291-303.
19. One may still distinguish between philosophy of language *simpliciter* and philosophy of language. Whereas the former is *ideological* and comparable to Husserl's ideal as found in his *Crisis*, the latter is post-analytical, and this accounts for the differentiation of their political import.
20. Hintikka quotes from Vol. 2 (p.684).
21. 287; Hintikka (1986).
22. The issue, I think, is one about mapping of the relation between syntax and semantics. See also my comments on 'Does Transcendental Subjectivity Meet Transcendental Grammar ?' (to appear).



## RE-INTERPRETATION OF LOCKE'S THEORY OF IDEAS

In 4.1.1 of the *Essay*, Locke argues that "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them".<sup>1</sup> The traditional interpretation of this and similar passages is a representative realism which, because it precludes direct perception of the physical world, leads to scepticism. That Locke himself recognizes and dismisses the problems associated with representative realism has led several scholars to reinterpret his work in a way which avoids the difficulties of traditional interpretations. Professor Hall has recently expressed dissatisfaction with such re-interpretations : "partly because some passages seem to me to suggest the contrary, and partly because I am uneasy with the terms of the discussion."<sup>2</sup> Recent support for the traditional interpretation is based on the argument (Ayers) that the term 'idea' is employed uniformly in accordance with the theory of knowledge Locke holds. In this paper I argue that Locke does not present either a consistent theory of knowledge or a consistent doctrine of ideas; given his varied remarks or views both interpretations remain plausible.

Locke's early critics (Norris, Sergeant, Lee, Stillingfleet) interpret the representationalism of the *Essay* in the framework of cartesian dualism. This framework posits the existence of two unlike substances, mind and matter, the modes or qualities of each substance being mutually exclusive. Since physical objects are not in the mind, must be represented to us by mental images or ideas caused by these objects. Rather than criticizing this view, Locke simply poses the question: "Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our Ideas and the reality of things. But what shall here be the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but

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its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?" (4.4.3) Locke's critics conclude that they cannot. Lee, for example, argues that Locke's philosophy "must involve us in an endless scepticism", for his principles "will neither allow us to suppose nor can prove the real existence of things without us".<sup>3</sup>

In the introduction to the *Essay* Locke apologizes for his frequent use of the word 'idea'. He explains that it is a term which serves best to stand for "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks". The term is used to express "whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking". (1.1.8) That such ideas exist he finds past doubt; this, he says, is intuitive knowledge, for "every man being conscious to himself, that he thinks and that which his mind is employ'd about whilst thinking, being the *ideas* that are there, 'tis past doubt, that men have in their minds several *ideas*, such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others". (2.1.1) Many of Locke's contemporaries express surprise and indignation over his careless use of a technical term. Surely, says Norris, "by all the laws of method in the world, he ought *first* to have defined what he meant by ideas, and to have acquainted us with their nature", for how can anyone discuss the origin of ideas "before the meaning of the word idea be stated, and the nature of the thing, at least in general, be understood?" Stillingfleet was equally baffled, proclaiming that Locke uses a new term, one which leads to religious, moral, and scientific scepticism.<sup>4</sup>

Hall points out that such complaints have continued unabated. Aaron, for example, contends that Locke "has included far too much within the connotation of this one term", e.g., sense-data, images, memories, concepts, mental acts. Like Locke's early critics, Aaron concludes that Locke holds a traditional view of ideas and knowledge. Aaron asks: "if Locke felt even vaguely that the theory was inherently defective, why did he accept it?" He concludes that "the only possible answer" is that Locke must have "felt there was no alternative". He notes that the theory was held almost universally at the time, and held by opposing schools of thought.<sup>5</sup>

Textual support for construing ideas as images or entities that form a screen between the mind and the external world is generally



based on passages stressing *mediation*. In 4.4.3 Locke states that "it is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them". He frequently speaks of contemplating, knowing, and perceiving ideas rather than things. In 2.1.25 he says "as the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions; and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them". Locke makes it clear that ideas somehow function in a representative capacity. In 4.21.4 he asserts that "since the things that the mind contemplates are none of them, besides the mind itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it; and these signs or representations are ideas". Locke seems to be committed to a belief in the existence of mental entities or objects, entities which function as pictures or images of a world we have no direct acquaintance with.

Michael Ayers argues that Locke's use of the term 'idea' is not ambiguous: "To show that his usage is not ambiguous it would be enough to show that it is employed uniformly in accordance with the theory he holds". Locke, he contends, holds an imagist theory, his doctrine of abstraction "is above all an imagist theory of the perception or intuition of universal truth" very much "like those of Hobbes and Berkeley". According to Ayers, an abstract idea is not, as Peter Alexander claims, a definition, but rather, "a particular perception or image 'partially considered'".<sup>6</sup> According to Locke, the immediate object of all our "reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars". (4.17.8) Ayers therefore contends that even the ideas of existence, power, cause, and unity involve images of particulars that one would subsume under such categories.

Yolton, Woosley, Soles, and others have taken the position that Locke does not regard ideas as images. According to Yolton, Locke uses the term 'idea' to indicate that perceptual awareness is mental. Woosley contends that Locke uses the term to express recognition of meaning (concepts). Soles argues that the need to emphasize immediate private aspects of consciousness is the "original motivation for the terminology of ideas". To avoid reification of ideas it is not difficult, he says, to rewrite Locke's claims; "thus, to say that our perception of the external world is mediated by the perception of ideas is to say that a necessary element in the perception of physical objects is the occur-



rence of mental states of a certain sort". For Soles, to say that we immediately perceive our own ideas is to say that we have "immediate and incorrigible knowledge of our own mental states.... thus with regard to the ideas of perception or sensation, the idiom need mean nothing more than 'is having a sensory/perceptual experience of a certain sort'". According to Soles, having an idea of pain and the sensation of pain are equivalent. In other cases 'has an idea' "means something like 'understands' or 'believes'".<sup>7</sup>

Common to re-interpretations is the notion that Locke's view represents a common-sense theory of knowledge. Yolton, for example, contends: "it is important, in the light of Thomas Reid's contrast between philosophical and the ordinary account of perception and ideas, to find Locke placing himself on the side of the 'un-philosophical' ".<sup>8</sup> This entails reading ideas not as images or entities, but, in the tradition of Arnauld, as modifications of the mind. In this context the current debate has not changed in essentials since the interpretations of Brown and Hamilton. According to Hamilton, representative perception admits of "a subdivision into two forms, —a simple and a more complex. The simpler, that the immediate or representative object is a mere modification of the percipient mind, —the more complex, that this representative object is something different both from the reality and from the mind".<sup>9</sup>

Brown contends that there is not a single argument in any of Locke's works that is founded on the substantial reality of ideas as separate and distinct things in the mind. According to Brown, Locke regards the idea neither as a material image nor as a mental entity that has an existence apart from the mental energy of which it is the object. Like Arnauld, Locke considers the idea perceived and the percipient act as constituting the same modification of the conscious mind. Hamilton argues that of all the opinions Locke expresses about ideas, he formally rejects that attributed to him by Brown. Ayers also finds this the most difficult interpretation to prove. The formal rejection is supposedly found in Locke's *Examination of Malebranche*. Locke explains that "the good word 'modification' signifies nothing to me more than I knew before; namely, that I have now" an idea "which I had not some minutes ago".<sup>10</sup> Hamilton concludes that for Locke ideas are separate entities. I think this conclusion should remain suspect. Locke's criticism of Malebranche does not seem to be a rejection of the view that ideas are



modifications, but a rejection of the view that the knower and known must be the same or similar. Because physical objects are extended and the soul is not, Malebranche contends that one cannot perceive the sun. Locke argues that ideas need not resemble their causes. His criticism may in fact be read as a criticism of the view that ideas are separate entities which must be similar to those of a spiritual being.

Locke rarely uses the word 'image' when describing the process of perception. Ayers suggests that the most probable reason for Locke avoiding the term is that it was used in too many ways. This, however, would hold equally true of the word 'idea'. Locke was presented with numerous opportunities to explain his use of the term, to be precise with regard to the ontological status of ideas, and to explain their representative function in knowledge. Unfortunately, he did not take advantage of the criticisms of his contemporaries. In most contexts other than that of treating memory, Locke appears to use the term, as Yolton contends, simply to stress the mental features necessary for cognition. That this does not square with several passages treating ideas as pictures or images, leads one to suspect that Locke does not have a consistent theory.

Yolton correctly notes that Locke often speaks of observing or perceiving external objects and not ideas. Knowledge of the existence of physical objects is not based on the mere apprehension of the connections between ideas, but rather, on the *reception* of ideas from causes external to the mind. Locke insists that it is only by *direct* contact with objects that we can claim to know of their existence, when, for example, "we immediately by our senses perceive in fire its heat and color". (2.23.7) In 4.2.14 he tells us that we receive ideas of objects only when we perceive them, i.e., only upon the "actual entrance of ideas from external objects". He clearly points out that the object of sensation is the external thing of which we have an idea. It is, he says, "*the actual receiving* of ideas from without that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know, that something does exist at that time without us". (4.11.2) Locke seems to be arguing that this is not an ordinary inference from an idea perceived to an object not perceived. As Yolton points out, "in stressing the mental features of knowing and perceiving, Locke did not mean to make knowledge of body impossible"<sup>11</sup>



In 4.2.14 Locke brings up the question of inference in the context of distinguishing ideas of memory, dreams, and the external world. "I ask anyone", he says, "whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night... we as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas". The inference to the physical object is unlike most scientific inferences which proceed from that which is seen to an unseen cause, and more like an inference related to time-lag in perception. It no more follows that we do not see the real sun because it takes light time to travel to our senses, than it does that we do not see the real sun because we have an idea of the sun in our mind. If by perceiving the real sun one means the real essence or insensible particles, then for Locke, we do not perceive the sun. However, as Yolton points out, if we mean the gross object in our perceptual field, then we do see the real sun and not just an image of this sun.<sup>12</sup>

That Locke does present a theory of direct realism in the *Essay* seems incontrovertible. He speaks as a direct realist in several passages in all Books, for example, in 2.23.7 of the distance between sensible objects that we perceive, in 3.6.24 he speaks of distinguishing objects by their sensible qualities, in 3.6.28 and 30 of men observing qualities joined and existing together in nature, in 3.11.19-21 of leading sensible qualities, e.g., shape and our perception of such qualities, in 3.10.32 he speaks of "he that, in a new-discovered country, shall see several sorts of animals and vegetables, unknown to him before, in 3.6.9 of those sensible qualities which we observe in substances, in 3.8.1 of our eyes discovering ordinary objects, in 3.6.7-8 of chemists examining bodies and qualities, in 4.13.2 of seeing colors, feeling cold; in this passage Locks says: "There is another thing in a man's power that is, though he turns his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he may chuse whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent application, endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it."

That this re-interpretation can remain suspect is not surprising. Hall and Ayers point out that it is not difficult to catalog a number of passages in which Locke speaks as a traditional representative realist. Treating ideas as pictures or images that are perceived occurs most notably, says Hall, in 2.10 "Of Retention"; e.g., section 1, "keeping



the idea ..... for some time actually in view..... is called contemplation"; also, section 5, "the pictures drawn in our minds, are laid in fading colours," or section 7, "viewing again the ideas, that are lodg'd in the memory ... the appearance of those dormant pictures." In 2.29.8 Locke explicitly tells us that ideas are "as it were the picture of things". Locke's discussion of complex ideas as putting simple ideas together suggests to Hall the construction of mental imagery. There are also a number of other passages in which Locke regards the object of perception and knowledge as the idea and not the external thing, e.g., 2.1.25 where he speaks about perceiving ideas annexed to impressions in the mind 4.21.4 a discussion of contemplating signs (ideas); a discussion of scepticism in 4.4.3 which arises because the mind "knows not things immediately".

The traditional interpretation and the re-interpretation would be somewhat compatible if ideas are simply regarded as images in the sense that (Yolton) "seeing a physical object is to have visual images which are caused by particles".<sup>13</sup> However, if these visual images are entities and these entities are *in the mind*, Locke cannot be a direct realist. Hall argues that if ideas are images, they seem to be entities of a kind, "even if they are obviously not 'real beings'".<sup>14</sup> By 'real beings' I assume that Hall is referring to physical beings. Locke himself does not object to calling ideas "real beings" insofar as they are not assumed to be extended; in reply to Norris he claims that "ideas may be 'real beings,' though not substances, as motion is a real being, though not a substance".<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately, the terms 'object,' 'real beings,' and 'entity' are just as vague as the terms 'idea' or 'modification'. Describing ideas as modifications does not clarify anything, for as Locke notes in answer to Malebranche, the word 'modification' "seems to me to signify nothing more than the word to be explained by it".<sup>16</sup> From the passages quoted by Hall there is nothing to suggest that ideas are entities in the strong sense necessary to support traditional interpretations.

Hall suggests that the supposed ambiguity in Locke's use of 'idea' may not be important. Possibly, he says, "*thought* is an ambiguous term, but do philosophers complain about this? After all, term can always be restricted, or different senses distinguished, and we do not always feel that the unrestricted or undistinguished term is a problem."<sup>17</sup> Although this may be true in a general context, given the historical outcry over Locke's use of the term 'idea', Hall is being overly



generous to Locke. If one is concerned about the ontological status of thought, it will not do for a philosopher to dismiss the question. Is thought a by-product of brain processes or is it spiritual in nature? Are thoughts entities, real beings? If the reader can take it any way one wishes, or find both views expressed in one work, it would seem incumbent on a philosopher to settle the question. In a different sense, questions concerning the nature of ideas may not be important to Locke's conclusions about knowledge. Because there is textual support for both the traditional interpretation *and* re-interpretation, I am inclined, as Hall, to think that Locke did not see the importance or relevancy of this type of dispute to his over-all theory of knowledge. Locke is hard-pressed with scepticism in the context of either interpretation. As Ayers suggests, ideas may be images, yet not entities which preclude observation of objects.

Re-interpretations may establish that Locke's view does not result in scepticism with regard to the *existence* of physical objects. Locke does not seem particularly worried about questions of existence, but rather, with questions concerning the correspondence of ideas to the *real nature* of objects either observed or assumed to exist. If we do perceive physical objects, the correspondence or resemblance relation is still in doubt. As Ayers indicates, in this context "we may say, the objects of comparison are simply the thing as we conceive it, and the thing as it is in reality". This may, as he contends, be an innocuous tautology: "that we can only think and reason about things as they are represented in our thought or as we conceive of them".<sup>18</sup> Nonetheless, this use of the word 'idea' seems to be primary and is the central focus of Book III and Book IV of the *Essay*. Woozley's re-interpretation focuses on this use of idea as an intellectual concept or meaning, Alexander as a definition. There cannot be conformity between ideas and the reality of things, ideas cannot "agree with things themselves" if by things and reality we mean "real essence."

Knowledge of bodies is limited to abstract ideas of nominal essences, concepts or definitions of things. I think that Ayers is mistaken in his claim that Locke would not quite understand the "alien notion of 'conceptualization'".<sup>19</sup> Locke draws a distinction between mere sensation and perception. The latter involves a considerable amount of mental activity, the former does not. The ideas we receive by sensation, he says, "are often in grown people altered" by acts of judgement



"without our taking notice of it". (2.9.8) Perception is seeing an object in accordance with a somewhat arbitrary abstract idea; it is "seeing as", or conceptualization of sense data. In Book III, Locke makes it clear that our descriptions of a particular substance are possible only because we possess general identifying concepts, i.e., to recognize a group of qualities as a definite thing presupposes possessing the concept or abstract idea of this object. This essence or idea may at times exemplify itself as an image with meaning, or, simply as a definition.

Whether one accepts the traditional interpretation or the re-interpretation, there is not much of a practical difference with regard to knowledge of bodies. Locke argues that our ideas of substances are all inadequate, i.e., whether images or not, whether entities or modifications, they can be nothing but partial or incomplete representations of their intended objects. The degrees of inadequacy in our ideas entails a corresponding doubt with respect to their reality, for complex ideas of bodies are "no further real than as they are combinations of simple ideas" of qualities that are actually united and coexist in nature. (2.30.5) For the most part, Locke is concerned with the general propositions of science and not with the extramental reference of ideas. "Nor let it be wondered", he says, "that I place the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas, with so little care and regard ... to the real existence of things: since most of those discourses which take up the thoughts and engage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business to inquire after truth and certainty, will, I presume, upon examination, be found to be *general propositions*, and notions in which existence is not at all concerned". (4.4.8)

In order to have general knowledge of substances at least three conditions must be satisfied: (1) we must know what changes the primary qualities of one body regularly produce in the primary qualities of another body, (2) we must know what primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations and ideas in us, and (3) we must have faculties acute enough to perceive the real essence of bodies and frame our abstract ideas of them accordingly. (4.6.14) Locke is pessimistic about these conditions ever being fulfilled by any finite intelligence. All general knowledge, he says, "lies only in our own thoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas". (4.6.13) Since our classifications (abstract ideas) vary according to education and other variables, it is not surprising to find Locke expressing scepticism concerning the reality of knowledge.



Perhaps Ayers gives Locke too much credit when he contends: "our best conclusion would therefore seem to be that there is an unresolved tension in Locke's conception of the relation between idea and object".<sup>20</sup> Hall is equally generous in his conclusion that "in deciding not to differentiate between a sense-datum and an image, but to treat both as mental objects allowing us to deal with parts of the world whether present or absent, and to designate them all by the single term *idea*, Locke may have obtained a convenient outlook for himself, even if it has generally baffled his commentators".<sup>21</sup> That we should not expect to find a consistent theory of knowledge or doctrine of ideas in the *Essay* is consistent with Locke's preparation of the work. In the *Epistle to the Reader* Locke explains: "Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse, which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and, after long intervals of neglect, resum'd again, as my humour or occasions permitted".

Criticisms concerning consistency and ambiguity are summarily dismissed by Locke as a failure of critics to understand the nature of his work; e.g. Locke retorts: "If any, careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost, have publish'd their censures of my *Essay*, with this honour done to it, that they will not suffer it to be an *Essay*, I leave it to the publick to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and shall not waste my reader's time, in so idle or ill natur'd an employment of mine, as to lessen the satisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to others in so hasty a confutation of what I have written".<sup>22</sup> Rosalie Colie appropriately notes that this is "undercutting with a vengeance: in one sentence to suggest that the work of critics who did not recognize the experimental character of an essay was negligible, because the nature of essays is to be carelessly written, stretches fairness to the breaking point".<sup>23</sup> Although Locke made slight efforts to explain his understanding of the term 'idea', he remained comfortable in its "convenient" ambiguity, an attitude which he deplores in the works of others. In the *Epistle* he complains that "neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalency of the fashion, shall be an excuse for those, who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not suffer the significancy of thier expressions to be enquired into".



I conclude that the complaints against Locke are in fact justified. As Hamilton put it: "Locke is of all philosophers the most figurative, ambiguous, vacillating, various, and even contradictory".<sup>24</sup>

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### NOTES

1. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by Peter H. Niddich (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). I have followed Hall in decapitalization and deitalicization of the *Essay*.
2. Ronald Hall, "'idea' in Locke's Works", *The Locke Newsletter*, no. 21, 1990, p. 15.
3. Henry Lee, *Anti-Scepticism* (New York: Garland, 1978 Reprint), Preface, c.
4. In *The Works of John Locke*, the twelfth edition (London, 1824), Vol. III.
5. Richard Aaron, *John Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 194; pp. 102-104.
6. Michael Ayers, "Are Locke's 'Ideas' Image, Intentional Objects or Natural Signs?", *The Locke Newsletter*, no. 17, 1986, pp. 12-13.
7. D. E. Soles, "Locke on Ideas, Words and Knowledge", *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, Vol. 42, 1988, pp. 156-157.
8. John Yolton, "Locke and Malebranche: Two Concepts of Ideas", in *John Locke Symposium*, edited by Reinhard Brandt (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), p. 218.
9. Sir William Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, edited by H. L. Mansel and John Voitch (London: William Blackwood, n.d.) Vol. II, pp. 45-56.
10. John Locke, "An Examination of P. Mahebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God", in *The Works of John Locke* (London, 1824), Vol. VIII, k par. 39.



11. John Yolton, *Locke and The Compass of Human Understanding* (Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 128.
12. *Compass*, p. 129.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Hall, p. 16.
15. John Locke, "Remarks Upon some of Mr. Norris's Books", in *The Works of John Locke* (London, 1824), Vol. IX, p. 248.
16. *Exmination of Malebranche*, par. 39.
17. Hall, p.20.
18. Ayers, p. 18.
19. Ayers, p. 24.
20. Ayers, p. 31.
21. Hall, p. 23.
22. Locke, Epistle to the Reader.
- 23.. Rosalie Colie, "The Essayist in his *Essay*", in *John Locke: Problems And Perspectives: A Collection of New Essays*, edited by John W. Yolton (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p.249.
24. Hamilton, p.55.



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## BELIEVER VERSUS<sup>1</sup> UNBELIEVER : REFLECTIONS ON THE WITTGENSTEINIAN PERSPECTIVE

The paper attempts to analyse and examine Wittgenstein's views on disagreement between a believer and an unbeliever (B and UB henceforth) on the basis of remarks found in *Lectures on Religious Belief and Culture And Value*.<sup>2</sup> It is proposed that use of 'believer' and 'unbeliever' is dependent upon the context. Believing in God or the Last Judgement consists not merely in having certain feelings and attitudes but also believing in the reality of God and the Last Judgement and interpreting life and the world in the light of these beliefs. Thus, disagreement between B and UB is not merely a matter of regulating or not regulating one's life by certain pictures but also of having different explanations/interpretations of life and the world. Some explanations of Wittgenstein's view that UB does not contradict B are discussed and it is argued that none of them rule out the possibility that UB may contradict B. In the end, it is suggested that Wittgenstein's discussion centres around the unshakeable character of religious belief. We find, however, that religious beliefs are not unshakable, believers themselves recognise sometimes that their empirical, scientific beliefs do not fit in with their religious beliefs. This recognition can weaken or destroy believer's faith. Religious traditions also recognise this tension and try to cope with it through modifications and reinterpretations of religious doctrines.

### I

In *Lectures* Wittgenstein says, "Suppose that some one believed in the Last Judgement, and I don't, does this mean that I believe the opposite to him, just that there won't be such a thing? I would say: "not at all, or not always".<sup>3</sup> (LC, p.53)

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In the following lines it is said that one who believes that after death the body would rot does not contradict one who believes that particles would join and there would be resurrection of a person. Similarly, one who thinks of an illness as retribution is not contradicted by a person who does not think so. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, it can not be said that UB "contradicts" or "believes the opposite" to the believer.

What does being a believer consist in? Wittgenstein emphasizes the following :

(1) B has an unshakeable belief. What he believes is not to be taken as a scientific hypothesis, or something which may or may not be true.

(2) His firm belief does not rest on evidence, rather B may defy all empirical evidence and hold on to his belief.<sup>3</sup>

Wittgenstein seems to suggest that a religious belief does not require any evidence. "The point is that if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole business". (LC, p.56) At other places he talks of B believing in the Last Judgement on the basis of a dream. It is not clear from *Lectures* whether in his view a religious belief requires no evidence or whether he wants to point out that what Believers regard as evidence may appear quite inconclusive, even ridiculous, to others. He, however, does rule out that a religious belief can be supported by historical or empirical evidence. A forecast about a Judgement day based on sound, empirical evidence is not a religious belief.<sup>4</sup> However, in *Culture and Value* we find that he dismisses the question of evidence and justification altogether. The unshakeableness of a religious belief is reflected in its regulative function in B's life.

(3) A religious belief "uses a picture." This has three aspects<sup>5</sup>

(a) B draws certain consequences from the picture.

(b) The picture affects and moves him deeply and

(c) It regulates his entire thinking and attitude to life.

Thus, one who believes in the Last Judgement or life after death approaches the events in life quite differently from the one who does not believe so. B commits himself to lots of things on the basis of his belief and is prepared to risk a great deal on its account.



*Believer Versus Unbeliever*

The difference between B and UB, thus, revolves around use of certain pictures. B uses certain pictures while UB is not affected by them; these have no role in his thinking and attitude to life. In Wittgenstein's words B and UB are on entirely different planes. The latter thinks differently, he says different things to himself. He has different pictures. This is different from what is normally called "believing the opposite". UB does not have the thoughts that B has or anything that hangs together with them. But we can't say he contradicts B. (LC, p.55)

It becomes clearer from remarks in *Culture And Value*, that Wittgenstein wants to emphasize the affective, commissive side of believing; for him what is important about a *religious belief* is not the form it takes, not the words that express it but the difference it makes to person's life. He views B's faith not as cold rationalistic assent to certain beliefs based on supporting evidence/ reasons but as something emanating from passionate aspect of B which results in changing his whole attitude to life. He remarks in 1946 "I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your life (or the direction of your life). .... The point is that a sound doctrine need not take hold of you; .... But here you need something to move you and turn you in a new direction. Once you have been turned around, you must stay turned round". (CV, p.53e)

Again in 1947 he says, "It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it's belief, it's really a way of living or a way of assessing life. It's passionately seizing hold of this interpretation." (CV, p.64e)

## II

Before proceeding any further with the analysis of disagreement between B and UB, let us clarify the meaning of 'believer' and 'unbeliever'. In LC, UB is generally used for an atheist and B for a practicing Christian. The meanings of 'believer' and 'unbeliever', however, are wider. One way to define 'B' would be to say it means 'one who believes in God'. In this sense all theists, whatever be the differences among their conceptions of God, would be B and all atheists UB. This, however, would not be satisfactory. Is a practicing Buddhist



or Jain, who does not believe in a personal God, a B or UB? Is a pantheist like Spinoza a B or UB? In Wittgenstein's discussion of believers, the important aspects relate to the affective commissive force of religious beliefs and their regulatory function in believers' lives. On this criterion a Buddhist or a Jain is B provided his beliefs fall into the category of religious beliefs.

A more promising way to explain B and UB would be to relate them to participation in a religious tradition. One who accepts the central doctrines of a religious tradition and participates in its activities related to rituals and worship may be called a B. The meaning of B and UB would be then dependent upon the context of its use. Depending upon the context, a believer may be a Christian, a Jew, a Hindu etc. Conversely, anyone who does not believe in the same things as the believer in question would be UB in that context. It is clear, thus, that UB need not always be an atheist but also a follower of a different religious tradition. *vis-a-vis* a Christian, not only an atheist but a practicing Jew, Muslim or a Hindu would be UB, though in other contexts a Jew may be B. This is in agreement with Wittgenstein's analysis of religious belief, since being a B consists in using pictures involved in certain religious beliefs. Therefore, anyone who does not use the pictures in question would be UB. (It is a further matter that UB does not have any religious beliefs where he is an atheist or he uses pictures involved in other different religious beliefs where he is a follower of a different religious tradition.)

The distinction between B and UB can operate at an even deeper level, i.e., with respect to certain specific beliefs of a religious tradition. One may be a believer in the sense of generally accepting the tradition but may reject certain doctrinal beliefs. How do we characterise such people, as B or UB? In other words, how do we look upon disagreements between followers of different sects or streams within the same religious tradition? Generally speaking, these are characterized as disagreements among believers but those who do not accept certain religious beliefs can also be characterized as unbelievers since pictures involved in these beliefs do not play any role in these persons' lives.

From the above discussion it becomes clear that disagreement between B and UB has various dimensions. Wittgenstein only



considers disagreement between a Christian and an atheist and says that UB does not contradict B. However, the same analysis would hold in cases where UB is a follower of a different religious tradition or of a different sect/stream of the believer's tradition. In all such cases the pictures involved in certain religious beliefs play no role in the thinking and lives of certain people.

Can we say in all such cases that UB does not contradict B? Let us consider some examples of disagreements between B and UB.

1. B regards his illness as a case of retribution. UB (an atheist) thinks that the illness is due to empirical causes ( eg, a virus ) and the thought of retribution does not even occur to him. (Wittgenstein's example)
2. Suppose in the feast on Mid-summer Common, a lot of people stand in a ring. Each person holds the hands of the person next to him on either side. Now each person says he saw his dead relative on the other side of the ring. He is aware that each person is holding the hand of another living person yet insists that he saw his dead relatives on the other side.<sup>6</sup> UB has no such thoughts and thinks that one sees only living person on the other side of ring. (Wittgenstein's example)
3. B believes in resurrection. UB (an atheist) does not believe in life after death. Another UB (a Hindu) believes in life after death but in rebirth and not resurrection.
4. B (a Christian) believes Jesus to be the Messiah, UB (a Jew) does not think so.
5. B (a Muslim) regards Muhammed to be the last prophet, UB (a Christian or Bohra Muslim) does not think so.
6. B believes that God creates and sustains the world, UB (a monist) thinks that there is no ontological distinction between God and the world.

In examples 3, 4, 5 and 6, it appears that UB contradicts B. In examples 1 and 2 the thought of retribution and of seeing one's dead relatives does not play any role in the thinking of UB. UB may simply shrug his shoulders at B's talk or may deny what B says. Wittgenstein would say that UB does not contradict B, it is simply the case that



pictures that affect B deeply and regulate his thinking and life have no role in UB's thinking and life. *Prima-facie* it appears that UB sometimes denies what B believes to be the case and thus contradicts the latter. How are we then to understand the statement that UB does not and can not contradict B ? Let us discuss some interpretations of religious belief on which this view can be upheld and examine them.

### III

1. A religious belief only expresses feelings, attitudes and commitments of a believer and does not involve asserting or denying anything. Any non-cognitivist analysis would therefore rule out that UB can contradict B.<sup>7</sup> Wittgenstein's emphasis on affective, commissive aspect of religious belief gives the impression that he is providing such an analysis. At the same time we find that in LC he is doubtful that belief in life after death can be analysed purely as expressing an attitude. (LC, p.71) In CV he mentions B's acceptance of somethings as true (CV, p.32e). We have also seen that a religious belief, according to Wittgenstein, makes B explain/interpret the events in life in a certain way (eg. illness as retribution). Thus, pictures involved in religious beliefs are also explanatory. This would involve beliefs that God, that God judges men etc. If so, a religious belief is not merely an expression of an attitude or feeling but also a belief that asserts (or presupposes) certain things to be the case. Perhaps what Wittgenstein wants to emphasize is that B does not merely have a belief about God and the Last Judgement but pictures involved in these are constantly in the foreground of B's thinking and determine how he sees events in life and how he leads his life. The content of the belief or the words in which it is expressed are not important, what is important is whether the belief affects and regulates his life or not.

Believers certainly talk of God as independently real and use 'truth' in the context of talk about God, and his relationship to the world and human persons. Any purely non-cognitivist analysis of religious belief, therefore, is prescriptive rather than descriptive. It would be more helpful to explore the possibility whether even after admitting that religious belief is a belief 'that', it can still be said that UB does not contradict B. Wittgenstein says that in some cases different ways of thinking need not be expressed by one person saying one thing, another person saying another. The expression of belief may play an absolutely



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minor role. (LC, p.55) This would suggest that Wittgenstein wants to highlight the difference in the ways of living of B and UB. What is significant in controversies regarding religious matters is not that UB denies what B believes but that they look at events in life differently and their lives are regulated by different pictures. This would be quite correct if it means that such controversies involve much more than mere opposition of beliefs 'that' but this does not show that opposition of such beliefs does not and can not figure in such contexts.<sup>8</sup> A belief 'that' can be regulative, for example, the belief that fire burns or that one's colleague has homicidal tendencies. In the believer's way of life his beliefs, feelings, attitudes and commitment to lead one's life in certain ways are all inextricably linked. The fact that believers interpret life and the world in terms of God's love, the Last Judgement etc. itself shows that their way of life has ontological commitments / presuppositions. A person who believes in judgement by a personal God would behave and act differently from one who believes in the doctrine of *karma* or one who regards God as a detached creator. What follows is that what it means to believe in the Last Judgement can be understood not merely by reflecting on the words that occur in its expression rather how B feels, what his attitudes are and how he behaves and acts have also to be taken into account. But this does not rule out the possibility that in controversies regarding religious matters there can not be opposition of beliefs 'that'.

2. B and UB use words differently. Thus, when UB denies the Last Judgement he means something different from what B means by it. Wittgenstein mentions how 'eye' is used differently when B talks of 'God's eyes. Similarly, 'Last' in 'the Last Judgement' is not being used in the sense of temporal end. He also shows how 'exist' is being used differently by B. If B and UB are using words in different senses then even if UB denies that there is Last Judgement he does not contradict B. This line of reasoning, however, can be stretched only up to a point. While B's use of 'exist', 'eye' 'last' 'judgement' etc. is different from their use in ordinary discourse, it is not completely divorced from the latter. The ordinary use of these words is also part of B's conceptual framework and he employs them in non-theological contexts. In many cases use of words in theological contexts is parasitical upon use in non-theological contexts. So, the use by B is analogical rather than in a totally different sense, and it must conform to the ordinary use to some extent.<sup>9</sup> Thus, unless it is ruled out that UB can understand the sense in which



B is using words, it remains possible that UB may deny what B says, using words in exactly the same sense as B. In some examples discussed earlier, B and UB seem to be using words in the same sense. Wittgenstein admits that UB can understand the words that B uses (LC, pp.55, 71). Yet, he declares that UB can't contradict B. One reason for this could be that UB misunderstands and misrepresents B's belief. Eg., when UB denies the Last Judgement he might be viewing it as an event taking place at some point in future. But this is not how B views the Last judgement. (LC, p.55) It is, however, possible that UB may be using 'Last' and 'judgement's in the same sense as B does. Wittgenstein says that UB can't contradict B because he has not got the thoughts that B has and what hangs together with these thoughts. Granting that the ideas that are always at the centre of B's thinking play no role in UB's thinking, this may be based on UB's rejection of those ideas. UB, for example, might have been a B earlier or might believe other things that imply denial of what B believes.

3. UB refuses to participate in B's form of life, therefore he can not deny what B says.<sup>10</sup> We have already granted that disagreement between B and UB is not merely a case of opposition of beliefs but involves much more. But now it is being ruled out that there can be such opposition of beliefs between B and UB. This view could be based on the following considerations.

a) UB does not deny what B asserts; rather he denies the presuppositions of what B asserts. (This may be countered as, for example, in the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions) There would be contradiction if, for example, B says "God is Love", and the other says, "God is not Love". But here both statements presuppose that there is God. When UB says, "But there is no God", this does not contradict B's statement; it only rejects the presupposition of what B says and, strictly speaking, this is not contradiction. This line of reasoning, however, is not very fruitful because it is evident that B and UB disagree regarding the reality of God and the Last Judgement. This opposition may not be contradiction in the strict sense but it is a fundamental difference all the same. Secondly, as is evident from the examples discussed earlier, (section II) B and UB are sometimes in agreement about the presuppositions and yet disagree. One who believes in resurrection and one who believes in rebirth both accept life after death and yet disagree about what the nature of this life is. A Jew and a Christian agree about the



person they are talking about, namely Jesus, and yet do not agree about certain things being the case.

b) One who does not participate in B's form of life can not understand the words occurring in B's statement.<sup>11</sup> If understanding 'God's Love' is identified with having certain feelings, attitudes and commitments, UB can not be said to understand what B says. Since B's uses of words are not totally divorced from uses of these in other non-religious contexts and since B shares with UB uses of linguistic expression and practices in these non-religious contexts, it is not clear why UB can not understand what B says. If one understands what 'love' means generally and understands how its use in religious contexts is similar to and different from its use in non-religious contexts, one can understand what ascription of love to God means reasonably well. That people sometimes have partial or total loss of faith also shows that it is possible to understand religious doctrines and not be affected by them. It is one thing to say that what is involved in believing in God's love can not be fully appreciated without taking into account B's feelings, attitudes etc. and quite another to say that one can not understand what B says without being a participant.

It is also not clear that B and UB do not share forms of life. They share many activities and also share understanding of things and events in non-religious contexts. If UB is an atheist he does not participate in the religious way of life. But if UB is a follower of a religious tradition different from that of B, he is participating in a religious way of life, albeit one with different concepts and ontological commitments. Wittgenstein has not defined the concept of 'form of life' clearly nor has he given many examples. Generally speaking, a form of life involves a common way of conceptualising experiences along with accompanying shared patterns of action and behaviour among members of community.<sup>12</sup> It is not clear whether religion can be called a form of life<sup>13</sup> and if so, whether different religious traditions constitute one form of life or several different ones.

4. B and UB have different conceptual schemes. The concept of truth is relative to conceptual schemes. Each conceptual scheme has its own criteria of meaning and truth and those determine what is meaningful and true within that scheme. Conceptual relativists deny that there is a concept of 'Truth' which is applicable to sentences



belonging to different conceptual schemes. If there were one set of facts to which truths are supposed to correspond, then two incompatible sentences about what is the case can not both be true at the same time. Conceptual relativists deny that there is one set of 'facts' about the world. We do not have access to neutral facts. Facts are not read off the world, rather facts are what they are because of how we read them. How we read them depends upon the conceptual scheme we are working with.<sup>14</sup> There can be more than one adequate account of how things are in the world. Thus, UB and B have different notions of objects and existence, their criteria of truth are different and therefore one does not contradict the other.

Whether there can be alternative conceptual schemes is a matter of controversy.<sup>15</sup> However, granting that there may be different conceptual schemes, this difference can have various dimensions. They may or may not have different criteria of truth, they may have totally different concepts or one scheme may include various concepts of another and have additional concepts of its own. Thus, two different conceptual schemes need not be totally distinct from each other; they may have overlapping similarities and degrees of differences among them.

Two different conceptual schemes may or may not be incompatible. A geologist's and physicist's schemes are not incompatible with each other provided they use the same language. But those of an astronomer and an astrologer are incompatible. If two conceptual schemes share a concept and yet differ about certain things being the case, truths of one would contradict those of another. Or two conceptual schemes may have different concepts of object itself and one may accept universals as real objects while the other does not. Depending upon the differences between conceptual schemes, in some cases two or more conceptual schemes may fit in with each other to give a picture of what there is, in others they may not. It is incorrect to suppose that if there is more than one conceptual scheme, each would constitute a self-sufficient system such that it neither touches nor conflicts with another on any point.

Similarly, two conceptual schemes may not have different concepts of truth and reality. Where factual discourse is concerned, we have to keep it in mind that what is true is determined by the scheme in question but it is also determined by what there is. To say that how



reality is apprehended is determined by one's conceptual scheme and that there can be more than one way of understanding reality need not allow that any thing goes in the name of describing what there is. We find, thus, that even if it is granted that B and UB have different conceptual schemes, the possibility of a statement by UB contradicting that of B can not be ruled out. Whether UB is an atheist, or a follower of a different religious tradition, if the conceptual schemes with which they are operating share a concept but differ regarding certain things being the case and both have the same criteria of truth, there would be opposition of beliefs. In certain disputes involving beliefs of Jews, Christians and Muslims this appears to be the case. This does not mean that in every case of difference in belief between B and UB there would be contradiction; only that in some cases there can be. It is also far from obvious that a religious person's concept of truth must be totally different and divorced from an irreligious person's concept of truth or from the concept of truth of a follower of a different religious tradition. In non-theological contexts, religious people and irreligious people operate with the same concept of truth. In theological contexts, believers speak of reality of supra natural beings and appeal to religious experiences and authority of revelation etc. But even then, point, of contact with the concept of truth in non-theological contexts of factual discourse remain. As for different religious traditions, quite often they do not have different concepts of truth and reality; rather they take different things as true and real. In some cases, however, the concept of truth and reality may be different as, for example, *Advaita Vedānta's* concept of ultimate reality.

A believer's conceptual scheme is not a self sufficient scheme covering all the aspects of his life; rather he shares with an atheist many concepts, explanations and practices as far as ordinary day to day life is concerned. He accepts the explanations and understandings of things and events that an atheist accepts but imposes upon them further meanings. His religious interpretations/explanations, therefore, are not at the same level as those accepted by the atheist; they are not substituted for the latter but added to them. B's conceptual scheme, therefore, includes the concepts of an irreligious person and also has additional concepts. If B's interpretation constituted an alternative to the atheist's interpretation of life and the world or if the two were interpreting different things, it could be plausible to think that the two can not conflict in any way. But that is not the case. B is operating with



both interpretations of life and the world, there is constant interplay of these two ways of looking at life and sometimes there is tension between them. That believers are faced with such tensions is evident from the fact that sometimes they find it difficult to combine their religious faith with their secular beliefs. This may lead to loss of faith. It is not as if once having accepted a religious tradition, one always remains a believer. The loss of faith may occur because pictures involved in one's religious beliefs are not found to be aesthetically or morally appealing but it may also occur because the believer is unable to combine his faith with his secular beliefs.

Wittgenstein declares that a person's acceptance of religious belief has its roots in his passions, not in intellect or reason. One does not come to religious belief after a process of reasoning; rather he submits to the religious authority (of the book or the prophet) which dictates him to believe certain things, however strange or unsound they may appear (CV, pp. 29 e & 32 e) and to believe them through thick and thin. The believer passionately and lovingly takes hold of the religious interpretation and this is behind the certainty characterising his acceptance of it as true (CV p. 32 e). Having once accepted, he would cling to his beliefs overlooking the demands of reason. Perhaps, this is really the sense behind the statement that UB does not contradict B. Whatever UB may say, whatever counter arguments he may offer, however sound his arguments may appear in the light of observations, a believer would not give up his faith. Nothing can, thus, make him deny what he believes. We, however, find that this is not corroborated by facts. Facts of life, scientific and empirical evidence do put a strain on B's faith; they sometimes weaken it, sometimes lead to modifications and sometimes even to loss of faith.

Wittgenstein's discussion of religion views it as a static phenomenon. Once the message has been given and accepted by believers lovingly, that is the end of the matter. This picture does justice neither to Christianity nor to other religious traditions. We find that religious doctrines go through modifications and reinterpretations and quite often these exercises result from a perception that existing empirical beliefs do not fit in with them. In believers' lives there is continuous interplay of religious and empirical and scientific beliefs and sometimes the two appear to conflict. The reactions of believers to such conflicts vary. Some are able to reconcile quite a lot of apparently



conflicting observations with their faith, some are not. How strongly a believer clings to his faith would depend upon how deep his passionate commitment to it is. Wittgenstein says "Life can educate one to a belief in God" (CV, p. 86e) we find, however, that life can also bring one to unbelief.

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## NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1. 'Versus' is used only to indicate the disagreement between a believer and an unbeliever, leaving it open what the nature of this disagreement is.
2. Notes taken by a group of students from Wittgenstein's lectures given at Cambridge in 1938 have been compiled and edited by Cyril Barrett in *Wittgenstein; Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Basil Blackwell, 1966. Though Wittgenstein never saw the notes written by these students, yet they can be taken as a fairly accurate account of his views at that time. The lectures throw light on topics that have not been discussed in detail elsewhere. *Culture And Value*, ed. G.H.von Wright, tr. Peter Winch, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1980. We will henceforth refer to lectures as LC and Culture And Value as CV.
3. Wittgenstein mentions that even when believers cite historical evidence in favour of their beliefs, they do not subject it to the kind of doubts to which such evidence is generally subjected.
4. Wittgenstein might be wanting to rule out the possibility that a belief based on empirical evidence could have affective, commissive force. Or, he might be wanting to point out that even if there is such a belief it would not be unshakable, since empirical evidence can only establish probability.
5. See Hudson, W.D., *Wittgenstein and Religious Belief*, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1975, pp.165-6



6. This would be a case of a belief which defies contrary empirical evidence if 'See' is being used in its ordinary sense or a sense somewhat similar to it.
7. Non-cognitivist analyses of religious language view it as expressing emotions, attitudes, or commitment to moral principles (Braithwaite), or beliefs (Hare). Philosophers like Ruth Rhees and D.Z. Phillips, who draw inspiration from Wittgenstein, also think that sentences like 'God exists', 'God is love' are not in the indicative mood. For Rhees 'God exists' is a confession of faith. (*Without Answers*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969, pp. 131-2) Phillips insists that a question about God's existence is not one about something being the case. (*Religion Without Explanation*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, p.168) Similarly, 'God is love' is a grammatical remark about what can and what can not be said about God. (*Faith After Foundationalism*, Routledge, London, New York, 1988, p.146) Phillips, however, admits that believers think of God as independently real and that it can not be said that theological statements do not have to do with objective reality or truth claims (*Ibid*, p.203)
8. For distinction between belief 'that' and belief 'in' and their interconnections, see Price H.H., "Belief 'in' and Belief 'that'" in, *The Philosophy of Religion*, ed. B. Mitchell, O.U.P. 1971
9. Talking about someone using 'death' in a different sense, Wittgenstein observes that unless his idea of death is related to our ordinary idea of death, there is no reason why it should be called 'death'. "If what he calls his 'idea of death' is to become relevant, it must become part of our game." (L.C., p.69) This would imply that uses of words in religious contexts have to be related to and conform to the rules of their usage in ordinary contexts to some extent at least.
10. Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 193
11. Philosophers like N. Malcolm, R. Rhees and D.Z. Phillips, think that understanding uses of language in religious contexts is open only to those who participate in the religious way of life. Phillips, however, has rejected the view that UB can not understand B. (Phillips, D.Z., *Belief, Change and Forms of Life*, Macmillan, London & Basingstoke, 1986, pp.11-12)
12. Hacker, P.M.S., *Insight and Illusion*, O.U.P., London, New York, 1975, p.220. Also Finch, H.L., *Wittgenstein: The Later Philosophy*, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1977, p.90. J.F.M. Hunter offers five different interpretations of the concept of 'form of life' (" 'Forms of Life' in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*" in *Essays on Wittgenstein*, ed. E.D. Klemke, Univ. of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, London, 1971, pp. 275-9)



13. It is debated whether 'form of life' refers to something as large as religion or something smaller like hope. See Patrick Sherry, "Is Religion a Form of Life?" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1972.
14. Peter Winch says, "Reality is not what gives language sense, what is real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense that language has. Further, both the distinction between real and the unreal and the concept of agreement with reality themselves belong to our language." "Understanding A Primitive Society," in *Religion And Understanding*, ed. D.Z. Phillips, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967 p.13. Similarly H. Putnam observes, "... the logical primitives themselves, and in particular the notions of object and existence, have a multitude of different uses rather than one absolute meaning". *The Many Faces of Realism*, Open Court, La Salle, Illionis, 1987, p.19, Phillips and others talk of each area of discourse having its own logic.
15. Davidson D., "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" in *Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. See also Rorty R., "The World Well Lost", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 69, 1972, & Rescher, N., "Conceptual Schemes" in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 5, ed. Peter French, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1980.



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## HEURISTIC APPROACH TO SCIENTIFIC THEORY-CONFIRMATION

The controversy regarding the correct approach to confirmation of scientific theory by evidence or experimental results has been one of the two or three focal issues in philosophy of science over the past two decades. In this paper\* my aim is to state, examine, and develop one recent approach - heuristic approach - due to J. Worrall (1985), one of a group of philosophers of science of London School of Economics (LSE). This group underlined the need to introduce heuristic ingredient into theory-confirmation. The idea, already there in William Whewell's classic work *History of the Inductive Sciences* (1837) although in an inchoate way, was brought back to life and articulated by E. Zahar (1973) of LSE and Worrall (1978).

### I

The first goal - that of explaining the heuristic position as regards one fundamental question of confirmation: 'When does a piece of evidence confirm a scientific theory?' - is to be achieved partly by a negative and partly by a positive phase. The negative task is that of Worrall's pessimism about two other approaches-logical and temporal; while the positive phase is his arguing that with a view to answering this question it has to be ascertained if the piece of evidence was used in the construction of the theory, that is to say, his arguing that confirmation is discovery-dependent.

On the logical approach, the question can be answered by ascertaining whether evidence *e* is logically deducible from theory *T*, as Worrall says, who thinks that the simple usual phrase '*e* is logically deducible from *T*' should be unpacked a bit:

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"Ideally, the evidence statement will assert that certain initial conditions held and that the experiment or observation had a certain outcome *and* the theory together with the statement of initial conditions will logically entail the outcome statement". [Worrall (1985), p.302]

Then, formally, *e* confirms *T* if, and only if, *e* is divided into two parts *i* and *j* (where *i* is the statement of initial conditions and *j* the statement of outcome) and  $T \& i \rightarrow j$  (where ' $\rightarrow$ ' is to be read as entail).

This view, Worrall argues, is amenable to 'tacking paradox'. Suppose we have a theory  $T_1$ , and evidence *e* ( $= i \& j$ ) independent of  $T_1$ . We can, then form a trifle theory  $T_2$  by conjoining  $T_1$  and *e*. The 'cobbled up'  $T_2$  along with *i* entails *j*, but is not confirmed by *e*. The reason is this : the same strategy may be adopted by taking another theory  $S_1$ , and *e* ( $= i \& j$ ) independent of it; and by creating a different theory  $S_2$  by simply conjoining  $S_1$  and *e*—where  $S_2$  together with *i* entails *j* but fails to be confirmed by *e*. This is the famous 'tacking paradox'. An almost similar case of 'tacking' is noticed, Worrall says, in the history of science, that is, in the case of scientific revolution in the field of optics in the early part of the nineteenth century. (See Worrall (1985), pp.303-4).

The second part of this negative phase concerns Worrall's repudiation of the temporal approach enunciated by Popper (1959) and later Popperians (for example, A. Musgrave (1974), I. Lakatos (1978)). According to this approach, Worrall writes : "... a theory is supported by any fact which it describes correctly and which was first discovered as a result of testing this theory; and that a fact which was already known before the theory's proposal does not support it". (Worrall (1978), p.46) Arguing against the second part of this quotation Worrall cites a case from the history of science—that is, the case of Mercury's perihelion. The fact of a deviation of 42 seconds of arc per century in Mercury's orbit was known for a long time before Einstein gave his general theory of relativity. On the temporal approach the fact of Mercury's perihelion does not support the general relativity; but scientists pass judgement to the effect of the general relativity being supported by the already known fact.

Now, the positive phase of our explanation of the heuristic position. In Worrall words : "... a theory is supported by any fact, a



'correct' description of which it implies, provided the fact was not used in the construction of the theory" (Worrall (1978), p.50). Again, he states his thesis in the context of examining Popper's intuitive remarks about testability in this way which he says he learned from R. Giere : "Popper is right that a theory is genuinely supported only by passing real tests, but in order to decide whether some empirical result constituted a real test of some theory, we have to look at how the theory was constructed" (Worrall (1985), p.313). That is to say, we are to inspect whether some empirical result, even if implied by a theory, was used in its construction. Then, confirmation, according to Worrall, is a triadic relation among evidential statement, a theory, and a class of facts used in the theory's construction. All this, now, leads to the heuristic criterion of confirmation : a piece of experimental result or evidence *e* confirms a theory *T* constructed in a particular way if, and only if, (i) *e* is implied by *T*, and (ii) *e* is not included in the class of facts used in the construction of the theory in that particular way, (though *e* may have been established prior to the construction of *T* in some cases).

That this criterion applies to actual scientific cases can be shown in the following way. The null result of Michelson - Morley experiments performed with a highly sensitive optical interferometer to determine the relative velocity between the earth and ether was in vogue in 1887 and known before Lorentz - Fitzgerald gave their contraction hypothesis and Einstein his theory of relativity to account for the null result. But the contraction hypothesis receives no support from this result, because it was arrived at by using the result, whereas the relativity theory receives enormous support from the result, because it was not involved in the phenomena used in the construction of the theory. Another case - the diffraction phenomena and polarisation effects do support Fresnel's wave theory of light, because they were not used in the construction of the theory; on the other hand, the corpuscular theory of light as a direct development of the ideas of Newton and Biot is not confirmed by those phenomena and effects, this is because they were used in the theory's development.

## II

The heuristic approach has argued an important thesis : discovery of a theory plays a major role in its confirmation. Equally important are its other ingredients which will be considered in our final section.



Here, in the first place, my comment has to do with the meaning of the word 'discovery' used by Worrall: he has not indicated the exact sense in which the word is being used. As, according to R. McLaughlin (1982), the word is an ambiguous one: scientists and philosophers of science use it in different senses.

In scientists' usage, the word 'discovery' means as first encountering in nature something (not proposition) unexpectedly or by chance, for example, the discovery of new isotopes of an element by F. Soddy, of neutron by J. Chadwick. This is a well-established sense of the word, according to McLaughlin who also mentions its other senses involved in philosophers' usage. H. Reichenbach (1938) used the word in the sense of "hitting upon" a hypothesis (proposition) as a result of mental grappling. Popper (1959), having ruled out the practicability of rationally characterising the discovery of hypothesis, has meant by discovery, the appraisal of scientific theorise. This is what is repeated by Lakatos (1978) while he equates 'logic of discovery' with 'logic of appraisal'. Finally, discovery of theories or laws, we think, refers to a particular historical process or mode of generation.

Let us, then, in order to avoid confusion, follow McLaughlin's terminological stipulations. The word 'discovery' should be used in the sense of first encountering in nature some particle or element or some natural phenomenon. The word 'invention' should be used to mean Reichenbach's notion of hitting upon a hypothesis; and for Popper's and Lakatos' usages the word 'appraisal' ought to be used.

Given these formulations, it is not hard to see that while Worrall brings into special prominence the issue of discovery into theory-confirmation, he is concerned with the issue of theory's invention or "hitting upon". As the latter involves some mental grappling, we prefer to use the word 'generation' (that is, particular historical process) or 'construction' (not, of course, interchangeable with 'discovery' as has been done by Worrall) to 'invention'. However, Worrall's intention is quite obvious - he intends to use the word 'construction' to state his discovery-thesis but wrongly uses it synonymously with 'discovery'.

Then, an enquiry into heuristic theory reveals its attempt to account for the confirmation of a whole theory or system consisting



of several hypotheses. Thus the theorists' settled mode of thinking is holistic : a theory in its entirety is confirmed or disconfirmed. But surely a genuine phenomenon is that of selective confirmation (that is, confirmation of some parts or hypotheses of a theory by some piece of evidence) argued by scientists and philosophers of science, for example, C. Glymour (1980).

Next, I am arguing against the sufficiency of the heuristic criterion of confirmation represented at the positive phase of this paper's section I. With a view to making my argument concrete, let us say, in the first place, following Kyburg Jr. (1985), that quantitative laws are representative of science. Then, for their testing and confirmation we must obtain values of the quantities occurring in a quantitative law by employing the procedure of measurement which involves error. The measuring process calls for computing intervals of experimental errors. (This phenomenon will be detailed in the final section). Now, values (measured or computed) of the quantities occurring in the law must fall within the intervals of experimental errors, if there is to be confirmation. But if those values do not fall within the intervals then they will not constitute confirming evidence for the law, even though the evidence complies with the heuristic criterion. This shows the criterion's insufficiency.

That the heuristic criterion is not sufficient may also be shown in another way. Thus, suppose that we have a set of values for the quantities occurring in a law, and that the set is implied by the law and is not used in the construction or generation of the law in a particular way, thereby satisfying the criterion. Again, suppose that instruments employed to obtain that set of values did not work properly or were internally disturbed. In that case, that set of values would not constitute confirming evidence for the law in question. We shall consider the role of instruments in confirmation later on.

My final comment consists in the fact that the heuristic theorist has not considered the question of 'how' we go about confirming quantitative laws. This is a major and fundamental question, because its solution has an important bearing upon the answer to the question of 'when' a quantitative law is confirmed.



## III

In attempting to develop the heuristic approach, the comments made in the previous section will be concretized here. In the first place, we address ourselves to the question of how quantitative laws are confirmed. Confirmation, in my view, is a three-staged process. First, we are to look at the particular historical process, or mode of generation, or construction of a quantitative law. Specifically, in consonance with the heuristic position we propose to inspect if some empirical results (that is, values) were used in the construction of the law; if used, the law will not be confirmed by those values. Secondly, we look at the issue of errors of measurement. In quantitative laws all the quantities may be measurable, or some are measurable and some unmeasurable. Attention is focussed not on the first alternative. We go about confirming a law having all its quantities measurable by obtaining values for all of these. This is done by employing the procedure of measurement which, as said earlier, involves error. We merely suppose here that a small size (as for example, ten) of successive measurements of all the quantities occurring in the law is made. Certainly we never get true values of the quantities measured, but only a distribution of values; thereby we can obtain only computed mean values for all the measured quantities. There is, thus, difference between real values and the computed mean values. Barring the questions of theoretically possible deviation which is arbitrarily great, we intend to know the actual possible deviation whose size is based on what is called in standard books on statistics, the *root mean square deviation* denoted by  $\sigma$  (Sigma). This is the square root of the sum of the squared deviation divided by the number of measurements. In symbols :

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{(a_1 - a)^2 + (a_2 - a)^2 + \dots + (a_n - a)^2}{n}}$$

Where  $a$  is the arithmetic mean, and the values obtained by measurement are denoted by  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n$ , and  $n$  is the number of measurements.

Now, given a small sample of ten measurements of each of the quantities in a law, the deviation of true value of each from its computed arithmetic mean value can not be more than  $\sigma$ . We, then, go on to calculate the interval of experimental errors :  $a \pm \sigma$  for each of the



quantities in the law. Finally, for the law's confirmation, we need to obtain value of each of its quantities by making further measurements and to check whether the value thus obtained falls within the corresponding interval for each of the quantities. If not, then the law will not be confirmed by the values obtained from further measurements.

The same course is to be adopted in case of confirmation of laws, some quantities of which are measurable and some unmeasurable; the only difference being this. We shall have to calculate the interval of experimental errors for the unmeasurable quantities from the values of the measurable quantities. The second stage of the process of confirmation ends here.

We now enter into the third stage where the role of measuring instruments or mechanisms employed to obtain values of the quantities in a law is to be considered. Here, following Nils - Eric Sahlin (1986), we must ascertain that the instruments used in measurements work properly. If the instruments do not work properly due to some internal disturbances or other reasons, the values they indicate would falsely support the law. In order to prevent this possibility, proper working of the instrument must be ensured. An instrument is said to be working properly if the propability of its working is high or 0.995; that is to say, 99.5% of the time it indicates values that fall within the interval of experimental errors computed to test previous laws. In other words, the probability of the 'correct' working of the instrument will be 0.995, if out of 1000 times a quantity is measured the instrument had shown values falling within the interval 995 times. We will define this sort of instrument as a 'tested instrument' in this paper. This concludes the third and final stage of the process of confirmation.

Depending on what has been said so far I am now directing myself to the question of when a quantitative law is confirmed. A piece of evidence (constituted by a set of values) confirms a quantitative law if, and only if,

- i) the set of values falls within the corresponding intervals of experimental errors computed for each quantity occuring in the law depending on a small sample (as for example, 10) of measurements of each quantity;



- ii) the set of values is implied by the law and initial conditions;
- iii) the set of values is not a subset of the set of values which was used in the generation of the law;
- iv) each of the instruments employed to measure the quantities in the law is a tested instrument (as defined earlier).

This criterion certainly is an improvement on the heuristic position characterised by Worrall. The clauses (i) and (iv) are new additions, while clauses (ii) and (iii) are reconstructions of Worrall's heuristic position.

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## NOTES

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## *NOTICE*

Professor R. Sundara Rajan tendered resignation of his Editorship of the journal. Taking into account that editorial responsibility should not in any way interfere with his academic and scholarly pursuit, the authorities of the University of Poona have accepted it. We are immensely grateful to him for the guidance, cooperation and help which the journal received during the tenure of his Editorship of the Quarterly.

*EDITORS*



## PROFESSOR P. T. RAJU

Professor P. T. Raju, was born in India in 1904 and took his Ph.D. from Calcutta University in 1935. He is the author of hundreds of articles and numerous books and is best known for such books of his as : *Thought and Reality*; *Hegelianism and Advaita* ( forwarded by J.H. Muirhead ); *Idealistic Thought of India*; *Comparative Studies in Philosophy* (editor with Dean Inge etc.); *The Concept of Mam : A Study in Comparative Philosophy* (editor with S. Radhakrishnan), *East-West Studies on the Problem of Self* (editor with A. Castell); *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*; *Lectures on Comparative Philosophy*, *Introduction to Comparative Philosophy*, *The Philosophical Traditions of India*, *Spirit, Being and Self* ( forwarded by Eugene Freeman ). Professor Archie J. Bahm calls Professor Raju the leading thinker in comparative philosophy at least in the English speaking countries. Raju's works have been translated into many languages including German, Spanish and Japanese. He was University Professor of Philosophy and Psychology from 1949 to 1962 at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur and then Professor of Philosophy and Indian Studies at the College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio, U.S.A. He was awarded the "Padma Bhushan" by the President of India in 1958 for his contributions to East-West understanding. In his passing away the philosophical world in general and India in particular have lost great champion of comparative philosophy.



## Empiricism Versus Pragmatism : Truth Versus Results

### INTRODUCTION

I wish to start this discussion with a cliché and a caveat. The cliché is that philosophy began in ancient Greece with Thales, at the dawn of the emergence of reason from the limbo of mythology and folklore. Thus, philosophy began in wonder and is love of wisdom. Philosophy is product of curiosity (and one might even say that philosophy itself is a curiosity), a relentless pursuit after profundity. But this cliché-repeated tirelessly in history of philosophy to endorse the hellenic origin of philosophy-faces a rebuttal in the light of contemporary advances in the sciences, though without dispelling the remarkable contributions of the hellenic thinkers.<sup>1</sup> It was a very humble period in retrospect, but for those who participated or partook, it must have had an exhilarating effect-even intoxicating, as the practice of the art of sophistry evidenced by sophists.

And, here is the point at which the caveat becomes important. Contrary to the idea peddled under various guises, this discussion is limited by the acknowledgement of the possibility that wisdom is unattainable and, consequently, that there is *NO* absolute truth. But, may be this presentation of the caveat is too pugnacious. What is intended here is to warn the reader concerning entertaining false expectations. For, in considering philosophy as love of wisdom, wisdom has often been equated with truth. The inaccuracy of such identity is shown clearly when one considers the possibility that, though it is valid to expect that truth may be the object of wisdom, one may be wise without knowing the truth.<sup>2</sup> It is in the light of the above cliché and caveat that the Socratic relentless questioning, of the beliefs of ancient Greece and the wisdom of the sophists, aimed at the delineation and determination of truth and falsehood, is to be considered.

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In a way, the 'history' of philosophy has remained faithful to the search for truth.<sup>3</sup> In this search, so many issues have been raised, so many theories formulated. A question innocently formulated has generated paradoxical positions, answers and conclusions. Thus, what is truth? has remained one of the most daunting philosophical questions. By contrast, what is the truth? has been more easy to consider-even though, not without its own befuddling conundrums. And, in most cases, this latter question has been what philosophers have been considering when proposing theories of "truth". In other words, they have been concerned with defining the truth, rather than "truth", while they have thought they were defining *the* truth. Formulated this way, it might appear confusing, but what is intended is reference to the various theories of truth as attempts to define truth within specific contexts. But most philosophers who have considered truth have confused the one issue with the other. From idealism onwards, the situation has remained virtually the same. Thus, such theories and philosophies as rationalism, empiricism, positivism, scepticism and pragmatism, have all foundered on the same score.

Now, one may ask, why pit empiricism against pragmatism and truth against results? Are we suggesting they are mutually exclusive? And are we saying that the empiricist is concerned with truth while the pragmatist is not, but rather with results? To avoid misleading the reader, it should be stated right away that pragmatism is also concerned with truth, at least as much as empiricism. But pragmatism takes cognisance of the limitation of empiricism and hence constitutes an attempt to improve on the weaknesses of empiricism. It is concerned to denounce the rigidity that has attended the foundationalist strategies of empiricism, which have virtually become a straight-jacket and a debilitating doctrinaire account of truth. But in so doing, pragmatism seems to go to the opposite extreme and, in the process, overboard, by allowing practical consequences to supplant truth. Can we salvage pragmatism? That is, while acknowledging the truth that it enshrines, save it from itself, and in process save man-even if no absolute truths exist to be discovered in an eternal, transcendental realm, mankind cannot jettison the desire for truth in favour of results without imperilling the greater end of making results serve human survival goals.

This is not impossible. If one acknowledges the fact that pragmatism-a consequence of idealism, rationalism, empiricism, positivism and relativism in philosophy-is more or less the official philosophy in the



West, it then becomes an interesting issue to see whither man is moving, in the West. Thus, in this essay I examine the issue of truth from the perspective of empiricism and pragmatism. This is not without references to other theories, but the concern is to see how the ascendancy of pragmatism has affected the practice of science and philosophy. To carry out the project of this essay, I consider in Section I the attempts to define truth and the concern of philosophy with the search for truth. This does not mean that all the various theories of truth will be considered in detail. To undertake such a task would be an unnecessary review that has no dividend to yield concerning the issue at hand. Hence, the discussion will only show how the point broached above on defining "truth" and "the truth" has affected the usefulness of the various theories of truth. In Section II, I discuss the cleavage between rationalism and empiricism to drive home the point made in Section I. This section has the additional value of showing the limitations of the epistemic dualism that has pervaded Western philosophy, in spite of the diversity of theories propounded in its historical facets. In Section III, I consider the origins of relativism in philosophy and, consequently, in science. This I suggest, sets the stage for pragmatism which is discussed in Section IV. The last Section, V, considers the pragmatist's preference for usefulness, rather than truth and attempts to show the consequences for man in science and philosophy.

# I

## WHAT IS TRUTH?

There are so many dimensions to any philosophical issue or concept that perceptive student of philosophy would be worried when he or she encounters any simplistic account. However, at any point in time it is very difficult, if not impossible, to take into consideration all materials (particular and general) relevant to any problem. Thus, discussions proceed with unintended disregard of other issues that do not directly seem relevant. However, a proper realization of the limitation this fact imposes on philosophical discourse would have been most advantageous, but this seldom is the case, as we often exuberantly proclaim the minimal advances we make from our limited perspectives to be of monumental importance—often supposing, over-ambitiously that we have captured, once and for all, the essence of the issue and provided the solution to the problem, on hand.



When one considers the concept of "truth" one finds that this consideration is of great value: What is truth? As a question this could be amenable to a triadic interpretation: i) taken as a request, it could be a demand for a definition of "truth". In this sense the demand is for an account of truth that can be applied in all circumstances-factual, formal, linguistic, metaphysical, moral, intuitive, etc.; ii) taken as request, again, the question may be contextually restricted to a particular kind of truth. That is, it could be a request for an account of 'the' truth; consequently, the question "what is truth?" can only be meaningful when taken within the particular context of discourse or inquiry; iii) finally, it could be taken as an absolutist requirement for the definition of *the* truth. This is the sense in which *the* truth is construed valuatively, by contrast to error, illusion, falsehood, deceit, deception, etc. By contrast to the first aspect of truth and the second aspect, the truth here lacks both a metaphysical and a contextual particularsistic aspect. The metaphysical aspect expects that truth is univocal and can be arrested into a single definition which can then be waved like a magic and like Aristotle's much quoted definition:

To say of what is that it is not, or what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is and what is not that it is not, is true.<sup>4</sup>

The metaphysical nature of this definition is evidenced in any attempt to cash out the implications of what it says. While it is suggestive of operational, the trial run of such application is doomed by the variability of content. Also, it suggests that what "truthifies" a statement or affirmation is homogeneous; which suggestion is simplistic. These are just glimpses of issues discussed when mention is made of various theories of truth. This has a resemblance to the first account, but it is quite distinguishable from it because, while philosophers have usually started from (i) they have entered into (ii), and dissatisfied, they have proceeded to (iii) with the belief that this is what is requested. While each approach seem to have its merit, because it engages different aspects of truth (possibilities, that is), they have variously led into philosophical *cul de sacs*. This has resulted from the confusion of one enterprise and product with the others, and in the consideration of a contrast between truth and usefulness, a careful analysis of the theories of truth is indicated, particularly in so far as they have responded to one or more of the three issues raised here.

#### Ia.

If we start with Aristotle's answer to "what is truth?" which is



quoted above, one immediately moves in the obvious common sense realist direction that has been regarded as the Correspondence Theory. There is something intuitively obvious in Aristotle's formulation that it seems evident that it must be 'true'. It is at this point that danger signals loom large on the horizon.

Any theory of truth must address three basic issues: the facts, and here, facts will have to be construed in the broadest sense to cover various things, ranging from events-like the battle of Waterloo and Operation Desert Storm to the pain in the groin on the one hand, and religious, metaphysical, moral on the other, apart from purely scientific facts produced through the advancement of science and technology. In fact, it has to be acknowledged that in spite of the last group of 'facts' our usage, understanding of, and disposition toward truth, has remained unaltered. The second issue which a theory of truth must be conscious of is our linguistic practice. This fact has been recognized by theorists, but its importance has been often misunderstood or emphasized wrongly. While Aristotle's definition of truth supposes that it is the "saying" that "truthifies", it has been easy to remark that it is not just the "saying" alone, or even, as such, that "truthifies" but the fact(s) as they are-this is the "it" of which Aristotle spoke.

Now, there would be no way to tether truths unless through the numerous "saying(s)" that we originate: the sayings could be verbal or it could be written, it could come in the form of an action and disposition to act or belief (a doxastic disposition). These are all conveyed in language. It is the linguistic aspect of truth referred to earlier. The "it" is indifferent to the saying or disposition or system we may build, whereas our saying(s) or description(s) and disposition(s) collapse or survive in virtue of their conformity to the "it" and its nature. That there was a battle of Waterloo is an "it", a "fact", our saying that "there was one" another "fact" - a linguistic statement that helps to tether the fact though. Whether we did make such a statement or not does not add or detract from the facticity of the "battle of Waterloo". This is because we are language users, communicating and codifying beings, capturing reality in language is the only advantaging factor the linguistic device serves.

The third basic issue a theory of truth has to address is the one broached in an implicit form above. It concerns our disposition or belief. It is the epistemic aspect, a cognitive component, which carries a



valuation, because belief or disposition to belief and knowledge (episteme) cannot hang incognito and in vacuo. Any affirmation of a proposition is loaded with this component; whether this is clearly stated or not is immaterial. Aristotle's definition can be considered reflexively in this regard. It carries the implication of an asseveration—that Aristotle does accept and believes the definition to be true and valid, and also an affirmation—that he wants others to consider his statement as true and accept or be disposed to positively act on its basis.

Usually, Aristotle's definition is viewed as the progenitor of the Correspondence Theory of truth. But, to my mind, it has carried the seed of other theories as well. It has also carried the seed of much more: it has led to the formulation of paradoxically enlightening and confusing theories, not just about truth, but also about knowledge. As in the case of 'knowledge', philosophers have led us up the path of a labyrinth of paradoxes in truth: a concept we use daily seems to become intractable all of a sudden once we enter into philosophy, while outside it we still use the concept and accept "truths" from compatriots unquestioningly. For example, ordinarily if I say I know that "Jamaica is a Caribbean country", there is hardly any dispute about my knowing, my knowledge and the truth of the affirmation. But when I am asked to explain what I mean by 'know', 'truth' and 'belief' out of context, but in philosophy, am totally lost and bewildered.

Ib.

Before considering the Correspondence and other theories of truth, a digression is indicated. Most contemporary Western philosophers have supposed, contrary to the tripartite analysis of truth provided above, that truth has two basic aspects or content, and they have consequently erred. They have supposed that only "meaning and fact" are relevant.<sup>5</sup> This supposition is diametrically antithetical to the analysis I think needs be made if the transcendence of empiricism and pragmatism is to be understood.

When Aristotle said "saying of what is, that it is, is true" and conversely, the implication is that, as Quine and Ullian says,

Truth is a property of sentences; it is the trait shared equally by all that would be rightly affirmed.<sup>6</sup>



But this is only one implication that Aristotle's definition has. It also implies that something *is*, and that which *is*, what makes the proposition (p) or (not-p) affirming or denying that it *is*, to be true or false. Over and above these two components is the value which the affirmation and the facticity of the content (objective) of the proposition has. This is what makes p significant for sentient beings interested in improving their own lives, taming lions, bringing the communist system to an end, defeating the Iraqi army or ensuring the continued dependence and instability of developing countries. Without p (as a sentence) and its content (call it meaning, significance or whatever) having implications for weal or woe for man—both real, potential or imagined—whether p is true will be irrelevant to him. This is why Quine and Ullian and those who follow their line of truth are only partially right. Consider Sybil Wolf-ram's procedure, for example:

For purposes of exposition, I shall begin by assuming that the correct subject of the predications 'is true' and 'is false' are type statements, and further that p in 'p' and 'p is true' represents the same type statement.<sup>7</sup>

Even though her concern is with what relationship exists between statements and what makes them true, the scale is unnecessarily loaded in favour of the assertoric function of sentences or statements— and here, she makes a distinction between a statement on the one hand and predicating truth of the statement, which seems rather unnecessary.\* The only function which such predication performs is emphasis, and discounting this need to distinguish between 'p' and 'p is true' has led toward the formulation of the redundancy theory of truth. For logicians, such emphasis might be important, but they do not, so to say 'truthify', that is, make true.

In this connection, Dummett's discussion of truth, calls for attention. In speaking about the relation of truth to sentences, he glossed some fundamental issues which makes his otherwise illuminating discussion stunted. This happens when he says that there is a similarity between the history teacher's assertion which the school boy follows that "It was neither James I nor Charles I who was beheaded" and "I was either talking to Jean or to Alice but cannot remember which", because he was taken in by the similarity in the structure of the two sentences. It is only this inadvertent confusion that justifies his contention that :



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My knowledge that I was talking either to Jean or to Alice derives ultimately from the knowledge that I had at the time that I was talking to (say) Jean: the fact that the incomplete knowledge is all that survives is beside the point. Rather, the difficulty arises because we often make sentences of the form 'p or q' when the ultimate evidence for making them, in the sense indicated, is neither evidence for the truth of p nor evidence for the truth of q.<sup>9</sup>

Dummett seems to ignore the fact the to know that 'p or q' is quasi-meaningless or lacking in content is one thing, to assert a different disjunction when one lacks evidence for either disjunct separately is another, which presents an awkward situation for Dummett's programme, leaving us dismayed.

The reason why pure formalism is of little assistance in determining the issues which truth deals with is clearly shown by Dummett's and Wolfram's oversights. If I had actually talked to either Jean or to Alice (not in a dream, not under hypnosis, drunkenness or seance or under drugs or hallucination or whatever other attenuating circumstances the Cartesian *malin genie* might occasion), then the knowledge I have is definite, in spite of the possibility of forgetting who I actually spoke to. The issue can be settled one way or the other, just like the case of the history teacher and his or her student, by reference to the fact to which the truth appertains. One does not need an arabesque of conceptual detail to see this. On the other hand, going by pure logic, a situation of either/or requires no epistemic locus, because any two statements/sentences can be disjunctively related. This is the warrant the logician has to combine in disjunctive relationships sentences that lack epistemic and ontologic content, such as "either the Devil is upside down or Mathematics is frightened". This is what Dummett captures in saying :

The most striking instance of this is the fact that we are prepared to assert any statement of the form 'p or not p', even though we may have no evidence for the truth of 'p' or for the truth of 'not p'.<sup>10</sup>

even though his initial example concerned 'p or q'. What we find in logic is that we need no knowledge at all to affirm 'p or not p' as such an affirmation is epistemically vacuous. On the other hand, and here lies the catch, we do need some knowledge to know that 'p or q' lacks content, and hence bears no grudge against the redundancy of truth or falsity when



applied to it in some instances while it is quite relevant in others. In actual fact, there can be no such a priori way of grouping or characterizing true sentences of real languages, because what confers truth is not determinable in that way. What the redundancy theory of truth says is not that the phrase "is true" is of no use, but rather, that it neither adds nor detracts from what it qualifies. This is not saying that "is true" performs no epistemic function when added to (some) sentences, and this point is further clarified in our discussion of the coherence theory of truth below.

Ic. (i)

### THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

In considering this account I wish to state that reference to it as a theory might be one of the initial problems that has affected its proper understanding and, perhaps, acceptance. In philosophy we are often compelled to clothe our ideas in grandiose linens and call our views highfalutin names to make them sound impressive and attract attention. Thus, saying that the correspondence account of truth is a theory serves the end of attaining to a class of elaborateness and, by default, pretend to be what it is not. Let us ponder this a bit more.

One intriguing aspect of the philosophical enterprise is the ability of the philosopher to see problems where every other person passes without noticing anything. This ability, however, is both an asset and a liability. It is an asset because it enables man to glimpse vistas that may otherwise have escaped knowledge and a broadening, by a process of critical examination, of our idea of how much and how little we know about ourselves the things about us and the universe at large. However, it is also a liability because it makes us ignore the foundations of theory and encourages flights of critical, speculative and professionalized (technical) fantasy, no matter how patently ridiculous and implausible such endeavours may seem; thus, starting from a vaunted vulnerability of the disclosures of common sense, philosophy outreaches itself by throwing away the baby and the bath water and proclaiming such efforts as being consonant with logic, reason and science.

There can be no doubt that a lot of philosophical water has passed under the bridge of thought since Thales is reputed to have stipulated that everything is made up of water. The desire to look beyond the way things



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seem is no doubt useful because it keeps in abeyance many errors, but this has been carried beyond reasonable levels. O'Hear, exemplifying this absurdity, says (and he is not alone in this regard) that

We have no direct access to the world: all our observations of the world and of things in it rests on categorizations and assumptions we impose on what we are observing, on beliefs of ours, in other words... The lack of direct experiential access to the world, combined with growing realization of the way in which our more theoretical beliefs about the world are far from conclusively supported by our observational levels of judgement, has led a number of philosophers to question whether there is any sense in which we are entitled to think that our beliefs about the world are true or justified.<sup>11</sup>

There are two ways of construing what he says here: i) that he is reporting what philosophers have done, which he himself does not necessarily subscribe to. This, however, is ruled out of court because, what he conveys is a categorical affirmation of the inaccessibility of the world to our cognitive equipment. This is what makes the second reading plausible, that, ii) O'Hear thinks that we do not have any way of knowing how things, including ourselves, really are in the world, and, hence, that he is an epistemological sceptic. How he is able to say that Aristotle's definition of truth "is correct" when he has assured us we have no access to the world is very baffling. We can (on O'Hear's understanding) only have indirect access to Aristotle's definition at best, and at that, we cannot know the full implications of what Aristotle meant. This is why O'Hear says that Aristotle's definition should not be seen as referring to anything in the world which "is" as it is described by the "saying", hence

One desirable feature of the Aristotelian definition is that it implies that sayings or statements are what truth and falsity are primarily properties of.<sup>12</sup>

Obviously, O'Hear and those who think along the same lines are fastening on only one aspect of the truth equation. Aristotle clearly had in mind both the "saying" and the "it" which makes the saying true or false. It is this that have led to the explication of the relationship of the "saying" and the "it" in the commonsensical language of "correspondence":

veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei.<sup>13</sup>  
CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar



This can be literally rendered: truth is the adequation of intellect to reality. It is clear here that though this definition aims at saying what commonsense intends, namely, that my assertion that "It is dark outside" is true if and only if it is dark outside at this point in time, it says more, for it is no longer the sentence I use to affirm that can be true or false but my ideas or intellectual state which must correspond to reality. The suspicion that I have here is that the introduction of intellect in the place of language is an unjustifiable fiat which has brought in another issue - that of the cognitive state of the agent. Thus, when philosophers consider the above as the "corresponding" issue, they are easily led astray; complications that could have been avoided are sneaked in. But, even then, not realizing that truth is not a fit between reality and intellect as such, the additional problem of how to understand "correspondence" has been thought injurious to the definition provided by Aristotle. If one could get over the scholastic hangover of speaking prematurely of what impact truth/falsity formulating propositions have on our intellect and attend to the definition of truth about factual, experienceable reality, we would be compelled to see that the most accurate account of truth is the one in terms of "correspondence".

Now, it may be asked what is meant by "correspondence"? I can only say that it is the relationship of fit between the "saying" - the statement - and the "it" - or state of affairs, event, idea, etc. which it is about. "It is dark outside" is true if and only if "it is dark"; my saying, writing, recording on tape, etc. would only be means of conveying it to others or tethering that fact; the reaction you have to it if you were with me when I said it or if you were the one at the other end of the phone, proposing to visit me, or if you read it in my memoir or essay and realize why I did not go out that moment, etc. would serve to convey the truth of what I said.

Correspondence is not such a mysterious thing that cannot be serviceable because it originated from our commonsense idea of truth. We do not have to be pretentiously profound by consigning everything ordinary to trash-basket. The word 'correspondence' is only a tool or relational term aimed at capturing a feature of reality and its linguistic (in the widest possible sense) representation. In this regard, William James seems to be clear on what truth is. He says,



Truth emerges from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to them, which facts again create or reveal new truth... and so on indefinitely. The 'facts' themselves meanwhile are not *true*. They simply *are*. Truth is the function of the beliefs (the statements) that start and terminate among them.<sup>14</sup>

and, in another place, he says

The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process, namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its valid-ation.<sup>15</sup>

One may balk at some of the metaphysical implications of the words that we use in conceptualizing our ideas, but this in no way indicates that the validity of our ideas (that is, our having them) cannot be separated from the unintended masks that language robes them in. This is equally separable from instances when unacceptable positions issue from transcendentalism and idealism, in the supposition that truth is eternal and otherworldly, to be attained only in a totally different realm. Perhaps, one should separate further the need to speak of a transcendental realm in an ordinary language from the need to put ordinary things in transcendental realm.

Loneragan's very illuminating exposition of truth is marred by the metaphysics of idealism that surrounds his project. Hence, his problem falls within the last category mentioned above. Speaking on "The Notion of Truth" he distinguished six aspects:

- (i) the criterion of truth
- (ii) the definition of truth
- (iii) the ontology of truth
- (iv) truth in expression
- (v) The appropriation of truth
- (vi) the truth of interpretation.<sup>16</sup>

What is of particular interest for the correspondence theory of truth is what he has to say under the definition of truth. There can be no doubt that his distinctions are of interest and should be patiently studied. In fact, it seems clear to me that a careful attention to the distinctions will



go a long way in dispelling the usual offhand dismissal of the correspondence theory of truth—particularly in the relationship between being, knowing, affirmation, verification and endorsement.

For being was identified with what is to be known through intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation; but the only reasonable affirmation is the true affirmation, and so, being is what is known truly. Inversely, then, knowing is true by its relation to being, and truth is a relation of knowing to being... truth consists in the absence of any difference between the knowing and the known being.<sup>17</sup>

Represented thus, truth cannot be separated from what makes it true even if, in the end, truths are represented in language (as they usually are). The apparent phenomenological diction found in Lonergan only reinforces the necessity to always ground truth in reality. This is what makes William James' words to ring clearly true, in spite of the simplicity of the way it is presented. He says,

Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-process... Truth is made... in the course of experience.<sup>18</sup>

Ic.(ii).

The vicissitudes that the correspondence account of truth has faced have been a result of many factors. As an account that aims to capture our every day attitude and demarcation of truth from falsehood, it lacks the elegance that other 'theories', deliberately formulated (concocted) have. It is a realist account. It is the empiricist account to which we often subscribe in our dealings with each other and with nature. It is no wonder that in spite of attempts to coerce us into submission by various forces, we still remain empiricists: even when we are philosophers in one breath, we are still empirical realists the greater part of our lives.

However, as philosophers, we can not be complacent. There are so many compelling reasons that signal suspicion and, even, distrust of what we would ordinarily have taken for granted. These reasons have been celebrated from the period of the earliest sceptics. They compelled Plato to place Truth, with capital T, and Knowledge, with capital K, outside the reach of man. They have also compelled the neo-platonists and schoolmen to look beyond the realm of the mundane to search for enduring knowledge.



Now, if one says one knows, one expects, often without meaning to, that what one knows is true. That it is true is not just enough, its truth must be such that time and space would not be able to affect the item so known. Or, what else do philosophers mean when they rhetorically contend that knowledge does not admit of error-how can you say that you know and may be wrong or that the item of your knowledge may turn out other than you claim it to be-false? What, Plato would ask, would the sense be in identifying the fallible with the infallible? Can we be comfortable with a truth that is true today but false tomorrow? These are very grave considerations: the notion of correspondence itself is so indeterminate that we are left wondering. So, where do we go for comfort and assurance-at least, even if we go on behaving normally and engaging in meaningful discourse with others by using correspondence, the ultimate goal would still be to obtain something that would not be subject to infelicitous mutations to which we and our items of cognition are so vulnerable. There is no way we are going to get outside our experiential milieu but we surely must be able to ground the disclosures of experience in some more valuable and long lasting nature that gives enduring satisfaction. This is exactly the point at which the empiricist-whether one who claims that the only way of knowing is through experience or that the only mode of being that is there to be known is ultimately material, experientiable matter-and scientists, together with the positivists, stop their ship or ground their ship. While obtaining some measure of valid knowledge for us, they have left many others unaccounted for, and also left the issue of value undiscussed. In fact the empiricist and positivist, also probably, analytic treatment of the issue of value is as a non-issue. Values are not things with tangible nature out-there and cannot be grasped in the same way. Consequently, they cannot be adequately confronted and treated.

Id.

## THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

As it is not just issues of value that the empiricist has left unaccounted for, other issues are begging to be dealt with. One of these issues is the nature of truths which do not just consist of facts out-there. They are not things that can be verified by reference to external objects. But they are still there: relations between propositions, logical truths, mathematical certainties, intuitive discoveries, etc. Thus, while one may not obviously disregard the correspondence account of truth, other



accounts call for attention.

Before the logicians and formalists systematized the coherence account of truth, the grains of the theory had surfaced in the works of ancient and modern philosophers-especially notable are Plato and Descartes. Thus,

cognitio fit per assimilationem cogniti et cognoscentis.<sup>19</sup>

meaning that propositions are to be held true if and only if they copy the eternal thought that considers them. The world of ideas and cogito are such thoughts that make our propositions true. The possibility of eternally participating in such a realm of truth has remained very alluring and rationalism has developed on such lines. And there are numerous advantages that such truth, if gained, would have for man: it would be self-insuring for one, and for another, one would be able to dispense with scepticism or ultra-scepticism which considers that we never have knowledge.

However, questions were very quickly formulated, both against the system of Plato and the cogito of Descartes. No less vulnerable has been the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. Thus, Kant was compelled to seek a third category of truth-synthetic a priori truths; a realm which, recognizing the validity of the use of Hume's Fork seeks to create a third category between that forked prongs. The most useful service that rationalism has performed is to advert our attention to the possibility of using unaided reason to devise elaborate systems, which internally coherent, can approximate particular logical and formal truths that proofs can capture. But many people have hoped for grater and better service.

Before dismissing the coherence account of truth, many empiricists are compelled to consider what the coherentist has to offer. In a way, the truth which the coherence account proffers cannot be discounted, unless at a loss, because it is obvious that there is a class of things which we do know and which we use ~~language~~ sentences, propositions, statements, affirmations, etc-to convey or record which the rationalist attempts to express. As Armour has simply formulated it, one can say that

the contention which forms the core of coherence theory of truth is that truth is a certain relation which holds amongst judgements.<sup>20</sup>



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Though the coherence theory is more elaborate, it seems to often tend toward a formalist interpretation. In fact, the word coherence itself is capable of varied interpretation. This tendency is understandable, given the fact that it arose from desire to account for a peculiar fact which the correspondence account fails to consider. But this has been the weakness of the theory.

The theory seeks to consider formal truths and the way we come to know them, which seem not to carry any empirical reference. In so doing, it neglects the possibility of discrepant, but internally coherent, systems. And when systems that exhibit these discrepancies were formulated, the coherence theory collapses. Thus, it led to suggestions that both correspondence and coherence accounts of truth are criteria of truth not actually theories. While this suggestion is admissible, the fact however remains that both theories have satisfied a yearning and failed to provide an ultimate account of truth which it initially set out to do.

Empiricists are often disdainful of rationalist attempts to build grandiose systems. While empiricists attempt to lay claim to being scientific, the rationalists can lay equal claim to being scientific, because the theoretical component of science which empiricists cares so much about is as important as the practical. Obviously if man has remained only a thoughtless practical being, there would have been limited advancement of science and technology. The internal coherence of the numerous systems have made it possible to choose between alternative systems and also made such choice rational-justifiable.

It might be objected at this point that I have neither presented a detailed account of both the correspondence and coherence theories of truth nor the various objections that have highlighted their inadequacies. It should be stated that under different circumstances, such an objection might be relevant, but what I intend to get at in this discussion is the nature of the transposition from the search for truth by philosophy to the search for the useful. This search for the valuable marks, as I conceive it, a transcendence of empiricism and rationalism on the one hand, and a sidetracking of the ultimate issues that science and technology would have to confront on the other hand. Thus, those who wish for a detailed treatment of the various theories of truth can easily consult such books listed in the notes and references, and of course, other valuable materials in their originals. But, it still bears restatement that the starting point of



theories of truth is to enable us to discriminate between truth and falsehood, this is what can be regarded as the goal of cognition.<sup>21</sup> This is the only way in which attention would not be diverted from the critical issues that have led to them.

One cannot but disagree with Bertrand Russell who is reputed to have once observed that in spite of the fact that every philosopher claims to pursue truth they seldom attain it because they do not desire to reach it.<sup>22</sup> Clearly this reverses the reason why philosophers often seem to fly in the face of reason, and an 'ad hominem' is not out of place here, because Russell's philosophies exhibit such a desire that was not ultimately realized, not because of an absence or lack of will to reach truth but because there is no such ultimate "truth" disembodied, transcendent, there, to be reached, and also, because philosophers often have to pursue strands of argument wherever they lead-even to absurd conclusions. In the end, each philosopher, standing in his/her corner, have supposed they are holding the truth-all truths. The correspondence theory seeks to corner empirical facts, while the coherence theory seeks to corner axiomatic facts and should be regarded as complementary. But the coherence theory, though concerned with language, does not seem to cover all linguistic demands. Hence, the semantic theory of truth was formulated, and it is to this we now turn. But, it should be remarked that the semantic theory has limited bearing (at least as far as this writer can immediately see) on our concern, hence it will attract the most cursory treatment.

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### THE SEMANTIC THEORY OF TRUTH

The impetus for the formation of the semantic 'theory' of truth arose from a direction not altogether connected with the useful contribution that the account has provided. Positivism at its height attempted to jettison from the parlance of serious discourse concepts that has no factual, empirical content and in their zeal, truth fell under the hatchet, because it does not add or remove from any proposition when added as suffix or withheld. In his earliest work Ayer says

Reverting to the analysis of truth, we find that in all sentences of the form 'p is true', the phrase 'is true' is logically superfluous. When, for example, one says that the proposition 'Queen Anne is dead' is true, all



that one is saying is that Queen Anne is dead. And similarly, when one says that the proposition 'Oxford is the capital of England' is false, all that one is saying is that Oxford is not the capital of England.<sup>23</sup>

This suggests that thinking that instead of saying 'p', saying 'p' is true' performs any purpose is a product of some mix-up in language, and as Ockham's Razor is a handy tool, such superfluity should be dispensed with. Thus, such predication of truth and falsity of propositions are linguistically redundant, just like saying that "God exist" is, according to this line of thought, a misnomer.<sup>24</sup> According to Sybil Wolfram, the redundancy theory consists of three theses :

1. that 'p' and 'p is true' are equivalent
2. that asserting that 'p is true' could always be replaced by asserting 'p', and
3. that to say of p that it is true adds nothing to/says nothing about p,<sup>25</sup>

all of which attempt to capture an important aspect of our linguistic practice in some situations. That this does not however follow is evident in many cases in which it is necessary to insist that 'p is true' says something over and above merely 'p'. In such situations, it is obvious that 'true' and 'false' are not redundant.

Deriving from this tradition, however, is the formalist or logicist theory formulated by Alfred Tarski that has been called the semantic theory of truth and is concerned with how the meaning of sentences can be explained by "trying to relate sentences in particular (technical) languages with their truth conditions".<sup>26</sup> There are two things to note about Tarski's account of truth. In the first place, it takes seriously the supposition by many western scholars that truth is a linguistic property: they suggest that only sentences (propositions, assertions, statements, etc. which follow from them) can be properly said to carry the predicate truths. However, when this is formulated in the redundancy theory, it was discovered unacceptable, hence Tarski had to provide a technical definition for a technical language-in which "p" and "p is true" are really equivalent because there is no room for an additional "is true" in formal/symbolic calculations, even though, contrariwise (and this is the Achille's heel of the theory), there is room for "is false" which the symbol "not" (written as  $\wedge$  or  $\sim$ ) stands for. The second thing is that the



account should be regarded as more appropriate to meaning, because it speaks to what a proposition means rather than to truth; though truth cannot be totally discounted.

Thus, the words of Dummett remain opposite here, he says

Baffled by the attempt to describe in general the relation between language and reality, we have nowadays abandoned the correspondence theory of truth, and justify our doing so on the score that it was an attempt to state a criterion of truth in the sense in which this cannot be done. Nevertheless, the correspondence theory expresses an important feature of the concept of truth which is not expressed by the law 'it is true that p if and only if p' and which we have so far left quite out of account: that a statement is true (if and) only if there is something in the world in virtue of which it is true. Although we no longer accept the correspondence theory we remain realists *au fond*: we retain in our thinking a fundamentally realist conception of truth.<sup>27</sup>

Obviously the correspondence theory has undergone many difficulties and only indirectly do many philosophers-even realists-defend it, one would be pressed to ask why Dummett can say we still remain realists in spite of non-acceptance of correspondence account. It seems to me that only a desire for abstract profundity can originate such ambivalence. For if the correspondence theory of truth is true, why should we not embrace it. The important issue is to understand exactly what it claims and where that claim terminates. That it terminates somewhere and needs the services of other accounts is what other theories have surfaced to fulfil. The various accounts have addressed different aspects of the same reality: a reality that consists of humans in a universe populated by and with diverse objects-concrete and abstract-and which humans must relate to cognitively, which cognitive relationship must be expressed by the tool of coordination, codification, conceptualization, communication and interpretation available, viz. Language; which tool and its disclosures must equally be judged for performance and correctness (non-performance and wrongness), hence truth and falsity. But, then, truth and falsity cannot stand isolated from the reasons of their origination: they are useful items needed for the measurement of our performance in relation to the universe and for the prediction of future performance. Ignoring this last aspect has created a gulf which the Pragmatic Theory of truth has attempted to bridge, and it is to this we now turn.



II.

## THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH

At the very heart of pragmatism is its account of truth. It is the blood that flows from it into every artery, vein, sinew and cranny—it is essential to any pragmatic theory to understand what it says on truth. However, pragmatism itself is bred out of impatience with system-building and logic-chopping of its predecessors and contemporaries. Founded within an atmosphere of freedom and secularism, a secularism that distances or pretends to distance religion from the market place and political landscape while proclaiming its religiosity and humaneness, pragmatism is enamoured in a spirit of individualism that sees self-interest as the primeval goal of intellectual and practical endeavours and seeks to align this with our rational and emotional inclinations. Pragmatism marks a return to an aspect of judgement which the other theories have relegated to the background; but only to an aspect that suits the spirit of the new-found liberty. For it could have treated all aspects of the nature of truth and other issues but it could not because it lacks both the patience and the will to do so. But this lack itself is a human lack because no theory is all-embracing as to capture all aspects at the same time. Unfortunately the liberty and pursuit of freedom that bred freedom farflung into all areas has almost become a cumbersome milestone dragging back further advances toward further freedom and liberalism. And this phenomenon is evident already in the Jamesian demarcation of pragmatism from humanism. According to James, pragmatism is narrower than humanism because while humanism requests that

the truth of any statement consists in the consequences, and particularly in their being good consequences.\*

pragmatism makes no such request. All it demands is that truth make a difference, whether the difference then be good consequences or bad consequences is not its concern. While we will presently elaborate the pragmatic theory of truth, it should be said that the consequences of this lack of concern for what results from the disregard of consequences of truth and falsehood has been monumental for mankind. These consequences will be elaborated later, but it should be recalled that pragmatism is against transcendental idealism and rationalism which creates a realm of truth accessible only to an ideal observer who is all-seeing. In fact,



nothing is more loathsome to the pragmatist than what John Dewey calls the spectator theory of knowledge, a form of foundationalism common to phenomenalist empiricism and Cartesian rationalism. Valid as this disapproval however is, the pragmatist goes to the other extreme in supposing that the human concern with and for truth is to use truth for goals for which she cares not whether goods or bad-an a-normative truth. Consequently, as hinted under section Id, capturing the criteria of truth under the factual content-correspondence, the systemic content-coherence, semantic content-linguistic, would not be enough; the valuational nature of human concern to attain truth and avoid error and falsehood demands attention. This is what humanism, bred in a genteel culture sought to capture, but which the brash pragmatic conquest of nature and science seeks to jettison.

It is true that the main pragmatists, Peirce, James and Dewey, have differences of refinement among them, but essentially they agree on what constitutes pragmatism and what constitutes a theory of truth. When one considers propositions as true or false, for the pragmatist, the method of resolving the dispute is quite simple. According to James

The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that follow from one side or the other's being right.<sup>28</sup>

Similarly Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action said, that,

to develop a thought's meaning we need only determine what conduct it is fitter to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance... To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve-what sensations are we to expect from it, and what reactions must we prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.<sup>30</sup>



Thus when we consider the notion of truth and falsity we find that it is the difference which true statements make that interests the pragmatist. We are more comfortable with truths because they ensure continued success, and expectations of success. On the moral side when one speaks the truth and is noted for so doing the breeds on a credit system.<sup>31</sup> In this regard

True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, verify.  
False ideas are those we cannot.<sup>32</sup>

Taken literally this has a tendency to mislead, but what James means here is the fact that false ideas are those that fail to turn out as expected. The use of validation, corroboration, verification might mislead, because to know that a proposition is false all one has to know on this count is that it is not the case, by arriving at a negation of its claim. But what James and others have in mind is elaborated when he says of truth that

'it is useful because it is true' or 'it is true because it is useful'. Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that there is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name of whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience.<sup>33</sup>

Though this formulation seems to be empiricist, it goes beyond empiricist account of truth, because, ultimately the credit system on which truth lives is the usefulness which it serves. This usefulness however is multiple in nature and enhances our scientific practice-satisfying our needs by leading to no frustrations or contradictions.<sup>34</sup> Empiricists consider verification and correspondence, and this covers correspondence in principle also. While the empiricist however fails to separate those that are valuable from those that are not, the pragmatist takes the bold step of disregarding the innumerable truths which have never entered into our consideration on a cognitive level simply because they do not make a difference or affect our lives one way or the other. For what would it mean to say that a sentence is true when it has no relevance to any thing? While the empiricist might consider it valuable to know it for itself, that is, as a truth which experience might confirm, but if for the pragmatist there is nothing to be gained from it, then it does not count because



...possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action...<sup>35</sup> From this simple cue pragmatism gets her general notion of truth as something essentially bound up with the way in which one movement in our experience may lead us toward other moments which it will be worthwhile to have been led to.<sup>36</sup>

Even in the domain of purely mental relations, truth is regarded in terms of utility—that is what consequences follow from their truth. Without such consequences, they may as well not exist at all. The 'eternity' of truths in the realm of ideas must be cashed out in the sense of what good they yield if they are put to some use. For

In this realm of mental relations, truth again is an affair of leading. We relate one abstract idea with another. Framing in the end the great systems of logical and mathematical truths, under the respective terms of which the sensible fact of experience eventually arrange themselves, so that our eternal truths hold good of realities also. This marriage of fact and theory is endlessly fertile.<sup>37</sup>

One issue which the pragmatist account fails to deal squarely with, apart from its account of religious moral and mathematical truths which are said by Russell to have been glossed over, is that it is selective in determining what constitutes truth and how truth shall be interpreted at all. The fact alluded to here will be illustrated when consequences of pragmatism outside the purely philosophical domain—in the work-a-day process of economics, government, science and technology, etc. are considered. For now we turn to a brief consideration of rationalism and empiricism on truth and how the cleavage generated there-in has engineered a shift away from the search for truth toward the search for usefulness.

## II.

### RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM ON TRUTH: THE INEXHAUSTIVE OPTIONS

William James perceives a need to contrast rationalism—which he often equates with transcendentalism and idealism—with empiricism with which he associates pragmatism, though careful enough to always indicate the point at which the last two part ways. It is instructive to understand how the pragmatist sees the rationalist and empiricist



conception of reality, knowledge of reality and truth in order to understand the inexhaustiveness of both and the necessity for pragmatic philosophy. In doing this, we should remind ourselves that the ultimate goal of philosophy and the philosopher is the attainment of wisdom. When wisdom is attained, then the wise man discerns the nature of reality and she also has access to truth. For procedural ease, let us consider first the features of rationalism-according to James.

For the pragmatist, rationalism means going by reason and principles. Rationalism is intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, monistic, dogmatical and believes in freedom of the will.<sup>38</sup> These are definitely large claims, but they can be conceded for the sake of progress in discussion. At least those who consider these claims tenuous can hold their peace and see what obtains on the other, empiricist, end of the curtain. In fact, it would be seen that James' claims are not without foundation. He refers to the various issues which rationalists consider and the conclusions they reach. Let us consider some of these.

In the first place when rationalists consider what there is-that is, the ontological and metaphysical issue of being-they end up by denigrating the world of experience and matter. Plato's real world is not here in the physical realm and Descartes' criteria of knowing and what can be known is clearness and distinctness obtained in moments of intellectual intuition-what may be called intellection. Only purely rational ideas can be known with certainty and constitute the ideal of episteme for Plato. The world that is available for sense knowledge is uncertain, fluctuating and unreal. Reason enables man to discover that the same surface cannot be both black and white all over at once, that twice two equals four, that if A is an animal and all animals are long-fangled, then A is long-fangled. Reason enables man to coordinate his/her ideas. Thus, according to rationalists, reason neither needs nor requires/depend on experience to start and/or thrive; what it thrives on are ideas which are either recollected, innate, intuitive or inborn.<sup>39</sup> Inattention and, possibly, laziness renders the reasoning capacity inadequate while pure contemplation and development of reason shows that nothing is too esoteric or abstract for reason to explore.<sup>40</sup> The whole point of Platonic theory of Forms is to dichotomize between perceptual knowledge and rational knowledge. It was an urgent need that arose from the divergent and discrepant conclusions to which empirical, perceptual disclosures led pre-socratics and contemporaries of Plato and the discovery that there



exists an area that avails sure, infallible knowledge, namely, logic and mathematics. Thus, Plato progressively transcended the vagaries of perception in a dialectical way until some firm, sure type of certainty was attained in the realm of the purely intelligible.<sup>41</sup>

For the rationalist there does not 'exist' any certainty to be known or truth to be discovered with the senses. A number of ideas were developed which have continued to influence philosophical thinking since. Some of them are that empirical knowledge can only give rise to opinions, that such opinions, though better than ignorance, are never certain, that the uncertainty of such opinions and beliefs is derived from the fallible, changing nature of both the senses and the objects of sensation, that because sensory knowledge is fallible it is inferior and cannot constitute knowledge in the proper and desirable sense, that as perception often leads to mutually discrepant theses, the contradictions it generates rules it out of knowledge court, that reason or intellect is capable of grasping infallible, certain knowledge of a higher, greater realm than the senses, that the *a priori* knowledge so derived is superior to a *posteriori* knowledge and that the areas of logic and mathematics provide examples of rational, incorrigible truths and are to be relied upon, for they are more valuable.

The pragmatist is decidedly against intellectualism or rationalism or transcendentalism. James rallied against those who would ignore the things they stumbly over and fall, only to peruse those in the starry heavens. Though such a realm holds a fascination and allure and may have emotional and psychological fulfilment to those who cogitate them, they could not and must not be substituted for action. The rationalist is not just claiming a realm of reality expressible in logical and mathematical equations, he holds that there are transcendental entities, that these entities are more real and that the truths they present are eternal and immutable. It is here that the empiricist picks up the gauntlet and counters by saying that a truth that has no factual effect on matters is of no consequence and can be ignored. Logical and mathematical truths are understandable in that they systematize and relate our daily life experiences to a logical and formal system. Even these would be trivially harmless unless the truths they speak to make presentations of empirical consequences.

The desire to emphasize the reality of knowable matter, that can be comprehended and represented in empirical language, whose truth can



be determined by reference to experience, and which is a natural point of view, is what empiricism stands for. James identified some banal features of empiricism as follows: the empiricist goes by the facts, or by experience or disclosures of the senses, in other words she is sensationistic (not as applied currently in journalistic media parlance), materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, sceptical and relativistic. These cluster of ideas, though not always totally congruent, represent the empiricist bias. That there are degrees of empiricism and room for individual idiosyncracies and/or eccentricities is granted, as, for example, in logical atomism, logical positivism, linguistic analysis, etc. But for James:

Never were as many men of a decidedly empiricist proclivity in existence as there are at the present day. Our children, one may say, are almost born scientific.<sup>42</sup>

The pragmatists' dissatisfaction with empiricism- whether phenomenalist foundationalist, or simply, realist materialist type- stems from the latter's disregard of why we seek to know and what difference that knowing can make for sentient beings, constituted the way we are, with the types of lives we lead and the goals we set for ourselves. A return to this indicates that we should sidestep the bifurcation of reality and truth and not just go on speaking as if the purpose of knowledge is not to aid action. Thus by contrast to empiricism and rationalism, the pragmatist asks an unusual question:

Grant an idea or belief to be true, what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?<sup>43</sup>

In doing this the pragmatist is not disagreeing with either the rationalist and the empiricist fundamentally. All it requests for is that the purpose of science (science conceived very broadly) should not be forgotten. We must remember that we live in an inclement universe, hence, we need to ensure that our energy is not wasted and our direction is not lost in the maze of investigations. While one could go ahead and search, one should not become extravagant enough as to be purposeless. Whatever truth is located must be harnessed to some goal.



In fact, the pragmatist does not directly engage the weakness of the dualism that led to the hybrid position canvassed by Kant or the relativism that Einstein has made to become the hub of contemporary science. Outside 'science' this weakness is increasingly becoming too obtrusive to be ignored and researches are being more vigorously pursued into areas that used to be considered as voodoo and unintelligible. The continued existence of religion, the failure of logical positivism in eliminating morality as an objective realm of philosophical discourse, metaphysics as a serious discipline, the success that have attended traditional medical practices, the contributions of intuition, imagination, etc. in the divising and creation of scientific and technological breakthroughs, all suggest that uncritical, contemptuous excision of any source of knowledge and truth from science is unscientific. And, all this would be quite acceptable (or should be anyway) to the pragmatist, provided it yields truths that do make some practical difference. Let us briefly consider how the relativism resulting from the demise of rationalist and empiricist conceptions of knowledge and truth has led to pragmatism: a spirit that encourages inquiry in all its multitudinous aspects but which cautions that at the end of the day only those results and claims that bear fruit by having consequences shall be considered serious.

## III.

## RELATIVISM IN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

We live in a relativistic universe. The Newtonian universe which existed till the beginning of the twentieth century was one in which conventional physics adequately described matter-in-motion. But relativistic universe is one in which matter is in motion at very great speeds. When velocities are sharply increased some strange things begin to happen. Such high velocities, we now know, are the general rule at both the microscopic and cosmological scales of physical reality. It is only at the macroscopic level of experience that Newtonian theories still operate.

Since Albert Einstein published his paper on special relativity in 1905, our understanding of our universe and our place in it has undergone continued revision. It may not seem at first glance that relativistic notions affect our routine behaviour, but the fact is that we are immersed in relativistic events. For instance, light photons striking our retinas can be described only in relativistic terms, and the very atoms that compose our bodies are themselves in motion at these high velocities.



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Beyond all this, the significant fact is that a new worldview was born with special relativity. It has gradually become part of our consciousness.<sup>44</sup>

I have quoted Christian at length here to drive home the significant way in which developments in scientific understanding of the nature of the universe have, in the contemporary period, altered man's perception, comprehension, codification, interpretation and doxastic attitude towards the nature of things-herself inclusive. But, strictly speaking, one can hardly say that Einstein created philosophical relativity though his contribution, by way of articulation of a scientific theory, has enabled philosophy to abandon an enfeebling timidity that have generated foundationalism of both the right and left; on the right rationalist foundationalism, epitomized in Cartesian egocentrism encapsulated in the cogito, and on the left, the phenomenalist, positivist search for the given, qualia, sensa or data, the rock-bottom on which to found belief in experience and its disclosures. In philosophy, because no records of prior formulations are considered or available, the search for wisdom is credited to have begun with Thales. Apparently those before him never thought about fundamental, ultimate issues that forms philosophy or so we are expected to believe; and, if they did, they never came up with answers similar to those he fathered. Be that as it is, relativism has been an old phenomenon in philosophy, in spite of our human desire for unity and order, a holism that craves for systematizing and hierarchy in all things. Because, as it were, when Heraclitus contended that one never steps into the same river twice and Protagoras that man is the measure, they were both formulating theories with philosophically sound foundations steeped in relativism.

Considered as metaphysical or ontological theories, they imply a multiplicity of nature and change, a perpetual flux perpetually presenting varied and various angles to one and many percipient and cognizing agents at one and different periods. In other words, the word reality, or what there is, continually change; this same world was first considered as flat, then circular, as the centre of the universe, then that the sun is the centre. In fact these views are themselves being continually revised or refined because we are approaching a situation of probable nilcentrism and multiverse instead of heliocentrism and universe. At least, science has authoritatively suggested many universes and many galaxies and there is no ruling out the possibility of life on a yet undiscovered universe.



In other words, what there is or what constitute reality has to depend on 'who' is involved and what perspective he occupies. When we consider other areas such as morality, religion, politics, culture, etc. one finds this flux bewildering. The dematerialization of matter and the cognate dematerialization of mind shows that,

man is not a passive perceiver of stimuli coming from an external world, but in a very concrete sense *creates* his universe... The world as we experience it is the product of perception not the cause of it.<sup>45</sup>

This is contrary to either rationalism or empiricism, but because it takes such a long time to shun accustomed ways of reasoning, man has continued to hold on to hackneyed views about the universe. Physics has found it not only expedient but necessary to obey the demands of scientific discoveries, it

has given up the hope of finding a thing in itself such as the atom of the mechanistic universe as an ultimate reality; in quantum Physics the object of research is not nature itself anymore, but man's investigation of nature...<sup>46</sup>

All these have implications for philosophy of empirical and rational knowledge. Other areas are not less affronted. The area of metaphysics has unsettled virtually all domains of research and thrown everything into a flux. Contending cultures, moralities, religions, and so called nationalistic aristocratism, egocentrism, empowerment, etc are masquerades launched, like space-crafts, by the dissolution of unity of knowledge. The flux has dire consequences for mankind because knowledge, in its continual advancement, has only continued to disclose new frontiers and vistas as yet unexplored. Epistemological relativism seems the only natural view justifiable. But mankind seems not to be ready for it; proclamations of democracy and liberalism are only servants for specific goals and designed ultimate ends.

All areas of scholarship has benefitted from Einsteinian reactivation of philosophical relativism. He could only have advanced this however, indirectly, because it is only science that accepts the limitations of truths thus far discovered, and it is only science alone that openly accepts that those truths are themselves of transient historical life span. Maybe because science could do nothing about this. Maybe!



Relativistic phenomena astound the layman, excite the physicist, and boggle the mind of the philosopher. In fact, the physicists don't even pretend to understand much of what they describe; they go their way developing pragmatic equations without worrying very much whether their formulas describe realities presently accessible to experience.<sup>47</sup>

In a situation like this, eternal truth is lost, and ideal of verification is hacked in the middle. Reason can disclose only limited truth and experience is incapacitated on many fronts by limitations with which it has to cohabit. While attempts have to be made to attain better understanding of ourselves and our universe, and, of course, other universes, these would have to be done with all modesty and responsibility. We may go ahead and postulate grandiose and highfalutin theories and stand back to admire the fruits of our labours like batik arts or oil paintings produced in moments of scarce ingenuity, we may fashion all novel instruments and contraptions, our helplessness must continue to dawn on us and compel us to tarry, otherwise we may set in motion forces greater than our computations have projected. This is relativism everywhere. And pragmatism is an attempt to grapple with relativism through an evasion of either or the horns of the dilemma of rationalism and empiricism. The latter two have a concern to ask for reality and truth, but the pragmatist sidesteps this issue and proceeds to action-actions that are required to be of consequence, not necessarily good ones though. Perhaps this is not a straightforwardly fair assessment of the position of the pragmatist. Surely, many people may be smarting to react, for they know the truth and would want that truth to make the difference. I believe that the point being advanced here is worthy of arguing for, even if it does not constitute the truth. It should be good if it compels us to pause to ponder.

#### IV.

#### THE PRAGMATIC 'POINT DE DEPART'

The validity of the anonymous deputation cited by Christian is indisputable; there is no doubt that new and robust energies and ideas hustled in the new world, that is, in United States of America. The irrepressible panache issued forth in all manner of ways, and as the country settled down to the business of harnessing resources for development and growth, it was a time to look for guiding principle or doctrine by which the new spirit shall be analysed ex post facto and guided in future. Christian syas



It has often been noted that pragmatism could only have been born on American soil, since it reflects the spirit of the nineteenth century, the frontier spirit of individualism, self-reliance and practicality.<sup>48</sup>

This contrasts deeply with the subtlety of the British Analytic tradition or the system-building pursuits of the German idealism. There is a lot of impatience in pragmatism, an impatience bordering on iconoclasm. This was the spirit of the age that bred pragmatism. The contemporaneous lamentations of Richard Rorty, Putnam, Davidson and Hacking are beacons to return to pragmatism; and ultimately John Rawls' theory of justice reflects a pragmatic attempt to make the best of the given situation.<sup>49</sup> Pragmatism started off not directly as a theory of truth, but as a theory of meaning paralld to the positivism that developed about the same time in Vienna Circle. Only the working out of the greater ramifications it portends for epistemology and science led it into methodological pragmatism and theory of truth. And, in fact, its proponents are often weary of being seen to be presenting an elaborate theory when all they wanted is a guide for action. Meanwhile, let us understand Peirce's attempt to provide a theory of meaning.

In Peirce's view, if one is asked what makes any idea meaningful, the only justifiable answer would consist of whether the idea made any difference in our experience. As such the meaning of any idea is no more than this because our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects. To say that "it is raining outside" would, on this score, lack any meaning for anybody unless one would go outside and get wet unless one wears a raincoat or uses an umbrella. It is only by reference to such consequences that such an idea or sentences could make any sense to us.

Now, Christian thought that this account of meaning, following on the heels of positivism is a "wholly subjective" one. I can not agree with this. He even cites the examples of ice and match flame to show how ideas are converted in meaning to the consequences they have, but these examples only show the objectivity of the criterion proposed by the pragmatist.<sup>50</sup> The consequences alluded to are capable of intersubjective verification, as they neither depend on the idiosyncratic intuitions of a Cartesian ego or on the personal subjective content of an experiencing empiricist seeking a foundation as such. Empiricism could even proclaim an objectivist epistemology if it grants the existence of material objects



as real, not either as visuo-tactual continuants, permanent possibilities of sensation or as logical constructions. In this regard, there would be a coalescence of opinion regarding objects, even though only propositions that are verifiable are meaningful to the empiricist, while, contrariwise, only those that make some difference in experience would have meaning to the pragmatist. While the rationalist would dispute the meaningfulness of empirical statement because of the numerous problems highlighted by Descartes in his methodic doubt, Peter Unger in his super neurosurgeon sceptical defence of ignorance and the empiricist rejection of metaphysical propositions, ethical statements from the realm of meaning along with positivism and, while granting the meaningfulness of logical and mathematical statements, still go ahead to charge them of being irrelevant to actual things, the pragmatist is able to have it both ways; all statements make meaning so long they have consequences in experience of sentient agents.

However, this contribution is not the one by which pragmatism is most widely known. It is what is called the pragmatic theory of truth that has made pragmatism most famous. I do believe that pragmatists actually do not have a theory of truth; rather what pragmatism proffers is a standard by which truth and falsity can be demarcated. They would not ask "what is truth?" since the search for that is, as such, not the goal of inquiry. As James puts it, the questions that arise are :

Grant an idea or belief to be true... what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?<sup>51</sup>

In answering these questions, the pragmatist says

True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot... This is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as. The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation.<sup>52</sup>



One can see that initially here, there seem to be no difference between the empiricist and the pragmatist. Clearly the difference is obvious between it and rationalism, but in the case of empiricism from which it takes its cue there is need for clarification to make a clear distinction. James does this clearly, but before taking this, it is even clear that certain germs of differences have been planted: the question about what difference a truth will make already transcends empiricism. It already acknowledges the existence of a truth, this suggesting that empiricist criterion of truth is dependent upon the correspondence theory of truth. But in this matter the pragmatist cannot be bothered, all that matters is that the proposition under consideration should make a difference even if it is false. And this is another plus on the side of pragmatism because it accounts for falsehood. This is the point where the pragmatist and empiricist use of 'verification' or 'validation' needs some consideration: While the empiricist means by those terms reference to experience or test in sense experience, the pragmatist says they

again signify certain *practical consequences* of the verified and validated idea... (because) the possession of true thoughts means everywhere possession of invaluable instruments of action...<sup>54</sup>

Elaborating on these points, James contends that the value of any truth are the practical results to which it leads. Aside from the practical importances of the objects of truth, everything else pales into insignificance:

it is useful because it is true or it is true because it is useful.<sup>55</sup>

These are the two sides of the truth equation; they are equivalent and mean exactly the same thing. Truth cannot be separated from usefulness because to say same thing is true and that it is not going to signal any difference is most imponderable. It is the use of a truth that completes its function in experience. According to James

From this simple cue pragmatism gets its general notion of truth as something essentially bound up with the way in which one moment in our experience may lead us towards other moments which it will be worthwhile to have been led to.<sup>56</sup>

For the pragmatist, then, the point at which he parts company with the empiricist is when the empiricist considers truth simply as what



corresponds to facts or coheres with a system of facts. Correspondence or coherence is irrelevant as far as the pragmatist is concerned. The ultimate point of seeking truth is not some abstract idea or concept called correspondence or coherence but what difference the issue being determined would make given my practical needs and goals. Truth is not eternally fixed to be approximated by the correspondence or coherence simpliciter. While those notions themselves might be useful, they are only true to the extent in which they serve the goal of shaping further experience for us. However, since science has shown that the sort of foundationalism which both rationalism and empiricism seeks cannot be sustained because of relativism and Kantianism is not to be absolved here nor other less popular theories such as semantic and redundancy theories, it follows that there can be no truths in themselves. The only truths that there are, are only 'tools' of action and when they lose their value they cease to be tools, and consequently, no longer truths. But this is not the end of the matter, it (that is, pragmatism) goes even beyond relativism, not by denying relativism, but by constructing the truth of relativism as a function of what follows from its acceptance. Relativism is itself considered as a tool of action and it would not be valid unless it makes some difference. This is how powerful pragmatism is on all fronts—it is an appealing philosophy and 'theory' of truth for the free, liberated, empowered, scientific, individualistic and ambitious mind. It can ignore intrinsic and extrinsic values and ask to be shown what it shall profit a man to lose all his heritage in order to attain the pragmatic paradise. It is even machiavellian! It is the challenge of today and tomorrow? Can it transcend itself?

V.

#### PRAGMATISM, HUMANITY, SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY : CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH.

There is no doubt that the human predicament is very disheartening: mankind turned away from mythology to break away from the shackles of dogma, intellectual bondage, abuse of knowledge and exploitation of the will to belief. Entering into philosophy he/she is met by a welcoming group of those who pride themselves with making it their duty to pursue wisdom, and by so doing arrive at the truth of things. For, what use is wisdom if it does not upbraid the intellect and enhance rational decision-making in favour of truth. But no sooner had mankind entered into this



sesame than she is confronted by a discordance of many and conflicting proclamations by those who will design it their business to be wise. Among these earliest philosophers, every brilliant breed they were, were to be counted the first relativists and sceptics with paradoxically liberating, because democratic, but incapacitating, because too pernicious, views about what there is, how they are to be known, and what truth, if any, our language can communicate about them.

Socrates' desire to draw man's attention to how little, if anything, man knows, is very enlightening but equally discouraging. While the sophistry of the itinerant teachers who exhort pay to teach people how to argue would not count as wisdom because they do not have truth enraptured in their intellectual portfolios, equally, the socratic questioning disclose no truth either, but is only a chastening device. And, this was most embarrassing to Plato, who Kantianly attempted a synergic reconciliation of empiricism and scepticism by looking toward the world of forms, thus placing truth, defined in absolute terms, beyond the reach of groping man. Neither can empiricism and science attain truth because of their limitations, nor can rationalism aspire any better because it lacks the power that an ideal observer, who knows all things eternally, can command. The sceptic on his own performs only useful service by drawing attention to these limitations, while the relativist, a resurgence of scientific reestablishment of the flux, shows how perspectives, goals, and time-space indicate what and how we know and relate to issue and show that ultimately Plato and Descartes and Aristotle and Hume all aspired to a temple they cannot build: There are no absolute truths, no eternal truths, only transient earth bounded truths: The only truths that exist are specific and can only be understood within specific domains—correspondence, coherence, semantic, redundancy, and all what not. Ultimately, there is an inverse sense, only inverse though, in which truth is opinion or belief: but this sounds ridiculous unless given an adequate interpretation. It is here that the pragmatist joins the stage and says that truth is usefulness and only in terms of what difference a truth makes is it to be understood.

Now, numerous issues arise which call for attention. The pragmatist has abandoned the need to tell us how to tell the truth, rather it has given us a means of measuring truth against the background of our goals and ends. Hence one could ask: If truth is not objective, does not inhere intrinsically in statements, how are we to determine their usefulness? The



pragmatist will answer by saying: No, you do not want to know that it is true or false; all you want to find out is what difference it would make, if it were true, then it will lead to certain consequences, if false, to others. If we then ask, granted that we have to act in spite of our not having access to objective, eternal truth, is usefulness value free? That is, if relativism-philosophical relativism which is supervenient on scientific, evolutionary, relativism-is valid and leads to useful consequences when adopted in action, hence true, is pragmatism also relativistic, meaning usefulness for who considers and adopts it? If there are no enduring truths and objective values, can pragmatism conduce to a human society that marries instrumentality of hypotheses-what truth has become-and human happiness? Who determines usefulness and for what? It seems to me that pragmatism is helpless on this pass.

There is no doubt that a main goal of the search for truth is the facilitation of action-and action can only be facilitated by rules that conduce to conduct and success. In this regard, pragmatism is useful. But it led to an abandonment of hard and fast pursuit of principles in favour of rule of the thumb in human affairs while it attained the highest level of vigour, precision and equated technological conquest of nature and man with truth. By refusing to participate in the search for truth, but seeking to try out various proposals and options it led to philosophies that abandoned the raising of fundamental questions in favour of apologetics, logic chopping and sterile intellectualism and professionalism. While pragmatism sought initially to bring philosophy within the reach of the people, it drove it beyond their comprehension because it made philosophy irrelevant once it had provided a guide to action. Do not ask what value a hypothesis has but what difference it makes.

There is no doubt that this essay started on a contentious note: it has a contentious title and designed a polemical programme for the audience. It would not be out of tune to end on an even more contentious note- if it can engender greater attention to truth and value, it would have performed a pragmatic critic of pragmatism. Hence, we may conclude with a cluster of opaquely related questions:

Granting that relativism means no absolutes, does it mean licentiousness? Why has truth disappeared and whither has it disappeared-

- (a) hiding endangered and almost extinct peoples and other species away from the conscience of mankind?



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- (b) leading policies (often deleterious) under highsounding, emotion-laden phraseology and diction?
- (c) cloaking dictatorship, oppression and subjugation in garments of democracy and benevolent rulership?
- (d) allowing the same event to mean good and bad, victory and defeat, etc.
- (e) etc. etc.

While we all want to get on with the business of living, while for truth to have meaning it has to conduce to action (usually beneficial to some person or group of persons), while science has encountered numerous wheelclogging perversions and misdirections, there remain numerous issues to be discussed. The discussion, in an open universal community of inquiry, in which all partake, would evidently conduce to the realization that the relativity of truth is not an unbridled excuse to make utility the master. This is all the more necessary because even those transient truths are of greater value ultimately than those transient uses or usefulness that the pragmatist unwittingly invites to displace truth. Our acknowledgement of the cognitive limitations-which ultimately is the main tool to determine truth or falsehood-of mankind is both a necessary factor that shows truth and utility as necessary partners with different roles in the task of human survival.<sup>57</sup>

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### Notes and References

1. Virtually all historical accounts of the origin of philosophy enclose the "official doctrine" that philosophy originated in ancient Greece. This view supposes that philosophy, defined as "love of wisdom" (and, elucidated as the critical and speculative application of reason to elicit and solve profound problems) was suddenly brought about by Thales, thus, suggesting that no philosophy took place in the various



civilizations before Thales, and that critical thought and concern with fundamental problems, were absent in such cultures. It is the view of this writer that this is a cliché that, due to the repetition and dogmatism of its acceptance, has attained the status of a truth worth examining if the errant Ghost of hellenic origin of philosophy is to be laid. This is a task being pursued in another project, but since truth-per pragmatism and empiricism is the concern of this essay, it needs be mentioned that the cliché is one that lacks empirical foundation (given evidences thus far amassed) but which has pragmatic utility of defending and maintaining a parilous vestige of a fantasy of superiority of western culture.

2. The caveat emplaced has the advantage, if taken in the context of the discussion that follows, of assuaging an expectation that all relevant issues-facts, ideas, etc.-can be taken cognisance of all at the same time. The issues related to whether one could be wise without knowing the truth is discussed in another fora, but it should be noted here that being wise does not mean knowing the truth, and this is what the pragmatist seeks to endorse.
3. This is to be understood in the light of the above (note 1).
4. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1011b, 25-28.
5. W.V. Quine, *Philosophy of Logic*, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, (1970), 1986, p.1.
6. W.V. Quine & J.S. Ullian, *The Web of Belief*, New York, Random House, (1970), 1978, 2nd Edition, p.13.
7. S. Wolfram, *Philosophical Logic: An Introduction*, London, Routledge, 1989, p.129.
8. *Ibid.* pp. 141-143.
9. M. Dummett, *Truth and other Enigmas*, London, Duckworth Ltd, 1978, p.6.
10. *Ibid.* p.6.
11. A. O'Hear, *What Philosophy Is*, London Penguin Books, 1985, pp. 87-88.
12. *Ibid.* p.88.
13. W. James, *Pragmatism*, New York, Meridian Books, 1955, p.237. cf. S. Wolfram, *Philosophical Logic*, op.cit. p.151, where it was said it is "The Correspondence theory which says that to describe a statement as true is to say that it corresponds with or accords with the facts."
14. *Ibid.* p.147.
15. *Ibid.* p.133. Even though one may not immediately see the point of saying an idea, proposition, sentence, etc. 'becomes true', one cannot but concede the validity of this description of what I have called the "truthification" process, particularly when it concerns beliefs, theories, etc. This is a crucial factor which further endorses the correspondence theory of truth.



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16. B.J.F. Lonergan, S.J., *Insight*, London, Longmans, 1957, p.549.
17. *Ibid.* p.552.
18. W. James, *Pragmatism*, *op. cit.* p.143.
19. *Ibid.* p.243.
20. L. Armour, *The Concept of Truth*, Assen, Van Gorcum and Co. 1969, p.81. cf. S. Wolfram, *Philosophical Logic*, *op. cit.* p.151
21. L. Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985, pp.9 ff. Armour accurately represents this worry when she says... the problem about truth has been shifted in a highly peculiar way. We started out wanting to know how men could tell the truth-conceiving of truth as something which we might succeed or fail in telling but something which was, in an important sense, added to the world by some human activity. It was this activity which we wanted to judge and for which we, therefore, needed criteria.  
  
What has happened as the theory has developed is that the problem has, by some subtlety, run away from us so that we now find that we are getting an account of a special world which is independent of us and which stands between us and the states of affairs which we wanted to get at. See Leslie Armour, *The Concept of Truth*, *op.cit.* p.51..
22. G. Santayana, "The Genteel Tradition" in Morton White, *Documents in the History of American Philosophy*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1972, p.414.
23. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, London, Penguin Books, 1971, pp. 85-86.
24. F.P. Ramsey, *The Foundations of Mathematics and other Essays*, London, OUP, 1931. See Chapter VI entitled 'Facts and Propositions'. This line of reasoning can be traced to Kant who argued that existence is not a predicate, thus converted, truth is not a predicate that adds or detracts from a proposition.
25. S. Wolfram, *Philosophical Logic*, *op.cit.* p.157. An elaborate and to my mind, successful argument is made to show that the theory is not correct is provided in sections 4.1 ff in the book.
26. *Ibid.* p.157.
27. M. Dummett, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, *op.cit.* p.14.
28. W. James, *Pragmatism*, *op. cit.* p.230.
29. *Ibid.* p.42
30. W. James, *Pragmatism*, p.43. James quotes this passage from C.S. Peirce "How to make our ideas clear" in *Popular Science Monthly*, January 1878.
31. William James, *Pragmatism*, *op.cit.* p.137.
32. *Ibid.* p.133.
33. *Ibid.* p. 135.
34. *Ibid.* p.137.



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35. *Ibid.* p. 134.
36. *Ibid.* p.135.
37. *Ibid.* p. 138.
38. *Ibid.* p.22.
39. In the *Meno* Plato propounded the doctrine of *anamnesis* or recollection, though he later abandoned it for the theory of Forms. Descartes also supported such a theory in *Meditation II* where he argued for innate ideas.
40. R. Descartes, *Meditation III* in E. Anscombe and P.T. Geach (eds) *Philosophical Writings*, G. Britain, Nelson Paperbacks, 1970, pp.76, ff.
41. E.M. Conford, *The Republic of Plato*, London, OUP, 1945, Book VI, 505-509B.
42. W. James, *Pragmatism*, *op.cit.* p.22.
43. *Ibid.* p.133.
44. James L. Christian, *Philosophy : An Introduction to the Art of Wondering*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977, p.537.
45. L.Von Bertalanffy, *Robots, Men and Minds*, New York, George Brazillar, 1967, p.92 cf M. Polanyi's discussion of the personal coefficient in the task of knowledge acquisition in *Personal Knowledge*, London, Routledge and K. Paul Ltd, 1973, p.303.
46. *Ibid.* p.94.
47. J.L. Christian, *Philosophy*, *op.cit.* p.537.
48. *Ibid.* p.42.
49. J. Rajchman and C. West, (eds), *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, Chapters 1,2,8,9 and 11.
50. J.L. Christian, *Philosophy*, *op.cit.* p.233.
51. W. James, *Pragmatism*, *op.cit.* p.133.
52. *Ibid.* p.133.
53. *Ibid.* p.133.
54. *Ibid.* p.134.
55. *Ibid.* p.135.
56. *Ibid.* p.135.
57. I wish to acknowledge the thorough and useful comments, questions and corrections of Mrs. Ed. Brandon on the draft of this paper, particularly with regard to the interpretation of Dummett's work and the logical issues raised in the essay. Whatever errors remain are mine to bear, not his.



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## THE MANDŪKYA UPANISAD AND KARIKAS : THE ADVAITIC APPROACH

(00). I am deeply grateful to my teachers, Professor Ashok Gangadean, Haverford College, USA, and Shri. Devarao Kulkarni, *Vedānta Kāryālaya*, Bangalore, for introducing me to *Advaita Vedānta*, and for continuing to nurture my apprenticeship in *Advaitic Thought*.

1.00. This paper attempts an introduction to the *Mandūkya Upaniṣad* and *Kārikās*. An aim of this paper is to curb blatant misconceptions about the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*. The explication here definitely shows that the line of interpretation favoured by Bradley York Bartholomew in his "Inner Self Located" (*Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4) has no foundation in the *Upaniṣads*. B.Y. Bartholomew seems to suggest that the *Tīrīya* is a cavity inside the brain. This conclusion is simply ridiculous.

1.001. The *Mandūkya Upaniṣad* has some relevance to the ontological difficulties which naturally erupt when one distinguishes the "mind" and that which is "external" to the mind. Instead of immediately entering the *Upaniṣad*'s core, it seems beneficial to prepare by first critiquing various views which have emerged regarding this distinction. The reason for doing so is to elicit a sense of the philosophical arena within which the *Upaniṣadic* insights are relevant. In this way we will become acquainted with the conceptual tools necessary for reading the *Upaniṣad*. This is very important because the *Upaniṣad* is not situated at the level of presenting views about the world/ reality; rather the *Upaniṣad* investigates the very fact that it is possible to articulate differing views concerning reality.

1.01. The distinction of matter and mind seems: chairs, the sun, space, the physical body, etc., are considered "material," and the mind is considered the "immaterial," or, simply, "the mind." The mind is

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commonly thought to be waking, (when awake) dreaming (when dreaming) and deep sleeping (when deep sleeping). That it is not the mind, understood as the "immaterial," which is "undergoing" these "changes" (i.e., waking - dreaming - deep sleeping - waking-....) is one of the conclusions put forward by the *Upaniṣad*. This is, however, not of immediate concern since the positions outlined below do not utilize the ontological information available in all the "three states" in their attempt at discerning the nature of existence. The positions below restrict the foundations of their respective analyses to the knowledge obtainable in the waking state.

1.10. We may roughly present these positions as possible responses to an ontological puzzle which seems to emerge when one distinguishes the material from the immaterial:

(a) Is the "internal-mind" "prior" or is it the "external-material" which is the truly "primary"?

1.11. We can now see the outlines of two broad, mutually exclusive positions regarding (a) :

*Position 1:* The mind is theorized to be an expression of the functioning of the brain; much like the relationship between heart beat and the heart respectively. It is held that the body (brain) is being primary, and thus matter is the ontological "cause" of the mind. There might be two variations:

(1) The nature of mind is such that the material world "structures" mind - mind is analogous to a "blank tablet."

(2) The nature of mind is such the mind is "structuring" what is external to it. Yet, matter is still paramount. This is akin to notions where consciousness is said to "shape" phenomena, and yet consciousness is dependent on matter to exist.

*Position 2 :* Mind/consciousness is asserted to be supporting matter. Accepting this view might yield two sub-positions:

(1) Individual minds cause their respective bodies/brains; however, the external object structure the individual minds.



(2) There is only one mind which is causing everything else, and it is also structuring everything (solipsism perhaps).

1.12. Both the above hierarchies<sup>2</sup> seem plausible (in at least the sense that they may be considered philosophical positions). But is this situation satisfying? There seems no ground for certainty if one subscribes to either of the hierarchies by the very fact that an opposing hierarchy exists.

1.13. Postulating that existence is, in its very nature, contradictory is not the proper approach to resolving this, for existence/reality (understood in the broadest possible sense) is the very standard of ontological harmony. This suggests that we encounter mutually exclusive hierarchies (Position 1 vs. Position 2)<sup>4</sup> because the manner in which we are *thinking* about reality does not reflect of reality's harmonious<sup>4</sup> nature. The faulty mode of thinking seems (term this "Logic 1"):  $X = X$  where "X" stands for any type of distinction. (X might be a certain belief, a certain state of affairs, any "this.") If Logic 1 is faulty, then Logic 1 must not exist. That is, when Logic 1 is considered inappropriate, then another "logic" (term this Logic 2) must be operating (since existence is operational), but one may not be aware of Logic 2's nature even though one must always be utilizing it/functioning within it. (This is analogous to the way in which one might live under gravity's influence while being unaware of its existence.) Mutually exclusive hierarchies exist because we have a mistaken way of thinking (Logic 1) about what it means for something to be distinct from something else.

1.14. The nature of Logic 1 and how theorizing under its influence seems to lead to contradictions need further articulation. Holding that a "section/segment/part" of reality is ontologically capable of existing by itself (or independently of the other segments) is the essence of Logic 1. It is only when one adheres to this supposition can one hold that a part "supports" other parts, or that a part is "prior" to another part (and one can then proceed to hypothesize a ontological hierarchy such as Position 1 or Position 2). A strategy, then, for establishing Logic 1's inappropriateness is to show how hierarchies are untenable. If we find contradictions at the very core of hierarchies, we may then conclude that the manner of thinking that led us to believe in the validity of the hierarchies, Logic 1, must be false:



Position 1: Matter 'causes' mind. (A is the ontological cause of B).

This is senseless since, strictly speaking,  $\text{mind} \neq \text{matter}$  ( $A \neq B$ ). The only way this might be true is if mind is reducible to matter. But this is blatantly false because, for example, if one is thinking of a tomato, one's brain, the matter, is not physically turning into a tomato.

Position 2: Mind causes matter.

Again this seems meaningless since  $\text{mind} \neq \text{matter}$ .

So why do we even begin to make statements like, "A causes B"?

It is because we have a certain naive approach to reality - we think that segments of reality (mind or matter in this case) can exist "independently" of other segments (Logic 1), and this leads us to propose that one segment may be causing another's being. However, nothing can ever be the ontological basis for anything else (if that thing is to maintain its identity as what it is), therefore Logic 1 seems mistaken.

1.15. Logic 2 is ( $\sim$ Logic 1). Thus Logic 2 is condensable as:  $X = (\sim Y)$ ,  $Y = (\sim X)$  where "X" and "Y" represent different "points of distinction". If X is *any* point of difference/segment of reality (beliefs, theories, a grain of sand, space, and "this"), then that segment is that segment because no other segment is that segment, and the truth of this is not based upon that segment being that segment (i.e., not upon  $X = X$ ). Under Logic 1,  $X = (\sim Y)$  was obviously true if  $X = X$  and if  $X \neq Y$ . But we have already discarded  $X = X$ , therefore, Logic 2 does not assert a relationship between segments; rather it concerns the very existence of segments. For example, a grain of sand is that grain of sand because another grain of sand is not that grain of sand, a tree is not that grain of sand, a thought is not that grain of sand, a monkey is not that grain of sand, and briefly, the rest of existence is not that grain of sand. Under Logic 2, existence is literally a "sea of difference" where no "section" is identical to another "section" of existence. Two "sections," however, may resemble one another. We are not here positively characterizing Logic 2, for Logic 2 is strictly nothing more than the negation of Logic 1. We may remind ourselves that Logic 1 is a manner of approaching difference, and thus Logic 2 signifies approaching reality while not being in the "mode" of Logic 1.



1.20. The *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* investigates reality while being cognizant of the inadequacies of Logic 1. As we discuss the main body of the *Upaniṣad*, we shall hopefully see better what exactly is meant by Logic 1, and also see that rejecting Logic 1 leads to the statement, "Existence is One without a second". It should be noted that by rejecting Position 1's and Position 2's source, Logic 1, the *Māndūkya* renders Position 1 and Position 2 irrelevant to a full understanding of existence.<sup>5</sup> The *Upaniṣad* scrutinizes the deep sleep, dreaming and waking "states" in Logic 2's mode of thinking. Since Logic 1 is abandoned, the ontological features of all the three states are given equal weight in determining the nature of existence. Under Logic 1's influence, it was easy to consider the waking as the "primary" state which gave rise to the other. But adopting Logic 2 demands a revised approach which examines the three states without ontological prejudice.

1.21. The first observation is that waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping are "interwoven". One does not, as it were, "hop" from waking to dreaming to deep sleeping, as though these were three absolutely separate states. There is continuity, ontological harmony. The states seem to melt into one another—there is no clash within this process. This melting of one state "into" the other seems akin to a "shift in emphasis." That is, it is not the case that upon waking, for example, that we are disconnected to the dreaming or to the deep sleeping. The latter states seem to "recede," or lose their emphasis, so to speak; they do not utterly disappear when one "wakes up". Similarly, upon "going to sleep", the waking world does not disappear; rather, the shutting of the sensory organs leads to the "bringing to the fore-front" what were already "there": dreaming and deep sleeping. We will see how the fact of the occurrence of "shifts in emphasis, and the fact that we are aware of the "shifting" are crucial to the *Māndūkya*'s assertion that reality is "One without a second".

1.22. The Second observation is that waking and dreaming states are characterized by differences while the deep sleeping state is without difference. That is, in the dreaming and waking states of one's experience, differences are experienced (and thus these are "dual states"), while in the deep sleep state, differences are absent (and thus this is the "not-dual/singular state").<sup>6</sup>



1.23. The deep sleep state is such that the difference between the self, or "I" and what is "outside" the "I" seems non-existent. Differences do not seem to exist when one is deep sleeping. Thus, the "I," *when considered as something which is identifiable as different*, does not exist within deep sleep. Therefore, there are no "experiences", within deep sleep since there needs to exist an "experiencer", and an "experienced" for experience to occur). Therefore, the "experience" of deep sleep is not "experience" in the usual sense of "experience". Then, whence comes the conviction, "I was existing in deep sleep"? It must arise, it would seem, from the fact that one *was* the deep sleep.

1.24. Of the dream and waking states the following may be said: differences/segments/things in the former seem discontinuous, disorderly, chaotic at times, and in general unlike the continuity, order, and linearly progressive nature of the latter. This fact does not, however, prevent the question: "Is the ontological structure of the waking similar to that of the dreaming?" The first step toward answering this question is to discern the ontological nature of the dream. A clear conclusion seems that Logic 1 is inapplicable to the dream state. To establish this, let us analyze the ontological components of the dream state. There seem to exist various differences/segments of the dream (and the "point of awareness" in the dream is also one of these differences-the "experiencer"). For example, suppose one is dreaming that one has wings and is flying in the sky. There exist the following relevant distinctions: the winged body, and the "locus" of awareness which is "doing" the experiencing, and the sky and various other "objects" of the dream. The "dream mind" is not identical to the sky, nor is it identical to the winged body - all three are distinct. Now, is Logic 1 applicable to any of these differences in the dream? Do any of these objects "self-exist" so that they are capable of supporting other aspects of the dream? Obviously not, because it is the dream itself which is being these distinctions and no one distinction is capable of causing the being of any other. Thus, though not obvious when dreaming, it is the "dream/dreamer" which is being the winged creature, the sky, the "dream-locus of awareness/dream mind", and any and all differences of the dream. Logic 1 would contradict this fact because under Logic 1, each of the differences is somehow self-existent, capable of causing, or being prior to the others. (Position 1 and Position 2 would then emerge by proposing different candidates as the truly self-existent. Position 1 would claim that



the winged body, the sky, etc., as primary (by labelling them "matter"), and Position 2 would claim the dream-point of awareness, ("mind") is the most primary. But the absurdity of such a conflict is obvious - none of the segments of the dream are self-existent; rather it is the dream which is existing as all of them.) Therefore, Logic 1 should be rejected as inappropriate to the dreaming state. Note here that the relationship between the dream and the various segments/differences of the dream is not of whole to a part, for each part is *fully* the dream-the dream is all that there is. This does not, however, deny the existence of differences in the dream; rather, differences are heightened, for no single point of difference can claim ultimate reality for itself. Now, given that Logic 1 is inapplicable to the dreaming, what may be said of the nature of the waking?

1.25. The waking world/state is similar to the dreaming; and it might even be declared another kind of dream *qua* ontology - i.e., *qua* the fact that Logic 1 is inapplicable to both states<sup>7</sup>. Since this is a central notion, fully marshalling arguments seems desirable:

(a.25) As proposed in section 1.21., the three states seem to "melt" into one another. There is no "break" in the fabric of being as one wakes, dreams and deep sleeps. Thus, there is no reason not to suppose that the waking is a dream. This is not solipsism, for the *Māṇḍūkya* pauses to properly analyze the *ontology* of the dreaming state. It is not the case, in the dreaming, that the dream-subject's (the winged creature's, for example) mind is "giving rise" to the dream, rather it is the dream which is being every distinction in the dream. Similarly, the waking-subject's mind does not give rise to the waking state either; rather it is the "waker/waking" which must be *being* the entire waking state. The full argument unfolds thus; since Logic 1 is clearly inapplicable to the deep sleep, and since there seems to be a melting, or a *shifting of emphasis* from the deep sleep to the dreaming, Logic 1 is inapplicable to the dreaming. Similarly, Logic 1 is inapplicable to the waking world for the waking world is also a product of a shift in emphasis.

(b.25) Since the argument in 1.14. suggests that Logic 1 does not fit the ontology of the waking state, and since the dream also does not afford Logic 1, dreaming and waking must be similar, and both must reflect Logic 2. It should be strongly noted, however, that dreaming and waking remain different *qua* their differences. The similarity is ontologi-



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cal, and, therefore, phenomenologically, the waking state may be considered more "concrete."

1.26. The above leads to the following further step: the "feeling" of "I" everyone is sometimes aware of, is that which is being the waking state, the dreaming state, and the deep sleeping state in the same way as the dream is being various differences in the dream. This is revealed when one says, "I slept", "I woke", "I dreamt". This "I" is the One without a second, the *Turiya*. For, the only way to account for the fact that we are indeed aware of the three "states" of our being, given that with each "shift" in emphasis from one state to the next, the respective selves (the waking body-mind, dream body-mind, the nothingness of deep sleep) in the states are "disappearing" into each other, is to posit that we are not restricted to any of these selves. Just as we know that we exist during deep sleep because we are deep sleep, we know we exist in dreaming because we are the dreaming, for otherwise, (if we were strictly the dream body-mind) the disappearance of the dream body-mind (which occurs while waking and deep sleeping) would mean that we would not possess any knowledge of having existed in dreaming. But we do have the recollection of having dreamt. This implies we are the dreaming while dreaming. Similarly, we are the waking state, and not just our respective waking body-minds.

1.261. To reiterate, if the "I" were exclusively the dream-self, then the disappearance of the dream-self/dream-body-mind-complex would have meant the annihilation of any sense of having existed during the dreaming. Similarly, one recollects that one was awake, because one is the waking, for if this were not so, the experience of the disappearance of the waking-self when dreaming (or deep sleeping) should have meant the loss of the memory of having existed. But the memory of having "been" persists through the shifts, and this is the "I", the *Turiya*. The "I" should *not* be considered as limited to the variety of differences (including the waking selves and dreaming selves) that might appear in dreaming and waking. Nor is it solely restricted to the "singularity" of deep sleep. This "I", the One without a second, stands in the same "relation" to dreaming, waking, and deep sleeping as the dream stands to the various differences of the dream. The One without a second is being all three states, and is the only existing. The steps to the realization of the One without a second is as follows:



(1) Since Logic 1 is not applicable to the waking state, the ontological nature of the waking state must be similar to the *ontological situation* in the dreaming, since Logical does not apply to the dreaming also. Therefore, the myriad of differences in the waking state are the "waking" itself, just as the numerous differences in the dreaming are dream itself.

This implies that the waking self (and all other distinctions in the waking) is really the waking.

Similar, the dreaming self=dreaming, and the deep sleep "self" = deep sleep.

(2) Observation: we are *aware* of having dream, slept and having been awake. Indeed we say "I woke", "I slept", "I dreamt". Thus, the waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping are "in continuum" with one another, and are not disconnected.

Now (1) and (2) imply

(3) Waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping must themselves be the being of the ultimate existence the "I". That is, the fact that the waking, dreaming and deep sleeping share the same ontological structure, Logic 2, and the fact that these exist in a continuum, and not disparately, suggests that what we were calling the waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping is really the unifying principle, "*Turiya*," the very "I" which each one of us "feels" when one utters, "I".

Thus, the pattern of argument here renovates our understanding of the "I" (the immediate "feeling" that we all have-- and indeed the reader of this paper must be experiencing at this very moment) as follows:

(\*) We initially think the "I" to be one of the waking, dreaming, or deep sleeping selves (the waking self is the common candidate).

(\*\*) When we realize that these selves *are* actually *the* waking, *the* dreaming, and *the* deep sleeping respectively, we might be tempted to consider the "I" as one of these.

(\*\*\*) However, we must arrive at the further recognition, owing to the fact that we are aware/know that these states are not absolutely disconnected, that really, the waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping are the "I", itself. That is, this "feeling" of "I", has always been, and is,



the three states, and thus It is all that there is, was, or will be. Calling the "I" "*Turiya*" does not gesture to some other fourth state, rather its intent is to capture the fact that we have cleared away mistaken notions (\*, \*\*) of the "I"'s nature.

1.2611. The *Turiya* is all distinctions -- there is no other outside it. It should not be confounded *with* the simple unity -- the one with a second, a third, a fourth, etc. The proper formulation is perhaps: everything is the "I" is not anything. All is It, but It is not in anything.<sup>8</sup> It cannot even be conceptualized as the "that which cannot be conceptualized". Knowing It is to recognize that one is always being It. In the context of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* *Turiya* is Divinity, the only existing reality which is fully each one of us (understood as distinct waking-selves, dream-selves) and more. The One without a second is not the logical sum, [waking + dreaming + deep sleeping], for then the individual pieces (dreaming, deep sleeping and waking) would not be *fully* It. Note how this dissolves the initial ontological concern (a) of section 1.10, for the immaterial and the material have all been revealed to be the One without a second. The non-ontological issues concerning (a) can be left to the physicists."

1.2611. There might arise a confusion here-- one might argue: if it is the case that, for example, mind is fully the *Turiya*, why then is it false to say that "mind causes matter" (Position 2)? The response to this is rather obvious: since the *Turiya* is also fully matter, we can also assert, "matter causes mind". This implies that "matter causes mind" and "mind causes matter" are equivalent. However, one usually means to exclude the possibility that "matter causes mind" when one asserts "mind causes matter" when one is operating outside of Logic 1.

1.262. Since all this is quite subtle, presenting a thorough rewording of the argument seems appropriate:

(a) *In the waking state*, one recollects three states of being -- dreaming, waking and deep sleeping. *When awake*, one usually considers the three "states" as follows: "I have a self -- a body-mind complex. When I am dreaming, my body 'rests', while the mind dreams, and deep sleeps". Call the self which reasons thus, "The question that is being posed of the waking state is: Does the waking have the same "ontological structure" that the dream possesses?



(b) *In the dreaming state*, one is also capable of recollecting three states of being -- one might *dream* that there are "three states". That is, one can *dream* that one has a body which "rests", and a mind which dreams and deep sleeps. One then, when *dreaming*, might say: "I have a self -- a body-mind complex. When I am dreaming, my body 'rests', while the mind dreams, and deep sleeps". Let us call the self in the dream which is capable speaking so, "the dream-self". The ontological structure of the dreaming is: there exists a dream-self (that point of "awareness" which might be accompanied or might be unaccompanied by a "body"), various other "objects", which are distinct from this dream-self and with which the dream-self interacts, and finally, the "dream" itself -- which is *fully* being the dream-self and the various other differences in the dream. Now, *within the confines of the dream*, none of the various distinct elements of the dreaming can conceive as an "entity",<sup>10</sup> the dream/dreaming. For, meaning can only be achieved by the activity of delineation, and the dream is not distinguishable in the dream. That is, in a dream, only "sections" of the dream may be articulated meaningfully. Thus, attempting to utter, "the dream" in a meaningful manner fails (*qua the dreaming -- we do, however, possess a meaningful notion of the dream since we can distinguish the dream from the waking, and from the deep sleep -- but we are incapable of defining the One without a second because the Turiya stands in the same relation to the three states as the dream does to its segments*). What can be asserted, or *known* meaningfully by any entity *in the dreaming* is precisely the fact outlined here: the dream-self may come to realize the sense in which the dream cannot be known. Thus, though the dream-self may come to realize the sense in which the dream, the dream-self may "recognize" itself as being the dream. (Similarly, I can come to recognize that I am *Turiya*, however, I cannot *characterize* myself as a "this".)

(c) *In deep sleeping*, one is the deep sleeping, and it is because of this fact that one is able to later recollect, "I deep slept". Because there is literally no notion of "another" in deep sleep, and indeed there is no "notion", including the notion, "there is no notion", it is impossible that one could have experienced deep sleep while being distinct from it. Thus, one is not distinct from the deep sleep while deep sleeping.



(d) Of the relationship between the dreaming and deep sleeping, there is not much room for controversy since it is easily seen that dreaming and deep sleeping are in "one continuum" -- that is, the dream is nothing other than a "shift out" of the deep sleeping. An interesting query, however, arises regarding the waking state: is the ontological situation of the dreaming (the "relation" previously discerned between the dream, and the various entities of the dream) applicable to the waking? One might ask oneself, "Is this waking-body, and waking-mind really the 'waking' just as the dream-mind and dream-body are the dream?" As the first step toward a response, let us examine the main reason which might hinder such an assertion. That reason seems to be rooted in the sentiment that the waking-mind, or the "point of awareness" in the waking is in fact what became the dream, and the deep sleep. Thus, one may be led to believe that there is no justification for instituting the ontological structure of the dreaming to the waking. This sentiment is not, however, sufficient reason for rejecting the ontological similarity, for such a sentiment might be present even while dreaming -- that is, such a sentiment is quite possible in dreaming -- where, obviously, the ontological situation in question holds. That is, it is quite possible to *dream* such that one "wakes up" from another dream. While *dreaming*, one can feel exactly what one might feel when "awake": "I was dreaming, and my mind was that dream, and it was my mind which also deep slept." Therefore, the existence of this sentiment can never be sound reason for rejecting the imposition of the ontological structure of the dream on to the waking. One may, however, object that the occurrence of this sentiment in the waking deserves "greater value" than the occurrence of the sentiment in the dream because of the "greater order" of the waking. In other words, the fact that the waking world seems to be "regulated" when contrasted with the dreaming is reason enough for weighing the arising of the sentiment in the waking in a higher stead than the arising of this sentiment in the dreaming. For, one may say, in a dream anything might occur at any moment, but in the waking, there is a certain consistent "movement of phenomena". For example, in a dream one might turn into a goat, but such an occurrence is impossible in the waking. However, this objection does not seem sustainable, for:

(1) We must first observe that these arguments are being considered in the waking state, therefore, one must show care by not allowing the vivacity of the waking to become overwhelming.



(2) Since the same sentiment (that of thinking the "dream" to be a function of the "waking") might arise both in a "ordered" situation and in a "disordered" situation, how "ordered" is the ordered situation (waking) given the fact that when one is in fact "in" the disordered situation (dreaming), one perceives not that disorder, but in fact considers that disorder the very nature of order?

There is surely a difference between the waking and the dreaming. It is a fact that the phenomena, or "occurrences" in the waking are different from those of the occurrences in a dream. Does this, however, entail that the sentiment arising in the dream is inferior to the sentiment arising in the waking? Such a move can only be an assumption, a "labelling" of one set of phenomena as "superior" in their "reality" than another set of phenomena. Indeed, such a labelling is no different than when one asserts *in a dream* (call this dream 1), after having dreamed of having woken up from a dream (call this dream 2), "dream was disorderly, I am now in the 'ordered state'". The truth of the matter is that one has moved from one dream to another (where the phenomena are different-- that is how one distinguishes between dream 1 and dream 2, while being in dream 1), and this fact does not entail a movement from one ontological structure into an utterly different ontological state. These conclusions seem to suggest that there cannot exist any arguments based upon the phenomena occurring in the waking state which oppose the introduction of the dream's ontological structure to the waking. Again, this is true because, regardless of what phenomenon of the waking state is offered as an objection to the conclusion that the waking has the same ontological structure as the dreaming, the mere occurrence of that phenomenon can never exclude the possibility that the waking and the dreaming have the same ontological structure because that very phenomenon could have occurred in a situation where the ontological structure in question was operational. (I.e., the same phenomenon could have occurred in a dream, therefore, the mere occurrence of the phenomenon in the waking-- such as the sentiment that the dream is the waking mind-- cannot shed light on the nature of the ontological structure applicable to the waking world.) Thus, asserting that it is the "waker"/waking which is fully being the various differences in the waking (space, the moon, stars, planets, human beings, animals -- all the distinctions present in the waking universe) in the same manner that the dream is fully being the various differences in the dream seems quite plausible.

(e) It remains to suggest arguments for introducing the ontological structure of dreaming to the waking. The "flow" from one state into



another seems a sound reason for supposing ontological similarity, for it would seem that it is impossible for one ontological situation to be meshed with a completely different ontological situation. The "flow"/"shift of emphasis" argument, however, depends on considering the dreaming and the waking as equally real (or equally false)-- that is, analyzing the fact of the "melting" without regard to the "reality" and "unreality" issue (which is actually a species of "primary" and "secondary"). Even though it is not precise to speak of "real" and "unreal" regarding the three state, it may be instructive to utilize those sentiments in our arguments. To "real" and "unreal" let us associate Logic 1 and Logic 2 respectively. It may be asserted: Dreams are unreal, and Logic 2 is applicable to dreams, therefore, Logic 2 is unreal. This implies that the waking world is real, and Logic 1 is applicable to the waking, therefore Logic 1 is real. However, this statement is being asserted *while* awake. *While* dreaming, the dream is being considered real by the dream-mind: thus, *while* dreaming, it may be asserted that the dreaming is real, therefore Logic 1 is applicable to the dream. Now, if dreaming is considered real in the dream, there must be something unreal by virtue of which the real can be the real. This implies that the waking becomes the unreal, therefore, Logic 2 must be applicable to the waking state. Now this is a peculiar situation, for depending on the state, one is compelled to interchange the ontological structures: while dreaming, Logic 1 seems applicable to the dream, and Logic 2 to the waking, and while awake, Logic 1 is applicable to the waking, and Logic 2 to the dreaming. This suggests three possibilities: both the waking and dreaming "have" both Logic 1 and Logic 2, or both waking and dreaming have Logic 1, or both waking and dreaming have Logic 2. The first possibility, that of "both Logic 1 and Logic 2", can be disregarded as obviously contradictory-- Logic 1 and ~Logic 1 cannot both be true at once. Regarding the latter possibilities, if we restrict the investigation to the waking and dreaming states, there seems nothing which will enable us to determine the correct ontological structure-- it might be Logic 1 or Logic 2 (over-looking for the moment the arguments presented in previous sections of this paper against Logic 1). The deep sleep state must now be brought under consideration, for this state is clearly "in continuum" with the waking and the dreaming. Obviously, in deep sleep, Logic 1 is inapplicable, for the deep sleep is without any distinction. The question of the self-existence of "segments" does not arise at all in deep sleep. Therefore, we may conclude that Logic 1 is inapplicable to the waking and the dreaming since the dreaming and the waking "melt" "in" and "out"



of the deep sleep. Thus, Logic2 ( $\sim$ Logic1) must be operating in the waking and dreaming.

(f) Once the ontological similarity between dreaming and waking is accepted, the *next* step is to demand the answer to this question: "What is the relationship between the waking, the dreaming, and the deep sleeping?" Given that we have intimate knowledge of having existed throughout these "states," these states are "in" a continuum. That is, since the knowledge of "having been" in these state does not arise from any one of the "selves" of the dreaming or waking, since these selves fail to persist in the deep sleep (and indeed, they fail to persist at all -- the waking and dreaming worlds are always changing, and as Hume says, there is no persistence of identity, rather, the idea of identity is superimposed upon resembling and contiguous phenomena), the dreaming, the deep sleeping and the waking are in fact the One without a second, the *Turiya*, *Brahman*, *Ātman*, the Self. The *Turiya* holds the same relationship to the "three states" as the waking and dreaming hold to their respective segments. The waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping, however, are different from one another; therefore, they are conceptualizable, while the *Turiya*, the One without a second, defies any such characterization by being fully all of these states. The *Turiya*, is not something remote. It is right here, right now, the very "I" which is reading this paper. This analysis, then, should not be interpreted as the articulation of a hierarchy -- it is not the case that the *Turiya* is at the "top". It is top, bottom, and middle. The *Turiya* is the waking, the *Turiya* is the dreaming, the *Turiya* is the deep sleeping.<sup>11</sup> It ought to be noted that the waking, dreaming and deep sleeping are different from one another though they are "unified" in *Turiya*. This is maintainable because we reject Logic 1 as the appropriate mode for understanding difference.

1.27 Listing some objections and responding to them should help further clarify the above:

*Objection 1:* Why does not the world disappear when someone is deep sleeping/dreaming (if indeed the *Māndūkya* is accurate)?

*Response:* This objection assumes that the *Māndūkya* is propounding a sort of solipsism. The objection misinterprets the *Māndūkya*



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as asserting that the One without a second is an individual's mind (such that when that individual is dreaming, the waking is converted to dream). Rather, the *Māṇḍūkya*'s analysis has been pointing to the inadequacy of considering the dream-subject as having any impact, say, on the dream itself when one is dreaming. For example, suppose Z is dreaming that he is talking to some person, say Q. Z shakes Q's hands, and Z is also thinking thoughts, just as he does had he met Q when awake. Z seems to possess both a body and a mind in the dream. Now it is not the dream-mind which is being the dream (for the dream mind is precisely not the dream-body, or other distinctions in the dream-the dream mind, however, in the deeper sense, is the dream, but in this deeper sense, there is nothing but the dream - in the deeper sense the statement "dream-mind is the dream" is equivalent to the assertion, "the dream-sky is the dream"). Z's dream body and Z's dream mind (both of which are distinct from Q) cannot have "given rise" to Q, and the rest of the dream. And since Z's waking body and waking mind are similar to a dream body and mind, the former pair can even less be said to be upholding the dreaming, let alone the waking.

*Objection 2:* The waking-self does not disappear upon dreaming or deep sleeping, owing to the fact that someone perceives the waking body in a "restful" state - perhaps lying on a bed. Moreover, scientists see brain-wave patterns, etc., in sleeping person. Therefore, the entire analysis here is utterly mistaken.

Response: One may conceivably make the same argument while dreaming, where there are no doubts regarding the ontological nature (though it is possible that all types of doubts may creep in while dreaming). Therefore, this objection fails. Further, the change from the waking to the dreaming selves is not dissimilar from the changes which occur in the waking phenomena themselves - everything is in flux - the body and mind are always changing, and so is everything else. Thus it might be said that the body of one moment is not the body of the next moment. Has not the old body disappeared? How are we to grapple with these ontological issues? The *Māṇḍūkya* responds by recognizing all this to be That (One without a second). Thus, the fact that there are brain waves etc., is true insofar as it is true - they are all fully true/real in that they are One without a second.



*Objection 3* : The argument here seems entirely like the "Poori Dough" hypothesis. Such a formulation is blatantly absurd. That is, to say "all this is One without a second" is analogous to saying that existence is a mass of Poori Dough - some same "stuff" which constitutes everything.

*Response*: This is a dangerous confusion. Let us explore the Poori Dough hypothesis. Let us imagine a mass of Dough. Imagine that two figures "X" and "Y" are sculpted from the Dough such that the quantity of Dough in X is greater than the quantity of Dough in Y. Now, we must ask the question, "Is the Dough that constitutes X identical to Y's dough?" Clearly, the answer is "No." For the Dough which is in X is in X, and in addition, the Dough in X is of greater mass than the Dough which is in Y. But the ontological nature of a dream is different. Each "segment" of the dream is *fully* the dream. It is not the case that there are smaller quantities of dream in different entities in the dream - all are the dream, and the dream is restricted to no single one of them. Similarly, the *Turiya* is fully everything. Existence itself is *Turiya*.

1.30, The *Māṇḍūkya* considers the purpose of this analysis to be therapeutic. The ethical approach is thus psychological, aimed at renovating one's *thinking* from that of Logic 1 to that of Logic 2. The cause of fear, which seems at the root estrangement from the "other," is deemed to be Logic 1, for it is Logic 1 which proposes that one exists independently of the other. Rejecting Logic 1 affords a way of accepting the fact that there are differences without this fact impinging upon the fact that everything is unified. Logic 1 is what makes difference and unity seems contradictory and problematic, but reality (which seems diverse in its unity) cannot be a problem, for reality/existence is the very standard by virtue of which one knows what it means for something to be problematic or otherwise. What is contradictory is Logic 1, not existence.

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## Notes

1. "Primary" "prior," and similar words are used equivalently throughout this paper. They are meant to highlight ontological status. For example, the ontological status associated with "brain" in the sentence "brain causes mind" leads us to say, "the brain is primary." "Causality" here is to be comprehended ontologically and not in the sense of the causality involved in someone kicking a football. I.e., the concern here is not with the efficient cause, to use Aristotle's term.
2. Roughly, whatever the possible variety, Position 1 places body, objects on "top" of a "ladder of primacy" while Position 2 places consciousness/mind on top.
3. Now, the same opposition might be seen within the general position--deciding between the various permutations--these will be "sub positional" conflicts. If it be objected here that we have a fine method of choosing between one position or another based upon, say, "scientific investigation", we can surely argue, "why consider a certain methodology of approaching phenomena as leading to the truth?" Is not such a move (that of "science") ultimately based upon the *supposition* of the validity of such an approach? We must remember further that science might help us discover causal chains--the "occurring" of phenomena in a certain order, but does this mean that it aids in the discovery of ontological primacy? Whatever may be the case, surely there exist mutually opposed ontological possibilities regarding the mind and body, the material and the immaterial, and complex issues therein. Their existence is itself philosophically significant.
4. The mere fact that mind, body, and objects interact smoothly.
5. Māndūkya Kārikā, Chapter IV, Verse 5. *Eight Upanisads with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya* Volume 2. Translated by Swami Gambhīrānanda (Calcutta : Advaita Ashrama, 5 Delhi Entally Road, 700014). Seventh Edition, 1989. (All references to Verses from this source.)
6. *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*, Verses 3,4,5.
7. *Māndūkya Kārikā*, Chapter II, Verse 4.
8. *Māndūkya Kārikā*, Chapter I, Verse 7.
9. There can be a legitimate physics, for the waking state is not a dream insofar as "disorder" is concerned. Thus, we can be certain of causality of the sort seen in the kicking of a football. But what this causality entails has been renovated. That is, the situation is similar to what might happen



in a dream where someone kicks a football: of course the football has been kicked, but the kicker, the ball, the fact that the ball travels, are all fully the dream. Therefore, from the perspective of the dream itself, there has been no kicking, or causality. Similarly, all that exists is said to be One without a second, and in this sense, there is no kicking, nor causing, nor body, nor mind, nor anything, but only the One without a second.

10. By "entity" or "a point of difference" we mean to signify any difference whatsoever. That is, "X" is an "entity" if X is in any way different from some "Y". Thus, for example, "mind" is an "entity" just as chair is an entity if by "mind" one means something different from what "chair" signifies. This feature seems to be in the very heart of meaning -- if one is to successfully mean something, one has to distinguish something from something.

11. *Māṇḍūkya Karikā*, Chapter I, Verse 1.



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## NYĀYA INFERENCE : DEUCTIVE OR INDUCTIVE

The purpose of this paper is to examine the veracity of the claim, made by some of the Indian thinkers like C.D. Sharma,<sup>1</sup> M. Hiriyanna<sup>2</sup> and Radhakrishnan,<sup>3</sup> that *Nyāya* Logic is deductive-inductive in character. I shall attempt to show that inferences in *Nyāya*, both of the old and the new schools, are not deductive - inductive in character, and those who have claimed it, have done it due to their misconception about the distinction of deductive and inductive inferences. To substantiate the position let me begin with the *Nyāya* doctrine of *Vyāpti* in general.

There is no doubt that the *Nyāya* system has had a long history and its position and ways of formulating the doctrine of *Vyāpti* have evolved considerably over the centuries. Nonetheless, both the schools of *Nyāya*, the old and the new, hold the view that *Vyāpti* is a logical ground of all valid inferential cognitions. One can see this from their conception of *parāmarśa* itself. Ordinarily, the term '*parāmarśa*' stands for cognition or knowledge in general. But in the *Nyāya* system it has a technical meaning. It is used to signify the cognition of *pakṣadharmatā* as qualified by *Vyāpti* (*vyāptiviśiṣṭa pakṣadharmatājñānam parāmarśaḥ*).<sup>4</sup> '*Vyāpti*' is understood in terms of 'invariable concomitance of the probans (*hetu*) with the probandum (*sādhya*) and '*pakṣadharmatā*' in terms of 'the presence of the probans (*hetu*) in the subject (*pakṣa*). And, inference is, thus, defined as knowledge arising in and through *parāmarśa*. Since *vyāptiviśiṣṭa* (that which is characterized by *vyāpti*) and *pakṣadharmatā* (the fact of being a feature of *pakṣa*) are the two essential components of *parāmarśa* on the *Nyāya* account, they constitute necessary and sufficient conditions of valid inferential cognitions in the sense that no inference can yield valid knowledge on the *Nyāya* account unless they are grounded on *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*. If this is so, and I believe it is, no inferences in *Nyāya* from the ground point of view could be said

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to differ from one another. And as a result, there could be only two alternatives possible: Either inferences in *Nyāya* are deductive or inductive; but in no case they can be both deductive and inductive, since this possibility is ruled out by their characteristics. How this is ruled out by their characteristics. How this is ruled out by their characteristics, before discussing it, let me first of all remove a common misconception about the distinction of deductive and inductive inferences. Deductive and inductive inferences are generally defined as follows:

### Deductive Inference

A valid deductive inference is one in which we always proceed either from the general to the specific or from the more general to the less general.

### Inductive Inference

A valid inductive inference is one in which we always proceed either from the specific to the general or from the less general to the more general.

These definitions are misconceived definitions in my opinion. A valid deductive inference is not one in which we always proceed either from the general to the specific or from the more general to the less general. Because, there are many counter instances of valid deductive argument in which inferences are drawn neither from the general to the specific, nor from the more general to the less general but rather from the specific to the specific. Take, for example, the following argument:

Ram is a student.

Ram is intelligent.

Ram is an intelligent student.

This argument is a case of a valid deductive argument since its premises, if true, provide absolute guarantee for the truth of its conclusion; and yet it involves no inference either from the general to the specific or from the more general to the less general. Inference is rather



from the specific to the specific. All its premises and conclusion are specific. So, it is wrong to say that a valid deductive argument is one in which we always proceed either from the general to the specific or from the more general to the less general. The given definition of deductive inference cannot be used as criterion for characterizing inferences in Nyaya as deductive.

Likewise, valid inductive inference is not one in which we always proceed either from the specific to the general or from the less general to the more general. Because there are many counter instances of valid inductive argument in which inferences are drawn neither from the specific to the general nor from the less general to the more general. Inferences rather are drawn either from the specific to the specific or from the general to the specific or from the general to the general. Take, for example, the following arguments:

(1)

The class that Mr X taught yesterday was interesting.

∴ The class that Mr X will teach today will be interesting.

(2)

All classes that Mr X taught in the past were interesting.

∴ The class that Mr X will teach today will be interesting.

(3)

All classes that Mr X taught in the past were interesting.

∴ All classes that Mr X will teach in the future will be interesting.

All these inferences are cases of valid inductive inferences since their premises, if true, provide a good reason or evidence (but not conclusive) for the truth of their conclusion; and yet none of them involves inference either from the specific to the general or from the less general to the more general. Their inference rather is either from the specific to the specific or from the general to the specific or from the general to the general. So, it is wrong to say that a valid inductive inference is one in which we always proceed either from the specific to



the general or from the less general to the more general. The given definition of inductive inference cannot be used as criterion for characterizing inferences in *Nyāya* as inductive.

The distinction between deductive and inductive inferences in fact consists in regard to the relationship of their premises and conclusion, not the way they proceed from one proposition (or a set of propositions) to another proposition. The relation that holds between premises and conclusion of a valid deductive argument does not hold good between premises and conclusion of a valid inductive argument. Premises and conclusion of a valid deductive argument always stand in the relationship of implication or entailment. It is because of this reason their premises with the negation of conclusion always imply a contradiction; and provide absolute guarantee, if true, for the truth of conclusion. While in the case of inductive argument the position is quite different. Premises and conclusion of a valid inductive argument do not stand in the relationship of implication or entailment. Their relationship always remains contingent. As a result, neither their premises with the negation of conclusion imply a contradiction, nor a logical oddity of any sort. Their premises never provide absolute guarantee, even if true, for the truth of conclusion. Unlike a valid deductive argument, it is always logically possible for the premises of a valid inductive argument to be true and the conclusion false. This gap is the distinctive mark of all inductive arguments, as opposed to deductive ones. This is the reason why the notion of 'validity' is used in each case in a different sense.

As deduction and induction differ from one another in regard to the relationship of their premises and conclusion, the possibility of *Nyāya* logic to be both deductive and inductive is completely ruled out. So the question which now remains is this: Is *Nyāya* logic deductive or inductive? It is, to my mind, neither. *Nyāya* logic is not a deductive logic since its inferences do not possess the fundamental property of a valid deductive inference. That is, their premises do not contain in them implicitly or explicitly the information of their conclusions. In other words, conclusions of *Nyāya* valid inferences, unlike deductive, always contain new information in them other than their premises. This happens because of their *vyāpti* relationship. *Vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) is a necessary but non-analytic relation. As a result, the premises of *Nyāya* valid argument with the negation of conclusion never imply contradiction.



but logical oddity as opposed to a valid deductive argument. This follows from the very nature of *vyāpti* itself. Had *vyāpti* been an analytic relation, the conclusions of Nyāya valid inferences would have not contained new information in them other than their premises. But since they do contain in them new information other than their premises on the Nyāya account, *vyāpti* relation holding between them cannot be said to be analytic. We cannot say that their premises with the negation of conclusion imply contradiction. This becomes quite explicit through the analysis of the *vyāpti* notion itself in the following way:

Needless to say that different Nyāya thinkers have defined the notion of *vyāpti* in different ways over the centuries from different points of view. Annambhatta, for example, defines '*vyāpti*' in terms of a 'concomitance-rule' and gives the example, 'where there is smoke, there is fire' in illustration of such a rule. In other words, for him 'where there is smoke there is fire' - such a rule (*niyama*) of concomitance (*sāhacarya*) is *vyāpti* (*Yatrayatra dhūmah tatra tatra agniḥ iti sāhacarya niyamah vyāptih*).<sup>5</sup> What he means is that *vyāpti* is the co-location of a probans (*hetu*) with a probandum (*sādhya*) that is not the negation of an absolute absence which has co-location with the probans'. (*Hetusamānādhi karanātyantā bhāva apratīyogisādhyasamānādhi karanyam vyāptih*).<sup>6</sup> Gaṅgeśa propounds the view that *vyāpti* is the co-existence of the probans (*hetu*) with the probandum (*sādhya*) which is not determined by the determinant of the negation of the absolute non-existence which co-exists with the probans, but whose negation does not so co-exist. (*pratīyogya-samānādhi karaṇa - yat - samanādhi karanātyantā bhāva-pratīyogitāvachedakāvachchinnam yan na bhavati tena saman tasya samānādhi karanyam vyāptih*).<sup>7</sup> According to Udayana, *vyāpti* is the relation between the probans (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*) without any limiting adjunct (*Anaupadhikah sambandho vyāptih*).<sup>8</sup> This means, in other words, when the probans and the probandum are unconditionally related, we have *vyāpti*. While Vallabha defines '*vyāpti*' in terms of a 'universal relation'. (*kārtsnyena sambandho vyāptih*).<sup>9</sup> For him it is the co-existence of the probandum (*sādhya*) with all instances of the probans (*hetu*). On the Vācaspati Miśra's account, *vyāpti* arises from the very nature of the probans (*hetu*). It depends on the very essence of the probans, so that when the probans as such co-exists with the probandum (*sādhya*) as such, we have *vyāpti* (*svabhāvikah sambandho vyāptih*).<sup>10</sup> This is also the view of Varadarāja. But for Vātsyāyana *vyāpti* is any co-existence of the probans (*hetu*) with the probandum (*sādhya*) (*sambandhamātram*



*vyāpti*).<sup>11</sup> In other words, whenever the *hetu* co-exists with the *sādhya*, we have *vyāpti*. It is now quite obvious from the given illustrations that *vyāpti* is formulated from varying viewpoints. But there is one thing common to all its various formulation which is, I think, undoubtedly held about the nature of *vyāpti* that it is a necessary relation. It holds not only between two concepts, pervaded and pervader, but also propositions expressing them. Its necessity can be viewed and interpreted from three different angles: logical, epistemic and ontological. All these three angles are no doubt different and distinct but in the *Nyāya* theory of inference they are quite mixed and interconnected. Because of this reason the conditions of inference in *Nyāya* differ from the western one. All this is required for an inference to be possible and valid. On western view like that of B-Russell it is the logical condition, that is, a relation of implication or entailment between propositions which constitute premises and conclusion of inference. Epistemic condition is no condition, on this view, for an inference to be possible. We can validly infer one proposition from another proposition (or a set of propositions) without knowing the proposition to be true. But on the *Nyāya* account, apart from the logical condition the epistemic condition is also required for an inference to be possible and valid. No inference, on this view, is possible unless premises are related and known to be true. In other words, inferences, on the *Nyāya* account, are possible only when we have knowledge of *paksadharmatā* as qualified by *vyāpti*. Both *paksadharmatā* and *vyāpti* constitute the ground of inference. It is because of this reason the notion of 'validity' is used in both the systems, *Nyāya* and western, in different senses. But since my concern in this paper is just to examine the nature of inference in *Nyāya* from the logical point of view, not epistemic or ontological, I shall not discuss them unless the discussion demands. From the logical point of view it can be said that *vyāpti* is, on the *Nyāya* account, a necessary relation but non-analytic. Its necessity is objective, not subjective. It holds not only between two concepts, pervaded and pervader but also propositions in which their use occurs. Consider, for example, the following argument as illustrated in *Nyāya* :

All smoky objects are fiery.  
This hill has smoke.

∴ This hill has fire.

This is a valid argument. In it *vyāpti* relation holds not merely between smokeness and fireness, or smokeness and smoke or fireness and



fire or smoke and fire but also between propositions in which their use occurs, that is, premises and conclusion. The first premise is a universal proposition. It expresses *vyāpti* between smokeness and fireness. The second premise is a singular proposition. It expresses no *vyāpti* between hill and smoke. But it is related to the first premise by way of *vyāpti*. *Vyāpti* holds between smokeness and smoke. The conclusion is a singular proposition. It expresses no *vyāpti* between hill and fire. But the conclusion is related to both the premises by way of *vyāpti*. *Vyāpti* holds not only between smoke and fire but also between fireness and fire. Thus, there are many *vyāpties* holding between the two terms. Since these terms, pervaded and pervader, occur in premises and conclusion, *vyāpti* relation also holds between them. Had it not been so, inferences, on the *Nyāya* account, would have merely been from terms to term, not from propositions to proposition. But this is not so. Inferences in *Nyāya* proceed from propositions to proposition (*paramarśa janyam jñānam anunitih*).<sup>12</sup> So *vyāpti* cannot be said to be merely a relation of terms. It is also a relation of propositions.

It is quite evident from the illustrated argument that *vyāpti* relation is a necessary relation but it is neither a relation of inclusion nor identity. To say that two concepts, pervaded and pervader, are invariably co-extensive positively or negatively, equally or unequally is not to say that they are identical or one includes the other as a part of its meaning. Neither the concept of pervaded is identical with the concept of pervader, nor the concept of pervader includes the concept of pervaded as a part of its meaning. Had they been identical, we would have perceived fire when we perceive smoke and question of inferring fire from smoke would have not arisen. But the perception of smoke is not the perception of fire, nor the perception of smoke by itself implies the perception of fire (although the cognition of smoke leads to the cognition of fire in inferential sense) and the *vice versa*. So, neither the concept of smoke can be said to be identical with the concept of fire, nor can we say that what they signify is one and the same. Both the terms do have different meanings and refer to two different and distinct objects. Likewise, had the concept of pervaded (i.e. smoke) been a part of the meaning of pervader (i.e. fire), valid inferences from pervader to pervaded would have been possible in unequally co-extensive cases too. But since valid inferences from pervader to pervaded (i.e. from fire to smoke) are not possible, on the *Nyāya* account, in unequally co-extensive cases, it cannot be said that the concept of pervader includes the concept of pervaded as



a part of its meaning. From the mere analysis of pervader, we cannot infer pervaded. When we infer pervaded from pervader in equally co-extensive cases we do so in virtue of their *samavyāpti* relationship (the term '*sama vyāpti*' signifies two directional *vyāpti*) which is neither a relation of inclusion (partly or wholly) nor identity. To say that pervaded and pervader are co-extensive in both the ways is not to say that they are identical, nor one includes the other (partly or wholly) as a part of its meaning. *Vyāpti* relation is neither of them. And yet it is a necessary and objective relation on the *Nyaya* account. In other words, *Vyāpti* is a non-analytic relation. It is not a construction of human mind. The necessity of *vyāpti* is objective, not subjective. *Vyāpti* propositions (i.e., all smoky objects are fiery) are, thus, synthetic, necessary and objective propositions. The necessity of *vyāpti* follows from its own nature, that is, invariability (*avinābhāvaniyama*). But the terms, invariability and a priority, imply necessity but in quite different senses. So, *vyāpti* propositions (though are synthetic and necessary) cannot be said to be synthetic a priori propositions in Kantian sense. The *Naiyāyikas* admit an extraordinary perception of *vyāpti* which holds between the entire domains of pervaded and pervader.

But then can we say that *vyāpti* relations are intrinsical? Surely not. *Vyāpti* relations are not intrinsical relations either on the *Nyaya* account because *vyāpti* relations are not grounded in the nature of the terms related, pervaded and pervader. Had it been so, the objects denoted by pervaded and pervader would have not existed apart from and independent of one another. But since the objects denoted by pervader (i.e. fire) and pervaded (i.e. smoke) do exist, as a matter of fact, apart from and independent of one another, their relation cannot be said to be intrinsical. To know one is not necessarily to know the other. The cognition of pervader is possible without the cognition of pervaded and the *vice versa*. We can perceive fire without perceiving smoke or smoke without fire. The perception of one does not require the perception of other. This is possible because they are extrinsically related. To say this is not to say that the relation of pervaded (i.e. smoke) and pervader (i.e. fire) is contingent. *Vyāpti* relation is an extrinsic relation, but not a contingent one. Extrinsicity is not opposed to contingency. It is opposed to intrinsicity. Extrinsicity and necessity are mutually compatible. Therefore, *vyāpti* relations can be extrinsic and necessary. There is no contradiction involved in it. Invariability (*avinābhāvaniyama*) implies necessity and universality but not in a *a priori* or analytic sense. The



pervaded and pervader can be related by *vyāpti* even if the meaning or the existence of the object denoted by one is not grounded in the other.

The notion of *vyāpti* is also different from the notion of material implication or entailment. The notion of material implication is a truth functional notion. It does not involve in it the notion of necessity. It merely expresses relation between the truth values of two statements without their being necessarily connected. But to say this is not to say that the notion of necessity is not captured in extensional logic. In extensional logic, the notion of necessity is captured in terms of tautology. Every valid argument in extensional logic corresponds to a tautology. Tautologous statements are analytic and *a priori* statements. They are true in all possible situations by virtue of their structure or form opposed to contingent statements. Take, for example, the statement form of tautology,  $P \vee \sim P$ . This statement form is true in all its interpretations (in the system of extensional logic) because of its form or structure, not because of the actual truth value of  $P$ . Its truth can be ascertained and known on *a priori* ground, independent of experience and fact, through the mere analysis of its logical form. The form of tautology is the form of analytic statement. This is quite obvious from the following equivalent expressions:

$$P \vee \sim P = \sim P \vee P \text{ (by commutation)}$$

$$\sim P \vee P = P \supset P \text{ (by the definition of material implication)}$$

The expression  $P \supset P$  is a statement form of identity. The forms of identity statements are the forms of analytic statements. Analytic statements repeat themselves. They do not say any new thing about the world. Their truth can be ascertained just by mere analysis of the symbols contained in them on *a priori* ground. But the notion of *vyāpti* is not a truth functional notion. *Vyāpti* relation is a relation of terms, pervaded and pervader, not merely a relation of propositions. Its necessity is grounded in the reality, not in the logical or formal structure of *vyāpti* proposition. As a result, the truth of *vyāpti* proposition cannot be ascertained and known independent of reality and experience like tautologous statements. So, it would be wrong to say that inferential necessity in Nyāya is a tautologous necessity. *Vyāpti* necessity is not a tautological necessity, nor the notion of *vyāpti* is identical with the notion material implication. Nyāya logic is different from extensional (or propositional) logic. The



notion of *vyāpti* is also different from the notion of entailment. The notion of entailment in logic is formulated in various ways. Some logicians identify this notion with the notion of strict implication or logical implication or formal implication and some logicians maintain the distinction between them saying that the latter involves merely the notion of deducibility in it, while the former involves, besides the notion of deducibility, inner meaning connection. Russell uses the notion of formal implication in a quite a different way from the notion of entailment or strict implication. For him formal implication is the class of material implication, which he expresses in the form of  $(x) (\phi \supset \psi \supset x)$ . Whatever the formulation of entailment may be, there is one thing common to all its variations which, I think, is undoubtedly held that it involves in it the notion of necessity opposed to material implication and expresses an inner logical connection between the propositions it relates, a relevance of one proposition to the other. Its necessity cannot be captured by any truth functional operator. Entailment is a modal notion and modal notions are different from truth functional notions of propositional logic. It does not depend upon the truth or falsity of the propositions it relates. It depends upon their inner logical structure or form. So, to say that 'p entails q' is to say that q is logically deducible from p. The notion of deducibility involves in it the notion of analyticity in stronger sense, than the tautological necessity of extensional logic. But *vyāpti* relation is not an analytic relation (neither in strong nor in weak sense of 'analyticity'). To say that pervaded and pervader are related by *vyāpti* is not to say that the latter is a logical deduction of the former. Deducibility is different from *vyāpti*. The necessity involved in deducibility is analytic. But the necessity involved in *vyāpti* is synthetic. Syntheticity is not opposed to necessity. It is opposed to analyticity. Necessity is opposed to contingency, not analyticity. So, *Nyāya* notion of inferential necessity based on *vyāpti* is neither a necessity of extensional logic in tautological sense, nor is it a necessity of modal logic. In other words, *Nyāya* logic is neither extensional (or propositional) logic, nor is it modal logic. The *Naiyāyikas* cannot be accused of committing the fallacy of circularity or *petitio principii*. This could have been the case had *vyāpti* been an analytic relation. But since *vyāpti* relations are non-analytic, inferences in *Nyāya* cannot be said to suffer from deductive weakness.



But when we say that inferences in *Nyāya* are non-deductive in character, from this it does not follow that they are inductive inferences. *Nyāya* inferences are not inductive inferences too, because they are grounded in *vyāpti* and *vyāpti* admits of no gap between premises and conclusion of a valid argument, which is the fundamental distinctive property of all inductive inferences. Inductive inferences always admit of gap between their premises and conclusion. It is because of this reason their premises neither provide absolute (or conclusive) guarantee for the truth of their conclusion nor do they, with the negation of their conclusion, imply any contradiction or logical oddity. While in *Nyāya* the position is different. *Nyāya* inferences do not suffer from the inductive weakness. A false conclusion in *Nyāya* inference does not validly follow from its true premises because of their *vyāpti* relationship opposed to inductive inference. *Vyāpti* relations are necessary relations. As a result, premises of *Nyāya* valid argument (if true) always provide absolute guarantee (not in deductive sense) for the truth of their conclusion without containing in them implicitly or explicitly the information of conclusion. This is a fundamental distinctive mark of *Nyāya* logic in my opinion which is neither a mark of deductive nor inductive logic. Therefore, any attempt to characterize inferences in *Nyāya* as deductive or inductive would be a gross mistake.

C.D. Sharma<sup>13</sup> opines that inferences in *Nyāya* are deductive-inductive in character. However, he holds the view that the *Nyāya* syllogism does not involve inference either from the universal to the particular or from the particular to the universal. It involves inference from the particular to the particular through the universal. Consider, for example, the following argument as illustrated in *Nyāya*.

1. This hill has fire. (*pratijñā*)
2. Because it has smoke. (*hetu*)
3. Whatever has smoke has fire e.g., an oven. (*udāharaṇa*)
4. This hill has smoke which is invariably associated with fire. (*upanaya*)
5. Therefore this hill has fire. (*nigamana*)

This argument is, on his account, a deductive-inductive argument but it involves inference from the particular to the particular through the



universal, that is, *vyāpti* proposition "whatever has smoke has fire". The example illustrates the truth that the universal proposition is the result of a real induction based on the law of causation. In other words, when we perceive the specific instances of smoke as related to fire several times positively and negatively without exception, we infer thereby that whatever has smoke has fire which is, in his opinion, nothing but an inductive generalization based on the law of causality. Out of the five propositions, two are redundant. We may easily leave out either the first two or the last two which are essentially the same. The first coincides with the fifth and the second with the fourth. If we leave out either the first two or the last two, we find that it resembles the Aristotelian syllogism. But on his view, the whole argument cannot be characterized to be deductive and formal only because it also involves inductive process. The universal *vyāpti* proposition 'whatever has smoke has fire' results from the specific instances of smoke as related to fire. This line of argument is, to my mind, not only based on the misconceived notions of deductive and inductive inferences (which we have already seen) but also misunderstanding of *Nyāya*'s notions of universal (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*). According to *Nyāya*, universals and particulars are two distinct and different realities. To say this is not to say that they are unrelated and belong to two different worlds. Universals and particulars do not belong to two different worlds on their view. Universal is not a collection of particulars, nor their relation is relation of whole and parts. Universal and particular are two different categories according to them. So, to identify one with the other is to commit a mistake. Consider, for example, *vyāpti* proposition 'whatever has smoke has fire'. This proposition is a universal proposition. It expresses *vyāpti* relation between the two universals, smokeness and fireness. But it does not express *vyāpti* relation between universal and particular (i.e. smokeness and smoke or fireness and fire) even if they are related. Because universals do not include in them, according to *Nyāya*, particulars though they inhere in particulars. To say that universals inhere in particulars is not to say that they form a part of particulars. Universals do not form a part of particulars on the *Nyāya* account. They are two different and distinct entities. Since, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, universals and particulars are two distinct and different realities, smokeness and fireness cannot be said to be a mere collection of particular smokes and fires. Nor can we say that they are constructed by our mind on the basis of particulars. If it were so, the *Naiyāyikas* would



have not advocated the existence of universals as distinct and different from particulars. They would have said that universals are nothing but a collection of particulars or mental constructions. But this they do not say. They rather say that universals are distinct and different from particulars and are as real as particulars. Therefore, smokeness and fireness cannot be said to be a collection of particular smokes and fires respectively, nor can we say that they are construction of our mind. If universals, on the Nyāya account, are not a collection of particulars, nor are they construction of our mind, *vyāpti* proposition 'whatever has smoke has fire' cannot logically be obtained from the conjunction of specific instances of smoke as related to fire through inductive generalizations nor can we interpret it in terms of them. Above all, the *Nyāyaikas* never say that *vyāpti* propositions are derivable through inductive process. What they rather suggest is that through inductive process *vyāpti* can be known and discovered. And to know or to discover *vyāpti* through inductive process is not to derive it from it. It is knowable, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, through *sāmānyalakṣṇa* and the knowledge of *sāmānyalakṣṇa* is a kind of extraordinary perception. Whether the *Nyāya* theory of extraordinary perception is sustainable or not is not a subject matter of the present discussion. But what is important to note here is that their theory of *vyāpti* is no way grounded in induction. Induction rather is based on it. Therefore, it would be incorrect to say that *vyāpti* proposition 'whatever has smoke has fire' results from the specific instances of smoke as related to fire through inductive reasoning. No *vyāpti* propositions are, on the Nyāya account, inductively generalized proposition. If so, the illustrated argument of *Nyāya* cannot legitimately be characterized as deductive-inductive.

The position that *Nyāya* logic is inductive is untenable from another point of view also. To arrive at a valid inferential knowledge, according to *Nyāya*, one must have knowledge of *pakṣadharmatā* as qualified by *vyāpti* or *parāmarśa*. If so, a valid inferential knowledge of universal *vyāpti* 'whatever has smoke has fire' would be possible only when we know that the specific instances of smoke and fire are related by way of *vyāpti* or else we cannot validly derive universal *vyāpti* proposition 'whatever has smoke has fire' from the specific instances of smoke and fire. But the admission of this position would amount to accepting that universal *vyāpti* proposition results from the specific



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vyāpti propositions and inference is from one set of vyāpti propositions to another, which means vyāpti proposition 'whatever has smoke has fire' is not the result of the so-called inductive generalization even if it is known and discovered through its positive and negative specific instances or the inductive process. The ground of vyāpti lies in reality on the Nyaya view. When it is known and discovered through inductive process, it is not done by way of derivation because any valid derivation (in the Nyaya sense) always presupposes the cognition of vyāpti. It is rather done by way of the cognition of its specific vyāpti. Moreover, inductive generalization does not involve in it the notion of necessity. It involves the notion of probability. As a result, Nyaya account of vyāpti proposition cannot be identified with inductively generalized proposition since the notion of vyāpti, according to the Naiyāyikas, involves the notion of necessity which any inductively generalized proposition fails to capture. Vyāpti proposition cannot be said to be based on the law of causality because causal relation itself is a kind of vyāpti relation on the Nyaya account. All causal relations are relations of vyāpti, but not the vice versa. All vyāpti relations are not causal relations, for example, the relation of universal and particular. Smokeness and smoke are related by way of vyāpti but their relation is not a causal relation. It is rather a relation of inherence (*samavāya*). To say this is not to say that vyāpti relation is identical with relation of inherence. All relations of inherence are relations of vyāpti but all vyāpti relations are not relations of inherence, i.e., causal relation. Smoke and fire are related by way of vyāpti but one does not inhere in the other. Neither smoke is inherent in fire, nor is fire inherent in smoke.

In fact, 'vyāpti' is a generic term. It includes in its meaning all relations that invariably connect their terms of relation; no matter what they are. It is because of this reason that in Nyaya valid inference the acceptance of premises with negation of conclusion always imply logical oddity (but not in the sense of contradiction) opposed to the so-called inductive inferences.

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## INTENTION IN WITTGENSTEIN

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Wittgenstein's thesis on intention is unique and has far-reaching consequences. Notably, his discussion on interpretation has a bearing on behaviourism of all forms on the one hand, and phenomenology and allied subjects on the other. Wittgenstein avoids both the extremes of holding human reality to be mechanical and predictable on the one hand and elusive human subjectivity on the other. However, he does not fail to recognize the merits in behaviourism and phenomenology which he skilfully incorporates into his own theory of action. The component of objectivity and the inter-subjectivity which is there in behaviourism is incorporated in the notion of 'rule-following' and the intentionality of phenomenology in the arbitrariness of the rules. Moreover, Wittgenstein ingeniously brings these two components, i.e., 'rule-following' and 'arbitrariness of rules' together in *human action*. By speaking of rule-following and arbitrariness of rules within the frame-work of a 'forms of life', Wittgenstein has brought behaviourism and phenomenology together. He does not permit speaking of *intentions* in isolation divorcing them from human action and behaviour in real situations.

The forms of behaviourism is negated for the main reason that it is meaningless to speak of behaviour without the component of what one often called 'intention'. In this sense behaviour without intention is mechanical and therefore not human. One has fundamentally failed to make the distinction between event and an action in this model. In contrast, the thesis of intentionality of phenomenology on the other hand, though is not outrightly wrong, misrepresents human intention in abstraction. It treats, among other things, interpretation as an integral part of the language use, not in the manner in which subjective and idiosyncratic factors are made to come into play in the hermeneutics, but in the manner in which one speaks of rules and their interpretations in logic.

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Of all the things that bind human beings with one another, what is noteworthy in Wittgenstein is the roles assigned to rules which bring human beings together on an inter-subjective platform of convention. The rules based on convention are the ones that bridge the gap between an individual and another upon which the whole linguistic activity using concepts and rules rests. This element of convention in language, though looks insignificant, plays the pivotal role of establishing the link between a human being and another making the community living a reality on the one hand, and language and reality on the other by putting to rest all philosophical deliberations on the nature of the relationship between language and reality.

Philosophers have often failed to keep speech about intention and 'intention' separate. These two should not be identified with one another for the reason that there can be wide gap between the two. One cannot rely much on the speech about one's intention, whereas, an action is a sure measure of intention. Intention that is represented in language need not be the same as the one which is there in action. If the speaker has difficulties of knowing his own intentions present or past, then the situation is more complicated. Even in such a situation speaking of one's intention would be possible by attributing certain intentions afresh on the basis of certain circumstantial evidences. However, such an attribution of intention subsequent to an action would be a mere speculation having no philosophical basis. There is not a single way one could ensure that the intention that one has expressed in language is the same as the one which was there in action. Wittgenstein does not deny the possibility that one could speak about one's intention; but he questions the authenticity of such a claim. He finds faults with the grounds on which one claims to have known one's intentions.

## 2. PROCESSES AND STATES OF MIND

One of the basic confusions, which perhaps is deep rooted in our language, is the unclarity that we have about a *mental process* and a *mental state*. If one scrupulously maintains this distinction without being misled by the superficial similarity in the structure of words, half of our battle against philosophical confusions is already won. We tend to think that we have a clear idea about mental processes on the analogy of physical processes and the mental state on the analogy of physical states. This analogy of physical and mental fails totally.



Apart from thinking, experience of pain, hearing of sound etc. are processes according to Wittgenstein. We say that pain is growing more or less; we speak of sound increasing or decreasing and so on.<sup>1</sup> Processes, are placed between two points in time, they have beginning and end. In response to the questions "When did it begin?" or "When did it end?" one could answer these questions without having any sense of oddity. For instance, with reference to certain pain one could ask the question when did it begin. But with reference to mental states, one cannot respond to these questions without certain oddity. For instance, "When did you start believing that you could lift the box?" is an odd question. The proper question would be "Do you believe that you could lift the box?"

Some words which seem to suggest mental processes, do not, in fact, refer to processes at all. For example, "having an opinion", "believing", "expecting", "hoping" etc. seem to suggest some processes, but they are not genuinely referring to processes.<sup>2</sup> Believing, expecting, hoping etc. do not begin at a particular point in time and end at another point in time though as mental states they come into being and may be that they fade away. It is quite possible that I believe that I have the ability to lift it. Surely, my attempt to lift the object was an action, and since it was an action it must have taken place at a particular point in time. But my belief, perhaps, began when I first thought of lifting the object and continued till I actually made an attempt. And this duration could be anything from a few seconds to some days. Similarly, one could say that one expected thunder showers when dark clouds were noticed. But when the clouds moved away, no more one expected rain. Obviously, there was an interval between when one expected rain and one has stopped expecting it.

Certain statements about our mental states tempt us to believe that mental states have temporal dimension. With reference to certain ability and knowledge we remark sometimes by saying "Now I know!", "Now I can do it!" and "Now I understand!". The word "know" is closely related to the word "can", "is able to" etc., and to the mental states such as "understand".<sup>3</sup> We should be careful, remarks Wittgenstein, and should not confuse both disposition and mental states to be something in time. Suppose one wants to remember a tune and it escapes somehow. Suddenly one gets it and says "Now I know it" and the person sings it. One has not remembered the tune part by part to consider



remembering as a process. When remembered, the tune was there in the form of a mental state. Similarly, the ability, the knowledge how to play chess has no temporal structure. Language misleads us into thinking that knowledge has duration like a toothache or a melody.<sup>4</sup>

Take a critical example where both processes and mental states are related. "Understanding" and the process of arriving at a certain formula can be cited here. For example, the process by which two pupils arrive at the series 1, 5 11, 19, 29 could be different and their understanding be the same. One might hit upon the formula  $a_n = n^2 + n - 1$  and another might hit upon the series of difference 4, 6, 8, 10. When one claims that one has understood the series, one does not claim just that the formula has occurred to him, but something more. One could say that understanding is the same though the process, accompaniments are different in the case of two pupils in question.

Wittgenstein suggests to conduct the following experiment. Interrupt a man in quite unpremeditated and fluent talk. Then ask him what he was going to say; and in many cases he will be able to continue the sentence he had begun.<sup>5</sup> This is possible because, knowledge is a mental state and not a process. If our habit is to treat mental states to be processes, then it is puzzling to explain the ability of a person to complete the sentence even after interruption.

Mental states do not have the dimension of past and future is clear from the following example. Wittgenstein remarks that we say a dog is afraid that his master will beat him. But we do not say that the dog is afraid his master will beat him tomorrow.<sup>6</sup> This is because, we take 'being afraid' to be a mental state and tomorrow to be a temporal concept. This being so, a mental state cannot be linked with a time dimension since mental state is not in time; it does not have past or future. Therefore, a certain combination of words describing mental states with the temporal attributes would not be possible. For example, expectation being a mental state and perception being a mental process it is not possible to combine them as subject and predicate. One cannot claim to perceive an expectation, though one can perceive the expression of an expectation. It would be quite odd to say that one perceives one's expectation, rather than to say that one expects certain things.<sup>7</sup>



Remarking on processes and states of mind, Wittgenstein says that we talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. We think that sometime in future we shall know more about them. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For, we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. When we deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium, it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them.<sup>8</sup>

### 3. THE NATURE OF INTENTION

Wittgenstein holds the view that intention is not an experience. It is neither an emotion, nor a mood, nor yet a sensation or image says he. It is not a state of consciousness. It does not have genuine duration.<sup>9</sup> He is of the opinion that having an intention is not to have any experience. Since intention does not have genuine duration, it cannot be an experience; and since it is not an experience, it cannot be stored in memory in order to recall it at a later date.

There is a tendency in philosophers to consider intention to be an inner experience, which can be known through introspection. But Wittgenstein believes that this is a mistake. Introspection is calling up of memories; of imagined possible situations and of the feelings.<sup>10</sup> If intention is not an experience having genuine duration, it is not possible to even introspect. It is not available to introspection because introspection is largely retrospection and intention cannot be stored in memory. For example, Wittgenstein holds that when someone says "I had the intention of..." one does not express the memory of an experience.<sup>11</sup> He claims that the 'inner experience' of intending vanishes in the situation where we try to remember our intentions of past actions. Consider the sentence; "For a moment I meant to...". When we introspect, what we find is not an intention; instead, one remembers thoughts, feelings, movements, and also connexions with earlier situations.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, Wittgenstein firmly believes that intention is something about which one cannot speak in the past tense.

Intention is not a mental state either. Several people could carry out something without any one of them having the intention. For example, a government may have an intention which no particular man has.<sup>13</sup> "This appliance is a brake, but it doesn't work"? That means, the brake



does not fulfil its purpose. But whose intention was it that it should work as a brake? This question is not appropriate in this context. Here one must speak of impersonal intentions which are not mental states. One is habituated to look at a thing as a symbol says Wittgenstein. For example, we see the intention behind making the machine and attribute that intention to the machine by claiming that the machine ought to work in such and such a manner.<sup>14</sup> We say that a broken clock is a clock. A brake which does not work also a brake. But these are not mental states of anyone.

Intention is neither an experience nor a state of mind. What is it then? Let us consider "willing" as an example. "Willing" is not the name of an action according to Wittgenstein, and, therefore, is not the name of any voluntary action as well. I can bring about the act of willing to swim by jumping into the water. But I can't will willing. But if "willing" is considered to be an action, then it is identical with speaking, writing, lifting, imagining something. But it is also trying, attempting, making an effort to speak, to write, to lift, to imagine a thing. Therefore, there is no "willing" as a separate thing other than what we do.<sup>15</sup>

Wittgenstein notes that it is not possible to have a verb to formulate an intention in words; there cannot be a verb to ask someone to act according to an intention; and there cannot be a verb to ask someone to think about one's intention.<sup>16</sup> This is so because, the relationship between intention and the action are internal. There is no scope for any arbitrary relation between intention and action. Moreover, internal relationship is possible if and only when both the things related are simultaneously present.<sup>17</sup> Perhaps this is the reason why Wittgenstein maintains that describing an intention means describing what went on from a particular point of view, with a particular purpose.<sup>18</sup>

Suppose at the end of a quarrel I say "All right! Then I leave tomorrow!"; I make a decision. But "I am revising that decision to go away to-morrow." only describes a state of mind.<sup>19</sup> Revising a decision is not a process, it does not have a point in time when it begins and another point in time when it ends, but is another mental state. Being a mental state, one might think that it gets isolated from action, but such a separation is not possible. This is because, if an action does not naturally follow after a decision, even revising the decision is not going to be of any significance. This is because if actions do not naturally follow from



our decisions, then the actions of revised decisions are also not going to follow automatically. We would require a faculty to induce actions after taking decisions. And if we assume that there is such a faculty to execute our decisions, one needs to work out the relationship between the faculty that takes the decision and the faculty that executes the decision. However, it is unnecessary to imagine such faculties, one for making decisions and another for converting decisions into actions. This would be unnecessarily complicating the matter. It is better to acknowledge the internal relationship that exist between a decision and the action. It is an unnecessary exercise to argue first that there is a gap and then fill this gap by invoking two separate faculties one for making the decision and another for executing the decision.

The following remark of Wittgenstein emphasizes the fact that intention is something that is in the present and is something that is inseparably linked to action: I open the drawer and rummage around in it; at last I come to and ask myself "Why am I rummaging in this drawer"? And then the answer comes, "I want to look at the photograph of...". "I want to", not "I wanted to". Opening the drawer, etc. happened so to speak automatically and got interpreted *subsequently*.<sup>20</sup>

Expression of the intention can't contain the intention. This is because language cannot explain itself. Since language itself is based on human intention, language cannot contain human intention.<sup>21</sup> This is the reason why one cannot have a verb containing the intention in language. Since intention and action are inseparably related, and since actions are in time, it is possible to ask the question about the beginning and the end of having certain intention. Wittgenstein remarks: but if you say you intended to play chess, you can say when you started and ceased.<sup>22</sup> However, the time lag between intention and action is not counted at all. Intention taken singly does not have any genuine duration. Hence the remark: "I have the intention of going away tomorrow." - When have you that intention? The whole time; or intermittently?<sup>23</sup>

How is confession of intention possible if intention is not there already before the action? What is important to realize is that confession is something like 'knowing how' not 'knowing that'. It is something performed, an action and therefore the question of intention being there earlier to the act of confession need not arise. If one says, I want to confess, it is a mental state, as any desire is a mental state. The problem would



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arise if we treat intention to be something similar to physical object and on the analogy of physical object ask the question "How is confession possible if intention is not there prior to the action?" The one who knows how to confess, confesses and there ends the matter.<sup>24</sup>

#### 4. INTENTION AND MENTAL STATE

It is possible to have mental states of various kinds without having any link with the world in the form of action. But intention is inseparably linked to action. Wittgenstein has painstakingly reserved the term "intention" to be used only in the context of an action. He would not like to speak of intention in a wide variety of ways the way we normally do. Generally, decisions, wants, dispositions, knowledge, belief etc. are all taken to be intentions. But Wittgenstein who wants to retain the fine distinction between intention and these mental states, does not permit such use of terms. Mental states are not automatically linked to physical world. What converts our decisions which are mental states to actions is the intention, but intention is not distinct and separate from action. One speaks of intention only in the context of action and intention and action are internally related. It is only in the context of action that one has to understand intention and not in the context of mental state which, of course, can exist without the other, i.e. action. An action cannot be conceived without intention, whereas a mental state can be conceived without action.

Why is it that we do not find any example of the kind where someone has learnt the expression "I was just on the point of" or "I was just going to..." and could not learn the use of these expressions? This is certainly not because that a person cannot learn this expression without learning to know content of our intention in the form of a thought. Wittgenstein indicates indirectly that it is not a sheer historical accident that we have never found such an individual. This fact indicates something basic about the very nature of the expression of this type. The expression "I was just on the point of" is only a preparatory; it is a part of knowing how which cannot be learnt without knowing to act in a particular way expressing one's intention in a concrete situation.

Wittgenstein clarifies how certain ambiguity of intention should not arise at all. If I have two friends with the same name and am writing one of them a letter, what does the fact that I am not writing it to the other



consist in? It may not consist in the content because it might fit either. To whom one has written the letter depends on how one has used this letter. It is only the application that is going to indicate the intention behind it.<sup>245</sup>

Wittgenstein wants to make the distinction between action and an event. Any explanation of how my arm went up in terms of physiological causes would not give us a satisfactory account of the human action of raising the arm. Action, for Wittgenstein, is human, and is invariably accompanied by human intention which is there from the very beginning till the end, since actions and intentions are internally related. Thus, we have on the one extreme of scale, a physical event, in the middle human action with intention and the other extreme the mental states of believing, knowing, willing and so on.

## 5. INTENTION AND RULE-FOLLOWING

Intention is very much linked with our idea of the rule-following. It is not from the habit that one follows a rule, it is not the repetition that would help us, nor our practice in that sense. Even if we follow rules almost in a mechanical manner, what is important to note is that rules are always followed in the *present* abiding the conventions. Rule-following is therefore an act with intention to abide by conventions.

Consider the long discussion by Wittgenstein on rule-following. What is it to be guided by a rule? Wittgenstein gives an example of playing in a field both the eyes being bandaged. Someone leads you by the hand, sometimes left, and sometimes right. One has to be constantly ready for the tug of his hand, and must take care that one does not stumble when there is an unexpected tug. Another situation one can imagine is that of someone leading you by force where you are unwilling to go. Yet another situation where you are guided could be by your partner in a dance. And still another situation where you are guided by someone else is that of your taking a walk with someone while conversing and you go wherever he does. Or you walk along a field-track simply following it.<sup>26</sup> All these situations are similar to one another, yet the experience of each one would be quite different. If one says that being guided is surely an experience, then one is thinking of a particular experience of being



guided and not what is common to all the above situations.<sup>27</sup> And all the above situations are situations where one is 'guided' by someone else.

Our feelings have no relation to our use of language. We formulate rules and use the words in accordance with rules. Rule-following does not have any reference to individual feelings. Wittgenstein provides an example to explain a certain phenomenon where one is in a position to follow a rule and say "now I can go on". In all the various situations which are described in *PI 151*, one is in a position to follow the rule, yet the individual experiences do not figure anywhere in the account of rule-following. He gives the following example : A writes series of numbers down; B watches him and tries to find a law for the sequence of numbers. If he succeeds he exclaims: "Now I can go on!" - So this capacity, this understanding, is something that makes its appearance in a moment. A has written down the numbers 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; at this point B says he knows how to go on. What happened here? Various things may have happened; for example, while A was slowly putting one number after another, B was occupied with trying various algebraic formulae on the numbers which had been written down. After A had written the number 19 B tried the formula  $a_n = n^2 + n - 1$ ; and the next number confirmed his hypothesis.

Or again, B does not think of formulae. He watches A writing his numbers down with a certain feeling of tension, and all sorts of vague thoughts go through his head. Finally he asks himself: "What is the series of differences?" He finds the series 4, 6, 8, 10 and says: Now I can go on

Or he watches and says "Yes, I know that series and continues it, just as he would have done if A had written down the series 1, 3, 5, 7, 9.- Or he says nothing at all and simply continues the series. Perhaps he had what may be called the sensation "that's easy!"

But the expression "Now I know how to go on" does not refer to any experience. If that were the case, the experience in following different formulae the experience would have been different. The word "Now I know how to go on" were correctly used when he thought of the formula: that is, given such circumstances as that he had learnt algebra had used such formulae before.<sup>28</sup>



Wittgenstein remarks that one need not do the same thing every time when one follows a rule. There seems to be a certain tendency on the part of philosophers to seek perfect similarity in the account of rule following. Wittgenstein asks: If from one day to the next you promise: "To-morrow I will come and see you" are you saying the same thing everyday, or every day something different?<sup>29</sup> He gives another example and asks the same question: suppose someone gets the series of numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, .... by working out the series  $2x + 1$ . And now he asks himself: "But am I always doing the same thing, or something different every time?"

Obedying a rule does not mean doing the same thing again and again. People tend to think that this should be so. Note what Wittgenstein remarks in *PI* 227: Would it make sense to say "If he did something different every day we should not say he was obeying a rule"? That makes no sense.

If one insists on doing the same thing again and again in following a rule, one cannot even use words in our imaginations and negative sentences. Wittgenstein remarks: The red that we imagine is the same red which we perceive. If that were not the case then in saying "Here is a red patch" and "Here there isn't a red patch" one cannot be saying the same thing by the word 'red'.<sup>30</sup> Language does not operate at the subjective level. What is necessary in language is to be able to recognize the presence as well as the absence of a certain colour when we perceive.<sup>31</sup> It would be odd to say that a process looks different when it happens from when it doesn't happen. This is because language abstracts from this level of difference. This subjective level of difference is not counted at the level of language.<sup>32</sup> In rule-following, the subjective variations are transcended.

The above suggestion seems to be self-contradictory. If one does not do the same thing in following a rule, how is it that we consider different acts in different situations to be following the same rule? Wittgenstein would not deny this at all. He would in fact consider this to be definitional. "All red objects ought to be red" is a grammatical point. And by offering the definition, one has offered the rule. Rule is not the same as its application. For example, Wittgenstein considers the statement "He has the same pain as I" as grammatical. It does not explain



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anything. He remarks further: if it were not the same, one would not have called it a pain at all.

What is noteworthy is that the individual variations due to sensation, feeling and other indiosyncratic factors never enter rule-following. Therefore, one could conclude that language transcends subjective level and operates at the inter-subjective plane.

## 6. INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE INTENTION

One needs to make a distinction between individual intentions and institutionalized intentions. This is required because one does not speak of individual intentions always, and the institutionalized intentions are given much importance. Our social organizations seem to work on the principle of collective intention, intention of no one in particular yet there seems to be a conscious pursuit of a certain kind. Language itself is a social institution and the intention that can be expressed in language must belong to this institutionalized way of expressing intention. Individual intentions figure only at the level of changing the existing conventions and norms. It is possible that an individual wants to deviate from the existing norms of using certain words, or wants to introduce new words to organize his thoughts differently, or express himself differently. For this, an individual might choose to introduce a new word either by ostensibly defining a word or by providing a verbal definition. But if this individual method becomes the institutional way of doing things, then each one of us would be able to adopt to the new situation. The critical question is: How does one know the intention of the other person especially when the rule is newly invoked for the first time?

Perhaps, we can get a hint from Wittgenstein from the following example on this issue. While speaking of copying Wittgenstein says: The method of projection must be contained in the process of projecting. The total result-i.e. the copy plus the *intention*-is the equivalent of the original. The actual result-the mere visible copy-does not represent the whole process of copying; we must include the intention. The *process* contains the rule, the result is not enough to describe the process.<sup>33</sup>

Note that it is not possible to simply say that I intend without adding the preposition 'to'. It is always appropriate to ask the question: "What do you intend to do?" whenever one says "I intend to...". This



is the reason we are not in a position to have a verb to describe our intention in language. Since intention and action are internally related, it is not possible to have one without the other. Therefore, there is no gap between intending and acting on the one hand, and action if performed would exhibit the intention. Intention is obvious to one who observes the action, and action should be moderated by intention.

## 7. RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS

In the light of the above discussion, what becomes pertinent is the question of interpretation. This problem of interpretation is considered to be double edged. The question that is immediately relevant is whether one interprets the rule every time one follows a rule, and whether one interpretation is necessary when one understands someone else's rule-following. Hermeneutics and its allied schools believe that every understanding involves interpretation. Wittgenstein seems to hold the opposite view, namely, understanding emerges only when one stops interpreting. Interpretation is a mental process, and understanding is a mental state for Wittgenstein. This being so, he would not like to identify one with the other. Interpretation is a process like thinking, but understanding is knowledge, a mental state.

A mental process can never be the intention itself he opines. For we could always have intended the opposite by reinterpreting the process of projection. It is easy to imagine a case in which, say to deceive someone, we might make an arrangement that an order should be carried out in the sense opposite to its normal one. The symbol which adds the interpretation to our original arrow could, for instance, be another arrow. Whenever we interpret a symbol in one way or another, the interpretation is a new symbol added to the old one.<sup>34</sup>

It is not possible to understand something when the act of interpreting continues and the level at which it should be taken is not clear. Understanding comes only when the process of interpretation stops. Interpretation is required only when there is some ambiguity; something is not understood straight. A decision is required to avoid this state of ambiguity or unintelligibility by supplying a rule of interpretation. When looked at this situation again, the new rule would help us to put intention and action together from a particular frame of reference.



But this is not a situation where understanding emerges if interpretation is to be forced on the context by invoking a rule for interpretation. Understanding would be there if and only if the rules that govern the behaviour of the person, and the behaviour are considered together. If the behaviour of the person does not fit any rule of behaviour, then there cannot be any understanding according to Wittgenstein. For example, a person raises his hand and a taxi stops and the stranger gets into the taxi and the taxi vanishes after a while. Understanding the intention and the action of the stranger by any observer would be the same here. Given the conventional rules, a taxi would stop if request by raising one's hand is made. And the convention is that one should raise one's hand for a taxi if and only if one wants to hire it. Given these conventions, the behaviour of the stranger is the indicative of his intention, namely that he wanted to hire a taxi which he did by raising his hand. Suppose the stranger were a criminal whose activities were being studied by a batch of secret police and they observed exactly the same what we narrated. Instead of understanding the way an onlooker did, every police person understands the intention of the stranger and his act of signalling differently. The taxi driver being a friend of the stranger senses certain danger and takes him away to some unknown destination in an attempt to save the criminal from the police. There is no ambiguity even in this understanding and no new rule for interpretation need be invoked. Given the behaviours of criminals and the conventions they adopt for their communication and the information that the members of this team had, they understood the intention of the taxi driver differently than the way an onlooker had done it. But there is no ambiguity here as well. Two different persons having different set of informations or theories perceive the intention and the behaviour of a person differently. In both the accounts the intention and the corresponding actions are internally related and there is no need to interpret anything by invoking a new rule for interpretation.

Let us put it in this way: "Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning mustn't be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation." If you do so, e.g., by saying that the meaning is the arrow which you imagine as opposed to any which you may draw or produce in any other way, you thereby say that you will call no further arrow an interpretation of the one which you have imagined. To say in this case that every arrow can still be interpreted would only mean that I could always make a different model of saying and meaning which had one more level than the one I am using.<sup>35</sup>



What is important to note here is that we understand only when we stop interpreting and stop invoking new rules for interpretation. Application of a rule is not interpretation according to Wittgenstein. A rule applies to its objects necessarily. The relationship between a rule and its application is natural, internal and necessary. Rules are arbitrary, purposeful, but once a rule is invoked, commitment to the rule is unavoidable and its application follows necessarily. Given this position of Wittgenstein, he would not naturally consider the cases of application to be so central to his inquiry. If there are cases of ambiguity of a certain kind, say the problem of deciding whether to call someone a bald person or not, whether to classify a plant as bush or tree, what is required is taking certain decision. And it is humanly impossible to solve all problems of this kind since there will always be borderline cases. But there is no ambiguity even here requiring interpretation, but only decision to invoke new rules or not.

Rule-following requires rule, either conventionally given or newly invoked. If the behaviour is not according to any rule and if the observer invokes a rule to interpret the behaviour, it would be the case of understanding for certain philosophers, but not for Wittgenstein. The situation where new rule is required to interpret the behaviour of the other person, is the situation where the person in question is not even aware of the rule. Therefore, the question of the person acting in accordance with this later invoked rule does not arise.

Given this position of Wittgenstein, there is no scope for ambiguity in rule-following in the case of an agent and understanding the behaviour of the agent on the part of an observer. Since he maintains that application of a rule is internal to the rule, there cannot be any process between the rule and its application. Therefore, interpretation cannot be a process or a stage between a rule and its application. He believes that understanding is something that happens naturally. But invoking a rule is an activity for Wittgenstein and whenever interpretation is inevitable an unfamiliar rule is necessarily involved.

One should remember that there is no finality to any interpretation. If one interpretation can fit the situation, another can as well fit the same situation. This is the basic scepticism of Wittgenstein about the interpretative method elaborated by Kripke.<sup>36</sup> The basic argument of rule-scepticism is that given certain behaviour of individuals, the same



behaviour seems to satisfy many rules and thereby making the process of identifying the rule that is being followed impossible for an observer. Wittgenstein rejects rule-scepticism as well as the hermeneutic position which cashes on the arbitrary relation that can be attributed to such interpretations. Recognizing the possibility of formulating unlimited number of rules for interpreting a situation, Wittgenstein rejects such interpretations as having any significance in language. Language, for Wittgenstein, consists of rules which assist one to interpret a situation or action provided the behaviour on the part of the other individual is rule-governed. This obviously lays a condition for understanding which is overlooked by hermeneutics as a discipline. The condition that should be met prior to any understanding is the recognition of a collectively accepted rule which guides both the behaviour and the interpretation of it. In the absence of a rule, if an observer assigns some meaning to the behaviour of an individual by invoking an imaginary rule, that is not acceptable to Wittgenstein. He believes that an essence of a rule is that it has an infinite application and there is no rule which has one application in only one occasion.

We should guard ourselves from mistaking this situation of invoking one-time rule for interpreting a situation and forgetting all about it later from the situation where one starts a convention by arbitrarily defining a word. The latter situation where one arbitrarily defines a word has to meet the following condition which the one-time rule does not: [1] a commitment to adhere to the definition and systematic use of the word in future, [2] the rule when invoked should be treated as a grammatical rule and its application later. These being the requirements, a one-time rule invoked on the spot by an observer to interpret certain behaviour is not a rule, and the interpretation is not a genuine one according to Wittgenstein. Any interpretation if it can be re-interpreted, and further interpreted is not a valuable interpretation because it would have no application in life.<sup>37</sup> If a word can be interpreted in all possible manners, one could hardly communicate anything using such a word. The word loses its significance as a symbol, and the distinction between one word and another cannot be maintained. However, Wittgenstein does not deny the possibility of assigning personal significance to a one-time behaviour of a person or a word, but such things do not enter language which is public.



## 8. INTENTION AND PAST ACTION

In the hermeneutic accounts, intention is something that is added by the observer onto an experience, behaviour, a symbol or a statement as a discrete component to complete the picture. Therefore, it is possible to supply this missing component of intention separately to our past acts as well. Wittgenstein's basic criticism of this position is that one cannot simply supply this missing component of intention in our account of past actions. He does not deny that often we attribute certain intentions to our past behaviour as is often done, but denies the legitimacy of such a claim.

Speaking on the issue of knowing past intentions, Wittgenstein says that one could never speak of past intentions. This is because, in speaking of past intentions, one always interprets from what is there in one's memory. For example, one may remember one's feeling, one's associated thoughts or behaviour. These thoughts and feelings, can be interpreted in various ways. It is nothing but reconstructing our past on the basis of what we remember. In this reconstruction, we supply now what is lacking in our picture of the past. Since intention is not something that is temporal in nature, one cannot say one is expecting someone all the time, or one intends to go tomorrow all the time, this information would not be found in the form of memory at all.<sup>38</sup> Intention is not something that is experienced, and therefore there is no possibility of our finding our intentions from memory. This being so, we attribute certain intentions to our past actions on the present assessment of our past actions, and therefore, even if we attribute some intentions to our past actions, one cannot contradict that because there would be no basis on which one could contradict such a claim. Therefore, Wittgenstein writes: if someone asks me whether I have doubts about my past intentions, I have no ground to doubt it, but I have no ground to believe it either.<sup>39</sup>

Wittgenstein provides another example of our interpreting what our intentions were from what we think of our past at present. I tell someone that I walked a certain route, going by a map which I had prepared beforehand. Then I show him the map, and it consists of lines on a piece of paper; but I cannot explain how these lines are the map of my movements, I cannot tell him any rule for interpreting the map. Yet I did follow the drawing with all the characteristic tokens of reading a map. In this example, even if I claim that I read my intentions from my



behaviour it would not be different than saying this: I am now inclined to say "I read the intention of acting thus in certain states of mind which I remember."<sup>40</sup>

Let us make the argument more explicit. [1] If one could speak of past intentions, then one has to suspend one's present intentions. That is to say, one has to speak of intentionless state of mind and have the past intentions which is a contradiction in some sense. Or, one has to treat one's present intention to be that of remembering one's past intentions. If this is done, one's present and past intentions are one and the same and thus, one has lost all the advantages of speaking about past intentions. [2] Sometimes one says: I alone know what I wanted.<sup>41</sup> We say in explaining the meaning of the word 'intention' that "Only you can know if you had that intention". And here the import of the statement is that the term 'know' means that the attribution of uncertainty is senseless. This is the way we use the word 'intention'.<sup>42</sup>

What is worth noting in the above examples is that our speaking of our past intentions makes no progress. This is because in addition to what is stated above, Wittgenstein considers that the most explicit expression of our intention, i.e., verbally stating our intention, by itself insufficient evidence of intention. That is to say that if someone says he wanted to do good to you, does not mean that he wanted really to do good until he has done it. This is not because that there were some time lag and the person could have changed his mind, but because the person himself would not have had the intention till he acted.<sup>43</sup> We say sometimes that there were connexions between the present thought and our past thoughts on a certain matter. According to Wittgenstein such connexions between the present thoughts and the past thoughts are found out only later. Therefore, it is a new construction of what one's past was, but not an indicator of what the past was.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, Wittgenstein firmly believes that intention is something about which one cannot speak in the past tense. This is because, intention is always in the present. Given this thesis of Wittgenstein, what follows is that our past intentions cannot be captured in language even by most explicit statements.<sup>45</sup> Whatever one tries, that would only indicate what one wants to express presently about one's past personal history as viewed by the person in question from the perspective of the present. That is to say, one cannot have any past perspective, the perspective is always tied down to the present and one could speak about the past only from the present perspective.



Imagine the following situation. Someone was about to say something, and he was interrupted. And after a while the person spoke. Here, Wittgenstein believes that there cannot be any difference between what the person wanted to say and what he said. Till he said it, it would be wrong to conclude that he wanted to say a particular thing. There cannot be any certainty with which one could say that he knew what he was going to say before he said it.<sup>46</sup> Wittgenstein believes that it is pointless to say that I know exactly what I was going to say. Since I did not say it, it makes hardly any difference. I don't read my intentions from the processes which happened at that time.<sup>47</sup>

The main reason why Wittgenstein believes that one cannot speak of intentions with reference to our past actions is that nothing can contradict our claim about our past intentions, since many interpretations could fit the same behaviour. If nothing can contradict, it is senseless to say what is said is the truth.

Why should it be the case that anything that is said significantly should be contradictable? The reason seems to be the following: If nothing could contradict a statement, it could only be a statement which is true by definition which Wittgenstein calls a grammatical statement. A grammatical statement is a statement of a general type which contains a rule for the use of a word based on convention, and anything based on convention cannot be contradicted. A grammatical statement which is true by definition, therefore, cannot be a factual statement. If it is a matter of definition that we know what our past intentions were, then this statement cannot be contradicted. But it is possible that this statement has no application or use. If by definition we say that we know what our past intentions were, then that would not be a factual statement about our past at all. Therefore, there is not much point in claiming that we know our past intentions as a matter of fact.

Wittgenstein is unhappy with the interpretative model. He believes that the component of intention cannot be added to a portrait. To think that intention is an element which has to be added to what we do is misleading because, it is always possible to add a different intention to the same thing. This is what the paradox of rule following which Wittgenstein discusses in the *Philosophical Investigations* which Kripke takes up for elaborate discussion in his book *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Kripke imagines the model to be of the above kind



where the intention is to be attributed to the act of rule-following subsequently. The sceptical problem is this. Wittgenstein asks: how is it that we know that some one is following one rule rather than the other? Wittgenstein thinks that if one could attribute an intention to an act in this manner by interpreting the behaviour in one particular manner, there is always another equally plausible interpretation of the behaviour.<sup>38</sup> He believes that interpretative model of accounting for intentionality inevitably leads to scepticism of rule-following.

One might wonder why Wittgenstein maintains that one cannot know the past intentions having maintained that use determines meaning of a word. He agrees that we use the term 'intention' in a particular manner where we claim that we had certain intentions in the past and deny that very possibility of knowing our past intentions. Going by his general theory, one is tempted to say, if everyone uses the term 'intention' with reference to their respective past, then there must be a sense in which they are using the term. One begins to become sceptical about Wittgenstein's theory. One may even ask the question: Is Wittgensteinian theory falsifiable? Wittgenstein has maintained that one cannot know one's past intentions because intentions do not have any genuine duration and this being so, they are something that cannot be experienced. Suppose someone maintains that intention is something that we remember, he wants to deny even this possibility by claiming that intention is not even a mental state.

## 9. INTENTION AND FEELING

One tends to identify our intentions with that of our feelings in certain occasions. For example, one tends to distinguish between mere uttering words from uttering words with certain feelings. Promising that one would do such-and-such a thing for someone with feeling is considered to be significantly different from uttering the same words merely without the feelings. One tends to treat the former case more seriously than the latter one, because one thinks that there is a certain commitment on the part of the speaker in the former case while speaking, and this is lacking in the case of the latter.

Intention and feeling are two different things. Feeling is a mental state whereas intention is not. Knowing for example what one intends with a particular move in a game of chess does not mean knowing the



state of mind while one is making the move. In certain cases, knowing the state of mind might furnish one with very exact information about one's intention.<sup>49</sup>

Even if one does not remember past intentions, one necessarily remembers the feelings associated with certain statements uttered and actions performed. On Wittgenstein's own admission, we remember our feelings and our actions, though one cannot remember one's intention. This is no loss, one may remark, by claiming that if feeling is remembered, it is the same thing as intention. Both intention and feeling can be identified at a certain level though there are different feelings due to various reasons. It is quite natural and intuitively accurate to consider saying with feeling is different from uttering mere words without any feeling. This is true especially in the case of promises. And, one could even identify the intention of returning borrowed money in the case of a person with that of his feelings. If he feels intensely, whether he is able to keep his promise once made or not, one tends to view his situation more sympathetically than the person who lacks appropriate feeling of guilt when he fails to keep his promise. This being so, there seems to be every ground to identify intention with that of appropriate feeling.

If I know certain things about private experiences only from my own case, then I know only what I call that, not what anyone else does. But when we are considering intention, sensation etc. we are speaking of words from the public language. Therefore, Wittgenstein thinks that at least the word 'sensation' should be explained in a manner in which every one understands it.<sup>50</sup> A dumb person cannot speak to himself in the manner in which we are able to do. 'Speaking to oneself' has certain meaning in our ordinary language which cannot be applied to a person who does not speak any language.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, Wittgenstein would not have any objection if one maintains that one has experiences which are private, but would have objections if one holds the view that these private experiences are the meanings of words which are used in our ordinary language which is public.

Contrary to one's expectation, Wittgenstein holds that whether one has said something with feeling or without feeling, that should be irrelevant to the issue of intention.<sup>52</sup> This is because, he thinks that feelings cannot give us the intention. One of the reasons for holding this view, he opines, is that one feels that one has caught the right intention



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of oneself in this feeling but in fact this is quite questionable. Giving the analogy of microscope Wittgenstein opines that it is an error to think that one has rightly adjusted the microscope focussing now on the correct feeling. One did not see it before what is now in focus. One tends to say that it did not highlight the correct feeling at that time. Now we are able to do it correctly. But the obvious question now would be: "What makes me now an able person to conclude a sensation which I remembered was the intention then?"<sup>53</sup>

Consider another example where one is tempted to treat the intense feeling of hatred as intention. Wittgenstein writes: "At that moment I hated him." If I were to rehearse that moment of myself I should assume a particular expression, think of certain happenings, breathe in a particular way, arouse certain feelings in myself. I might think up a conversation, a whole scene in which that hatred flared up. And I might play this scene through with feelings approximating to those of a real occasion. If I now become ashamed of this incident, I am ashamed of the whole things: of the words, of the poisonous tone, etc.<sup>54</sup>

Wittgenstein holds that when someone says "I had the intentions of..." one does not express the memory of an experience.<sup>55</sup> He claims that the 'inner experience' of intending vanishes in the situation where we try to remember our intentions of past actions. Consider the sentence: "For a moment I meant to..." When we introspect, what we find is not an intention; instead, one remembers thoughts, feelings, movements, and also connexions with earlier situations.<sup>56</sup>

Wittgenstein does not want to undermine the fact that while one is following a rule, one might have certain feelings, certain facial expressions can be observed, yet that is not what we consider as rule-following.<sup>57</sup> When we look at our feeling etc. certain interpretation always springs from our mind. That does not mean that such an interpretation would give us the intention.<sup>58</sup>

## 10. INTENTION AND THOUGHT

Thoughts are mental states. This being so, one has a temptation to hold the view that one's intentions are stored in one's thoughts which one can recall at will. Thus it looks quite logical that one can review one's own past intentions by recollecting one's thoughts. This general philo-



sophical position which seems to have been taken for granted is problematic for Wittgenstein. It is this philosophical position which Wittgenstein wants to demolish. Let us consider his main arguments against such a general position.

The basic tendency in most of us is to identify intentions to be mental. Challenge from Wittgenstein on this position comes in two different ways: Firstly, he points out that all the situations where we feel the necessity of attributing some intension to the speakers are not the situations where one requires such an intentions. Secondly, there is no other ground for accepting intentions as mental entities.

When someone says "I was then going to say..." is like speaking from the notes. That means, the note is not the full text, it is expanded at the time of delivery. Thus the question of something that was in mind before it was said does not arise here.<sup>59</sup> The grammar of the expression "I was then going to say..." is related to that of the expression "I could then have gone on." Or this is like saying that if someone falls into water then I should have jumped after him.<sup>60</sup> It is like that one has some outline of the things, and filled the details when it was found necessary.<sup>61</sup>

Consider the following example where the question is framed in mentalistic vocabulary but the natural response is not in mentalistic vocabulary: "What is it like doing the sum in one's head?" The natural response would be something like the following: "First I add 17 and 18, then I subtract 39..." But this is not the same as doing the sum in one's head claims Wittgenstein. He adds further that this is like doing the sum in a normal way without doing it in the head.<sup>62</sup> This example is designed to show no special significance should be attached to our mentalistic vocabulary. They are used and understood in normal terms without forcing us to recognize any mentalistic processes.

Wittgenstein gives another example to elucidate the same point. If we assume that there are 'mental processes' then we would be in a difficult position to explain our normal activities. Having accepted mental processes we cannot deny that this mental process would have some constraints such as time, energy etc. Now if we are to consider one rule in mathematics or in natural language, that would require us to recognize that the rule has infinite applications. This character of rule would force on us the view that we never know the rule and its



applications fully because we have not taken infinite time to consider all the infinite cases of its applications. Wittgenstein believes that our supposition here is wrong. He opines that comprehending a rule is done at once; it is not a 'mental process' requiring some time to process the thoughts in our mind. The reason is that a process would have taken some time to be completed whereas comprehension of a formula takes no time. It occurs to one in its entirety in a moment. The same thing can be said about a tune which one suddenly gets it after struggling for a while.<sup>63</sup>

Intention cannot be considered like an object which can be named in order to make it a subject matter of our thought and analysis. If intentions can be embedded in thoughts and images etc. it would have been possible for anyone to infer with great certainty what one were going to do next after knowing the relevant thoughts of that person. But often one cannot do this. Moreover, if one were to infer one's intention on the basis of one's own thought and images, others have equal right to claim that a certain conclusion that "I was then going to do such-and-such" were uncertain.<sup>64</sup>

If language were able to describe itself, then one could have explained the intention in language, but language being intentional in character, it cannot speak about itself. Therefore, Wittgenstein holds the redundancy theory of truth. By claiming that "What I have just said is true", one does not add anything to what is asserted. If language could express about itself, then such a sentence would have added something about itself in language. No one could speak about one's intention or the intention of others in a clear manner in language. One has to look for intention in the act of speaking or in a specific context, but one cannot add the component of intention what is often called 'text'.

A 'text' is something which is always interpreted, but a thought cannot be text in this sense. This leads to the suggestion that a thought should be understood as something which requires no further interpretation and therefore itself the meaning of the text. And further this meaning is nothing but the intention, the final product that we were trying to achieve by interpreting the text. However Wittgenstein makes an admirable observation there. He writes: By "intention" I mean here what uses a sign in a thought. The intention seems to interpret, to give the final interpretation; which is not a further sign or picture, but something else, the thing that cannot be further interpreted. But what we have reached is



a psychological, not a logical terminus.<sup>65</sup> A thought cannot be used as further sign. And the impossibility that one senses here is the psychological impossibility. Therefore, there is no end to the process of interpretation, however, there is always an end to psychological process. On this ground Wittgenstein wants to keep thought and intention as distinct and separate.

## 11. INTENTION AND ACTION

Language is inseparably linked to our form of life. Without assuming that human intention to use the language, it is not possible to conceive of language at all. Wittgenstein says "If you exclude the element of intention from language, its whole function then collapses."<sup>66</sup> To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are all customs and hence can be called as institutions. Language is an institution, and to understand a sentence means to understand a language.<sup>67</sup> An institution is what it is by virtue of the rules that govern the institution. An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess. In so far as I do intend the construction of a sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak the language in question. Suppose someone asks me: "Do I know what I long for before I get it?". The answer would be obviously yes if I know how to talk.<sup>68</sup>

Every sign in itself is dead, it gains life only when we use it says Wittgenstein.<sup>69</sup> What is being emphasized here is that a sign is given some significance by using it. A ruler against an object does not say that the body is of such-and-such a length. There has to be someone to read it in a certain conventional rule governed manner. A sign is alive only when it is applied according to the rule it has. Uttering something without meaning, whatever is normally meant by the expression, is not possible. One cannot say I did not mean what the words meant, it would be absurd to say that.<sup>70</sup>

The question is whether one knows what one wants to do until one does. But such a question is nonsensical. If this is nonsensical, then one surely knows what one intends. Wittgenstein asks: What is that connexion between the act of intending and the thing intended? The



connexion is in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the day-to-day practice of playing.<sup>71</sup>

When someone cursed and meant N. it is irrelevant whether he looked at picture of N. or whether he imagined him or mentioned his name. Now the question that should not arise is: "The point is how the man who is cursing means his victim."<sup>72</sup> This is because given the conventions, the rules of the words, they would naturally refer to the person who was the victim. Nor, of course, does one ask: "Are you sure that you cursed *him*, that the connexion with him was established?" This seems to be an impossibility. The connection between language and reality is intentional in nature.<sup>73</sup> To say that the order "Do such-and-such" is executed by "doing such-and-such" is to make a grammatical statement. Thus, the connection between language and action is made by grammar in conventional terms.

Wittgenstein uses the analogy of copying something in order to explain what is intention and how it is embedded along with what we do. One cannot know the intention of a person simply by looking at the copy. The copy plus the intention in the form of following a rule would be equivalent to the original. By looking at the result alone, one cannot infer the intention of the person. The details are necessary in order to know the intention.<sup>74</sup>

Intention is present only in action, in doing things. To say that I had certain intention is to speak about oneself, the manner in which one reacts to certain things rather than speaking about intention. But it is not a mental state like disposition or that of knowledge. It is inevitably linked to action. Therefore, one can act only in the present, but nevertheless like mental modes, it seems to occupy a range, though not measurable. One could say that intention acts like a mental state from the beginning of an action to its completion from a point of view and yet does not occupy time.

To conclude we shall quote again from Wittgenstein.<sup>75</sup> Why do I want to tell him about an intention too, as well as telling him what I did? -- Not because the intention was also something which was going on at that time. But because I want to tell him something about myself, which goes beyond what happened at that time. I reveal to him something



of myself when I tell him what I was going to do.-- Not, however, on grounds of self-observation, but by way of a response.

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### NOTES

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2. PI 572-574. Also see PI 586.
3. PI 149-151.
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5. L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel* [Z] Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. Von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd Edn., 1981. p.8/38.
6. PI 550.
7. PI 453.
8. PI 308.
9. Z. p. 9/45.
10. PI 587.
11. Z. p. 9/44.
12. PI 645.
13. Z. p. 9/48.
14. See LWL p.40.
15. PI 613-615.
16. Z. p. 9/49.



17. LWL pp. 31-32.
18. Z. 23/p.4.
19. PI 588.
20. Z. 8/p. 2.
21. LWL p. 112.
22. LWL 84.
23. Z. 46/p. 9.
24. Z. 39/p. 8.
25. Z. p. 1/7; also see Z pp. 4-5/24.
26. PI 172.
27. See PI 173.
28. PI 179.
29. See PI 225 and PI 226.
30. See PI 443. Also see PI 445 and PI 446.
31. PI 448.
32. PI 446.
33. LWL pp. 36-37.
34. L. Wittgenstein. *The Blue and Brown Books* [BB], Basil Blackwell. Oxford, 1975, p. 33.
35. See BB, pp. 33-34.
36. S.A. Kripke *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Basil Blackwell. Oxford, 1982.
37. PI 198. If it is only one person follows a rule only once in life, then this is arbitrarily defining the word "to obey a rule" in a new way. But this is not the normal meaning of the expression "to obey a rule". See PI 199.
38. PI 645.
39. PI 646.
40. PI 653.



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41. *PI* 197.
42. *PI* 247.
43. *PI* 641.
44. *PI* 640.
45. See *PI* 641.
46. *PI* 633.
47. *PI* 637.
48. *LWL*, pp. 31-32.
49. *BB*, p. 147.
50. *PI* 594.
51. *PI* 594.
52. *PI* 594.
53. *PI* 646.
54. *PI* 643. Also see *PI* 644.
55. *Z*, p. 9/44.
56. *PI* 645.
57. See *PI* 173
58. *PI* 656.
59. *PI* 634. Also See *PI* 635.
60. See *PI* 143, *PI* 185-187; also see *PI* 660 and *PI* 692.
61. *PI* 635.
62. *PI* 369.
63. *PI* 184. Also see *PI* 180.
64. *Z*, 41/p. 8.
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67. *PI* 199.
68. *PI* 441.
69. *PI* 432 also see PR. p. 69/31.
70. *PI* 674-676. Also see *PI* 430.
71. *PI* 197.
72. *PI* 680
73. See *PI* 681-684. Also see *PI* 458.
74. *PI* 636. Also see I.W.L. pp. 36-37.
75. *PI* 659-660.



## SOCIAL ATMOSPHERE

### 1

Imagine the following situation. There is a discussion about whether the authorities in a state (or, for that matter, in any society) may not perform anti-social actions (meaning thereby actions which in one way or another endanger the being or character of the society of which the person who performs them is or is not a member) as much as, if indeed not more than, anybody else. We find that the atmosphere at the discussion is such, whether that discussion is taking place somewhere isolatedly or in a more general way, that people say just what they wish to say and do their best to support their contention by means of arguments. Some people go on to mention various instances of anti-social actions which the authorities in a state may have been performing. Some other people maintain that there is a sense in which those in authority can never be said to perform anti-social actions. Even the people who are rather shy or reserved for one reason or another feel encouraged to express themselves.

Now, imagine that at this discussion, where the atmosphere is that of a free or frank expression of views, encouraging even those who are rather shy or reserved to speak up, there is somehow introduced the consideration that the authorities concerned at the moment do not look with favour at their being made objects of critical comments directly or indirectly. Now, as soon as that happens, the atmosphere is more likely than not to become charged with a certain amount of tension, more or less depending upon the people affected. There is the possibility, however remote, that there are people who would go on discussing things in exactly the same old way. But there would, one supposes, be some people, who would go on saying just what they wish to say, advancing arguments in support of their contention, but who, in order to be able to go on doing all that, would have to bring into play in extra measure another element of

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their nature, the element of fearlessness. And there would, one further supposes, be some people, presumably very many more than of the preceding kind, who would either straightaway cease to express an opinion or express an opinion which can no longer be characterized as free or frank, in which a certain amount of intellectual crookedness has entered.

Now, imagine a further change in this modified atmosphere. The authorities concerned at the moment let it be known in some way that they do not look with disfavour at their being made objects of critical comments directly or indirectly. As a result, there is likely to be some lessening of tension, depending upon the amount of trust which the authorities are able to arouse in their word. In the light of the trust which at least some of the people belonging to the second category mentioned in the previous para may come to have, they would have to bring into play in a less extra measure their element of fearlessness, and consequently they would or rather they would once more be enabled to behave as their former self. Chances are that most of the people, even if not all the people, belonging to the third category mentioned in the same para would continue to play safe and thus behave in the same manner in which they did in the midst on the modified atmosphere.

## 2

Suppose there is a group of people who have met to discuss whether there should be sex education for children at a certain age. For the sake of simplicity, but not contrary to all expectations, let me say that these people can be more or less sharply divided into two camps, which we may simply call conservatives and liberals, the former maintaining that there should not be and the latter maintaining that there should be sex education for children at a certain age. Both the camps feel so strongly about their respective positions that, to ensure a result in their favour by whatever means, they do not hesitate to resort to a great deal of behind the scenes canvassing and manoeuvring before the meeting itself. There are occasions when they even become personal in their approach.

As a result of all this activity, which had been going on prior to the meeting, we find that the atmosphere at the meeting is surcharged with tension. Have the people met to discuss the above-mentioned problem, to find out, for example, whether the children should just be



permitted to bungle through such an important part of their life as sex, as seems to be happening most of the time, or whether one should take the risk of letting them make light of the instruction which they may be given in the field. Of providing them with yet one more of those occasions for amusement? Or have they met, seized of that nerveshattering tension, to make sure in every way that there would be no opposition to their point of view? As soon as there is a dissenting voice, they take steps to silence or suppress it; they will become extremely unpleasant in their dealings, even to the extent of making fun and shouting, they will try to sidetrack the issue, they will indulge in emotional outbursts and, if nothing else works, they will not hesitate to issue threats.

In the midst of this atmosphere of tension, in which the people do not do what they said was their aim to do but are led to do something different, there may emerge an odd person who is enabled to call up some courage and clarity and who consequently appeals to the people to come back to their work. Chances are that this appeal would further accentuate the tension; people's defence mechanism may come into operation in a rather aggressive way or their emotional commitments may be just too high. Or the appeal may fall on deaf ears; people may apparently listen to it and then, when it is over, just pass on. Or there may be a chance, although in a hundred, that there is a faint response to the appeal; people do not immediately decide to go back to their work, but they may not mind, say, the idea of postponing things in order to take stock of the situation. If that happens, there is already a dent made in the prevailing atmosphere of tension, with the promise of a quieter atmosphere ahead.

### 3

Terrorists, whether they belong to the official side of a state (or, for that matter, of any society) or to the opposing side, with a view to whatever they may subsequently be up to, aim at producing a certain kind of atmosphere, the atmosphere of extreme fear in which people would be led to act or refrain from acting in anticipation of some great harm.

Imagine the following situation. The authorities in a state, in order, say, to keep their crumbling personal positions intact, declare



conditions of emergency. They leave people in no doubt that anyone as much as expressing a flutter of dissent would be dealt with in the severest possible manner. They deploy army and police and all the other paramilitary forces which they may have at their disposal all over the place in order to let people see that they mean business; they even raise new battalions of toughs with a view to forcing people into submission. No news and views are allowed to be made public except those which are of a harmless nature or which are favourable to the authorities. The long arm of power reaches out for suspects, even those who are remotely so, in all sorts of incredible ways and punishes them in ways which will leave all but the hardest and the maddest completely nerveless. In order to make the atmosphere as frightening as possible, the authorities do not even hesitate to harass the innocents.

Now, imagine the following situation. There are people who are on the opposing side in a state, people who are of the view that the existing authorities are using the various resources of the state for the fulfilment of their personal ends, and who, as a consequence, have it as their aim to remove these authorities. In pursuance of this aim, they declare that all those in authority, unless they leave or mend their ways on their own right away, stand to be forcibly removed or liquidated or brought to some grievous harm; and also all those who connive with these authorities stand to suffer in equal measure. And after this, on the assumption that the people on the opposing side mean what they say, one can expect a spate of what have come to be called terrorist activities; there would be kidnappings, killings, lootings and burnings and so on. In order to make up for their meagre resources compared to those of the authorities and also to gain the psychological advantage of causing a scare among people of being caught unawares, these people may adopt guerilla tactics. In the course of time they may even be able to collect enough resources indigenously or otherwise to meet the might of the authorities more or less face to face, at least in localized combats.

Needless to say, the atmosphere of terror would be compounded so very, very much more, if both those on the official side and those on the opposing side in a state did their utmost towards producing such an atmosphere. It would be an atmosphere in which people at large would be constantly, or more or less constantly, and rather intensely apprehensive about what they should do or refrain from doing.



It has been said that the atmosphere in a social setting like home or school, as a part of the atmosphere in general, in which children grow up and are educated, makes a great contribution towards their being or personality. And, as a result, it is considered an important part of their upbringing and education that they are provided with the right kind of atmosphere.

Will they, for example, grow up in an atmosphere in which women and even men, in the midst of whom they live, constantly pry into other people's private life and affairs and weave sensational stories around them which they then go on to narrate to all and sundry with almost sensual fun? Will they, again as an example, be educated in an atmosphere in which the people who are responsible for their education show no intellectual concern for what has been going on around them, who never miss an opportunity to talk shop and who are in the forefront of every move and struggle, justified or unjustified and whatever be their character, which are aimed at serving their personal interests?

Or else: will they, for example, grow up in an atmosphere in which the people who are responsible for their upbringing, be they parents or somebody else, find time to be with them and have patience to answer their unending queries about the world which they are beginning to discover, and have joy in bringing them into contact with the objects of nature, like flowers and animals, which they are likely to be so very fond of? Will they, again as an example, be educated in an atmosphere in which the people who are responsible for their education never flag in their devotion to their work, are always upright in their thought and action and full of concern for the well-being of those for whose education they are responsible?

There, I suppose, will be no denying the fact that these different kinds of atmospheres, and likewise other kinds of atmospheres, in which the children grow up and are educated may often have some impact, sometimes a great deal and sometimes not very much, upon the being or personality of these children. But, such is human nature, there may be children who escape this influence altogether or are subject to it only minimally; and there may even be children who are given to an adverse



reaction. Even children, we find, may not manifest uniform receptivity to what is presented to them; they may even have it in them to respond to it in their own different ways.

## 5

The atmosphere of a social setting may be one of its important ingredients. It is, or consists in, the general feel, general emotive experience, which it offers of itself, as being, for example, relaxed or tense, friendly or hostile, warm or cool, exhilarating or depressing, encouraging or discouraging, spiritual or physical, academic or non-academic and so on. This general feel or emotive experience which a social setting offers of itself, it offers, it would seem, through the varied expressions of the people who are there in that setting, for example, their facial expressions, their words, their actions and even physical objects which they may appropriately use as expressing themselves, like perhaps a display of black to mark a mournful state.

One may seek to produce a certain atmosphere in a social setting, and one may try to do so for a certain purpose. Thus, for example, one may seek to produce an atmosphere of terror in a social setting, and one may try to do so with a view to forcing people to conform or submit or just lie low. One may succeed in producing the atmosphere in a social setting which one is seeking to do, or one may not succeed in doing so; or one may succeed in doing so only more or less. Likewise one may succeed in producing the effect which one is trying to produce through the production of such and such an atmosphere, or one may not succeed in doing so; or one may succeed in doing so only more or less.

How exactly does one produce an atmosphere in a social setting which one would like to produce? Thus, for example, suppose we wish to establish an institute of research into non-violent methods of action, and in view of this would like this institute itself to embody an atmosphere of non-violence. How exactly do we enable this institute to come to have this kind of atmosphere? There can be no denying the fact, I think, that what the people who are there in that institute say or think or do is of vital importance for the purpose. People there all the time, being all too willing to sit together and to try to understand and appreciate what they are saying and to try to settle their differences, if any, through a mutual exchange



of views, and to respect each other even if the differences are not settled, all this can do so very much in determining the non-violent atmosphere of the place. But besides there being some such determinant that I may call the spiritual or intellectual determinant of the desired atmosphere, there would also seem to be what I may call the physical determinant. Thus the design of the building in which the institute is located, the use of nature in the form of trees and plants and flowers and water and even animals as a part of the physical establishment of the institute and the lay out of various things do not seem to be of inconsiderable importance for the purpose. Is it not in this sense that some old places of worship, even in the absence of any actual use, are said to have an atmosphere of serenity?

## 6

What exactly do I mean by a social setting, like a body of people, large or small, discussing whether the authorities in a state may not perform anti-social actions as much as, if indeed not more than, anybody else or whether there should be sex education for children at a certain age? Let me mention one or two other examples of a social setting, namely lovers in a rather secluded place suddenly finding themselves surrounded by a band of hoodlums bent upon mischiefmaking, or a person or group of persons obstructing another person or group of persons from indulging, say, in some act of destruction.

A social setting, in the sense in which I understand that term, is, in the first place, the name of some particular or concrete situation or circumstance or state of affairs. And, in the second place, it is the name of that particular or concrete situation or circumstance or state of affairs in which two or more persons, directly or indirectly, are in some way engaged or occupied in relation to one another. One may designate a social setting as a social situation also. And one may define a situation in general, and not merely a social situation, as a concatenation of facts or events, as two or more facts or events in some way related with one another. A situation or concatenation of facts or events may be fortunate or unfortunate, dangerous or not dangerous, difficult or not difficult, having far reaching consequences or not having far reaching consequences, rewarding or not rewarding, harmless or not harmless, confidence-giving or not confidence-giving, heartening or disheartening, encouraging or discouraging and so on.



Does every social setting have an atmosphere as one of its ingredients? That is, does every situation in which two or more persons, directly or indirectly, are in some way engaged or occupied in relation to one another, offer a general feel or a general emotive experience of itself? There can be little doubt that there are some social settings which have an atmosphere which is quite unmistakable. People are engrossed in some serious discussion, and then the place acquires a remarkably solemn atmosphere. The chief of an establishment is busy harassing people working with or under him, and then the place acquires an atmosphere of torment and suffocation and sometimes even of grumbling and protest. People work together having respect for and faith in one another, and then the place acquires an atmosphere of frankness and affability. And so on. But what about the following social settings? People are travelling together in some way, and then, in order simply to while away their time, they start chatting with one another. People meet or join at a somewhat formal or ceremonial party and they move among themselves enquiring who they are and where they work and how they feel where they work, and they feast themselves and one another with what is available there. One would be hard put to saying what atmosphere, if any, these social settings have.

## 7

A social setting may have many ingredients. Essentially speaking, it has two or more persons who, directly or indirectly, are in some way engaged or occupied in relation to one another. But it may also have some other ingredients which are not essential to it but which are there, say, for the purpose of creating or accentuating an atmosphere in a social setting. Thus, for example, in order to be able to have a discussion in a relaxed atmosphere, one thinks it fit to meet in the midst of nature or in a place where one can feel oneself at ease, so that this social setting of discussion would have as its ingredients not merely human beings who have met to discuss but also the sky and the trees and the slabs of stone upon which they sit or recline. Or, in order to be able to rule in an atmosphere of fear for the ruled, one may think it fit to make oneself as secluded as possible, so that this social setting of rule through fear would have as its ingredients not only human beings who rule and who are ruled but also the various barriers which have been erected between them.

Atmosphere, when it is an ingredient of a social setting, is not like many of its other ingredients, an ingredient along with those other



ingredients. It is not like this that in a social setting there is this human being and that human being and this tree and this slab of stone and then alongside these some atmosphere. What kind of ingredient of a social setting in that case is atmosphere? I have defined atmosphere of a social setting as the general feel, the general emotive experience, which this setting offers of itself. That would mean that, in the first place, the atmosphere of a social setting is what this setting presents itself as, as a whole, and, in the second place, it is what this setting presents itself as, as a whole, in emotive terms. The atmosphere of a social setting is a kind of spiritual all-pervasive persence. As I have said before, it would seem, it manifests itself through the varied expressions of the people who are there in that setting, like their facial expressions, their words and their actions, and even through the various physical objects which may be there in that setting.

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### DISCUSSION

## DOES TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY MEET TRANSCENDENTAL GRAMMAR?

Does the 'availability of transcendental critique' (Pradhan, 1992) ala Wittgenstein suggest a full-blooded 'transcendental turn' in philosophy? Does it also provide a medicum of continuity between the early and the later Wittgenstein so as to enable us to assert that a transcendental subjectivity meets the transcendental grammar? If Dr. Pradhan (1992) wants to demonstrate that so long as the transcendental critique is available, the transcendental turn is also available, then the only course is to make Wittgenstein a Kantian, and transform the Kantian paradox of knowledge with a Wittgensteinean brush so as to make it look like a semantic Kantianism. (Hintikka 1984 : 4-5). A semantic Kantianism, on Hintikka's view, is a 'linguistic counterpart' of the above paradox, and is also a direct consequence of ineffability of semantics. Pradhan quotes it without building on this. That he deviates from the above view is shown by the way he first treats *critique* of reason (first sense) and then conflates it with the *critique* of language (second sense), and then, with a *critique* of ideology (third sense). So, he raises more questions than he could answer: he wants to show that the 'critique' (in his third sense) insulates Wittgenstein both against philosophy (early Wittgenstein) as well as against science (later Wittgenstein) whereas, the 'turn' recovers it in the form of a transcendental project of *a priori* rules (first sense) of grammar (semantics).

So, Pradhan's first mistake is to identify the transcendental critique of theoretical reason with the critique (in the second sense) of the limits of (meaningfulness of) language (or symbolism), and thenceforward to conflate it with the critique of philosophy itself (a sort of end-of-philosophy). The critique of language cannot become a critique of

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philosophy because it cannot successfully demarcate meaningfulness (sense) and meaninglessness (non-sense), and *a fortiori*, it is not scientific (Baker and Hacker, 1984). The other major interpretation in this genera is that of Hintikka (1986); as on his view, a critique of reason is not a critique of language in at least one sense in that it does not overcome the 'paradox of transcendental knowledge' (45). On the positive side, a critique of language is to be termed as a 'critique of pure language' (17) which accepts the universality of logic (language), and leads us on the consequent ineffability of semantics, according to Hintikka (1986). Now, the latter is not as much anti-foundational as the critique of philosophy is, and *a fortiori*, all the three are to be kept distinct. Not only are they distinct, but if a Rortian slant is favoured, then they are quite opposed to each other seen through Hintikka's lens. Wittgenstein maintains a distance from Husserl; nor is it clear that the Hermeneuticists are Kantians in Pradhan's 'sense' (see for example Habermas's reply to his critiques, especially to R. Bubner in *Critical Debates*). So, it would be naive to lump them all into one category.

The second mistake is to fuse the 'transcendental turn' with the transcendental critique of the limits of grammar on the basis of its apparent insularity from causal and scientific modes of reasoning. It seems that Pradhan wants to work only with these three options: if it is not philosophy and not science, then it is a transcendental enterprise. How does this conclusion follow? It appears as though Pradhan refuses to consider the Kantian one as philosophical, (he is inconsistent) nor does he take Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a distinct variety of philosophizing. So, the term transcendental serves as a convenient rubric and a self-contradictory rubric, as it were. What positive gain he gets by calling it transcendental turn, he has not shown. If it is a transcendental critique from the standpoint of *a priori*, of grammar, then it is again an inquiry only into the nature of philosophy. Then, it is not entailed by any critique of philosophy, nor does it entail a transcendental turn. It appears that the above basic contradiction is not resolvable within the paper. Seen in the context of two Wittgensteins, the former critique can hardly be continuous with the latter. I only hope that Pradhan must be aware that the issue of continuity is only an issue about the middle Wittgenstein especially after the publication of the *Nachlass*. If so, Pradhan's search for the doctrinal continuity in the former is only a search for an anonymous Wittgenstein.



Pradhan was apparently carried away by the labels 'antiscientific' (Baker and Hacker, 1986) and 'anti-scientistic' (Stuart Shanker, 1986) so as to preempt his mind in the above direction. If it were so, then he runs the risk of a double mistake, instead of one. Baker's reason for calling it anti-scientific is that it is not a scientific theory about the nature of meaning, with which he seems to agree. Similarly, Shanker's reason for characterising it as anti-scientistic is that it is not a sort of scientific paradigm of philosophizing let loose by Frege and Russell. More exactly, Shanker favours reversal of the images: philosophy should become a paradigm of mathematics *contra* Russell. Pradhan's misunderstanding here is that none of the above is philosophical. Exactly the contrary is true. Shanker's *raison d'être* for showing it as philosophical is based on the fusion of the grammar (of conceptual confusions) with the philosophizing about mathematics. For Baker, it is more about the nature of philosophy than about grammar and hence the above fusion may not be as much warranted as it is made out to be. So, Pradhan's only option is not to impose an *a priori* theory of grammar on the language-game view of language. He must be aware that this does not make him a Kantian in any sense.

Pradhan may backtrack by saying that he only wants to bend the transcendental turn in a similar direction as that of the other writers. *A fortiori*, his view must be taken only as a transcendental without a synthetic *a priori* as many would maintain. But where is the evidence for such a view found in the article? That this is not exactly his view, he would advocate, is evident from a frozen Kantian argument which he appends to it, no less quoting Kant himself on p. 158. Similarly, he also prefers to call the condition of possibility of language as a 'transcendental fact' (161, 164). In a similar vein, he speaks of the transcendental horizon of the language that makes it what it is (163, 165). Pradhan, however, wants to fully endorse Baker's two reasons (normativity and possibilities of phenomena) for identifying the linguistics of rule-following with the normative rules that govern the use of language. But from Baker's own viewpoint, it does not follow that there is plausibly a transcendental linguistics of normativity. The following points go against any such move: (1) Normativism represents a 'counter-theoretical' move in that it works not only against any theory of meaning, but also against any reduction of language to set of rules; (2) normativity is itself a *façon de parler* since normative rules is a myth; (3) *a fortiori*, there is no transcendental *a priori* critique of language-games. It is precisely (3) that seems to be at the forefront of Pradhan's mind is made clear from the way he pursues



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a *grammar-an-sich* point of view. It is only in support of this that he quotes the passage (PI, 122) on p.156 calling our attention to Wittgenstein's account of 'perspicuous' grammar. In fact the passage in question need not be interpreted as a positive suggestion to that effect. A very similar tendency is noticed in his effort to cement the 'arbitrariness' of the rules, whereas other interpreters do not do so. So also, does Pradhan want the autonomy to imply a *priori* linguistics?

Again, what Pradhan's 'lay out' (sec. 1) has missed in his research in the middle period is compensated by making two moves: first, he takes that the transcendental turn is as much a phenomenological turn (sec. 2) and reducing the nonmativity of rule-following into a phenomenological turn of rules (sec. 3). Here, Pradhan fails to do justice to phenomenological turn of the middle period that is in the forefront of Hintikka's discussion which he mentions in f.n.6. It is surprising to note how Pradhan hopes to throw light on Wittgenstein's transcendental turn without considering the crucial phase in which he considered 'phenomenology as grammar'. Hintikka focussed attention exactly on this aspect quoting from the *Big Typescript* (cf. Hintikka, 1986). But on Hintikka's view, a phenomenological turn carries a physicalistic implication in the sense of Carnap/Schlick, which centralises the phenomena of grammar. Hintikka also discussed how this could be said to be related to Schlick's account of the relation between meaning and verification, as reflected in a sinn-based account of verification (the *sinnse/meaning* of the proposition lies in its method of verification) rather than a reference-based, as it is usually understood. Again, assuming that what he says is correct, it only leads towards a rejection of synthetic a priori of grammatical rules - a point that goes against *an-sich* point of view. Wherein lies Pradhan's manoeuvre? Again, Pradhan does not hesitate to identify rule-following with the 'constitutive rules' of the later Husserl's transcendental phenomenology but Hintikka's point directly goes against it (see also C. Wright, 1989).

On the whole, Pradhan's manoeuvre does not move an inch beyond the seasoned Kantian interpretation given by Stanley Cavell (1986 reprint) in a similar context under a similar title. Pradhan however does not bother to know that such a Kantian move is exactly a point of dispute even among hermeneuticists like Kar-Otto Apel, who is generally considered to look at Wittgenstein from a Kantian point of view (1986).



Even if Pradhan fails to address himself directly to the question whether the transcendental linguistics of normativity is a worthwhile project in later Wittgenstein, he might have been benefitted by inquiring into Baker's reason for calling normativity as *façon de parler*, namely that they cannot provide a backdrop for a theory of grammar, into the way Stuart Shanker makes a theory of grammar to get absorbed into a philosophizing about mathematics, so as to present it as a project of epistemology *simpliciter*. Thus, just as for Baker there is a reason for saying that a theory of grammar can never become a good substitute for a theory about philosophy, for Stuart Shanker; a theory of grammar need not necessarily be basic, but at the sametime a theory of philosophy is basic when it sets at rest the conceptual confusions that occur within mathematics. However, a transcendental turn will be a too far distant dream for both. To what extent, the universality and necessity of rules provide an anti-anti-philosophical project is not at all clear from Phadhan's anti-philosophical critique.

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## BOOK REVIEW

Nilima Chakravarty: *Indian Philosophy - The Pathfinders and the System Builders*, Allied Publishers, 1992, 358 pages. Price Rs. 325/-

There is no dearth of good books on Indian philosophy. But the work under review may be said to have an edge over many of them. I say so because of its many positive features. First, its language is all along very easy to follow; and so it should be welcome to general students of Indian philosophy. Second, it provides copious 'notes and references' at the end of every chapter - indeed nine pages of such helpful material even after the chapter on Kautilya who is not commonly included in works on Indian philosophy; and should therefore be of great help to researchers. Thirdly, quite unlike the more popular books on the subject, the present volume pays ample attention to individual thinkers too, and not merely to systems and schools.

Further, I like the openness of the work's contents, Philosophy in ancient India permeated every sphere of human thought and activity. So it is only proper that the learned authoress has devoted separate chapters to Kautilya, one of the earliest political thinkers of the world, and Caraka, one of the most illustrious medical scientists of ancient India. In both these chapters, be it noted, due space has been given to the *philosophical* views of the two luminaries.

Here, however, I see a lacuna too. Why has Bharata not been given a separate chapter when, upon the author's own view, his remarkable work, *Nāṭya Śāstra*, is a 'part of the philosophy of value?' (xxvi). Bharata is perhaps no less close to philosophy as traditionally conceived than Caraka.

There are some other oddities too, and I think it necessary to list some of them, mainly with the purpose of enabling the author to remove



them (and their like) when she prepares the work for its second edition which it may well run into:

*daulistic* on p. xxxiii. and *relization* on p. 338; p. 324, 'complacency' should be 'imperturbability' (for, as extreme self-satisfaction or smugness, complacency is not a desirable attitude, and so cannot be recommended by the yogic disciplines of which the author here speaks); p. 213, 4th para, 3rd line: 'describes' (or 'interprets'?) Caraka to mean; p. xi, first para, last but one line, 'appears to' where the entire para uses the past tense all along, could be made bearable by supplementing it ('appears to') with 'have been'; p. 177, 3rd para, 1st line, *vyasana* is addiction (bad habits) not 'troubles or calamities'; commas *missing* after 'according to kautilya, Caraka' on pp. 170, 215 respectively; on p. xix, last para, 2nd line, 'of' missing before 'the true nature of one's own self'; and again 'the' missing before 'doctrine of karma' on p. 340, last para. On the other hand, the comma after 'lines' in the closing para of the book is a sheer intruder, more disturbing than the absence of 'the' before 'still living issues'.

I would like to believe that many of these defects are the printer's doing. But I cannot say the same of the fourth para on p. 215. Here, I regret to say, the meaning is unclear. But let me explain, by inviting attention to the author's own words:

"This prompted him to study *puruṣa*, the empirical soul. It is evident that *puruṣa* for him (Caraka) is the *human organism*." (Italics added)

My difficulty, here, is that in so far as an organism is organized structure, or that which has it (or a living animal or vegetable), how can *puruṣa* be said to be (the same thing as) a soul and an organism, though an organism may well be said to have a soul?

But such little blemishes are more than set off by the many excellences of the book. It is, without doubt, a product of painstaking study and research. I can imagine the labour that must have gone into the production of complete chapters, of about 20 closely printed pages each on Uddālaka, Yājñavalkya, and Caraka; and of an even more



comprehensive one on Kauṭilya (39 pages). Here, in the chapter on Kauṭilya, the author has taken care to mention such little known details as the fact that the shrewd and crafty Brahman' (165) regards *harsa* (or excessive joy) too as one of the six psycho-ethical 'enemies' of man (174); and that man, for Kauṭilya, is not 'inherently good' but naturally fickle-minded (177). The conclusion rightly reminds us that

"though *ātman* has been looked upon by many as the pivotal conception of Indian philosophy, it does not occupy the same position in the thought of all (Indian) philosophers; (that) for Mahavira, Kanada and Jaimini it is only one of the many realities (and that even) for the Buddha, or Kapila or Patañjali (it is not) the only reality" (334).

In fact, no chapter of the book could be said deficient in substance. Even biographical details have been provided in ample measure, and in almost every chapter; and I feel impelled to say that a volume of 358 pages in smaller than usual (yet easy-on-the-eye) print is no mean achievement.

The table of contents is very helpful, because of liberal provision of sub-headings signifying the main points made out in the chapters. Due attention has also been paid to the proper use of diacritical marks. But what has struck me more is the closing emphasis of the book. It does not provide anythings new; but what it says is true and could well be of positive help to those who do philosophy in India today because it invites attention to some very vital, if non-academic, pre-conditions of philosophic activity:

"The *yoga* thinkers ... (have presented) a very comprehensive and thorough analysis of (the) human mind, characterising its nature and distinguishing its constituents, different levels, functions, and motives. What is more, a highly scientific system of discipline for gathering complete control over the mind, in a gradual manner, (has been) drawn up ... Its (*yoga's*) power of control over one's body and mind and, above all ... *its efficacy for attainment of tranquillity of mind afford ample scope for further research and thought.*" (344, italics added)



All in all, the authoress, who has taught philosophy for about 41 years at the oldest ladies' college of Delhi University, and also for a number of years at the University itself; and what is more, *has been all along liked for her ability as a teacher and qualities as a person* - can look back with satisfaction at what she has been able to achieve in producing this lucid, informative, and comprehensive study of Indian philosophy.

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## THE MAJORITY RULE FALLACY

The majority rule principle has come to form the basis of democracy and parliamentary procedure. It appears to be as fundamental to our society as number is to mathematics, or the engine is to an automobile. It is thought that without the majority rule, we just could not move. We "fight for democracy" and as people and government we wish to spread it throughout the world. Even humanists, who are the furthest removed from holding dogmatic, uncritical values, state in *A Secular Humanist Declaration* (1980):

We are committed to extending.... democracy throughout the world....  
(p. 24)

We are impressed with the majority rule. We are impressed with democracy. We are impressed with parliamentary procedure. And so, as one would wage war, we set out to "wage" democracy. This view was also recently expressed by Petra Kelly (1983):

There remains nothing left for all of us to do, than to wage more democracy. (Es bleibt uns allen nichts anderes übrig, als mehr Demokratie zu wagen.) p. 14

("Wage" here means also risk, dare or venture.)

We think that democracy and the majority rule alone will save us and other societies as well. They are weapons with which to defend ourselves. Thomas Jefferson (1968) wrote :

The only weapons by which the minority can defend themselves against.... those in power are the forms and rules of proceeding.... by a strict adherence to which the weaker party can only be protected from those irregularities and abuses which these forms were intended to check and which the wantonness of power is but too often apt to suggest to large and successful majorities.

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Although a majority has seemed to favor democracy and the majority rule, a minority has recently leveled strong criticism of them.

The majority principle is a broken reed. (Barry 1979, p. 172)

[There] is nothing to the view, then, that what the majority rules is right. (Rawls 1971, p. 365)

Majority rule is fatally flawed by an internal inconsistency which ought to disqualify it from consideration in any political community whatsoever. (Wolff 1970, pp. 58-59)

Majorities may commit acts of tyranny. (Fishkin 1979, p. 5)

Nobody but a moral imbecile would really be prepared to deliver himself over body and soul to the majority principle. (Barry 1979, p. 171)

In the area of parliamentary procedure the majority rule is so universally taken for granted that there exists practically no critical literature on the subject. In one rare article, however, John Heinberg (1968) wrote :

Majority decisions are often erroneous or partisan. (p. 99)

The majority.... has no inherent ethical validity. (p. 100)

It is argued that the majority rule (henceforth : MR) guarantees neither truth nor fairness. Extensive criticisms of the MR have not been presented, and seldom brought "under one roof." This will be done here. Without awareness and a clear picture of these criticisms we will continue to exercise "tyranny" disguised as democracy, parliamentary procedure, or majority rule.

1. *MR is a mechanical, mathematical, procedure.* It is expedience. It is held that decisions must be made quickly, and that MR is better than fighting. "Das muß biegen oder brechen," refers to the view that a decision must be reached at all costs. "Die Tugend besteht in Handeln," (Virtue lies in action) makes a similar point.

"Decision", by itself, refers to a cutting, ending or the bringing of a matter to a close. It is not necessarily a rational or reasonable process. It is merely a way of ending a controversy. "Die Entscheidung" (decision) literally refers to a separation or departing; and "beschließen" (to decide), "Der Entschluß" (decision), and "zum Schluß Kommen" (conclude) suggest merely the closing or finishing of a matter.



As a mechanical, mathematical procedure, MR and decision-making alone do not guarantee truth, fairness, success or satisfaction of wants. They may be bad decisions. The justification of a decision must be determined outside of MR and not by the MR decision itself. Increasingly, articles on the "voter paradoxes" show even mathematical problems with the fairness of MR. (Blair & Pollack 1983) (Kelly 1978) (Brams & Fishburn 1983) Decisions alone are not self-justificatory. The cartoonist, Abner Dean, rendered this point as follows. A picture showed someone shooting arrows indiscriminately in all directions. The caption read, "Anyone can make a decision".

Having to decide may presuppose a necessity which does not exist. It may be a "hasty decision" and so an informal logical fallacy. In this sense, MR does not end conflict, but keeps it going. MR spurs action, but it may be blind action.

J. S. Schumpeter (1950) wrote :

Democracy is.... incapable of being an end in itself. (pp. 240-242)

John Wilson (1979) wrote :

To take "society" or a "consensus" as authoritative-is just another way of trying to shrug off the burden of reason and find safety in some fixed and easily identifiable set of rules. (p. 33)

2. *Fifty-one percent rule.* There may be only a bare majority. Supreme Court cases are frequently 5-4 decisions. This makes for a weak decision. It may be compared to receiving a score of only 51% on an examination or being only half awake, half-pregnant or half-guilty. We do not want drugs put on the market which are only fifty-one percent safe. If only fifty-one percent vote for something we may take it as a sign that it is a questionable decision. The same would apply to any figure less than unanimity.

A correction is to require a three-fourths vote or unanimity or to alter the course of action to reflect the weakness of the vote.

The fifty-one percent rule is again a mechanical rule which cannot guarantee truth or fairness.

3. *Avoidance of possible unanimity.* Where a possible unanimous decision could be reached, a mere majority decision is instead accepted.



The jury system has adopted the unanimity rule and the critical literature and experience with the system may be examined. In interpersonal relationships we often require unanimous approval. And even a political party has adopted the rule (Die Grünen, West Germany).

Unlike MR, the unanimity rule tends to force full discussion of all views and provide the utmost recognition of every individual view. The following writers have expressed this criticism :

Majority rule, with the single exception of rule by a unanimous majority, cannot be justified. (G. Allen 1977, p. 57)

I suggested that we might adopt the principle not of satisfying the preference of the majority, but safeguarding the interests of everyone ... The majority principle cannot be regarded as sacrosanct.... (B. Barry 1979, p. 172)

But even the unanimity rule would have to be qualified to avoid failure. It also is a mechanical rule. For example, all of a group of children could to a disastrous decision.

4. *Votes are quantitative not qualitative.* Each vote counts mechanically as much as any other vote, thus ignoring the qualitative intensity of each vote. The victorious majority may be indifferent on an issue the minority feel strongly about.

The intensity of the minority may outweigh the numbers of the majority so as to make it tyrannous to overrule the former. (Fishkin 1979, p 16)

In themselves, votes are not qualitative, as they are crude, all-or-nothing systems which do not admit of degrees. Preference voting or point assignment is a partial correction.

5. *MR commits the appeal-to-majority fallacy.* Merely because most people vote for something does not make it true. Truth comes rather from sound arguments and evidence. As a method of determining the truth, the most effective and best course of action, MR may be irrelevant. We cannot vote-in truth. Whatever deviates from good evidence and argument is a fallacy. MR appears to qualify as a "fallacy of majority rule."



*The Majority Rule Fallacy*

It is relevant that one version of the appeal-to-majority fallacy is appeal to the emotions, rather than appeal to the understanding.

6. *The majority may show no concern or sensitivity to the minority.* Nothing in the MR, as such, requires one to take any notice of minority views. The MR may even be called the "theory of the oppression of minorities." MR would need extensive qualification to overcome this problem. But to give such qualification would be to undermine MR as itself a procedure to guarantee fairness or effectiveness.

To have a vote in the minority is, in effect, to have no say at all. It is a form of disenfranchisement. The minority views and interests can be entirely disregarded.

What matters is not to satisfy the preferences of the majority but to respect the interests of all. (Barry 1979, p. 170)

Nor can it be argued that there will be fairness over time, that we may lose one vote but win the next. If an interest group combines with a smaller group it may render the latter as a permanent minority and even exercise tyranny over it. Madison (1974) expressed this concern :

If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. (p. 13)

However, even if the outcome differed in each decision, that in itself would not guarantee or even suggest fairness. Some decisions are clearly more significant than others. It is a myth to think that over time the equality of votes and issues will equal out.

7. *Disregard for alternatives.* The majority may impose deprivations on the minority although more considerate alternatives are readily available.

It is tyrannous for a government to impose severe deprivations when an alternative policy would impose no severe deprivations on anyone. (Fishkin 1979, p. 16)

For a voter to have to choose between alternatives none of which are acceptable is to render MR a fallacy of irrelevance. Many voters



then vote merely for the "lesser evil." Machinery could be instituted to allow the vote "neither" as an option, especially in a presidential election.

#### 8. *Inappropriate representation.*

a. Not all those able to vote, do vote. Absentee ballots would increase the number voting. In the United States just over fifty percent of those able, vote. The result is inadequate representation.

b. Not all or not all affected are represented, whereas many not affected are represented. The issue may concern or affect the minority directly, but not the majority. Women and majority of older men may vote to have all men between the ages of 18 and 21 be drafted to fight a war.

c. Not all those qualified to vote can vote. Job, weather, or other circumstances prevent them from voting. Often, meetings are held where only those present are allowed to vote. Partial correctives of inappropriate representation are to ensure (1) that those mainly affected have a vote and perhaps the final or only vote, (2) that on relevant issues the vote cross nationalistic lines even extending to world citizenship, (3) that businesses and other organizations move toward participatory establishments, (4) decentralization, (5) direct rather than representative democracy, (6) truly representative leadership.

9. *MR is too indirect and representative.* It becomes more symbolic than real. Here the complex machinery of politics, "Realpolitik," and practical politics becomes of more concern than MR or democratic principles. There is substituted a limited pragmatism as the phrase "What the traffic will bear", suggests.

Thus, besides theoretical problems there are practical problems with MR. An individual votes for a representative B, who in turn is represented by another representative C, in general or in committee, and a regress of abstract representation develops reducing to absurdity any individual vote.

There are seemingly limitless ways in which one's vote becomes eroded. MR decisions are often determined in advance of the meeting.



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or by collusion, biases, lobbies, "trade-offs", rather than by the facts and arguments at issue or by one's view. If a vote is held on the merits of a particular proposal the outcome of the vote may have nothing to do with the merits of the proposal. We may reject in MR the myth of "equal representation." It is a faulty-assumption fallacy.

10. *MR and utilitarianism.* A defense may be given that MR produces the greatest good for the greatest number. It has been shown that MR is value free. It may produce harm or good but guarantees neither. The utilitarian principle cannot be used as a defense because "good" is a vague, open-context term and because the formula cannot be carried out consistently. Given that a good is distribution of food to five hundred people. According to the formula we could give a tiny portion to all, or a larger portion to a few. If we stress quality we give to an elite few people. If we stress quantity we give less good to more people. Five units of good times one hundred people or one hundred units of good times five people still results in the same total distribution of units.  $5 \times 100 = 100 \times 5$ .

We can accordingly decide to keep all the food for ourselves, or for one hungry person with the reasoning that the utmost quality has been achieved. Perhaps utilitarians should only distribute to other utilitarians to maximize the greatest good. The utilitarian formula thus allows distribution any way whatsoever. It is unworkable and cannot, without severely restricted qualification, be used to attempt to support MR.

11. *MR requires limitations.* MR is often used to apply to basic civil and human rights which ought not to be subject to it. It should only be used within well-prescribed limitations, rules, laws, and procedures.

The majority rule.... is contingent on the presence of a number of highly restrictive conditions. (Barry 1979, p. 172)

Free speech; honest, open inquiry; enhancement of each individual, health, safety, protection of human lives, etc. should in general not be negotiables, and so not subject to or undermined by MR. The United States still regards all of these including loss of life in battle as negotiables in spite of the Bill of Rights and Constitution.



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No minority can be, or should be, expected to acquiesce in the majority's trampling on its vital interests. (Barry 1979, p. 171)

There are ultimate ideals and interests which the most ardent democrat will put above democracy.... (J. S. Schumpeter 1950, pp. 240, 242)

A correction is to set severe limits, for instance by adopting by-laws on what is admissible. *Robert's Rules of Order* (1967) on parliamentary procedure states :

Motions must not be in violation of local and Federal laws, the organization's constitution and by-laws, or standing rules. (p. 132)

MR is also often used on matters requiring only individual decision rather than the relevant collective decisions. Authority and decision should, in general, rest with the individual unless it can be clearly established that a cooperative decision is needed, or that there should be authority over the individual. Otherwise MR may constitute unnecessary interference as well as a violation of civil rights.

12. *Irrational voting.* The basis for any vote is totally unspecified. One may vote on the basis of (a) wants or desires, (b) bias, (c) opinions or mere beliefs, (d) value judgments, (e) goals, (f) well-founded knowledge and evidence, (g) mistake, (h) emotion, such as anger or personal attraction, etc. Socrates was found guilty and condemned to death by the close vote of 281 to 220. It was commented of the voters that "He may cast his vote in anger." (*Apology* sect. 23)

The above possibilities invalidate MR decisions. Because we do not know if votes were based on evidence or wants or bias, etc., we cannot know what the decision means. A fallacy of equivocation and category-mistake are produced.

For example, recently it was reported that the majority of West Germans (75%) were found to oppose the deployment of missiles on German territory, (*Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 9, 1983, 2, 7. See also *Die Zeit*, Oct. 14, 1983, p.3) It would be a fallacy to conclude that the majority (a) did not want them there, or (b) believed on good evidence that they should not be there, or (c) therefore they should not be there. We do not know why they voted as they did.



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Most people may not want to go to dentists, but nevertheless find it wise to do so. To confuse a want-based vote with a truth-based vote is to equivocate. The truth must be determined by evidence, not by wants or majority votes. Whether or not the missiles should be there depends rather on the consequences and arguments. It is a category-mistake to conclude, "Most people voted (wants or good evidence?) for X, therefore it is the best decision." Yet most people do conclude that.

A decision may be desired, but be unintelligent, or be intelligent and not desired. A vote based on wants or opinions should not be used to determine factual matters. The degree of safety of nuclear weapons is determined by research and evidence, not majority opinion.

If MR is used only to survey want or becomes an opinion survey, it is valuable, though still not completely. But surveys alone should not determine decision.

To attempt to correct some of the above deficiencies one could instruct the voter, as the judge instructs the jury, and require the voter to defend and give reasons for his or her vote.

At present, voters are appealed to less by education than by persuasion, advertising, appeal to special interests, and by racial, gender, financial and religious biases.

13. *The uninformed vote.* Those voting are often not adequately educated, informed, or involved in objective discussion before voting. Yet, we encourage everyone, regardless of ignorance, to vote. Democracy depends on an educated people. (Kolenda 1984) Democracy and MR among five year old children may be suicide.

Correctives would be to require each citizen to read the relevant arguments and literature before voting; to, at certain meetings, provide arguments and evidence to support one's vote; to subject such arguments to inspection before the vote and subject it to further appeal and accountability after the vote. In the courtroom and other examination situations in everyday life such criteria are normal and to be expected. Presently, voting can and does even violate the most basic civil rights, and its basis is a scandal of the intellect.



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If the above is unrealistic, still some procedures would be needed to save the credibility of MR and to ensure that the vote will be well-informed and rational.

14. *"Rule" is ambiguous.* In majority rule, it is not clear what "rule" means. It may mean principle, but it may also mean "decides", "prevails", "dominates", "predominates", "wins." Does it mean that the majority can use violence to force the minority to comply? MR is a form of the *ad baculum* fallacy, that is, use or threat of force. It is not specified how the MR will "rule." Is the decision to be merely a recommendation, or perhaps not enforced at all?

It would not be rational to, in advance, commit oneself to accept any majority decision on any subject by any means of enforcement.

If we are to vote on whether or not we should go on a picnic we may take a vote. If six wish to go and five do not want to go, is it acceptable to force all to go?

15. *Improper question.* The vote is only as valid and useful as the clarity and intelligibility of the question. It makes a great difference if one is asked if they want missiles deployed, or if they have clear evidence and sound arguments that support their deployment. It makes a difference if we are asked if we want to go on vacation and, if we are able to go on vacation now.

The question voted on must be properly and clearly formulated. It must be adequate to include all viable possibilities and alternatives. MR does not provide the restrictions and procedures to ensure the needed clarity of the question.

16. *"General Will" or "Good of All" myths.* One may attempt to justify MR by appeal to the notion of a higher "general will" of the state. It is a fiction. To speak of adhering to MR for the "good of the majority" has already been eroded. This is the fallacy of *argumentum ad superstitionem*.

17. *MR based on trust.* Defense of MR by the argument that people should be trusted not to misuse it, fail. The above indicates constant abuse and misuse in theory as well as practice. If trust were



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acceptable MR would not be needed in the first place.

18. *Self-applicability of MR.* It may be question-begging to allow MR to decide on questions of MR, democracy, or majority versus minority. We cannot without possible contradiction ask for a majority decision on MR itself or its limitations.

Any use of the majority principle in order to establish boundaries must involve begging the question.... [or] where people are disagreeing about the "body" they want to be members of. (B. Barry 1969, pp. 168-169)

MR may, for example, be used to dispense with MR.

19. *Inconsistent application of MR.* In many decision-making situations MR is either not preferred or not used. MR is often not used in the following places.

a. The operation of business and industry is often not participatory. Some meetings, union votes and stockholders meetings use MR. A government may be democratic, but one's immediate job and living situation may be a dictatorship.

b. Situations requiring expert knowledge : medicine, science, therapy, education, law, etc. Here those most knowledgeable are relied on, whereas in MR those least knowledgeable are relied on.

c. Interpersonal decisions between family members, friends or two people. In such situations, in place of a vote there is discussion and concern for one another, and use of MR would be thought to be dehumanizing. Where only two or three people are involved MR would be unworkable.

d. Religious groups, eg., Catholic, Islamic, etc. do not believe in the democratic process.

e. In the military.

f. In application to non-negotiable issues.

g. It is not applicable to every issue whatsoever. Its scope is limited, often vaguely, to apply only to certain issues.

h. MR can be used to decide on becoming a dictatorship.

i. Where a power hierarchy is established .



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The issue raised is that of choice. We do not allow MR where we wish to dominate or indoctrinate. But the alternative is to be dictatorial. Neither option may be appropriate. One should be free to choose whether or not to belong to a religion or celebrate Christmas. Neither parental force nor MR should be appropriate. Children should not be indoctrinated either at home or at school.

Young minds should not be indoctrinated in a faith before they are mature enough to evaluate the merits for themselves. (Kurtz 1986)

20. *MR is the best method when all else fails.* It is argued that MR may have some minor limitations, but when all else fails, it is better than war. But the objections to MR have been seen to be major, not minor. If all else fails the situation is a failure, and that failure should be attended to, not ignored. If there is a failure then MR itself will be manipulated and guaranteed not to succeed. "Either MR or war" is an either-or fallacy. It may be better to, at that point, just draw straws.

More appropriate would be an evaluation of the causes for the lack of ability to agree. What caused the breakdown of communication, or lack of ability to be fair? Was it lack of education or information? Disagreement is a useful tool to force deeper analyses into the argument, not a point at which to ignore or end the issue. Increase of pre-trial settlements involve attempts at negotiation. Neutral outside arbitrators often are called in to settle disputes. In some cases, therapy and educational programs may be needed. We may simply use the scientific method of inquiry and employ decision-making theory in place of MR.

In any case, prevention of the conflicts in the first place may be preferable to any other method. If we have the responsibility to wage war or MR, we have the responsibility for preventing the problems from arising in the first place. MR may tend to take the place of establishing a climate of good communication and fairness.

21. *Should MR decisions always be followed? Civil disobedience.* We may agree to be bound by the decisions of the MR as by a social contract. To do so blanketly is to agree to the unknown. The question arises as to whether we should be bound completely or by



every decision of MR or of a democratic government. Is, for example, civil disobedience justifiable? The subject is controversial and the literature on the subject is rapidly increasing.

Agreements to social contracts and MR decisions ought to be made only within a number of highly restrictive conditions. If those conditions are violated our compliance may be withdrawn. A decision need not be followed if it (a) is objectively irrational, (b) is unfair, (c) is not based on correct information, (d) undermines basic civil rights, (e) is inhumane. We may choose not to obey an officer or fight in certain or any wars. It is not "America right or wrong."

Disobedience and civil disobedience may be carried out whenever they are justifiable. One central problem with civil disobedience is use of force. It may be argued that use of force is unacceptable. It is an informal logical fallacy. What is needed instead is to call attention to the arguments and relevant information. If peaceful demonstrations, satire, or even humor call attention to the arguments they are appropriate. (Shibles 1985) MR itself may be seen as a form of force or violence.

In view of the above, no one should be expected to comply in every way with all decisions of the MR. Non-compliance should be performed in such a way as to preserve, as much as possible, the MR system itself.

22. *MR is not a substitute for thinking.* Voting is not thinking. Thinking is largely language-use with all of the fine distinctions of our language. We cannot give that up to a numerical procedure. Similarly, we cannot give up thinking in ordinary language to the mechanical, quantitative model of the syllogism. We seldom, if ever, think in syllogisms.

There is a similar controversy between ordinary language philosophy and symbolic logic. Can ordinary language be reduced to a quantitative, mathematical model?

23. *Additional logical fallacies of MR.*

a. *Composition and division.* MR is a part-whole confusion.



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What is true of the part is asserted of the whole. It is a form of synecdoche. MR may in this sense be thought of as a metaphor or fiction. Also, what is true of the whole may be falsely applied to the part. Because one is a member of a group having made a decision, does not mean one voted for, agrees, or even plans to support that decision.

b. *Argument from consequences.* Does the end of having to arrive at a decision justify the means? It is only assumed that it does. MR may produce neither truth nor fairness. This compares with "hasty generalization" under point # 1.

c. *Contextual fallacy.* Committing oneself in advance to MR decisions regardless of substance, time, manner, and circumstance of whatever decision will be produced.

d. *Either-or fallacy.* The denial of gradations or alternative solutions. We vote either yes or no, and what is voted on may also lack gradation or alternatives. Often candidates run unopposed, thus allowing no choice. For an analysis of "approval voting" (vote for each approved candidate), Borda's preferential system, Condorcet, etc. see Brams & Fishburn 1982 : "Every practical voting system suffers certain deficiencies." (p. xii)

e. *Appeal to emotions* Voter propaganda and advertisement may be cited as applications of MR in practice.

f. *Argument from the familiar or well-known.* Because MR is common, we tend to think that there is nothing wrong with it.

g. *Argumentum ad fidem.* Arrangement from faith is a fallacy. To be told merely to have faith in MR, or democracy, is unacceptable.

h. *Genetic fallacy.* He must be a good mayor, because he was elected by a majority. This does not follow.

i. *ad hominem.* The individual may be "brow beaten" or forced to go along with the majority decision.

j. *ad ignorantiam.* The truth of a statement or the best course of action may be irrelevant to what the majority believe. Voting is often



based on ignorance.

k. *ignoratio elenchi*. This is proving an irrelevant conclusion. Sidgwick phrases this : "The journey has been safely performed, only we got the wrong train." MR decisions may sometimes succeed, but it does not mean that they did so because of the MR machinery.

l. *reductio ad absurdum*. By MR we may produce tyranny as indicated earlier. Another example of the fallacy is : Because most people believe in war, therefore war is good.

m. *Statistical and probability fallacies*. (cf. "voter paradox" controversy.) (Arrow 1963) (Brams & Fishburn 1983)

n. *tu quoque fallacy*. "You also" fallacy. Because most want or think that way as well.

o. *ad verecundiam*. Appeal to authority. MR is appeal to the authority of the majority.

p. *Fallacy of oversimplification*. The fallacy of assuming that MR in itself, or unqualified, guarantees truth or fairness.

q. *Dehumanization fallacy*. The fallacy of quantification into votes, treats humans as if they were inanimate,

It may be concluded that both in theory and practice MR is based on a number of fallacies, guarantees neither intelligent decisions, fairness, or truth. It tends to take the place of rational discussion, inquiry, communication and concern for others. However, by careful qualification, conditions, and restrictions it can be made to work in certain situations. In any case, an educated voter is an absolute necessity. The absence to such conditions has been more noticeable than their presence.

**A Case Example.** Die Grunen party in West Germany recently, by a few votes, became the first new party in the West German Bundestag in thirty years. They do not provide an extensive critical analysis of MR, but do propose alternatives to traditional democratic practices and the MR, which may in practice correct some of the abuses mentioned above. Several such proposals involve :



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a. decentralization of government, industry, social units, cities, decision making, etc., in order to allow more people to share in decisions which affect their lives.

b. participatory decisions in the various institutions.

c. an attempt to educate and bring reasoned arguments to the people thereby enabling them to be informed voters.

d. a general attempt to establish direct democracy.

e. a concern for all minorities. For example, they were the only party in the Bundestag to oppose a 4% raise for MP members. They said it was not acceptable during 9% unemployment. (*N.Y. Times*, Oct. 14, 1983, p. 36)

f. a concern to extend the minority and majority to include all people everywhere in the decision-making process. The concept of "world citizen" is implied.

g. an attempt to place humane behavior, a healthful environment and human rights, as opposed to war, killing, and exploitation of the environment, as issues which are not-negotiable and outside the realm of MR. (Kelly 1983, pp. 22, 26, 27) At present, such issues as killing and war are not only negotiable, they are common political, economic and legal practices.

h. a rotation system whereby members of the Bundestag share each term of office.

i. reference to their party in the form of oxymoron, as the "anti-party party." ("Antiparteinpartei", *Ibid*, pp. 21, 26) Petra Kelly claims to be an anti-leader leader.

As the above example indicates, it is not recommended that the MR be abandoned. What is suggested is that the necessary qualifications and limitations be provided and the rhetoric of the MR be revised to reflect argument rather than pressures. MR decisions can only be regarded as valid within and as qualified by such parameters. Only when



we see what is defeasible with MR can we proceed to make it an effective and viable method.

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## APPROACHES TO CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT SCIENCES : A PHILOSOPHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION

### INTRODUCTION

The field of management is a relatively new discipline. However, even in pre-modern times, one form of technique or the other was used in solving organisational problems. But as modern organisations become more and more complex, both in scope, content of activities and context, modern managers now face newer challenges at work. The organisation of work in modern times seems to have become a kind of jigsaw puzzle. This situation has arisen as a result of rapid growth and development of modern industrial activities in this century. The growth in industrial activities has also affected the activities of modern governments; and this seems to have ostensibly created a reciprocal interaction between the organised business activities of the entrepreneur and the development of policy instruments formulated by government to control business activities. The intensive nature of the interrelationship between the activities of industry and the public sector has generated a lot of debate as to how best to manage the scarce and limited resources of the modern state.

The situation is becoming more complicated, therefore, calls our attention to the introduction of more appropriate techniques in the organisation of work and work related activities at the work place. Some scholars (Shott 1979; Hochschild, 1979; Denzin, 1970; Becker, 1953) have argued that problems in management sciences could be solved through the use of analysing qualitative data in social research. Other scholars (Dantzig, 1967; Goodeve, 1948; Akcoff and Sasieni, 1968, Kemper 1978a, 1978b) have argued that it is unlikely that problems in management sciences could be solved by merely analysing qualitative data in social enquiry. They argue that organisational problems could

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only be solved through the application of scientific tools in the analysis of data. The first group sees research in management sciences as involving the investigation and interpretation of the social world using qualitative techniques in the analysis of data. The second group using social action or the social world as an objective reality, therefore, could be investigated and interpreted using the canons of scientific principles and rigours applicable in the natural sciences. This debate has had a long standing tradition which appears to have defied any form of meaningful settlement. But management scientists should as a matter of necessity adopt a position if their studies are to be given a place of prominence in contemporary research agenda.

In view of the issues we have raised, what we have set out to do in this paper is threefold. First, we shall discuss assumptions relating to ontology, epistemology, models of human nature and methodology employed in analysing and interpreting the social world from the point of view of the subjectivist frame of reference. Second, we shall also discuss assumptions relating to ontology, epistemology, models of human nature and methodology, employed in positivism in the analysis and interpretation of data in management of social sciences. The third and perhaps final issue addressed here is an attempt to identify areas of pragmatic affinity between the two polarities-relativism and absolutism. This will be our contribution to the debate between relativist and absolutist scholars in their search for answers in interpreting the social world.

## DEFINING MANAGEMENT SCIENCES

The term management sciences is used in a very broad sense in this paper. Management sciences among others include disciplines such as organisational behaviour, industrial or organisational psychology, industrial sociology, economics, operations research, political science, statistics, cultural anthropology, accountancy, personal management, organisation theory and all other related disciplines. Depending on the persuasion and school of thought of each contributor, the various disciplinary areas which constitute management sciences could as well be described as behavioural or social sciences. In this paper, we are not interested in the identification of semantical differences between different scholars. The terms management, behavioural or social sciences, therefore are used interchangeably.



## RESEARCH APPROACHES IN MANAGEMENT SCIENCES : THE SUBJECTIVIST-OBJECTIVIST ASSUMPTIONS

Research approaches in management sciences could be typologised into two broad categories-the positivist or objectivist and subjectivist or relativist approaches. The positivist or relativist approaches in management sciences assumes or adopts scientific methodology in their method of data collection, analysis and interpretation. The positivist uses nomothetic methodology that are found in the natural sciences in the study of the social world. The subjectivist or relativist on the other hand assumes or adopts ideographic methodology in their method of data collection, analysis and interpretation. We shall explain the concept of nomothetic and ideographic methodologies later in this paper.

Management scientists have in the main adopted these two approaches in social enquiry. But there seems to be areas of conflict in the adoption of these two broad categories as a result of the unit of analysis in all management sciences. The view has been advanced that because the management sciences are concerned with the investigation and interpretation of social phenomena, it is wrong to adopt positivist methodology or scientific investigations that are popular in the natural sciences. But positivist scholars, on the other hand, have argued that irrespective of the environment and social context in which we find ourselves, the appropriate methodology to adopt in an attempt to establish any form of objective reality is through the use of methods that are adopted in the natural sciences.

There has been a long drawn argument between subjectivist and objectivist scholars in their analysis and understanding of the social world. These arguments are based on the premise that "all theories of organisation are based upon a philosophy of science and theory of society." It is therefore important to discuss the philosophical assumptions upon which the various approaches are predicated. Burrell and Morgan (1979) have argued that the convenience exists to conceptualise the management sciences based on four sets of assumptions. These assumptions, according to Burrell and Morgan, are related to ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology.

It is the view of Burrell and Morgan (1979) that management scientists should see their subjects through "explicit or implicit assump-



tions about the nature of the social world and the way in which it may be investigated." The first set of assumptions are of an ontological nature. These are assumptions which concerns or deals with the very purpose of the phenomena to be studied or investigated. Management scientists are faced with a fundamental ontological question. This has to do with questions relating to the 'reality' to be investigated. Ontological assumptions create the necessary pathway for the researcher to understand the reasoning behind the very essence of studying any phenomenon. Ontological assumptions are made to stimulate individuals to ask questions relating to the phenomena they are investigating-to establish the fact, whether or not the phenomena to be investigated is real, and of an objective nature. Ontological assumptions are made by researchers to identify the nature of the phenomena to be investigated-whether the phenomena being investigated is concrete, hard, and has objective features and characteristics.

Burrell and Morgan (1979) went further to argue that, succeeding the assumptions relating to ontology are other associated assumptions which are essentially of an epistemological nature. Epistemological assumptions which we make as management scientists centre on the theory of knowledge. These are assumptions which have to do with how knowledge develops and is communicated to other people in intelligible form. The question of epistemological assumptions does not only address issues relating to communication of ideas or knowledge to people but also anchors on how to establish a line of divide between what is regarded as 'true' from what is regarded as 'false'. The ability to develop a level of consciousness to discriminate between what is generally regarded as true or false is what shapes our frame of reference. On a rather philosophical note, Burrell and Morgan (1979) have in fact argued that the "dichotomy of 'true' and 'false' itself presupposes a certain epistemological stance." All epistemological assumptions therefore are based on the "view of the nature of knowledge itself, whether knowledge could be identified and it's nature communicated as being hard, real or tangible or whether knowledge is something of softer, subjective, spiritual or even transcendental, which is based on our experience of the past. In other words, whether knowledge as a phenomenon could be acquired through learning or something which the individual has to experience personally.

Closely following the heels of the ontological and epistemological assumptions but which are "conceptionally separate" are a third set



of assumptions relating to 'human nature.' The assumptions relating to human nature tries to identify the relationship or tissue of connection between human beings and the environment in which they operate and transact. Burrell and Morgan (1979) have argued that there cannot be any meaningful discussion in the management sciences if the nature of human beings which form the object and subject of discussion is excluded. It is therefore possible to identify perspectives in the literature which advocate the view that human beings respond either in a mechanistic or deterministic way to situations they experience in the external world. If human beings respond in a mechanistic way to their environments, then the environments condition and shape their behaviours. But if human beings respond to their environments in a deterministic way then it is assumed that they create, control, manage and direct activities in their environments.

The three sets of assumptions discussed above have a symbiotic relationship and implication of a 'methodological nature.' Each of these assumptions has an overwhelming influence on the way we try to explain the social world. The kind of ontologies, epistemologies and nature of human beings determines the type of methodology one adopts in social research. There are methodologies used in the social sciences which conceptualise the social world in the same way as the natural world; as being objective, hard, "real and external to the individual." But there are others who see the social world in a rather subjective form, therefore softer and even of transcendental and spiritual nature. Burrell and Morgan (1979) have argued that if management scientists subject themselves to methodologies which treat the social world as a tangible entity, constituting any form of objective reality, then the issues involved border on the "analysis of relationship and regularities between the various elements which it comprises." The focus, therefore, is on how to identify and define the elements and how to design ways of expressing these relationships. The perspective that adopts a methodological stance which sees the social world as objective reality, attempts to establish principles and universal laws to explain and "govern the reality which is being observed."

But if a management scientist subscribes to the view that society or the social world could be explained or created through the subjective experience of individuals, it means that our search for understanding the social world around us is based on the subjective experience of the



individual who is attempting to study and explain the social world. The central issue in this perspective border essentially on how individuals create, modify or interpret social phenomena via their understanding of the social world around them. The interpretation and explanation of the social world is seen to be a reflection of the unique features and finite provinces of meanings the individual gives to the phenomena under investigation. This approach in methodological parlance highlights the fact that the social world is on the whole relativistic in nature therefore, could be seen as "antiscientific" as opposed to the "ground rules" which are generally used in the natural sciences. Burrell and Morgan made an attempt to use a schema to illustrate the dimensions on which to explain the subjective - objective debate in social enquiry. Burrell and Morgan's (1979) schema is replicated below:

### THE SUBJECTIVE- OBJECTIVE DIMENSION

The subjectivist approach  
to social science

The objectivist approach  
to social science

Nominalism	←	Ontology	→	Realism
Anti-Positivism	←	Epistemology	→	Positivism
Voluntarism	←	Human nature	→	Determinism
Ideographic	←	Methodology	→	Nomothetic

### THE ONTOLOGICAL DEBATE BETWEEN NOMINALISM AND REALISM

The ontological debate between nominalist and realist conception of the social world has been a long drawn battle. The nominalist argument on what represents the social world anchors on the fact that what is regarded as social world external to the individual is merely the imagination of that individual, nothing but names, concepts, ideas, and labels used by individuals to describe situations. The nominalist does not accept the view that there exists any 'real' structure in the social world. The 'names' used by individuals are referred to as artificial creations whose value is merely to make sense in our analysis of situations and in negotiating the social world in which we are an integral part. The realist on the other hand argues that the social world in which we exist is something of an objective type. The social world of the realist is assumed



to be hard, tangible and is made of 'immutable structures.' The realist has postulated that whether we see, feel nor touch these structures, they still exist as 'empirical entities.' The realist developed the ontological argument that we may not even be aware of the existence of some of these structures therefore, cannot even give them names, labels or 'concepts to articulate them'. The realist has a strong belief that the social world exists quite differently and "independently of the individuals appreciation of it". The individual is born into the social world and learns to live within it. The individual cannot create the social world or any part thereof. The social world maintains an objective form therefore, determines the behaviour of the individual. Ontologically, it is argued that the existence of the social world is beyond the realm of imagination of the individual. The realist believes very fervently that the social world has an existence which is tangible with immutable structures, therefore is as much as the natural world.

#### THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEBATE BETWEEN ANTI-POSITIVISM AND POSITIVISM IN SOCIAL ENQUIRY

The epistemology of anti-positivism argues that it is practically impossible to establish regularities and search for general laws which could be used in defining, explaining and interpreting the social world. It is the view of the anti-positivist that the social world is highly relativistic, therefore, 'can only be understood from the point of view of the individuals who are directly involved in the activities which are to be studied'. Anti-positivists completely reject the notion of the 'observer', which dominates the epistemology of the positivist. Anti-positivists do not believe in the argument that those who observe situations and other social activities are better disposed towards understanding and explaining these activities. Anti-positivists argue that it is only possible to 'understand' social action or human activities if we put ourselves in the place of those individuals whose activities we are attempting to understand, while they are in action. They believe that we can only understand human activities from the 'inside' rather than the 'outside'. Anti-positivists do not believe that science can generate any form of objective knowledge.

Positivists on the other hand attempt to understand and interpret the social world by trying to establish regularities and general laws. Positivists themselves may differ in essentials and details in their search



for regularities and establishment of general laws but they are all in agreement as to how knowledge grows overtime. They all see knowledge as a cumulative process. Knowledge to them is like mental bricklaying. Anytime a new 'block' of knowledge is laid, the tendency is that the old knowledge becomes obsolete. It is therefore, important to tear down the old knowledge and allow the new stock of knowledge to assume its proper place. Positivist scholars believe in experimenting in their environments as a natural step towards establishing objective reality in the social world.

### THE DEBATE BETWEEN VOLUNTARISM AND DETERMINISM AS MODELS OF HUMAN NATURE

There have been rival claims between positivists and anti-positivists as to the correct model of human nature in social scientific theory. The debate had rested on two extremes of a continuum, each group holding very fast to its claims of the proper model of human nature in social analysis. On one extreme are positivists, who hold a determinist view, arguing that man and his activities are determined by the situation in which he finds himself or the environment in which he exists and transact. On the opposite end of the continuum we have those who maintain a voluntaristic position, arguing that man is completely autonomous and free-willed. For management or social science theories to be imbibed and articulated by both determinists and voluntarists in an attempt to understand human nature they must adopt either of these two broad categories. But those who are unable to identify themselves with any one particular conceptual rubric should adopt a 'middle of the road' position by synthesizing the two extremes of a bipolar system to understand the correct nature of human beings. We shall discuss a possible point of convergence between positivism and relativism in understanding human nature, later in this paper.

### THE METHODOLOGICAL DEBATE BETWEEN IDEOGRAPHIC AND NOMOTHETIC THEORY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH

The ideographic methodology in social research is concerned with the argument that to understand the social world requires the researcher to obtain first hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. This requires the investigator to have very close contact with the background and life-history of the subject of investigation. The ideographic



research methodology focuses on the analysis of the subjective information to be generated by the researcher. The information to be generated could be obtained by 'getting inside' the situation to be investigated and taking active part in the daily flow of activities. The researcher could analyse insights or information emanating from such encounters with one's subjects. This could be done through the analysis of information found in diaries, biographies, resumes and journalistic records. Blumer (1969) has argued that the ideographic research methodology emphasises the relevance and usefulness of allowing "one's subject unfold its nature and characteristics" while the investigation is going on.

The ideographic methodology was highlighted earlier by Glasser and Strauss (1967) in their 'Grounded Theory' approach in social research. Brown (1973) also discussed the concept of 'Grounded Theory' elaborately in his review of literature in respect of approaches to conducting research in management or social sciences. The 'Grounded Theory' approach highlights the fact that in all social scientific productions it is necessary for the researcher to collect as much information as possible, in view of the fact that the knowledge being sought for is 'grounded' in the data the researcher is able to collect. The Grounded Theory approach has little or no favour for a priori hypotheses formulation and testing. It is a research approach which assumes that as the researcher analyses the research data, the answers being looked for shall emerge as findings. The 'Grounded Theory' approach therefore ignores hypotheses formulation and testing but encourages the use of research questions.

Two important variants of the ideographic research methodology which have become acceptable and popular in management sciences are the concepts of interactionism and ethnomethodology. Interactionism as a research approach was popularised by Weber (1949) and Mead (1938). Interactionism as management science research approach is concerned with the 'interpretation of meaning'. The researcher interacts with respondents who are likely to act or react to the researcher's questions and the researcher interprets the actions of the respondents by giving meaning to such actions.

The second variant of the ideographic research approach which is relevant and useful in management sciences is ethnomethodology. Ethnomethodology which is reminiscent of Garfinkel's (1967) work is



concerned with interest in observing every day practices of organisational or societal members. Based on these observations, ethnomethodologists make identifiable 'observable-reportable' behaviour patterns of organisational members. Ethnomethodologists, according to Silverman (1985) "are not concerned with what they are doing". Ethnomethodologists, because of their interest in what people are doing are able to observe and report social behaviour in organisations and at the wider level of society. Ethnomethodologists differ somewhat in their method of enquiry from interactions scholars, but share a common view that proper description is in itself explanatory, part of "a naturalistic observational discipline that can.... deal with the details of social action(s) rigorously, empirically and formally", (Schegloff and Sacks, 1974:233). Other scholars, Cuff and Payne (1979), whose research approach lie within the rubric of interactionist-ethnomethodological perspective, have vividly established the tissue of connection between description and explanation within ethnomethodology. They therefore, argued that :

"Instead of trying to produce 'deductive causal explanations' (Popper) or sets of law-like propositions, they aim to produce descriptions. These descriptions concern methods members use to accomplish the world for what it is. In the description and analysis of those methods, ethnomethodologists, like other social scientists, are attempting to generalise about social life. In their case, these generalisations are about the sort of 'apparatus', the 'sense assembly equipment', that human beings use to construct and sustain their everyday lives" (1979:178).

Another aspect of the ideographic research tradition which has important theoretical taste and value to the management scientist is the concept of ethnography found in cognitive anthropology. Ethnography, according to Silverman (1985) in sociological orthodoxy is concerned with "methods for describing interactional particulars", which the sociologist would also refer to as 'participant observation' in social research. Halfpenny (1979) found a great deal of value in ethnography which is widely used in cognitive anthropology by researchers, and argues that the approach involves "grasping and comprehending the culturally appropriate concepts through which (actors)... conduct their social life." Because culture has an important role to play in management sciences, Ahiauzu (1987) has in the past used ethnographic approach in investigating human activities in African organisations. Ethnographic research approach involves a situation where the researcher takes active part in activities



involving the phenomenon under investigation. While actively participating in the group, the researcher is also observing, grasping and comprehending those aspects of people's culture which influence the behaviour of group members in organisation. Although this approach is relatively new in mainstream management science investigations but it has a fairly long historical tradition in cognitive anthropology and interactionist sociology. Since management science principles are essentially derived from both anthropological and sociological theory, it follows therefore, that what is new is the practice and what is not new is the theory.

The second major strand of the debate is the use of nomothetic methodology in conducting research in management sciences. The nomothetic approach to social enquiry lays a great deal of premium on the application of scientific techniques in the analysis and interpretation of data. The nomothetic approach to conducting research in management sciences, according to Burrell and Morgan (1979) places great emphasis "on the importance of basing research upon systematic protocol and technique". The nomothetic approach adopts techniques and methods characteristic of the natural sciences. It subjects all data to the crucible and rigours of scientific examination, which has as its focus the process of formulating and testing hypotheses. The major tool of analysis in the nomothetic approach to conducting research in management sciences is the use of quantitative techniques. The specific research instruments used in the nomothetic approach are surveys, questionnaires, personality tests and other standardised instruments.

The specific research instruments mentioned above form the basis of the nomothetic methodology in management sciences. These instruments are essentially statistical in character. The techniques that are relevant in analysing and interpreting social reality in management sciences are the non-parametric statistics. Other aspects of the nomothetic approach which are relevant in conducting research in management sciences is the use of operations research techniques. A fundamental feature of the use of scientific techniques in conducting research in management sciences "is its ideal of objectivity", a kind of ideal which subjects scientific knowledge to objective and impartial tests. The nomothetic methodology in conducting research in management sciences relies in explaining social phenomena via scientific experimentation. Scientism is the ideological preoccupation of the researcher who



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adopts the nomothetic methodology in conducting research in management sciences. The analysis and interpretation of all social phenomena is based on the principles of sciences.

### THE SUBJECTIVIST-OBJECTIVIST DEBATE IN CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT SCIENCES : THE NEED FOR A CONVERGENCE THESIS

Bonth anti-positivists and positivists have a common goal of analysing and interpreting social phenomena. They both have different ways of attempting to achieve the same goal-the issue is not that of goal-setting but the problem is how to get to the goal. The process of attempting to get to the goal is where the argument begins to tilt towards the two polarities.

If we examine the rival claims made by anti-positivists and positivists in their analysis and interpretation of social phenomena based on different ontologies, epistemologies, models of human nature, and methodologies, the view had been powerfully articulated that these are competing approaches in social research. While anti-positivists have argued that their approach to the analysis and interpretation of the social world is the only viable option open to the researcher, positivists have strongly condemned this claim, arguing that it is 'fatally wrong' to compare two approaches that are entirely different.

The wide polarity created by anti-positivists and positivists in their attempt to understand the social world has caused a great deal of concern among scholars. Dilthey (1976) has therefore made some efforts through the use of hermeneutics to establish some form of conceptual mediation and modulation between two competing polarities in social research. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), "Hermeneutics is concerned with interpreting and understanding the products of the human mind which characterise the social world", (p. 236). It is Dilthey's thinking that over time, human-beings 'externalise the internal processes of their minds through the creation of cultural artefacts which attain an objective character'. Such cultural artefacts could be exemplified and typified in the form of 'institutions, works of arts, literature, languages, religions' and other forms of characterisations of human thought. Other scholars (such as Weber, 1949; Hughes, 1958; Runciman, 1972) have also shown great concern as to how best to reduce the gap between the



rival claims of antipositivists and positivists in their understanding of social reality. Johnnie (1991) in a rather philosophical discourse has argued that the boundary line between social constructionists (antipositivists) and positivists in their analysis and interpretation of the social world cannot be stretched beyond a breakable limit. This is because the arguments of both groups are all poised on the same continuum. But the demarcating point is merely the method adopted by each group to get closer to the 'truth'. Since what is regarded as 'true' or 'false' in management sciences is still a matter of the theoretical and ideological persuasion of each research. It is therefore difficult to conclude that one approach is superior to the other.

In an attempt to blur the contours of demarcation between the two research approaches adopted by anti-positivists and positivists, Bulmer (1984) has argued that any attempt to polarise the two dominant approaches stands the danger "of reifying the distinction between them and implying that each may be a self-contained and alternative method of social enquiry". He says this is not the true situation but the opposite of the truth. Bulmer went further to argue that different styles of research complement each other; and that a combination of different approaches can be fruitfully exploited to the advantage of management or social scientists. The view expressed above had earlier been advanced by Anderson (1972) when he argued that there is need to combine both qualitative and quantitative data in the analysis and interpretation of social phenomena. Using the same argument in sociological analysis, Coser (1984) has argued that sociology as a discipline is not sufficiently advanced "to rely on a precisely measurable variables". He believes that qualitative data collected within a small universe could theoretically provide a lead, which at a later stage in the development of the discipline could be subjected to the rigours of statistical analysis.

In another stimulating discourse, Sieber (1973) has highlighted the danger inherent in treating different research approaches as alternatives. Sieber has therefore advocated that it is likely to be more fruitful to combine different approaches within a single study. Sieber went on to argue that :

"The integration of research techniques within a single project opens up enormous opportunities for mutual advantage in each of the three major phases- design, data collection and analysis. These mutual benefits are



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not merely quantitative.. but qualitative as well - one could almost say that a new style of research is born of the marriage of survey and field work methodology".

The argument presented above by Sieber was also supported by Warwick (1983) where the importance of "methodological marriages" was stressed. Warwick had insisted that it is important to adopt different approaches or styles, as the weaknesses of one approach may be counterbalanced by the other.

## EPILOGUE

There is no one best method or approach to be adopted in social research. The approach should depend on the individual researcher, the unit of analysis, the research design and the context in which the study is to be carried out. Zelditch (1962) had demonstrated that there were several routes to obtain different types of information. Zelditch therefore, went on to argue that :

"Frequency distribution might best be obtained by enumerators and samples, but incidents and histories were illuminatingly studied by direct observation and institutionalised norms and statutes by interviewing informants".

There is therefore, no one 'best' method or approach in conducting research in management sciences. The best approach almost always is a function of the background of the researcher, the researcher's ideological persuasion, the contextual factors militating in favour or against the researcher and the nature of the phenomena under investigation. The adoption of a combination of the different research approaches is likely to lead scholars in the management sciences closer to the 'truth'. But this does not mean that researchers in the management sciences should always adopt a combination of the two approaches simultaneously. Some studies may require a combination of both approaches, while others may require the adoption of single research approach.

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## DURKHEIM'S NOTION OF SOCIAL FACT

In what follows, I wish to present a critical analysis of Emile Durkheim's views on social facts. Durkheim, is regarded as one of the profound thinkers in Sociology. If Augustus Comte is credited with the honour of having created the discipline of sociology. Durkheim is credited with the honour of making it a positive and scientific discipline having a distinct subject matter and method of its own.

What do sociologists study? Do sociologists study individuals or society? According to Durkheim, sociologists study social facts. But now the question is: How to understand the notion of social fact?

Before we answer the question what is a social fact it is imperative on us to explicate the concept of fact. Fact is usually distinguished from things and events. Things are amenable to perception. In short, we perceive things and objects. But can it be said that facts are amenable to perception? Perhaps not. The early Wittgenstein and Russell argued that there are facts. Russell even went to the extent of advocating the existence of negative facts. But neither positive nor negative facts are amenable to observation. Facts emerge only when we begin to talk or think about things. If there were no speech and thought, there would be no facts. In other words, there is a kind of dependence between fact and speech. But are facts a kind of things? In what sense do facts emerge out of our speech, thought and description? In answer to this question, it can be said that speech, does not give rise to facts as a particular cause gives rise to a particular effect. Speech and fact are simultaneous in origin. Communication and understanding presuppose something stable and persistent and this stable element in speech and communication is meaning. In short, that which is spoken, communicated or thought of is the meaning of fact. A certain type of

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meaning or fact is known as proposition. Seen in this light, facts turn out to be meanings and meanings are different from things. In this sense only meanings or facts enjoy a Platonic status. Meanings and facts are interchangeable.

Durkheim in his attempt to protect the autonomy and identity of sociology, distinguishes it from psychology. His major assumption is that psychology studies the psychic states of men either at individual or at the collective level. The psychic states being mental, are subjective and so are not persistent. Further, these psychic states, including the collective sentiments, are the effects of social facts.

Far from being product of the will, they determine it from without. They are like molds in which our actions are inevitably shaped.<sup>1</sup>

Further, he says :

The determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of the individual consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

In the course of these lines Durkheim wishes to detach and delink social facts from individual psychic states. He has not given any argument in support of his thesis. Further, the existence of social fact independent of any individual is inconceivable. It is rather the case that only after the individual human beings appear on the surface of the earth, the so called social facts emerge. Durkheim admits that social facts are coeval with individuals. In a way, the emergence of individual and social facts is simultaneous. He says :

Indeed social things are actualized only through men; they are a product of human activity.<sup>3</sup>

From the context, it appears that Durkheim is not so much concerned with tracing out the chronology of the social fact as he is keen to distinguish between individual consciousness and social fact. It is true that all thoughts and actions begin with particular individuals but they (thoughts and actions) do not remain confined to them at all. In short, they get socialised and collectivised. This type of collectivisation of events does not take place in nature at all. By being *socialized* and *collectivised*, actions and thoughts acquire a kind of autonomous



status and in their turn, tend to determine individual thoughts and actions. At a certain stage, the social facts cannot be thought of as being identical with the sum totality of the individual actions. Durkheim says :

A whole is not identical with the sum of its parts. It is something different and its properties differ from those of its component parts.<sup>1</sup>

If it is being argued that social facts are not modified by the individual thoughts and actions at all then it can be pointed out that Durkheim is trying to create a fictional entity in the name of social fact. It is true that sometimes a kind of social fact determines the individual psyche but at the same time it is equally true that on certain occasions, the individual transcends and modifies the so called social facts; nay, even replaces one order of social fact by another. Durkheim seems to have overlooked this fact. Further, in this connection he makes a very tall claim in his remark :

When the individual has been eliminated society alone remains.<sup>2</sup>

How and in what sense does the society continue to exist even if the individuals are eliminated? Surely the ideas and thoughts of a society survive the death and destruction of individuals but only in a fictional sense. This is because of the desire to treat society as basic and primary over the individuals that Durkheim advocates a kind of ethereal existence for it. Further, he treats society and social facts as a body of authority and knowledge which can be understood without reference to individuals. This view is based upon the presumption that knowledge and fact have a contextless existence. To cling to it, is to cling to the rationalist hangover. On the other hand, nothing is knowledge or fact unless it is recognised. The world might exist even if there is nobody to know it. In fact, an unknown planet might exist; nobody may be aware of it. But no knowledge and fact can be said to be there without being known and recognised. The idea of unknown and unrecognised fact is a contradiction in terms. Durkheim tried his best to make sociology an empirical science on par with physics, chemistry and biology but he could not free himself from certain apriori assumptions about knowledge, society and fact.

Social facts along with society have been treated by Durkheim as having a kind of coercive power over the individual. In fact, it



is argued that society exercises a kind of moral authority over the individual. In this sense, society rules over the individuals through its moral code, religion, government and other forms of social organisations. Durkheim says :

We have shown that the source of all that is obligatory is outside the individual.<sup>6</sup>

Religion has also been conceived by Durkheim in the similar manner. It is the society that creates morality and religion and through these it controls and restrains the individuals. He says:

Religion is, in a word, the system of symbols by means of which society becomes conscious of itself; it is the characteristic way of thinking of collective existence.<sup>7</sup>

By placing morality and religion outside the individual, Durkheim again falls back on the so called independent and impersonal social facts. It is true that morality and religion have a kind of coercive power but what is their source? Can it be said that their source is not the human individual? On the other hand, the source of all thought and action including religion and morality is the human individual. It is the human individual who not only creates morality and religion but also is guided by it. At times, he even transcends, modifies and replaces one order of morality and religion by another. This is how major social and cultural changes take place from time to time. Durkheim tends to endow social facts with some kind of self-abiding force. If his view is accepted, social change and dynamism cannot be explained at all.

If social facts are all-pervasive and they have a kind of impersonal force then the source of social change, if any, will lie with these facts alone and not with the individual. But as a matter of fact most of the time, it is the charismatic leadership that initiates social change. In Durkheim's scheme of things, there is no scope for exogenous type of social change. In short, for him, all changes are endogenous. Further, by accepting social facts as supreme over the individual, Durkheim tends to advocate a kind of social determinism. If social facts are coercive and they do not owe their origin to the individuals, then it is these social facts which act as the determinants of everything that take place in society. To argue in this manner is to advocate a kind of deterministic mode.



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Further, morality and religion cannot be said to belong to the realm of facts. That is to say, the language of religion and morality is not the language of fact. The categories of truth and falsity cannot be applied to it. The language of morals belongs to a normative order and the language of religion is a mixture of parable, myth and values. Therefore, to treat morality and religion at par with facts is to misconstrue their meaning and significance. If the logical positivists underplayed the significance of morality and religion, Durkheim has overplayed their significance. The coercive nature of morality and religion does not follow from their being at par with facts but from the fact that any violation of moral rules and religious rituals calls for a kind of social censure. As a matter of fact, precisely because of these reasons, morality and religion seem to be exercising a type of coercive force on individuals. Morality, as a system of values has been created by men. An ethical code is different from a mere conjunction of moral injunctions of the form 'do's and 'donot's. In short, an ethical code or moral system is an integrated one in the sense that it contains its justification including the world view of the group concerned. Similar is the case with religions. Seen in this light, morality and religion turn out to be a system of symbols and meanings, which are being created and recreated since the dawn of civilization. Durkheim seems to be treating symbols and meanings as facts which can be either true or false. On the other hand, it is the individuals who not only control but also create the so called social facts. But once the symbols and meanings are created they do not remain at the level of its creator i.e., the agent. In fact, it tends to acquire a social and objective character.

How do we know the social facts? Are they amenable to ordinary observation and perception or they are known through a kind of intellectual reflection? Durkheim says :

We cannot doubt their existence since we perceive it simultaneously with our own.<sup>8</sup>

It is argued that knowledge of our self and knowledge of social fact are simultaneous. That is to say, self knowledge involves the knowledge of social facts. Durkheim treats self as a kind of society. He attaches a kind of Cartesian indubitability to the knowledge of social facts. According to Durkheim, everything that goes in the name of the individual is really society in disguise. That is to say, for him, the individual is a replica of society and society incarnates in individuals.



It is not clear what does Durkheim mean by 'perception of the self'? Is the individual nothing but a replica of the society in the sense that individual freedom and liberty are mere myths? By equating the individual self with society, Durkheim is forced to accept the view that society is prior to individuals. But the context yields altogether a different picture. It is this : Society and individuals mutually influence one another. This fact cannot be denied. But then the meaning of 'mutual influence' is to be explicated. When it is said that society and individuals influence one another it does not mean that society and individuals are a kind of physical objects and their mutual influence is to be understood in terms of causal interaction. Rather, the mutual interaction, if any is to be understood in the sense of interchange of meanings. If society is understood as a concatenation or a system of meanings it makes its presence felt on the individuals and the individuals in their turn, sometimes not only transcend the meaning system but replace one system by another.

Durkheim argues that if one wishes to discover social facts one has to undergo a special type of sociological training. Further, he maintains that the objective of education is to gradually instill the social facts into the mind of students. He says :

All education is a continuous effort to impose on the child ways of seeing, feeling and acting which he could not have arrived at spontaneously.<sup>9</sup>

Durkheim does not spell out the nature of the sociological training which could help men in discovery of social facts. Given the nature of social facts, they can neither be perceived nor observed. Therefore, the only method of teaching social facts to students is to brainwash them. In his attempt to uphold the supremacy of social fact, Durkheim envisages education as a process of imposing ideas on the pupils.

Further, Durkheim postulates a particular objective of education and then argues that education is an attempt to instill social facts. He seems to ignore 'spontaneity' that is very important in learning and teaching. If the objective of education is to brainwash, then accordingly, the educators have to instill corresponding values, norms and attitudes into the mind of their pupils. But conceptually, education and brain



washing are opposite concepts. Spontaneity and individual freedom are built into the concept of education and Durkheim rejects them. The desire to make sociology an independent and autonomous discipline compels him to discover social facts in all aspects of life including the field of education.

Durkheim sometimes seeks to prove the existence of social fact by arguing as follows : It so happens that sometimes a group of absolutely innocent and inoffensive people get together and indulge in inconceivable violence and atrocities. This proves that a particular type of social fact is responsible for igniting the innocent mass of people to violent action. But this argument misconstrues the actual situation. It is not the presence of impersonal social facts that goad innocent men to violent action. Durkheim ignores the obvious fact that the behaviour of individuals in isolation is different from that of individuals in a crowd. In short, individuals behave differently on different situations and it is not because of the presence of certain social fact but because of the fact that a crowd is guided, by and large, by its own psychology.

The upbringing of children is sometimes cited as an evidence in support of the existence of social fact. Durkheim is inclined to argue that upbringing of children involves inculcation of social facts. Here, too, he goes wrong. He overlooks various aspects of upbringing. Further his obsession with mechanistic concept of mind and society has compelled him to explicate the concept of education and upbringing in such a fashion. He seeks to bring sociology at par with other positive sciences like physics and chemistry but does not take sufficient care to distinguish between what is a fact and what is a fiction. The so called social fact is a logical construction- a fiction that man creates in interaction with others. But the moment we treat these social facts as the solid bed rock of human society, confusions begin to ensure.

Regarding the status of social fact, Durkheim appears ambivalent. On the one hand, he claims that social facts are uncreated; on the other hand, he maintains that they (social facts) are created through individual actions. Further, in this connection, he maintains that social facts exist in form of ideas in the minds of individuals. Contrarily, he also maintains that the locus of the social fact is no other than human society.



Now the question is : How to understand these statements of Durkheim's? Is it really the case that sociology is an autonomous discipline? Are social facts the prerogatives of sociologist only? We wish to point out that no social science, either history or economics, study the human individual in its physical aspect. In short, all social sciences, to begin with, study social actions and social actions are meaning-impregnated. The meaning dimension of social action makes it symbolic in nature and distinguishes it from natural events. This aspect of social action has not been recognised by Durkheim. Seen in this light, not only sociology but all social sciences study social facts. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that sociology is an autonomous discipline because it studies social facts.

It is true that if there are no individuals there can be no society. In fact, individuals are both causally and logically required to account for society. Further, with the death and disappearance of some individuals, society cannot be said to disappear. Therefore, individuals cannot be regarded as constituting the substratum of social fact. If at all there is a substratum of the social fact, it is none other than the society. If society is defined as the totality of what man has including the system of knowledge, beliefs, values and norms then it becomes indistinguishable from the so called social facts. Durkheim should have used society and social fact interchangeably but he does not do that. If society and social facts are construed as a system of symbols and meanings, they cannot be adequately and exhaustively studied in terms of cause and effect. The failure to understand this aspect of social fact has compelled Durkheim to fictionalize social facts into things and objects. Once the symbols and meanings are created, they become persistent to a very great degree. Though the so called meanings and symbols are created by men yet in their turn, they continue to influence man almost unceasingly. This is the implication of what Durkheim means by saying that the social institutions and facts, therefore, are not created by men. They are received from the previous generation. Seen in this light, it can be said that man is not so much influenced by the physical environment as he is by the so called social environment. But Durkheim does not take note of the fact that there is constant interaction between man and the so called social facts or meanings. Man creates the social facts or meanings and the meanings in their turn mould man. This constant interaction between man and society accounts for social change and dynamism.



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To conclude, social facts as envisaged by Durkheim are a kind of meanings. These meanings are relatively permanent. To study society means to study these meanings. Durkheim, because of his positivistic bias, misconstrued these meanings as social facts.

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## CONSCIOUSNESS AND NOTHINGNESS

The conception of Nothingness has occupied a central place in the stream of our contemporary thought. Many thinkers, since the time of Hegel, investigated into the nature and origin of Nothingness, and endeavoured to elucidate its role in human history. It is worthy to mention that the Western thinkers before Hegel were reluctant to deal with and accommodate it in their philosophical systems. Parmenides went further by denying the concept and believed that reality consisted of Being qua being. Aristotle agreed that Being could generate only being and there would be no logical ground for the deduction of Nothingness. However, the Aristotelian formula became a dominant metaphysical principle till the time of Hegel, who deduced the conception of Nothingness from Being and kept it as the first antithesis in the first triad of the Doctrine of Being. No doubt, this bold attempt is a great achievement and has given birth to a new philosophical thinking, but we should make an inquiry into validity of the deduction of Nothingness from Being in Hegel's logic.

Being is an undeduced logical beginning as all things whether material or non-material presuppose Being, whereas Being itself does not presuppose another being. Such kind of Being is pure because it is indeterminate and has no qualification, the most abstract and the poorest conception in the hierarchy of the dialectic progression of the categories. Being is not any particular being like the being of this table or of that chair, it is Being in general and indefinable since it contains no determination. Our knowledge of it does not go beyond that it 'is'. It exhibits itself as pure 'isness', and as an indeterminate immediacy, logically prior to all categories in Hegel's Dialectic. And since it has not passed over into another (its opposition), is self-identical. But the moment it produces its opposite then the application of the abstract law of identity to it would become inappropriate, simply because it is

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does not remain the same and it goes through, change.

At this stage, Being has no determination except 'isness'. It is mere emptiness and absolutely negative, or rather equivalent to nothingness.<sup>2</sup> With this movement of passing into nothingness, the negating power emerges and gives life to the dialectic evolution.

Unlike Aristotle, Hegel makes Being a birth place for Nothingness, and finally both concepts constitute oppositions that can be regarded as two different, we can easily claim that A is not A because Being is equivalent to Nothingness. It should be also remembered that the difference between them is not like the difference between light and darkness, because they are two abstract categories while light and darkness are determined and possess qualities.

We must note carefully that Being which is supposed to be absolutely abstract, is determined at least by 'isness'. If Nothingness is the negation of Being, then it should become the negation of 'isness' and not its equivalent. This permits us to describe Being as 'isness' and Nothingness as 'not-isness', otherwise the latter can not become the negation for the former.

It is true that Being can not be described the way a particular being is described. A particular being is something with multiple universal determinations, whereas Being (Pure Being) does not have any, except 'isness'. In consequence, Nothingness becomes the opposite of Being when it negates it, and not because both of them are empty abstractions. Their sameness or identity brings a futile result in passing over into each other if their difference is not over emphasised. The possibility of the deduction of the third category namely, Becoming, relies totally on the determination of Being and not on its emptiness. Furthermore, Pure Being is not absolutely empty, it is 'isness', then it is positive. How does a positive being generate Nothingness?

Throughout the process of the deduction of the categories, Hegel deals with the answer of this question. The opposites of each triad are derived from each other and involve each other. But still it is not clear how Nothingness is the product of Being. The proper answer is provided in Sartre's ontology which is the rejection of Hegel's interpretation of Nothingness as a component part of Pure Being. What Sartre has developed is that Being is *massif*, full positivity, does not contain



negation,<sup>3</sup> and such kind of Being can not generate Nothingness. Hence, Nothingness is not a counterpart of Being which is passive, massif and full, but produced by an active, empty being which can experience its reality by intuition.

"It follows therefore that there must exist a Being (this can not be in-itself) of which the property is to nihilate Nothingness, to sustain it perpetually in its very existence, a being which nothingness comes to things."<sup>4</sup>

The Being by which Nothingness is made-to-be and brought into the heart of Being is an active being with the power of negation. Active in the sense that it is not full positivity, not filled but going to fill itself, and that kind of Being is Consciousness (Being-for-itself). Sartre outlined this approach to consciousness for the first time in his work on *Imagination* in 1936, and later in 1943 he gave full description of his theory in *Being and Nothingness*. Imagination, for Sartre, as one of the activities of consciousness constitutes double nihilation. The nihilation of the real object by producing an unreal one, and the nihilation of the unreal object as something real. From one side, the imagined object is unreal, the world does not present it as an actual one. On the other, the imagined object is produced by consciousness as something which does not exist anywhere in the external world.<sup>5</sup>

Consciousness is not the Cartesian self-substance, but a fragile and translucent being without a ready made essence or nature. It is an emptiness striving restlessly to make an essence for itself. Nothingness is thus, originated in the ontological structure of consciousness, because consciousness is not full, and lacks all possibilities. Nothingness can be traced out in the intentionality of consciousness and its transcendence towards the external reality. It is brought into the world due to that lack and that act, "Nothingness is not, but it is made-to-be."<sup>6</sup> Intentionality is an indication to that lack and the emptiness in consciousness which makes consciousness relational, transcendent and making itself rich with content. That relation between consciousness and its object is necessary because every consciousness is consciousness of something. Hence, if there is nothingness, consciousness should be aware of it. But the problem which arises here is that, how can consciousness be aware of Nothingness?



Sartre reminds us the significance of the question for the discovery of Nothingness, as we know, man is the only being who is in a position to ask questions about himself and about Being. By doing that he detaches himself from Being and places himself in a neutral state between the possibility of knowing and not-knowing, between Being and non-Being. He investigates the being of a kind of being or its way of being which is not known yet. At the same time man does not know whether the answer of the question is positive or negative, whether that kind of being reveals itself to consciousness or not. What Sartre tries to say is that a negative answer is in our expectation. The revelation of the non-being of being is equally possible as the being of it. Every question is pregnant with the element of negation.<sup>7</sup> If the answer is negative, our interrogative attitude presents a double nihilation; first, the non-being of knowing that being, second, the non-being of that being for consciousness.<sup>8</sup>

In order to understand Sartre's interpretation of Nothingness and its apprehension by intuition, we restate the example of finding Pierre in the Cafe. I have an appointment with him, expect him to be there. When I enter the Cafe, I see that he is not there. I experience the non-being of my friend at the Cafe. The object of my intuition is the non-being of his being at that moment, and that non-being was in my expectation,

"This figure which slips constantly between my look and the solid, real objects of the Cafe is precisely a perpetual disappearance; it is Pierre raising himself as nothing on the ground of the nihilation of the Cafe. So that what is offered to intuition is a flickering of nothingness; it is the nothingness of the ground, the nihilation of which summons and demands the disappearance of the figure, and it is the figure-the nothingness which slips as a nothing to the surface of the ground. It serves as foundation for the judgment-*'Pierre is not here.'*" It is in fact the intuitive apprehension of a double nihilation.<sup>9</sup>

This example does not explain the origin of Nothingness only, but also how Nothingness becomes a ground for negation. Before I proceed to discuss Sartre's view on Negation, I would like to talk about the source and the role of Negation in Hegel's philosophy. Dialectic logic considers Negation to be the essentiality of every antithesis. It appears for the first time as a category in the sphere of Determinate Being.<sup>10</sup> The legitimacy of its deduction relies on the determination of Being.



and that exhibits the influence of Spinoza on Hegel, particularly in saying that 'Omnis determination est negatio'. Whatever determination is attributed to Being that involves the negation of some other determination which is not in Being. For example when we say, 'The cat is black', it indicates that the cat is only black and it is not white. Every determination carries the seeds of negation in itself.

The role of Negation in Dialectic is not confined to any specific stage of logic, rather it emerges as a propelling force in every movement. Hegel, in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, depicts successfully the role which is played by Negation in human history, through which consciousness modifies Being into the desired world. In the historical process of consciousness, Being is negated and transcended. Such negating characteristics of consciousness dominated the core of Hegel's anthropology. It seems that even Hegel describes consciousness in the *Phenomenology*, it should be underlined because it is the name of a book, as Nothingness and the source of Negation, because consciousness has temporal determination, it is incomplete and strives to complete itself in history,

"Time therefore appears as Spirit's destiny and necessity, where Spirit is not yet complete within itself; it is the necessity compelling Spirit to enrich the share self-consciousness has in consciousness, to put into motion the immediacy of the inherent nature (which is the form in which the substance is present in consciousness); or, conversely, to realize and make manifest what is inherent, regarded as inward and immanent, to make manifest that which is at first within i.e., to vindicate it for Spirit's certainty of Self."<sup>11</sup>

Hegel's conceptions of negativity and temporality of consciousness has left a great impact on Sartre or it is what exactly Sartre tries to say. But Sartre confines Negation to consciousness because consciousness is the only being characterised by Nothingness. Accordingly, Negation becomes an intentional act of consciousness towards Being as well as towards itself. Being as full positivity knows no otherness and can not negate anything.<sup>12</sup> A geological destruction (like a storm) does not do anything to Being, and it does not destroy it, but modifies only the distribution of its masses, "there is no less after the storm than before."<sup>13</sup> The storm is destructive in its relation to consciousness as it destroys human existence.



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"In order for destructibility to exist, man must determine himself in the face of this possibility of non-being, either positively or negatively; he must either take the necessary measures to realize it (destruction proper) or, by a negation of non-being to maintain it always on the level of simple possibility (by preventive measures)." <sup>14</sup>

Sartre unlike Kant believes that Negation is a pre-judicative attitude,<sup>15</sup> and it is not necessary to be the quality of a judgement. We can experience it before making a judgement and express it in a look or a gesture. He argues also that Nothingness is logically prior to Negation. Following Hegel Sartre defines human history as a constant negation to transcend the given reality. Through the process of Negation man can change and modify Being as well as himself. But when Negation is directed towards consciousness and becomes internal negation, then leads to self-deception (Bad Faith). In bad faith consciousness denies its own reality and puts itself at the level of a non-conscious being, viz. being-in-itself or being for other.

Although internal negation involves bad faith, and denies individual reality but it is different from telling lies to the others. A liar knows the truth and hides it out from the others, whereas in bad faith there is no distinction between the liar and the others. It is that state where the liar and the others are united and are one. The person tells lies to himself intentionally. How can man deceive himself? and why?

Consciousness, as it is characterised by Nothingness, is a self-productive activity against the facticity of Being. That activity is a constant progression and does not recognise stagnation except in the projects which were accomplished in past and they no longer exist. In addition to that since man has a physical presence in the world he enjoys the facticity of Being. Consciousness can not escape from Being and its facticity, but it can transcend it and proceed towards future possibilities. Facticity and transcendence are two different elements in the ontological structure of human existence, when they are mixed up together, and considered to be identical, pave the road for the emergence of bad faith. In clarifying that, Sartre has given the title of Jacques Chardonne's work, "Love is More than Love," as an example for bad faith. The title takes the sexual love between two lovers as some thing more than that and transcendent like Platonic love. However,



the identification of these two elements is not the only kind of bad faith. Sartre indicates two more kinds which happen not only at the level of literary ambitions and confusion between facticity and transcendence, but in the daily life of a common man. The first kind considers consciousness to be an object, a thing like all particular objects around us. And in the second kind, consciousness is for-others.<sup>16</sup>

In the first case, consciousness (Being-for-self) becomes an inert object like a lifeless entity in the world. The best example of this kind of bad faith is that of a woman who goes out with a man, she knows his intentions when he holds her hand, but she does not notice it, and keeps her hand between the hands of the man, neither consenting nor resisting,<sup>17</sup> her hand has become a thing. In the second case bad faith is like Heidegger's conception of 'Verfallensein or 'das Mann', when inauthenticity invades human existence and individuality becomes a loose term. Under such circumstances the individual behaves the way it is appreciated by the others. The waiter is supposed to behave like a waiter because that is what people want from him, but from inside he himself is not a waiter.

"All his behavior seems to be as game. He applies himself to chaining movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other: his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is amusing himself".<sup>18</sup>

Bad faith is not an unescapable condition, rather it is intentional and adopted by consciousness in order to avoid anguish and responsibility. When man is afraid of responsibility and freedom, he attempts to degrade his ontological position in the world by denying freedom and making himself a passive being and behave according to the wishes of the others.

Finally, Negation can play its role positively as well as negatively in the dialectic of consciousness. It is that power which can cure and destroy. Either man lives the way he wants and creates his own history authentically, or turns his own being into in-itself, and being for-others. Authenticity is the affirmation of human freedom, and inauthenticity is the denial of that freedom. In the first case man struggles to fill the



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gap within himself by the power of negativity, and in the second case he denies the reality of that power.

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## KAUṬILYA AND GANDHI--A COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL APPRAISAL

It is interesting to note that Kauṭilya has been very often compared to Machiavelli and both of them have been condemned as advocates of gross immorality in politics. It is further interesting to note that neither Kauṭilya's nor Machiavelli's policy has found favour with any administrator or politician worthy of his name in theory while in practice, paradoxically enough, most of them have been found to be adopting the policy of Kauṭilya or Machiavelli in some form or the other at least in some of its characteristic aspects. Keith has tried to show how Kauṭilya's contribution to Political Philosophy is nothing in comparison to that of Plato or Aristotle. "It is a very misplaced patriotism", says Keith, "which asks us to admire the *Arthaśāstra* as representing the fine flower of Indian Political thought. It would, indeed, be melancholy if this were the best that India could show as against the *Republic* of Plato or the *Politics* of Aristotle."<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, it would be evident even to a casual reader that the following remarks made by one of the outstanding thinkers of this century regarding Machiavelli and his contributions are applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to Kauṭilya.

"It is the custom to be shocked by him, and he certainly is sometimes shocking. But many other men would be equally so if they were equally free from humbug. His political philosophy is scientific and empirical, based upon his own experience of affairs, concerned to set forth the means to assigned ends, regardless of the question whether the ends are to be considered good or bad. When, on occasion, he allows himself to mention the ends that he desires, they are such as we can all applaud. Much of the conventional obloquy that attaches to his name is due to the indignation of hypocrites who hate the frank avowal of evil-doing."<sup>2</sup>

The author of *Mudrā Rākṣasa* had an illuminating insight, it seems, into both the character and policy of Kauṭilya, as is evident

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from the following remarks made by Rākṣasa in a soliloquy when he sees Kauṭilya- "Aye! *Ayam sa durātmā, athavā ayam sa mahātmā Kauṭilyaḥ*" "Oh! Here is Kauṭilya an evil soul or perhaps a great saint." Bhāgurāyaṇa in his soliloquy acknowledges Cāṇakya's policy as wonderfully multifarious (*Aho! vicitrataḥ rya cāṇakyanīteḥ*) Like providence that is unpredictably multidirectional Kauṭilya's policy is variegated and multi-dimensional (*Aho citrākārā niyatir iva nītir nayav-idaḥ*), says Bhāgurāyaṇa. There is something uniquely mysterious and attractive about Kauṭilya, the man, and something peculiarly alluring and at the same time repulsive about his political thought.

It is not necessary here to highlight the common points between Machiavelli's *Prince* and Kauṭilya's *Artha Śāstra* nor is it important from my point of view to point out their difference. All this has been done so many times and in so many ways by a number of learned scholars. I would only point out that it would be unjust to compare Kauṭilya with Plato or Aristotle. The latter were philosophers of vast dimensions for whom political thought constituted only a part of their philosophical enterprise, whereas the former was primarily a political thinker whose main area of interest lies in what can be regarded as 'power-politics' in those days within a limited context. Hence, the difference in treatment of the subject-matter and their attitude towards Ethics and other branches of knowledge. *Republic* of Plato is a philosophical treatise of which the discussion on an ideal state constitutes a part only, while *Arthaśāstra* is a treatise mainly on the art of Government, its main aim being to specify the means and methods of how a state should be ruled. The comprehensiveness or otherwise of the *Arthaśāstra* is to be judged only within its specific context, that is all. It should be borne in mind that Kauṭilya was not at all a speculative thinker like Plato or Aristotle.

It would be worthwhile to compare and contrast Gandhian views with that of Kauṭilya in matters relating to means and end. *Yogaśrama* and *rakṣaṇa* of the subject is being commedable end in view, this end alone would justify the means, according to Kauṭilya; but for Gandhi, no end for that matter, howsoever laudable it may be, can justify the means. Unscrupulous means should not be adopted to achieve laudable objectives, according to Gandhi, for according to him both the means and the end need to be pure for making a genuine or a real achievement possible. But is this practicable? A straight forward question indeed which, however, is difficult to answer and cannot certainly be answered



in a simple yes or no. Kauṭilya is far from being a dreamy idealist and he is concerned with practical politics, one must not, however, lose sight of this simple point.

Bhartrhari compares politics with a prostitute who goes on changing her colours from time to time as per her convenience.<sup>3</sup> According to Machiavelli, "It is well to seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, religious, and also to be so; but you must have the mind so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change to the opposite quality."<sup>4</sup> For Russell, "Most political leaders acquire their position by causing large numbers of people to believe that these leaders are actuated by altruistic desires. It is well understood that such a belief is more readily acceptable under the influence of excitement. Brass bands, mob oratory, lynching, and war are stages in the development of the excitement."<sup>5</sup> Any means, thus, becomes acceptable in politics for attaining one's end. Kauṭilya is in favour of means such as setting fire to the houses and poisoning by the help of spies. All this is in direct opposition to those like Gandhi who with equal vehemence adhere to *ahimsā* and advocate that politics should be guided and controlled by ethical considerations. Experience, however, shows that Governments of all countries take resort to expediency rather than ethics while dealing with their own people or even with the Governments of other countries in matters concerning state and administration. Elaborate spying system is approved in national as well as international politics. K. Satchidananda Murty, an eminent Indian Philosopher, in his recent lectures delivered on '*Pañca Śīla & Pañca Tantra*' has raised a very significant question as follows: "Reflections on *Pañca Tantra* makes one ask, has any state of considerable power ever been established at any time, any where without the use of force? Can such states even after their establishment be governed without resort to force?"<sup>6</sup> This is a very important point to consider *vis a vis* the principle of *ahimsā* which has been made much of in the political philosophy of Gandhi. Murty without any hesitation points out elsewhere that "Gandhi knew very little about the power of Fear and Terror which could make human beings incapable of doing good in return for evil, or of doing anything at all".<sup>7</sup> Martin Buber in his letter addressed to Mahātmā Gandhi in 1939 had expressed his doubts about the efficacy of *Satyāgraha* in the regime of a Hitler. Buber, with all his respect for Gandhi, pointed out in no uncertain terms, "An affective stand may be taken in the form of non-violence against unfeeling human being



in the hope of gradually bringing them thereby to their senses; but a diabolic universal steam-roller cannot thus be withstood".<sup>8</sup> Buber writes from his own experience to Gandhi, "It does not seem to me convincing when you base your advice to us to practise *Satyāgraha* in Germany on these similarities of circumstances. In the five years which I myself spent under the present regime, I observed many instances of genuine *satyāgraha* among the jews.... Such actions, however, apparently exerted not the slightest influence on their opponents".<sup>9</sup> Can it be said with sufficient reason that, whether it was Buber in particular or Jews in general, they were all too impatient with *Satyāgraha* and *ahimsā* as the instruments for change of heart of their opponents? This, however, cannot be proved this way or the other in as much as human situation is not uniform and varies from place to place, time to time, and also from one context to the other.

In view of this Kauṭilya's stand cannot be set aside so lightly as one would like to do if one adheres to some sort of value based politics governed by ethical considerations. It is not true that Kauṭilya was entirely opaque to the significance or even the importance of ethics in the daily life of kings and his subjects. Kauṭilya's reference to *Mātsya nyāya* in course of his discussion regarding the necessity of punishment shows his concern for protection of the weak subjects against the aggressive tendency of the strong. Just as big fish devours the small ones, the strong would devour the weak people unless the latter are protected by a king through punishment or *daṇḍa*. In the words of Kauṭilya, "*Apraṇīto hi mātṣya nyāyam udbhāvayati | Bālīyān abalaṁ hi grasate daṇḍadharābhāve*".<sup>10</sup> This shows how and to what extent Kauṭilya was concerned with the protection of the weak as against the aggression by the strong. The king is advised to protect the weak through *daṇḍa* or punishment and to that extent the king is endowed with virtues that are certainly ethically laudable. Kauṭilya cannot, therefore, be condemned as being opaque to ethics altogether. Moreover, Kauṭilya is aware that a king is genuinely interested and engaged in the welfare of all creatures, would be loved and adored by one and all. That is why he is full of praise for such a king who is *Rājarsi*, both a king and a *Rṣi*, according to him. Kauṭilya points out clearly that such a king gets a unique rank because of these rare virtues of his. In the words of Kauṭilya himself, "*Vidyā vinīto hi rājā prajānām vinaye rataḥ, ananyam padaviṁ bhuṅkte sarvabhūta hite rataḥ*". This shows high sensitivity to morals recommended by Kauṭilya in day to day politics



of kings *vis a vis* their subjects. Moreover, kings or the *Rājarṣis* are advised to follow the pursuit of *kāma* only in so far as it does not conflict with *dharma* and *artha*. “*Dharmārthāvivirodhena Kāma seveta na niḥśakhaḥ syāt/Samam vā trivargam anyonyānubandhanam.*” Although it is true that *artha* is the main objective according to Kauṭilya (*Artha eva pradhāna iti Kauṭilyah*), still he does not lose sight of *dharma* or *kāma* altogether. Once the importance of *dharma* is acknowledged with that of *kāma* and *artha*, ethics finds a footing in Kauṭilya’s framework, as I understand it.

It is true, however, that cruel and immoral means are recommended by Kauṭilya for the protection of the State and the Governments against the enemies and the traitors, when the state is in difficulty. These are forbidden in case of law-abiding citizens and also in normal times. “*Evam duṣṭeṣv adhārmikeṣu ca varteta, netareṣu*”.<sup>11</sup>

This is an important point emphasised by Kauṭilya which one should not forget in this connection. If ‘*Ārjavam hi Kuṭileṣu na nītiḥ*’ is accepted, if it is not advisable to be simple and straight-forward in face of some one who is crooked, Kauṭilya’s policy can not but be appreciated in this light. As a matter of fact, virtues like *ahiṃsā* (non-violence), *satya* (truthfulness), *anasūyā* (freedom from malice), *ānṛśamsya* (compassion) and *kṣamā* (forgiveness) are recommended for one and all irrespective of their *varṇa* and *āśrama* by Kauṭilya *Sarveṣām ahiṃsā satyam śaucam anasūyānṛśamsyam kṣamā ca l’* In view of this a re-appraisal of Kauṭilya’s policy is of paramount importance for eradicating some of our misconceptions in this regard.

The problem, however, is not so simple. Nothing succeeds like success in politics, and once unscrupulous means are given approbation for achieving one’s end in politics there can be no end to this and it would be hard, if not impossible, to check the immoral tendencies in our day to day life also. Under the circumstance, instructions to adhere to the traditional morality or even morality of whatever sort it may be could be obeyed more in violation than in practice and ultimately a time would come when everyone, irrespective of his being in or outside politics, would have a tendency to pay a mere liployalty, if at all, to morals and values. That would be very dangerous state-of-affair indeed. If full-fledged and one-opinted devotion to *ahiṃsā*, as propounded by Gandhi, may not be practically useful, in affaris of the State or the



Government, adherence to Kautilya's policy of adopting all sorts of unfair means by the ruler for the sustenance or protection of the state could end in sheer disaster in our public and private life as far as morality is concerned. The reason is very simple. Once it is allowed that any means is alright in state-craft, the ruler would have a tendency to consolidate his position at all costs and would be paying a mere lip-loyalty to the idea of protecting the State from the evils inside or outside itself. Self-protection, self-aggrandisement would then be the motto for the ruler and all sorts unscrupulous means would be adopted by the ruler for achieving his own end rather than the good of the state. Since immoral means are already sanctioned and highly immoral practices are not only permitted but deliberately perpetrated for achieving political ends, the same means and the same practices would be both permitted and perpetrated for achieving personal ends. My point is that there is no end to immorality and once this is allowed it can go to any extent. As a matter of fact, all sorts of unscrupulous means and immoral practices have been taken resort to and are being practised even now in world-politics in the name of love of one's country, internal and external security, progressivism and what not. And once this is encouraged it would have a tendency of percolating and infiltrating into the daily life of the public. Individual morality cannot be kept separate from unscrupulous state-policies or ideologies in spite of the best efforts of an able statesman, for ordinary men have natural tendency to follow the examples of their masters. "*Yad yad ācarati śreṣṭhas tattad evetaṛo janāḥ | Sa yut pramāṇam kurute lokas tad anuvartate*" as it has been aptly stated in the *Bhagavadgītā* (III.21) Ultimately this may lead to the utter destruction of the state, Government and the ruler as well.

If value-based politics may be useless, politics without morals could be self-destructive. This is the *paradox of politics*. Morals may not work and immoral tendencies cannot be checked at any particular level, according to the sweet will of the politician; this is the paradoxical situation in which practical politics finds itself at the very outset, and there seems to be no escape from this situation. So, what happens in practical politics is well-known; there is a constant swinging movement, so to say, in politics. Sometimes power-politics in which adoption of unscrupulous means is sanctioned without any hesitation takes the upperhand, while value-based politics is undermined or is at best paid



a mere lip-loyalty. At other times, the wind seems to blow in favour of value-based politics, specially when the ruler and the people are completely fed up by politics which has become too muddy and are compelled by circumstance to lean in favour of morals in politics. My assessment is that neither a Gandhi nor a Kautilay is self-sufficient for politics; politics has to go on experimenting with one after the other or even at times one along with the other, and nobody can predict at the outset if this or that would succeed in the long run. Even great political pundits cannot predict what would be the final result of such experiment, for the result is likely to differ according to different contests. Success and failure in one context cannot guarantee similar success and failure in another context, for the simple reason that the uniformity of condition cannot be ensured in such cases.

As in all human affairs, in affairs of the state also I do not think that there is any golden path in an absolute sense. If Kautilya's policy has had its day and has succeeded in affairs of the state, so also has Gandhian method succeeded in its own way. If there are cases where Gandhian method has failed, instances can also be cited where adoption of a policy like that of Kautilya has produced mere monsters trying to devour each other by hook or by crook. So, we cannot say that one is superior to the other, nor can we say that one is merely complementary to the other. There is nothing like the perfect or the best policy in politics; policies need to be adopted, experimented upon, promoted and undermined according to circumstances that arise from time to time differing also from place to place. As far as Kautilya is concerned, we must admit that his insight into the workings of human mind in matters of state-craft, his observations on the practice of espionage etc. are simply penetrating. In any case Kautilya's policy has not lost its relevance even in the so-called modern times in which we live, move and have our being. It is being put to practice even in our times in various manner by different Governments of the world who may not otherwise be acquainted with or even be aware of *Arthaśāstra* as a treatise. Politics being a practical affair, nothing, it seems, becomes outdated in politics so long as it works. We are only to distinguish works of political wisdom from those of mediocrity or of mere drudgery, and *Arthaśāstra*, whether one agrees with it or not, is certainly a work of great political sagacity.



Consideration of morals, of values has always been there alongside the play of power-politics and it would also continue to be there. An astute politician with rare insight alone would be able to maintain a balance between the two which is an unavoidable necessity if the society is not to degenerate and disintegrate. Our normal day to day transaction (*lokavyavahāra*) has been described as a mixture of truth and falsehood by Ācārya Śaṅkara in his *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* in a specific sense and with a specific purpose.<sup>12</sup> From another point of view, it appears to me that it also is applicable in the field of politics. It is a part of the duty of an astute as well as a patriotic politician who is worthy of his job to ensure that there should not be any excess of falsehood at any point whatsoever. As a matter of fact, I should think that political astuteness itself consists precisely in this, i.e., continuing to be in power as long as possible without allowing falsehood to take the upperhand in any case.

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"Satyānṛtemithunīkṛtya aham idam namedam iti naisargiko'yaṁ lokavyaya, hārah"



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## THE LAW OF DEPENDENT ORIGATION AND RELATIONS

The Dependent Origination (*paticcasamuppada*) is the law of the origin of states depending upon some causes or conditions. There is nothing like a self independent entity. Everything comes into existence depending upon some other thing. It is said that "When this exists, that exists; on the arising of this, that arises. In the absence of this, that does not come into existence; on the cessation of this, that ceases to be".<sup>1</sup> It is stated that there are twelve links, which make the wheel of becoming (*bhava-cakka*) revolve. These are the (1) Ignorance (*Avijja*). (2) Activities (*Sankhara*). (3) Birth-consciousness (*Vinnana*). (4) Mind and Body (*Nama-rupa*). (5) Six-Senses (*Salayatana*). (6) Touch (*Phassa*). (7) Feeling (*Vedana*). (8) Desire (*Tanha*). (9) Clinging (*Upadana*). (10) Becoming (*Bhava*). (11) Birth (*Jati*). (12) Decay & Death (*Jara-marana*). With these links, the circle of existence goes on revolving and exhibits the *samsara* as a fact of life.

The relation (*paccaya*) has been explained as that from which an effect derived from a cause comes- *paticca etesma etiti paccayo*<sup>2</sup>. It has the characteristics of rendering service<sup>3</sup>. The state which renders service to the standing or arising of a state only is said to be its cause or condition<sup>4</sup>. Where one *dhmma* by its arising or persistence is a helper to another *dhmma*, that first named is the causally relating *dhmma* to the last named. Thus, a relation (*paccaya*) is not only relating thing but also an assisting agency (*upakaraka*). There are twenty four types of relation, which have been enumerated, explained and illustrated in the *Patthana-pakarana*<sup>5</sup>, the seventh book of the *Abhidhamma-Pitaka*. They are namely (1) *Hetu-paccaya* (root-condition), (2) *Arammana-paccaya* (Object-condition), (3) *Adhipati-paccaya* (Dominance-condition), (4) *Anantara-paccaya* (Contiguity-condition), (5) *Samanantara-paccaya* (Immediate-condition), (6) *Sahajata-paccaya* (conasance-condition), (7) *Annamanna-paccaya* (Mutuality-condition), (8) *Nissaya-paccaya* (Base-

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condition), (9) *Upanissaya-paccaya* (Decisive-condition), (10) *Purejāta paccaya* (Pre-existence-condition), (11) *Pacchājāta-paccaya* (Post-existence-condition), (12) *Āsevana-paccaya* (Repetition-condition), (13) *Kamma-paccaya* (Action-condition), (14) *Vipāka-paccaya* (Resultant-condition), (15) *Āhāra-paccaya* (Nourishing-condition), (16) *Indriya-paccaya* (Faculty-condition), (17) *Jhāna-paccaya* (Concentration-condition), (18) *Magga-paccaya* (Path-condition), (19) *Sampayutta-paccaya* (Association-condition), (20) *Vippayutta-paccaya* (Dissociation-condition), (21) *Atthi-paccaya* (Presence-condition), (22) *Naatthi-paccaya* (Absence-condition), (23) *Vigata-paccaya* (Disappearance-condition), and (24) *Avigata-paccaya* (continuance-condition).

The law of Dependent Origination with its twelve factors, is no doubt, anterior to the theory of relations (*paccaya*), as is evident from the *Nikāyas*. These two are two facets of the same doctrine. The former describes the things that are related and the latter, the way in which things are related. In other words, we can say that the law of dependent origination explains the process of existence of conditioned things. The theory of relation (*paccaya*) explains the relation existing between different phases, coming into existence. Such relations are explained in conditioned things only.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, the two constitute one consistent whole, the one supplementing the other.

Again, the theory of relation (*paccaya*) is the final development of the theory of causality discovered and propounded by the Buddha. And, it was also said that the theory of relations was formulated by the *Ābhidhāmmikas* in an attempt to place the theory of Dependent Origination on a more philosophical foundation. To find out how far the attempt of the *Ābhidhāmmikas* had been a success is the purpose of this paper. The present paper expounds the brief description of the causal relation of the two terms of each of the eleven propositions of the causal chain with reference to the twenty-four types of relation.

### 1 Relation between Ignorance (*Avijjā*) and Activities (*Saṅkhāras*):

When, in the *Kāṃāvacara* plane, one contemplates on the nature of ignorance in order to get rid of it, the resultant activities are obviously conditioned by ignorance as the object condition (*ārammaṇa-paccaya*). But however a person, in the *Kāṃāvacara* plane, performs acts of charity and the like in order to get rid of ignorance, or when a person, in the



*Rūpāvacara* plane, practises meditation for the same purpose, the ignorance does the function of a decisive condition (*upanissaya-paccaya*) in respect of the activities, representing the act of charity and the practice of meditation.<sup>8</sup> Again, when a man enjoys greed which is accompanied by ignorance, ignorance stands to the activities representing the enjoyment as an *ārammaṇa-paccaya*. Similarly, when in the case under consideration, the ignorance becomes a dominant object or a driving power, the relation becomes an instance of *ārammaṇādhīpati* or *ārammaṇūpanissaya-paccaya*. When however a person, being misled on account of ignorance, commits the immoral acts of killing and the like, the ignorance as a driving power stands in *upanissaya-paccaya* to the activities, representing the act of killing.<sup>9</sup>

## 2. Relation between Activities (*Saṅkhāras*) and Consciousness (*Viññāṇa*):

The activities are technically known as *Kamma* and hence they are said to stand in *Kamma-paccaya* to the resultant consciousness. The priority of fructification of a particular *Kamma* is determined by its relative strength or power, and so the fructifying *Kamma* is also regarded as an *upaṇissaya-paccaya* of the resultant consciousness.<sup>10</sup> Thus, activities stand as *Kamma* as well as *Upanissaya-paccaya* to the resultant consciousness.

## 3. Relation Between Consciousness (*Viññāṇa*) and Mind Body (*Nāma-rūpa*):

Here, (*Viññāṇa*) is not restricted to *vipāka-viññāṇa* (resultant consciousness) alone but is taken in a wider sense including volitional consciousness (*abhisāṅkhāra-viññāṇa*) also. The term *nāma-rūpa* also does not stand only for *nāma* and *rūpa* blended together, but severally for *nāma*, *rūpa* and *nāma cum rūpa*. Because *Viññāṇa* sometimes (e.g. in the *arūpa*-plane) gives rise to *nāma* alone, sometimes (in *rūpa*-plane) to *rūpa* alone and sometimes to both *nāma* and *rūpa* (e.g. in the *Kāma*-plane). The *viññāṇa* stands to *nāma* in the following nine relations, each of which has the causal characteristic of 'co-presence with the effect': *sahajāta*, *añṇamañña*, *nissaya*, *sampayutta*, *vipāka*, *āhāra*, *indriya*, *atthi* and *avigata*.<sup>11</sup> It also stands to *hadaya-vatthu* (heart- base), at the time of rebirth (*paṭisandhi*), in the same nine relations, only replacing *sampayutta* by *vippayutta*. It also stands to other physical aggregates (except the *hadaya-vatthu*) in eight relations, excluding only the *añṇamañña* from



the nine above in case of *hadaya-vatthu*.<sup>12</sup> The *abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇa* however is related to the physical aggregates in relation of *upanissaya*.<sup>13</sup>

#### 4. Relation between Mind-body (*Nāma-rūpa*) to Six Senses (*Ṣaḍāyatana*) :

It has been discussed in three ways, namely the relations between *nāma* and *ṣaḍāyatana*, the relations between *rūpa* and *ṣaḍāyatana* and the relations between *nāma-rūpa* and *ṣaḍāyatana*.

(a) *Nāma* : *ṣaḍāyatana*- In the *arūpa*-plane, at the moment of rebirth (*paṭisandhi*), *nāma* as *vipāka* is related to the sixth organ in the following seven ways namely, *sahajāta*, *aññamāñña*, *nissaya*, *sampayutta*, *vipāka*, *atthi*, and *avigata*.<sup>14</sup> Besides, the *nāma* as *abyākatahetu* (viz. morally neutral *alobha* etc.) stands as *hetu-paccaya* to the said sense-organ and similarly the *nāma* as psychical nutriment (*arūpi-āhāra*) stands to the same as an *āhārapaccaya*. And also during the process of continuity (*pavatta*), including that of cognition, the *nāma* as *vipāka* has the same relations with the sixth sense-organ. The *nāma* as activities however bears to the said organ all the above relations excepting the *vipāka* which is possible only between terms which are resultants (*vipākas*). In the other planes, viz. *Kāma*-vacara and *rūpā*-vacara, at the moment of rebirth (*paṭisandhi*), *nāma* as *vipāka* is related, through the heart-base, to the sixth sense organ in the same seven ways mentioned above. To the other five sense-organs, however, it is related, through the four primary elements, in six ways, viz. *sahajāta*, *nissaya*, *vipāka*, *vippayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*.<sup>14</sup> The relations of *hetu* and *āhāra* are also possible in the same way as in the case of *arūpa* plane. And also during the process of continuity, including that of cognition, the *nāma* as *vipāka* has the same relations with the sixth sense organ as *vipāka*. The *nāma* as *vipāka*, however, bears to the said organ all the above relations excepting the *vipāka*. To the remaining five sense-organs, during the process of cognition, the *nāma* as *vipāka* is related, through the corresponding five sense-bases (*cakkhuppāsāḍādi-vatthu*) in four ways, viz. *paccajāta*, *vippayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*.<sup>16</sup> The same relations also hold good between *nāma* as volition and the five sense organs.

(b) *Rūpa* : *Ṣaḍāyatana* : There is no *rūpa* in the *arūpa*-plane, and so the question of determination of relation between *rūpa* and *ṣaḍāyatana* in that plane simply does not arise. In the other planes, however, the



physical base of heart, at the moment of rebirth (*paṭisandhi*), is related to the sixth sense-organ in the following six ways : *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *vippayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*.<sup>17</sup> The four primary material elements, however, are related, at the moment of rebirth as also during the process of continuity, to the remaining five sense organs according as they arise in the following four ways : *sahajāta*, *nissaya*, *atthi* and *avigata*.<sup>18</sup> The faculty of material vitality (*rūpa-jīvitindriya*) is related to the five sense organs, at the moment of rebirth (*paṭisandhi*) as well as during the process, in three ways, viz., *atthi*, *avigata* and *indriya*. *Āhāra* is related to the same five sense-organs, during the process by way of *atthi*, *avigata* and *āhāra*.<sup>19</sup> The *hadayavatthu* is related, during the process, by way of *nissaya*, *purejāta*, *vippayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*.

(c) *Nāma-rūpa* : *Salāyatana* : In the *kāma* and *rūpa*-plane, at the moment of rebirth (*paṭisandhi*), the *nāma* (consisting of three *vipākakkhandhas* viz. *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṅkhāra*) and *rūpa* (*hadayavatthu*) stand to the sixth sense organ (viz. *manāyatana* or *viññāna*) in the following ways, namely, *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *vipāka*, *sampayutta*, *vippayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*.<sup>20</sup>

#### 5. Relation between Six-Senses (*Salāyatana*) and Touch (*Phassa*) :

The first five sense organs are related to the respective objects in six ways, viz. *nissaya*, *purejāta*, *indriya*, *vippayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*. The sixth sense organ viz. *manāyatana* is related to the mind impression (*mano-samphassa*), which is a form of *vipāka* or resultant consciousness, in nine ways, namely, *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *vipāka*, *āhāra*, *indriya*, *sampayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*.<sup>21</sup>

#### 6. Relation between Touch (*Phassa*) and Feeling (*Vedanā*) :

With reference to the five doors (*pañcadvāra*) the visual-impression (*cakkhu-samphassa*) is related to the feeling, arising at the eye-base in eight ways.<sup>22</sup> viz. *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *vipāka*, *āhāra*, *sampayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*, and identical is the case of other four kinds of impressions. To the corresponding feelings, accompanying the process of *sampaṭicchana*, *santīrana* and *tadārammaṇa* in the *Kāma*-plane, the visual impression and the like are related by way of *Anantarūpanissaya* only. The mind-impression (*mano-samphassa*) accompanying the *manodvārāvajjana*, is related to the feelings, in the



*kāmāvacara* plane, accompanying the process of *tadārammaṇa* by way of *upanissaya-paccaya* only.<sup>23</sup>

Touch also serves as the *nissaya-paccaya* (dependence-condition) for the arising of feeling, the latter cannot arise without a foot-hold on the former.

#### 7. Relation between Feeling (*Vedanā*) and Desire (*Taṇhā*) :

Feeling stands to desire as *upanissaya* in as much as the former is the driving power conditioning the latter.<sup>24</sup> It serves as a nourishing-condition (*āhāra-paccaya*), for desire to arise and develop, it must be fed by pleasurable feeling. It also assists in the arising of desire by way of controlling condition (*indriya-paccaya*), since desire is controlled or determined by the pleasurable nature of the object. Lastly, feeling may appear to be continuance-conditions (*avigata-paccaya*) because once the pleasurable feeling is absent, one does not crave for it.<sup>25</sup>

#### 8. Relation between Desire (*Taṇhā*) and Clinging (*Upādāna*) :

The desire serves clinging as a root condition (*hetu-paccaya*), for just like the root of a tree, which draws up sap from earth and water and carries it up to nourish the tree and as a result the tree blossoms forth and bears fruit, even so desire, rooted in desirable objects, draws up the essence in the form of pleasure so that at last man clings to those pleasurable objects. Desire is also served as nourishing-condition (*āhāra-paccaya*), and also as a dominance-condition (*adhipati-paccaya*) for dominated by the strong desire for pleasurable objects, one clings on to them.<sup>26</sup>

The *Kāmatāṇhā* is related to *Kāmupādāna* by way of *upanissaya* inasmuch as the latter arises with respect to the objects of the former. In other words, *Kāmatāṇhā* leads one to *Kāmupādāna*. To the other three *upādānas* viz. *diṭṭhupādāna*, *śīlabbatupādāna* and *attavādupādāna*, however, the *Kāmatāṇhā* is related in seven ways, namely *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *sampayutta*, *atthi*, *avigata* and *hetu*.<sup>27</sup>

#### 9. Relation between Clinging (*Upādāna*) and Becoming (*Bhava*) :

All the four kinds of *upādānas* are related to the *rūpa* and *arūpabhavas*, as well as to the moral volitions and the life-continuum of



the *Kāma-bhava* by way of *upanissaya-paccaya* only. To the accompanying immoral volitions of the *Kāma-bhava*, they are related by way of *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *sampayutta*, *atthi*, *avigata* and *hetu-paccaya*. In the case of non-accompanying (i.e., immediately preceding) volitions, however, only the *upanissaya-paccaya* would hold good.<sup>28</sup>

*Upādāna* also serves as nourishing condition (*āhāra-paccaya*) for becoming (*bhava*). If one does not continue to cling on to this or that state of becoming, then there would be no rebirth.

#### 10. Relation between Becoming (*Bhava*) and Birth (*Jāti*) :

Here, becoming refers to only *Kamma-bhava* or the activities, which are responsible for birth by way of being its *Kamma-paccaya* and *upanissaya-paccaya*.<sup>29</sup>

*Bhava* also serves as resultant (*vipāka-paccaya*), because, it is the effectiveness of becoming of the desire to be born that is manifested in the birth of a new being.

#### 11. Relation between Birth (*Jāti*) and Decay and Death (*Jarāmarāṇa*):

Birth is related to the decay & death by way of resultant-condition (*vipāka-paccaya*) for the latter are nothing but the fruitioning of the cause which is birth. It also serves as a contiguous condition (*anantara-paccaya*) for immediately after birth, the decay and death follow because of impermanence. Then, as pre-existence-condition (*purejāta-paccaya*) and also absence (*natthi*) and abeyance (*vigata*) conditions, birth serves the consequent suffering etc.<sup>30</sup>

*Jāti* is also *upanissaya-paccaya* of *Jarāmarāṇa* inasmuch as in the absence of *jāti*, *jarāmarāṇa* is impossible, while on the occurrence of *jāti*, the latter invariably follow.<sup>31</sup>

The above remarks would clearly bring into light the relation existing between the theory of Dependent Origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) with the twelve factors and the theory of Relations (*Paccaya*). The attempt of the *Abhidhammikas* to place the theory of Dependent Origination on a more philosophical foundation had thus been proved to be a success. With the formulation of the theory of Relations, the problem



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how the things that are given in the theory of Dependent Origination are related and in what way, is very consistently solved.

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## Footnotes and References

1. *Imasmiñ Sati idam hoti, imassa uppāda idam uppajjati. Imasmiñ asati idam na hoti, imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati* - *Majjhima-nikāya*, II. (Ed.) Bhikkhu J. Kashyap. Nalanda. 1958. p. 257
2. *Visuddhimagga*, (Ed.) Dwarikadasa Shastri. Varanasi. 1977. p. 450.
3. "upakāraḥ lakṣhaṇaḥ paccayo" - *Ibid*.
4. "yo hi dhammo yassa dhammassa thitīyā vā upattiyā vā upakāraḥ hoti tassa paccayo ti vuccati" *Ibid*.
5. *Paṭṭhāna-pakarāṇa* I. (Ed.) Bhikkhu J. Kashyap. Nalanda. 1961. pp. 3-11.
6. *Paṭṭhānanayo pana āhaccapaccayatthitā ārabha pavuccati* - *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho* (Ed.) Revatadharmā, Vaaranasi. 1965. p. 210.
7. "Sā hi avijjāṃ khayato yayato sammasanakāle kāmāvacarāṇaṃ pūññābhisaṅkhārānaṃ ārammaṇa-paccayena paccayo hoti" *Visuddhimagga*. p. 457.
8. "Avijjāsamattikkamattāya pana dānādini ceva kāmāvacarapūññakiriyavattūni purentassa, rūpāvacarajjhānāni ca uppādentassa dvinnāṃ pi tesam upanissayapaccayena paccayo hoti" *Ibid*.
9. "Esā hi avijjā ārabha rāgādinaṃ uppajjanakāle ārammanapaccayena, garuṃ katvā assādanakāle ārammaṇadhipati-ārammanupanissayehi, avijjāsamulāphassa anādinavādassavino pāpūpātādini karontassa upanissayapaccayena paccayo hoti" *Ibid*.
10. "Kusalākusalaṃ kammaṃ vipākassa upanissaya-paccayena paccayo." - *Paṭṭhāna-pakarāṇa* I. p. 138.
11. "yaṃ hetum paṭisandhiyaṃ pavattiyāṃ vā vipākasaṅkhātā nāmaṃ tassa upanissaya vā upanissaya vā paṭisandhiyaṃ vā ānāmaṃ vā vipākavīññāṇasahajāta-ānāmañña-nissaya-sampayutta vipākāhārindriya-atthi-avigatapaccayehi navadhā paccayo hoti" - *Visuddhimagga*. p. 474.



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12. "Thapetva pana vatthurūpaṃ sesarūpassa imesu navasu aññamaññapaccayaṃ apanetvā sesehi aṭṭhahi paccayehi paccayo hoti" Ibid. p. 475.
13. "Abhisāṅkhār aviññāṇaṃ pana assasattarūpassa vā pañcavokārabhave... Upanissayavasena ekadhā vā paccayo hoti" Ibid.
14. "Paṭisandhiyaṃ tāva avakamsato sahaajāta-aññamañña- nissaya-sampayutta-vipāka-atthi- avigatapaccayehi sattadhā nāmaṃ chaṭṭhāyatanassa paccayo hoti" Ibid. p. 470.
15. "Itaresaṃ pana taṃ pañcannaṃ cakkhāyatanādinaṃ catumahāphūtasahāyaṃ hutvā sahaajāta- nissaya- vipāka- vippayutta- atthi-avigatavasena chahākarehi paccayo hoti" Ibid.
16. "Tattheva hi pavatte sesānaṃ cakkhāyatanādinaṃ pañcannaṃ cakkhupasādhādivatthukaṃ itaraṃ pi vipākanāmaṃ pacchājāta- vippayutta - atthi-avigata-paccayehi catudhā paccayo hoti" Ibid. p. 477.
17. "Rūpaṭo hi paṭisandhiyaṃ vatthurūpaṃ chaṭṭhassa manāyatanassa sahaajāta-aññamañña- nissaya- vippayutta- atthi- avigatapaccayehi chadhā paccayo hoti" Ibid.
18. "Cattāri pana bhūtāni avisesato paṭisandhiyaṃ pavatte... cakkhāyatanādinaṃ sahaajāta- nissaya-atthi- avigatapaccayehi catudhā paccayo hoti" Ibid.
19. "Etesaṃ pana cakkhādinaṃ pañcannaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ pavatte ca atthi-avigata - indriyavasena rūpajīvitam idhā paccayo hoti. Ahāro ca atthi- avigatāhāravasena idhā vā paccayo hoti" Ibid.
20. "Paṭisandhiyaṃ tāva pañcavokārabhave khandhattaya- vatthurpasāṅkhātāṃ chaṭṭhāyatanassa sahaajāta-aññamañña- nissaya - vipāka-sampayutta-vippayutta-atthi- avigatapaccayūdihi paccayo hoti" Ibid. p. 478.
21. "Cak khāyatanadīni tāva pañca cakkhusamphassādibhedaato pañcavidhassa phassassa nissaya- purejāta-indriya- vippayutta- atthi-avigatavasena chadhā paccayā honti. Tato paraṃ ekaṃ vipākamanāyaatanaṃ anekubhedassa vipākamanosamphassassa sahaajāta- aññamañña-nissaya-vipāka-āhāra-indriya-sampayutta- atthi- avigatavasena navadhā paccayo hoti" Ibid. p. 479.
22. "Tattha hi pañcadvāre cakkhupasādhādivatthukānaṃ pañcannaṃ vedanānaṃ cakkhusamphassādiko phasso sahaajāta aññamañña- nissaya- vipāka-āhāra-sampayutta-atthi-avigatavasena aṭṭhadhā paccayo hoti" Ibid. p. 480.
23. "Yā pana tā manodvāre tadārammaṇavasena pavattā kāmāvacaravedunā tāsāṃ manodvāravajjana- sampayutto manosamphasso upanissayavasena ekadhā vā paccayo hoti" Ibid.
24. Ibid. p. 481.
25. Kalupahana, D.J., "The Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism" (2) University of Ceylon Review Vol. XIX. 1962. p. 189.



26. *Ibid.*
27. "Ettha ca evaṃ desite upādānacatukke purimassa kāmupādānassa kāmataṇhā upanissayavasena ekadhā va paccayo hoti. taṇhābhinanditesu viṣayesu uppatito. Sesattayassa pana saha-jāta- aññamañña- nissaya- sampayutta-atthi-avigata- hetuvasena sattadhā vā paccayo hoti" - *Visuddhimagga*, p. 485.
28. "Rupārūpabhavānam hi kāmabhavapariyāpannassa ca kammabhavave... upanissayapaccayavasena ekadhā vā paccayo hoti. Kāmabhavave attanā sampayuttākusala- kammabhavassa saha-jāta- aññamañña- nissaya- sampayutta- atthi-avigata- hetupaccayappabhedehi, saha-jātādīhi paccayo hoti. Vip̐payuttassa pana upanissaya paccayeneva ti" - *Ibid.* p. 487
29. "So hi jātiyā paccayo, na upapattibhavo. So ca pana kammapaccaya- upanissayapaccayavasena dvedhā paccayo hoti" *Ibid.*
30. Kalupahana, D.J. "The Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism" (2) *University of Ceylon Review*. Vol. XIX. 1962. p. 189.
31. "Tasmā ayaṃ pi jāti-jarāmaraṇassa ceva sokādinam ca paccayo hoti veditabbā. Sā pana upanissaya-koṭiyā ekadhā vā paccayo hoti" - *Visuddhimagga*, p. 487.



## THE DIALECTIC OF THE ANCIENTS AND ITS RE-EMERGENCE IN HEGEL

### PREAMBLE

It can be said that Hegel was in the main, the modern rediscoverer of the extremely dynamic character of Aristotle's metaphysics which treats all being as process and movement—a dynamic that had become entirely lost in the formalistic tradition of Aristotelianism. It can also be said with a little exaggeration that Hegel's philosophy is, in a large sense, a re-interpretation of Aristotle's ontology rescued from the distortion of metaphysical dogma and linked to the pervasive demand of modern rationalism that world be transformed into a medium for freely developing subjects; that the world become, in short, the reality of Reason. But much more acceptable is the view that Hegel's philosophy is Kant seen through an intensive study of the ancient Greeks, and a religious conviction that has rejected orthodoxy.

Our concern here is only with the off-mentionial "magic" of Hegel: the dialectical method. Thus this paper elucidates the ancient and contemporary antecedents to Hegel's philosophical orientation.

### FROM THE ANCIENTS

The word "dialectic" is derived from the Greek word *dialektos*, which means "debate" or "discourse". Diogenes Laertius ascribes the origin of dialectic to Zeno of Elea who is renowned for his paradoxes. Others ascribe it to Heraclitus while yet others claim that dialectic started with Socrates. According to Engels "Heraclitus was the first to penetrate the hard core of scientific insight.... described the universe as flux".<sup>1</sup>

But Aristotle joins Laertius in the view that dialectic originated with Zeno, and says further that dialectic proceeds from the opinions

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of men and, therefore, its reliability cannot be juxtaposed with demonstration which proceeds from first principles. He therefore classified dialectic with sophistry, but admits that it is capable of providing a method of criticism for the unearthing of principles of inquiry. Zeno's paradoxes are therefore good examples of dialectic because they refute the hypotheses of their opponents by drawing unacceptable conclusions or consequences from them.

The attempt to credit Socrates with the origin of dialectic is readily called to question by the fact that in Plato's *Parmenides* Socrates (as a young man) was subjected to the kind of treatment he metes out to others elsewhere. Perhaps the two innovations to the dialectical method that can be legitimately ascribed to Socrates are: (1) epagogic arguments and (2) universal definitions. The former consists in leading an interlocuter in an argument to a generalization by leading him to accept the truth of series of propositions about particular cases. The latter refers to the constant and peculiar characteristic of a genus e.g. "man is a rational animal" attributes rationality to all men.

Plato in his use of dialectic distinguished between "eristic" and "philosophical" dialectic, respectively. Eristic dialectic, which he variously termed the degenerate form of dialectic, shadow of dialectic and "anti-logic", refers to the art of quarrelling employed by the sophists for the sole purpose of winning a dispute. By calling it "anti-logic" or the art of contradiction, Plato indicates that it is a tendency to contradict, to maintain aggressively whatever position is opposite to that of one's interlocuter. In this respect, Protagoras, a leading sophist, claimed that he could "make the worse argument the better" i.e., he could take any side in an argument and win. For the sophists "knowledge in the strict sense was unattainable.... everyone should 'measure' matters according to his nature and needs, since man alone was the measure of all things".<sup>2</sup>

For Plato, dialectic is applied philosophically when it is employed in seeking the truth. It emphasizes seriousness without conscious trickery and it is from the perspective of philosophical dialectic that Plato recommends the debarment of youths from the practice of dialectic. According to him it can be used wrongly and can make unserious men reject good moral principles in which they have been bred and resort to pleasure-seeking.



Lads, when they first get a taste of disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it contentiously, and imitating confuters, they themselves confute others. They delight like puppies in pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them.... And when they have been confuted by many, they quickly fall into a violent distrust of all that they formally held true<sup>3</sup>.

Apart from the desire to win, people may also engage in eristic dialectic for pedagogic or tutorial purposes. Aristotle believes that a pupil's wit is sharpened if he is encouraged to practice argumentation by trying to defend his thesis against criticisms, by trying to think up and organize criticisms of other pupils' theses. Thus a teacher may himself engage his students in eristic bouts, or else pit one student against another, subject to his own tutorial criticism and moderation. Parmenides recommended this type of dealectic for the young Socrates, because of its importance to the young man who desires to study philosophy.

Eristic dialectic is also recommended by the ancients because of its "peirastic" or probing purpose. At times people feel self-satisfied and complacent in their views and opinions. In such a state of mind, Aristotle says that they need to be deflated, as it were, for the good of their soul and wits. Hence

When they discover that they can quickly be driven, without trickery, into acknowledging things patently inconsistent with other things which they had felt sure of, they become warier and intellectually humble<sup>4</sup>.

This is explained in Aristotle's *Topics* and in Plato's *Sophist*. In the latter book Plato presents sophists who merit a better name because they help purge complacent people of thier conceit of knowledge, through cross-question and examination. This is also what Socrates has in mind when, at the beginning of *Theaetetus*, he explains at length how he, like a midwife, enables people put aside their "sham offspring" (the false conceit of knowledged) in order to give birth to genuine or true knowledge. His usual custom is to start from that which is "familiar" and taken for granted, proceed to point out some of its inherent implications, before moving on to better understanding and clarity.

This idea of orderly progression, or of doing one thing after another, is frequently harped upon in Plato's dialogues. It is present wherever Socrates argues that one question is prior to another and must



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first be attended to. He would maintain, for instance, that it would not be proper for us to ask whether "x" is good, bad, etc until we have disposed of the question "what is 'x'?" Thus for Plato and his master "any discourse ought to be constructed like a living creature with its own body, as it were; it must not lack either head or feet, it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to suit each other and the whole work"<sup>5</sup>. This idea that each item in a composition should follow by some necessity directly from what preceded it, which is also found in Hegel, Plato calls "logographic necessity".

Dialectic was therefore an art as well as a method for Plato, and he hinted variously in his works about its relation to other arts and sciences. In fact he placed dialectic in a sovereign position over and above all other sciences by saying that it is the coping-stone of all other studies, and that no other kind of study can rightly be placed above it. Since for Plato the ultimate science is that which presents truth in its utmost clarity, what he is to be understood to be saying here is that dialectic attains greater truth and precision than any other science. Thus dialectic (the copingstone) should be approached after one has studied the other sciences, because it directs and disposes of all other sciences. The law-giver, or he who makes the words of language must, according to Plato, go to the dialectician to ascertain if he has made them well. Also the mathematician or geometer must hand his discoveries over to the dialectician, just as the fisherman hands over his catch to the cook.

This architectonic character of dialectic is probably a consequence of its synoptic attitude to the other sciences. It seeks an insight into the community and related and the unrelated in all sciences.<sup>6</sup>

In the *Philebus* Plato says that all great sciences require "talk" and the context seems to give this statement the more definite meaning that dialectic is a necessity in every important science or art. It is also in this book that he says conclusively that dialectic is, indeed, the instrument through which every discovery ever made in the spheres of arts and sciences has been brought to light. This may mean that in all fields of endeavour it is possible to achieve something without the science of dialectic, but that one must rely on dialectic to achieve the best. By the best Plato means the highest amount of certainty, clarity



and systematization. This, in part, is what philosophy *per se* aims at in its search for knowledge and truth.

Plato distinguishes between reason and sense and maintains that dialectic uses the faculty of reason to arrive at the truth. Sense can only give us opinion, while reason can be used by itself to achieve by far the best results. This does not mean that the dialectician is not interested in the sensible as such; the point being made here is that the dialectician does not answer a question by resorting to a process of sensible observation. Dialectic uses only words, and no diagrams or experiments, in addition to reason. Looking at the opposition between these two faculties, Socrates says :

I was afraid I might become totally blind in soul through looking at facts with my eyes and trying to grasp them with each of the senses. It seemed to me that I ought to resort to discussions, and study the truth of things in them.<sup>7</sup>

The supreme method for Plato has its being only in conversation and he makes out time in *Phaedrus* and *Letters VII* to deprecate the practice of writing philosophy down in very strong terms. In *Phaedrus* (277D) he asserts that writing is inferior to conversation because words cannot teach, clarify or certify a thing. They make people forgetful, by luring them to trust written words instead of their own memories i.e. we can learn most from a man only by conversing with him and not by reading what he has written down. This argument draws nourishment from Plato's conviction that true knowledge is supposed to be engraved indelibly in the soul. Written words cannot answer questions. They can neither explain anything you do not understand nor remove any objection you may raise.

In this view, then aim of higher education is the conversion of the soul from the study of what is empirically given to the senses to the contemplation of real existence. This, he explains, is because most men dwell in the darkness-as in a cave-and all their thoughts, beliefs and ideas are tailored to suit the blurred luminosity of the environment; and the object of education is to lead men from the cave of obscure vision to the clarity and world of reality. Thus education is neither a matter of putting knowledge into the soul of a person who does not possess it, nor of putting sight into blind eyes, but of orientating man to the supremely real.



## FROM THE MEDIEVALS AND THE MODERNS

Much later in the history of philosophy some Neo-platonists developed the idea that the course of the world is governed by a process with three stages: unity (*mone*), going out of oneself (*Prohodos*), and return into oneself (*epistrophe*). In the middle ages dialectic was one of the seven liberal arts and it was Abelard, a conceptualist and a student of William of Champeaux and Roscelin, who made it the method of scholasticism. In his book entitled *Sic et Non* (Yes and No) Abelard held the view what dialectic is the sole road to truth apart from scripture. This view "had, at the time a valuable effect as a solvent of prejudices and an encouragement to the fearless use of the intellect"<sup>8</sup>. Abelard was opposed by Peter Damian for whom dialectic was an exhibition of the sin of pride.

In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (A61, B86) dialectic becomes *die logic des Scheins*: the logic of mere appearance, of error and illusion. For Kant dialectic among the ancients is a name for the misguided efforts of man to apply the principles governing phenomena to "things-in-themselves"; ".....A Sophistical art of giving one's ignorance and even the illusions that one produced deliberately, the whitewash of truth, by imitating the method of thoroughness prescribed by logic....."<sup>9</sup>. Kant therefore set out to expose what he calls the illusions of judgement which claims to go beyond the limits of sense experience (Transcendental Judgement).

Looking through the West European philosophic tradition, Hegel rejects cristic dialectic. He rejects

that dialect which takes an object, proposition and co. given to feeling or in general, to immediate consciousness and explains it away, confuses it, pursues it this way and that, and has as its sole task the deduction of the contrary of the idea with which it starts- a negative form of dailectic commonly appearing even in Plato<sup>10</sup>.

Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three steps of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this terminology, but Hegel did not. He never once used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in his books. And they do not help us to understand his *Phenomenology*,



his *Logic* or his philosophy of history. Insistence on this triad impedes any open-minded comprehension of Hegel's work by forcing it into a scheme which was available to him and which he deliberately spurned. The mechanical formalism, in particular, with which critics since Kierkegaard have charged him he derides expressly and at some length in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*.

This not to say that Hegel is at variance with Plato. Quite the contrary. He joins Plato in rejecting the mischievous form of eristic dialectic and also recognizes the need to "disturb" people with rigid views. This, according to him, is because,

... philosophy finds obstruction too in the unreasoning concept that builds itself on well-established truths, which the possessor considers he has no need to return upon and consider, but rather takes to be fundamental, and thinks he can by means thereof propound as well as decide and pass sentence. In this regard it is necessary once again to make a serious business of philosophy"<sup>11</sup>.

The school of thought which holds dialectic as a method that seeks to build a deductive system as Hegel knew in the various branches of mathematics, and such as we know in our systems of symbolic logic, is rejected by Hegel. Such methods, according to him, though essential and brilliantly successful in their own fields are quite useless for philosophical cognition. They are successful in mathematics because the concepts of mathematics have been artificially arrested and purged of anything half-thought or implied. Thus it achieves hard clarity because it deals with things merely as units, merely as externally ordered and assembled, and not as having any deeper affinities with one another.

Hegel was therefore clear, as Kant was not, that the truth of such propositions as  $5 + 7 = 12$  was the tautological consequence of the rules and definitions of the number system. It is only on its fringes that mathematics becomes dialectical; where, passing beyond the situations with which it is adapted to deal, it is forced to frame wholly new concepts of the infinite, the infinitesimal and incommensurable.

The kind of thought we find in a formal deductive system is characterised by great fixity and difiniteness of notions, presuppositions and deductive procedures; as well as by an extreme stress on the distinctness and independence of one notion and principle from another.



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Hegel calls this the thought of the Understanding (*Verstand*). Having cut off ideas by presenting them as independent and fixed, this kind of thought proceeds to play various "neat" games with them. These games are entirely successful because their counters are of standard shapes and fit perfectly with and into each other.

This use of "Understanding", with its faint flavour of deprecation, to stand for a somewhat hide-bound, philosophically inadequate form of thinking is common to the German idealists, and goes back to Kant. Kant opposed Understanding to Reason (*Vernunft*). The former is, for him, a faculty content to apply categories and principles to the wanted material of finite experience, while the latter attempts an "unconditional synthesis" and tries to apply the same categories and principles on and beyond the very horizon of experience. Kant prefers the pedestrian ways of the Understanding to the soaring dangerous ways of Reason, while Hegel reverses the preference. For the latter Reason is a higher mode of cognition and emerges out of Understanding through dialectic.

According to Hegel, Understanding is at work not only in mathematics, but wherever ideas or procedures are given a quasi-mathematical definiteness, and are kept apart by other ideas and procedures into which, however, they naturally shade, and without which they can have no significant application. The sciences and practical arts all involve Understanding in their initial abstractions, and would be impossible without it. They must deal with their subject matter from a peculiar, single standpoint and must dismiss all other standpoints and considerations as irrelevant. "A table of contents is all that understanding gives, the content itself it does not furnish at all"<sup>12</sup>.

Understanding, like "sense" in Plato, is for Hegel, the beginning of philosophy : for it is only when mutually complementary, often antithetical abstractions have been clearly developed (perhaps by the sciences) will it be possible to integrate them into a richly analysed living view. Just as Plato would have us believe that the separate sciences need philosophy and the philosopher, Hegel says "Let the other sciences try as much as they like by ratiocination or *raisonnement* without philosophy, they are unable to keep alive without it, or to have any spiritual significance and truth in them"<sup>13</sup>.



Philosophy must therefore be able to use the work of the Understanding because Understanding will lead to thwarted and arrested development if it is allowed to dominate philosophical thinking. Philosophy must allow things to "pass over into one another" if it is to reinstate and understand the continuum of experience and save it from being reduced to senselessness by Understanding.

It is to the hard and fast, isolated notions, axioms or rules of the Understanding that dialectic (a "moment" in philosophical thinking) stands opposed. In dialectic one-sided abstractions demand to be complemented. This demand may express itself by a sheer breakdown into senselessness, or by the passage to the demanded complement or antithesis, which may be just as one-sided as the original notion, and may merely supercede it. At higher stages, however, dialectic becomes a reflective shuttling to and fro between notions known to be interdependent and correlative, and at a yet higher level it becomes a simple development of our notions, the more narrowly abstract growing into the more "concrete" and rich in "sides". In all these processes contradiction is most evident: it is implicitly present in the original products of Understanding, and becomes explicit when these products break down and start passing into their complements. It is also "preserved" in the result of all such processes.

Hegel emphasizes that the corrosive philosophical doubts, which are characteristic alike of the destructive modern and "noble" ancient skepticism, are deep forms of cognitive despair, which are not to be appeased by an ordinary proffer of information. Nor is dialectic to be identified with sophistry, the arbitrary and tendencious seeing of facts from points of view which lead to distorted conclusions. Hegel is therefore opposed to any view of dialectic which makes the contradictions of dialectic *merely apparent*, something that will vanish once systematic science has been achieved. To think of them in this manner is in fact to make of them a restored discipline of the Understanding, from which contradiction and movement have been eliminated. Like the Neo-platonists Hegel sees the levelling of all pretended universal definitions (Socratic "irony") and the development of ideas in the Platonic dialogues, like the *Parmenides* as "the true uncovering positive expression of the Divine Life". For him, therefore, the "...*Parmenides* of Plato- is perhaps the greatest literary work in ancient dialectic"<sup>11</sup>.



But it is in the Kantian antinomies that Hegel sees the most positive expression of dialectic. He praises Kant for noting not only that our notions of time, space, and causal dependence can be developed in contradictory ways, but also for showing further that such contradictions are "essential and necessary": that they do not spring from a causal error or a conceptual mistake as previous philosophers had supposed. He, however, criticises Kant for asserting that the antinomies are afflictions of our understanding and that they have no application to things-in-themselves. Hegel points out that, in holding this view, Kant shows a misplaced tenderness for "things-in-the-world": an unwillingness to see contradictions in them and a greater willingness to see them in thought, reason or spirit. Kant is further criticised for confining his antinomies to a limited set of cosmological ideas instead of recognizing their presence in objects of all types and in all notions and ideas.

Dialectic is not, however, for Hegel the end of philosophizing but only a "moment" or an aspect in philosophical thinking. If it overcomes the hard and fast notions and presuppositions of the Understanding, it must itself be overcome in the higher thought of Reason, or, as Hegel calls it, Speculative Thought. The peculiar characteristic of Reason or Speculative Thought is that it succeeds in *uniting* or *reconciling* opposed characteristics, so that the unalloyed contradiction marking the dialectical stage, which is responsible for its unease, passes over into a stage which is also one of harmony and peace.

This speculative or reasonable attitude in philosophy marks, according to Hegel, a thinking return to the unthinking reasonableness of ordinary thought and speech, as this had been before it was disrupted by the action of the Understanding. One may in fact say with some exaggeration that for Hegel, the overcoming of contradictions and irrationality consists really in their permanent acceptance, since they are seen to be essential to, and, therefore part of the final rational outcome.

But from the point of view of the Understanding, the results of Reason cannot be anything but contradictory, since they contain contradictory elements. The stability of the reasonable result (which is alien to Understanding) as opposed to the dialectical phase, lies in the fact that one of its aspects overreaches (*ubergreift*) the other, and demotes it to a mere condition of itself. The stages in such a movement



are: (1) a movement from an initial stage of positiveness (characteristic of Understanding); (2) a stage of contradictory sceptical malaise (characteristic of dialectic proper); and (3) a stage of accommodation which will re-instate the stability of the reasonable result and positiveness at a higher level (and will therefore be typical of Reason) until it culminates in Freedom. Thus "The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development"<sup>15</sup>.

Rejecting Schelling's use of dialectic in a wholly external and formal manner, Hegel holds the (platonian) view that the various stages of development should arise from each other in a *necessary* manner in a genuine dialectic. We are not to determine its course: it must determine itself by its inner necessity. Each stage is to be precisely the "nullity" of the immediately previous stages, the full "experience" of just that which these previous stages were attempting and failing to do. It has no further content than this, and therefore could not be different in any way whatever.

For Hegel, therefore, the dialectical system is in a sense more rigorous than the mathematical. This is because while the latter may have many starting points and many alternative directions that proof may take, there is but one unique starting point and a single line of proof in the former.

The negation which dialectic applies is not only a critique of conformistic logic, which denies the reality of contradictions, but also a critique of the given state of affairs on its own grounds- a repudiation of the established system of life which denies its own promises and potentialities. Nothing which does not sustain itself in a life and death struggle with the situations and conditions of its own existence can be. The struggle may be blind or unconscious, as in inorganic nature; it may be conscious and concerted as in the struggle of mankind with its own conditions and with those of nature.

The different modes of being represent different modes of unifying antagonistic relations; and refer to different modes of persisting through change, of originating and perishing, of having properties and limitations, and so on. And Hegel incorporates this basic (Aristotelian) conception into his philosophy by saying "The different modes of being



are more or less complete unifications". Being thus means unifying and unifying means movement. This is dialectic proper.

Reality thus becomes the constantly renewed result of the process of existence and *identity*- the continuous negation of inadequate existence. Because the subject maintains itself in being other than itself, each reality is a *realization*: a development of subjectivity which comes to itself in history where the development has a rational content. Thus "True reality is merely the process of reinstating self-identity... it becomes actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves"<sup>16</sup>.

It can therefore be said by way of conclusion that for the ancients as for Hegel, the sciences are unable to tell us their essential meaning without philosophical comprehension. Their existence is due to motives whose truth and cogency are themselves beyond scientific demonstration. Science is in need of philosophical direction, but not in the sense that philosophy is to overrule the method of science. Indeed this is precisely the way in which science and philosophy are not to be related. The whole point of dialectic is that the will and striving for systematic knowledge (science) should be pervaded by the desire for comprehensive grasp of reality (philosophy), and that the philosopher need not quarrel with the scientist (The Unity of Knowledge).

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## DISCUSSION

### YOUNG AND OLD ARGUMENTS ABOUT GLOBAL ANTI-REALIST RELATIVISM ABOUT TRUTH

Relativisms of various sorts (about truth, knowledge, standards, meaning, morals *etc.*) have managed to retain their interest for many thinkers (including philosophers, not just sociologists of knowledge and anthropologists) despite two millenia of (putative?) refutations<sup>1</sup>. My interest in relativism is in relativism about truth, a thesis which has been called 'the Achilles heel of relativism'<sup>2</sup> for it would seem, on the face of it, absurd to challenge the objectivity and absoluteness of truth. This may be, however, merely because one is surreptitiously building in some sort of naive realist, or correspondence, theory of truth such that any claim that the truth of statements (or sentences *etc.*)<sup>3</sup> varies with theory (or belief systems, or conceptual scheme, or culture, or whatever)<sup>4</sup> seems to give to those theories *etc.* literal world making power such that one is stuck with the odd situation that different theorists literally occupy different universes, a view fraught with difficulty<sup>5</sup>.

More promising, it would seem, would be to embrace in some way something more like a coherentist conception of truth, for with its likely disengagement of truth from reality, the relativisation of truth to various belief systems, or whatever, would seem possible without literal multiple realities as a distasteful corollary of truth relativism.

In a series of papers over the last few years (including one in this journal)<sup>6</sup>, a Canadian philosopher, James Young, has suggested an extreme form of relativism based on anti-realist/coherentist theories of meaning and of truth/justification. Young's self-set task in his papers is to establish that what I shall call 'global anti-realist relativism about

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truth' is 'at worst, a defensible position'<sup>7</sup> To this end he both clarifies just what the position amounts to and defends it against standard criticism. He doesn't claim to show the view to be correct but, I shall argue, even the minimal aim he has for his papers is too sanguine.

The starting point for Young's thesis is an anti-realist construal of meaning.

Young says that, of the two major motivations for anti-realism, one of them, the reductionist tendency to give the meaning of the members of some class of sentences by sentences in another class to which the first is reduced, can be ruled out *a priori* as a line of argument that will support global anti-realism because, as Colin McGinn has pointed out,<sup>8</sup> though it can eliminate a (straight forward) realist understanding of the "reduced away" sentences, one must always have at least one class of sentences in terms of which to do the reducing<sup>9</sup>.

The other major motivation for anti-realism, the rejection of standard truth conditional meaning theories, is, in Young's view, more promising as route to *global* anti-realism<sup>11</sup>. Young investigates the promise of viewing the understanding of sentences to reside in a grasp of the conditions which would warrant them to and notes, correctly, that 'not just any conception of warrant will serve the purposes of global anti-realists'<sup>11</sup>. What's needed is 'a conception of warrant which does not presuppose the realist treatment of some sentences'<sup>12</sup>.

Promising enough in this regard for his purposes, thinks Young, is a theory of meaning which takes a coherentist conception of warranting conditions, one in which 'a sentence is warranted if it coheres with the other sentences which speakers have assented to as true'<sup>13</sup>.

So, Young's idea of sentence meaning is an anti-realist coherentist one in which one's understanding of a sentence is constituted by one's understanding of the conditions in which it would be warranted. Part of one's theory dictates what those warranting conditions are, that is, what bunch of other sentences would, were they to be assented to, warrant also assenting to the sentence in question. So much for meaning, what of truth? For a sentence to be true is simply for these warranting conditions to have received assent, for their assertion also to form part of a correct theory, that is, one endorsed by the community of cognitive agents<sup>14</sup>.



But this is, in a way, to collapse truth and mere belief, contrary to Young's explicit intent<sup>15</sup>. To be sure, some sentence, *S* say, won't be deemed true just because someone (or even some community) believes it. As Young remarks, *S* 'is true if and only if it is warranted by theory and quite independently of whether anyone believes it (*S*) to be true'<sup>16</sup>. However, this leaves unsettled what the status of the theory which so warrants *S* is. As Young notes in response to Joseph Wayne Smith, if *S* is true because warranted by a *correct*<sup>17</sup> theory, the anti-realist does owe us an account of what counts as a correct theory. Young denies having a correct theory amount to just *any* consistent set of sentences, noting that a sentence from a novel (he draws his example from Jane Austen's *Persuasion*) though part of a consistent set, is not true on this account. Why? Because the novel doesn't constitute anyone's theory. So, at least a necessary constraint on something being a correct theory is that it is 'adopted by some community'<sup>18</sup>. Smith, or in any event, I, would respond to this by querying what counts as a set of sentences being *adopted* by some community. If 'adopted', as I've assumed, just means 'believed', then, as Young notes Putnam to object, 'truth is relative to what someone believes'<sup>19</sup>. It is just that the relevant object of belief will not be *S* but a set of sentences. If 'adopted' does not just mean 'believed' then it seems to me that I (and Smith) would be 'quite right to seek clarification'<sup>20</sup> beyond that given.

Let me allow that something could be done here by Young, such that his view does not collapse truth into mere belief. However, further objections to his views remain. Note that the relativism in Young's view comes from the possibility that various communities might adopt various theories. Thus *S* might be understood differently (differ in meaning) from community A to community B because that part of A's theory which stipulates the conditions under which *S* is warranted might be different to its counterpart in B's theory. Thus meaning is theory relative (and thus community relative)<sup>21</sup>. And so is truth. Other parts of a community's theory will give the sentences actually assented to by that community and should they include those constitutive of the warranting conditions of *S* then *S* is true. Thus the truth of *S* is also relative to theory on this view.

Now, Young notes and responds to an objection to relativism by William Newton-Smith to the effect that, on Young's view, a sentence



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might be true relative to one theory and false relative to another.<sup>23</sup> Newton-Smith considers truth-conditions to be bound up with the meaning of a sentence such that two sentences with different truth-conditions could not count as sentences of the same type (or as synonymous)<sup>23</sup>. But, he continues, if sentences have the same truth-conditions how can they end up with different truth values? So, put another way, Newton-Smith's view is that no sentence can be true relative to one theory and false relative to another, contrary to the relativist's claim.

Young responds<sup>24</sup> by saying that Newton-Smith presupposes a realist conception of truth for, if truth-conditions are *intra-theory*, then one sentence,  $S_1$ , might be true relative to one theory,  $T_1$ , and its assented to sentences (including those setting out the truth-conditions of  $S_1$ ) and another sentence,  $S_2$ , false relative to another theory,  $T_2$ , and its assented to sentences. Thus, says Young, 'anti-realists can preclude situations where two sentences with the same truth-conditions have different truth values'<sup>25</sup>.

He goes on to point out that it's not as if  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  truth conditions are set by  $T_1$  and these differ from those set by  $T_2$  for  $S_2$ . Thus,  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  are different in truth-conditions (and meaning) and are not the same sentence.

In this last response, Young ignores the other prong of Newton-Smith's thrust against the relativist. Newton-Smith is quite willing to allow that the same sequence of marks might have two meanings, and thus truth conditions, one set of which might be satisfied and one not. Such a situation he dubs 'trivial semantic relativism'<sup>26</sup>. His charge against the truth relativist is that her view is either trivial (if two sentences not meaning the same are involved) or incoherent (if somehow the same sentence is supposed to be both true and false). As the name suggests, *trivial* semantic relativism seems an uninteresting form of the thesis yet that seems to be what Young admits to.

It might be, however, that Young gives away too much to Newton-Smith and that his view is not as trivial as I have suggested Newton-Smith would deem it. Much depends on how holistically we are to construe the semantic operations of a theory to be. In outlining Young's views earlier, I was at pains to have it that, say,  $S_1$ 's truth



conditions were laid down by some (meaning setting) sentences of  $T_1$  and that it would be an extra move, appealing to  $S_1$ 's coherence with other sentences of  $T_1$ , that would determine whether  $S_1$  was warrantably assertible (was true). The picture imagined is something like that  $S_1$ 's meaning is constituted by its relationship to, say,  $S_2$  and  $S_3$ , as stipulated by the metasentence  $Ms_1$  : ' $S_1$  is true if  $S_2$  and  $S_3$ '. Now whether  $S_2$  and  $S_3$  are assented to, or not, I took to depend on whether or not some further sentences, say,  $S_4$  and  $S_5$ , had already been assented to. Thus, when Young says: 'a sentence is true if and only if warranted by a correct theory'<sup>27</sup>, I've taken this to allow for two cognitive agents within a community sharing  $Ms_1$  and thus meaning the same by  $S_1$  yet not agreeing about  $S_4$  and  $S_5$  and thus not agreeing that  $S_1$  is warranted.

It seems to me that some such limitation upon seamless holism is needed to allow for substantive disagreement, that not just based on two agents being "at cross purposes" in their attempt at mutual communication. Yet, if we do allow this distinction, then it does seem possible for two agents (or two communities<sup>28</sup>) to share an understanding of a sentence yet for that sentence to be true relative to the relevant body of assented to sentences of one but not the other.

Mind you, though this seems to rescue Young's anti-realist relativism about truth from Newton-Smith's charge of triviality without opening it back up to the charge of incoherence, it's not clear just how palatable a position we're left with.

'Truth' would be univocal; and sentence meaning for a community a matter of the truth conditions associated with that sentence by that community. Yet not all within the community<sup>29</sup> might have a similar enough assenting history to make the same truth valuations of sentences of which they have a shared understanding. Weird, perhaps, but not incoherent and, maybe we ought not be overly surprised to see relativism being as peculiar as it promised to be. After all, despite his talk of his view of truth conditions as being "independent of the whims of individuals"<sup>30</sup> through being associated with a correct theory, the intra-theoretic nature of this notion of "objectivity" and the subjective construal of correctness has obvious potential for relativistic oddness.

So, though it might escape Newton-Smith's dilemma, it is still not clear whether Young's anti-realism is coherent; it is, however, odd.



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Further problems occur due to Young's unusual advocacy of the view as viably *global* in its scope<sup>31</sup>, a theory of truth for all sentences.

The first difficulty this seems to cause relates to the standards by appeal to which some sentence *S* is deemed warranted by, or coherent with, say, sentences *X*, *Y* and *Z* which have already been assented to. These standards, *C* say, can themselves be asserted in a sentence, say, 'standards of coherence *C* are correct standards for judging the warrantedness of sentences'. And this meta-sentence's warrantedness is presumably also to be judged by seeing if it coheres with (and is thus warranted by) some further, already assented to, sentences; and such judgements of coherence presumably appeal to some standard of coherence deemed apt for such meta-sentences. There's a whiff of a vicious regress here and the global anti-realist owes us further elucidation of the position.

Moreover, as has been noted in many places, beginning with Plato's *Theaetetus*, if the statement of global anti-realist relativism doesn't fall within its own scope then it constitutes its own counter-example yet, if it does fall within its own scope, which is Young's stance,<sup>32</sup> whether or not a given community understands Young's thesis is presumably a matter of them sharing an understanding of the truth conditions of global anti-realist relativism (the conditions in which it would be warranted to assert it). This doesn't seem problematic but it does seem a weakness of the view that, though two communities/theorists might share an understanding of the thesis' truth conditions, they might not share views about whether or not the sentences stipulating the thesis's truth conditions are warrantably assertable. This is presumably because of a different assenting history concerning the sentences epistemically linked to these truth condition ones or to differing epistemic criteria concerning the warranting of these truth condition claims, or whatever. The point is that a realist/absolutist, though sharing Young's understanding of global anti-realist relativism might have that thesis false relative to her theory even though relative to Young's theory it might be true.

The relativist, then, would seem unable to go beyond saying that, though relativism is true-for-him it might not be true-for-everybody; absolutism might be true-for-somebody. That relativism is just true-for-some is not necessarily disturbing and, as Young is at pains



to insist<sup>33</sup>, not incoherent. That absolutism is true-for-somebody is perhaps not incoherent, but it is weird and deserving of further exploration and explication.<sup>34</sup>

One could try to insulate anti-realist relativism from each of the preceding two objections by making it less global but whatever the merits of this path might be<sup>35</sup> it is not one that Young wishes to tread and it is *global* anti-realist relativism that is of concern here.

A further objection of a rather different sort concerns Young's conception of the correctness of a theory as being temporally tied to the time of inquiry: 'a theory is correct if it is currently adopted by some community.'<sup>36</sup> Truth is relativised to a *current* theory and thus seems relativised to the fleeting present. So, even though 'the earth is flat', as asserted in 600 B.C. in Ionia, say, might have been true relative to the beliefs of some then existing community, it is no longer true, even for them. Time has, so to speak, passed that truth by (unless a *current* community with the same understanding of that sentence is warranted in endorsing it by their own theory). The difficulty this time is that it's hard to see why Young isn't *more* relativistic than this. He would seem to be committed to saying that though it used to be true-for such Ionians that the earth was flat it is no longer true<sup>37</sup> *even for them* (or relative to their theory) because they are no longer around to do the requisite assenting.

But this is odd, why would Young hold this? One could still, to take up one of his concerns, draw a distinction between a correct theory, apt for sentence warranting, and a fictional novel<sup>38</sup> by having a correct theory being one held at some time or other such that it is true (tenselessly) relative to the theory of those Ionians, that the earth is flat though not true that Lousia Musgrove visited Lyme Regis<sup>39</sup>. Why the temporal parochialisms?

Reflection upon the case of fiction generates the noting of another oddity in Young's account of the status of some set of sentences as a correct theory. What makes something a correct theory is simply that 'it is currently adopted by some community'<sup>40</sup>, so, if, for some strange reason,<sup>41</sup> some community came to believe Jane Austen's *Persuasion* then it would be true that Louisa Musgrove visited Lyme Regis. And if they become disabused of belief in the set of sentences comprising *Persuasion* then it would become false again. This is at least odd, though



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not, perhaps, incoherent (and thus not, perhaps, a point against Young's main concern with these papers).

As another worry, it's not clear that Young's can be a *global* account of warrantedness, except for eternal beings. Presumably there must be some sentence, X, say, which is an agent's initially assented to sentence yet this can't be warranted as there are no prior-assented-to sentences to form the reference class for such a warrantedness decision. So, warranting cannot get started. Nor can X be understandable for there is not yet in place a standard of coherence in terms of which to grasp 'which other sentences would have to be true'<sup>42</sup> if the sentence is to be warranted'<sup>43</sup> yet that is Young's proposed account of understandability. Can understanding get started?

So far, my remarks have been concerned to query whether we have, indeed, been offered a conceivable candidate for 'a theory of meaning which would entail global anti-realism'<sup>44</sup>. Now I'd like to raise a more general query about the notion of warranted assertability, or, more particularly, that of assertability.<sup>45</sup> What is it to assert something? I take it that whatever account is given by the anti-realist had better not, on Young's view, appeal to any realist notions yet it is hard to see how this can be avoided. To assert 'snow is white' would, on the face of it, be naively considered to be understood as a claim about snow. It seems, that is object-linguistic. Yet on the global anti-realist's view it seems, rather, to be metalinguistic. On that view, the understanding of any sentence consists in a grasp of the coherence relations between it and other *sentences* to which speakers have assented. Somehow the world has been lost as the focus for assertion<sup>46</sup>. Similarly, one can wonder what the act of assent amounts to. If realist construals are to be avoided, then an account of the phrase 'assented to as true'<sup>47</sup> has to be analysed in terms of warranted assertability and the focus for assent is metalinguistic. Without any grounding of these sentences to the world (via, say, perception)<sup>48</sup> it's difficult to comprehend them as anything but empty symbol schemata, ones anything but understandable in anything but a formal way. Hence, perhaps, the tendency for most anti-realists not be global in the scope of their theory.

Young is aware that he has not shown global anti-realism to be correct, he does claim, however, that, when based upon a coherentist account of warrant and a warranted assertability theory of meaning,



it 'is, at worst, a defensible position'<sup>49</sup>. I hope to have shown him to have been too sanguine.

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### NOTES

1. for a recent, fairly comprehensive work see Harvey Siegel's *Relativism Refuted* (Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1987).
2. By Chris Swoyer, see his 'True for' in J. Meiland and M. Krausz, eds., *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral* (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1982) 84-108. An even more vulnerable looking thesis is ontological relativism: whether this is held to be merely the other side of the coin of truth realism or not depends on one's conception of truth-a matter which is a concern of this paper.
3. As will emerge, it is more than usually enjoined upon those thinking about these issues to be carefully explicit about what they take to be "truth-vehicles".
4. Which of these one relativises truth to can make quite a difference to one's chances of making out a case for coherent relativism about truth. Taking there to be something like an analytic/synthetic distinction (*pace* quineans) and appealing to conceptual schemes (*pace* the neo-verificationist tendencies of Donald Davidson's 'On the very Idea of Conceptual Scheme' *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 47, 1973/74, 5-20) as our relativisation relatum allows some sort to be made of truth relativism even within a correspondence/realist notion of truth. The idea is being pursued by me as a development of one of Jack Meiland's ideas (see his 'Concepts of Relative Truth', *The Monist*, 60, 568-582). Failing to make a conceptual scheme/substantive theory distinction and trying to make sense of truth relativism within a correspondence conception of truth is decidedly difficult.; see Steven Edwards' monograph *Relativism, Conceptual Schemes and Categorical Frameworks* (Aldershot, Avebury, 1990).
5. For a sequenced dialogue on this see W. Newton-Smith, *The Rationality of Science* (Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) 34-37; Frank White, "On a Proposed Refutation of Relativism", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 64, (1986), 331-334; Peter Davson-Galle, "Relativism about Truth", *Metascience*, 6, (1988), 54-56; Frank White, "Comments on Relativism about Truth", *Metascience*, 7, (1989), 2-5; and Peter Davson-Galle, "Truth and White 'Lies'- a Frank Response", *Metascience*, 7, (1989), 6-7.



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6. Relatively Speaking: the Coherence of Anti-realist Relativism". *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 16. (1989). 503-510; "Global Anti-realism". *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research*, XLVII. (1987). 641-647; "Meaning & Metaphysical Realism". *Philosophy*, 63, (1988). 114-118; and "Relativism Revisited". *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, XVII. (1990). 374-377 (respectively. I shall refer to these by 'R.S.' 'G.A.R.', 'M.M.R.' & 'R.R.')
7. G.A.R.. p. 647.
8. Colin McGinn. "An A Priori Argument for Realism". *The Journal of Philosophy*, 76. (1979). 113-133.
9. As a passing remark. Young slides from the correct claim that any reductionist thesis requires that at least one class be understood in a non-reductionist fashion to the not correct claim that any reductionist thesis requires that there is at least one class which is understood in a realist fashion (G.G.R. 643). I see no reason to rule out, *a priori* a non-realist account of the meaning of the "reducing" class(es) together with a reductionist account of the reduced sentences. One can adopt, for instance, a non-standard theory of meaning employing warranting conditions for the "reducing" class in much the way that Young suggests for all sentences. The point is not that reductionism entails realism about the "reducing" (class(es) but that it can't. entail anti-realism about that class.
10. G.A.R.. 643.
11. M.M.R.. 116.
12. G.A.R.. 644. Such a presupposition was, it will be recalled, Young's objection to reductionist motivations for anti-realism (but see note 3).
13. G.A. R.. 645.
14. R.R.. 374 and R.S.. 504 I am not sure quite what counts as a community here but have allowed it to be a bit schizoid in that people who share meaning-determining bits of theory might not share truth-determining bits of theory. It seems to me that for present purposes the more important way to classify people into a community is in virtue of their shared meaning/understanding, not these shared substantive commitments.
15. R.S. 505.
16. R. S. 506.
17. R.R. p. 373 and R.S.. pp. 503-505. Note that it is a correct theory, not the correct theory; hence the relativistic element of the Youngian thesis. Smith's article is "Young on the Coherence of Anti-Realist Relativism", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 16. (1989). 61-65.
18. R.R. 374.
19. R.S.. 506.



20. R.R. 373. Mind you it seems clear from Young's remarks here and there that he *does* mean 'believe'. See, for instance, G.A.R., 645.
21. More strictly, I take in that meaning is not so much theory-relative as the meaning-determining-part-of theory-relative.
22. See R.S., 507.
23. Though Newton-Smith's understanding of 'truth-conditions' is not Young's coherentist rendering.
24. R.S., 508.
25. R.S. *Ibid.*,
26. William Newton-Smith, *The Rationality of Science* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.), 35.
27. R.R., 373.
28. I am not clear whether the notion of a community here is tied just to shared meanings or also to shared truths.
29. Or not all communities; see note 28.
30. R.S., 506.
31. See G.A.R. in particular, where Young distinguishes his view from those of more cautious anti-realists, among whom he numbers "founding father" Michael Dummett.
32. R.S., 505.
33. R.S., 505. I have myself been at pains to point this out; see my "The Strong Programme and Reflexive Incoherence: *Metascience* 7, 2 (1989), 99-100.
34. The tenor of these remarks could be carried across to other aspects of the anti-realists' theory. The status of their remarks about language learning and sentence understanding, about the dependence of warrants on previously assented to sentences, about the link between truth and warrantedness is up for query yet Young's thesis rests on these claims. See R.S. 646 and 647.
35. I have, in the past, argued that the relativist about truth restrict her thesis to being one about object-linguistic claims and thus (as the thesis is meta-linguistic) avoid reflexive incoherence problems. See my 'Can Relativism About Truth Avoid Self-Refutation?', *Metaphilosophy* 22, Nos. 1 & 2, (1991), pp. 175-178. I have since resiled from this view, deeming the object/meta-language distinction unviable in this context; see my 'Weak Neo-Meilandian Relativism About Truth', unpublished.
36. R.R. 374.
37. At least for Young this meta-claim is true: it might not be for some variety of relativist.
38. Recall R.R., 374.



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39. This was Young's example from the novel *Persuasion* see R.R. 374.
40. R.R. 374.
41. Or, assuming for a moment that there's a distinction, perhaps for some strange cause like, for instance, being hypnotised to believe it (or a wider set of sentences including those of *Persuasion*).
42. As we will see below, the use of 'true' might be problematic.
43. G.A.R., 645.
44. G.A.R., *Ibid.*,
45. Compare what I take to be remarks in a similar spirit in Hilary Putnam's *Reason, Truth & History* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), 124.
46. I don't think that this is to be swept aside with an 'of course, I said that I was an anti-realist!'. It's of interest to note in this context that not all of those who construe themselves as anti-realists are as happy as Young to sever a firm tie between truth (and assertion) and reality. See, for instance, Michael Hand's paper, in part in commentary upon Young's M.M.R., 'Anti-realism and Holes in the World', *Philosophy* 65, 1990, 218-224.
47. G.A.R. 645.
48. Young discusses perception reports in G.A.R., 645.
49. G.A.R., 647.



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## THE SCOPE OF VERBAL TESTIMONY (ŚABDA-PRAMĀṆA)

This paper proposes to examine the Nyāya definition of *śabda-pramāṇa* along with some other definitions with a view to identifying its scope in upto-date contexts. The study, besides ensuring a correct attitude to what is usually considered a remnant of theological philosophy, has been undertaken with two objectives in mind : To evidence the evolution of the concept of *śabda-pramāṇa* in the tradition and to identify such areas of its scope which may be of relevance to modern Indian philosophy, irrespective of its theological bearings. The following three definitions have been selected for treatment in this paper : (i) *aptopadesah śabdaḥ* (Nyāya-Sūtra- I.1.7), (ii) *śāstram śabdavijñānadasannikṛte-rthe vijñānam* (Sabara-Bhāṣya- I.1.5), (iii) *yasya vakyasya tatparya- viśayibhūtasamsargo manantarena na bādhyate tad vakyam pramāṇam* (Vedānta-paribhāṣa).

As a result of the analysis, the scope of *śabda-pramāṇa* i.e., the area of its operation, may be identified as follows :-

- i. The information from reliable persons including media reportings.
- ii. The necessary or self-evident truths entailed by the analysis of meaning.
- iii. The knowledge of value.
- iv. The knowledge of mythological entities, heaven etc.

1. The verbal testimony is defined in the *Nyayasūtra* as '*aptopadesah. śabdaḥ*' (N. S. I.1.7). It may be interpreted in two ways depending on whether one takes the compound as relational (*aptah lasya upadesah*)<sup>1</sup> or as qualificational one (*aptascopepadesah*), meaning thereby the words of a 'reliable person' and 'reliable works' respectively. The latter interpretation has been accepted by the *Sāṃkhya* and is favoured by the *Mīmāṃsa* and *Vedānta* schools because it is a simpler supposition of the two. Of course, the atheistic



leanings of the *Sāṃkhya* and *Mīmāṃsā* systems also might have contributed to their understanding of 'sabda' as a 'reliable statement' rather than a statement of a reliable person.

The *Nyayasutra* and the tradition following it (with the exception of Bhasarvajña) favours a relational interpretation of the *Sutra*. 'apta' is a person who possesses direct knowledge of an object. Hence, the statement of a person prompted to speak from direct knowledge of something is (serves as) a valid means of cognising (to others). The elucidation in the *Bhāṣya* thus presumes two things : A verbal knowledge, and its source, a person who knows. This knowledge need not necessarily be a sacred knowledge, nor the person an omniscient being. These meanings were later additions, and lend an insight into the stages by which the *Nyaya* system subsequently developed into a formidable theistic system. In so far as the *Sutra* and its exposition in the *Bhāṣya* is concerned, it shows no theological bias, though it does not categorically rule out the possibility of such an interpretation. The brief exposition gives the impression that verbal testimony (*sabda-pramāṇa*) was recognised as a separate means of cognising more out of pedagogical rather than epistemological considerations. The value of language as a means to dissemination of knowledge is fairly obvious. The *Bhāṣya* emphasises this point when it claims that the *Sutra*- formulation (of *sabda*) uniformly applies to the seers, the arjans as well as the barbarians. Thereby all social (and linguistic) transactions take place.<sup>2</sup>

The *Sutra* on '*sabdapramāṇa*' is a recognition of the pragmatic value of language in disseminating valuable experiences of the few among the masses in the form of information. It is through language that the knowledge acquired by a recluse or by a scientist working in his laboratory, comes to be shared by others and becomes a public property. In fact a vast mass of knowledge a man accumulates in his life, is acquired in the form of information. Its source, the language, qualifies for recognition as a means of cognising (*pramāṇa*) for firm pragmatic reasons. Hence, reporting by a reliable person or media, signifies that first determination of the scope of *sabdapramāṇa*.

The question is, can such a verbal knowledge be recognised as a valid means of cognising, in the sense in which preception and inference are so termed. Little discernment is needed to see that such a knowledge



## Verbal Testimony

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is derivative in nature, a translation of the original experience of the person who seeks to recount it. The '*apti*' or direct comprehension of the object, in consequence of which a person is called '*apta*', and which, transmitted through language, serves as a means of cognising (*sabdapramana*) to others, is itself brought about not by *sabdapramana* but by other accepted means of cognising, perception etc. In case of doubt, it is open to verification by those very means of cognising and not by *sabdapramana*. Hence, like memory, verbal, cognition is simply a translation, which states for others, a given experience originating in some person by means of cognising other than *sabda*.

The *Naiyayika* may point out that these questions arise due to lack of appreciation of some finer conceptual distinctions of his theory. The man with direct knowledge (*apta*), and not the direct knowledge (*apti*) is the basic, originative source of *sabdapramana*. Hence, the correspondence of a statement with some experience does not deprive the verbal testimony of its originative character. The reliable knower (*apta*) is the source of reporting as well as of its validity. All we have to do is to ascertain that the source person is not maliciously motivated; he is neither a liar nor a deluded person. What is needed is the validation of the cognitive and psychological mechanism of the source-person. From the reliability of the person flows the reliability of his words and of the cognition transmitted through them.

The *Naiyayika* seems to be technically correct when he says that the question of the validity of verbal cognition cannot be directly raised; rather it should be raised as to the reliability of the source-person (*apta*). However, it simply shifts the problem of validity from 'word' to the source-person without solving it. As Dignaga points out, verbal comprehension is a matter of inference based on past experience, and as such cannot be recognised as an independent means of cognising. What he does not say but could have said is that the reliability of the source-person is also a matter of inference, and what is more, the assessment may vary from person to person.

The issues becomes more obvious in the following *Sutra*; *sa dvidvidho dr̥ṣṭadṛṣṭarthatvat* (N.S.I.1.8) - that (*sabda*) is of two types, according to its object being verifiable and non-verifiable by experience. The *Sutra* is clear and comprehensive in its import. However, the *Bhasya* and the *Varttika* following it, not only seek to



eliminate the radical distinction but also arbitrarily narrow down its scope. Thus reads the *Bhasya* - *yasyeha drsyate-rthah sa drstarthah; yasyamutra pratiyate so-drstarthah* - that of which the object is verifiable here, is *drstartha* and that of which the object is verifiable hereafter, is *adrstartha*. The interpretation is objectionable as it views the radical distinction between *drstartha* and *adrstartha*, simply as varieties of the *drsta* - real and potential. The *Varttika* tries to rectify the distinction by making *drstartha* and *adrstartha* respectively as objects of perception and inference. Our mundane objects of perception etc. are verifiable here - (*drstartha*), whereas the mythological entities like heaven etc. are objects of inference. (*pratyksata upalabdhorthah drstarthah, anumanata upalabdhorthah adrstarthah*).

Thus, the interpretation of the *Bhasya* and the *Varttika* bring the mythological entities within the perview of the verbal cognition. This is the second determination of the scope of *sabdapramana*. The *Mimamsa* seems to lend support to it as it defines *sastra* as the knowledge of distant things through verbal comprehension - *sastram 'sabdavijnana-dasanni krste'rthe vijñanam*. (*S.B.I.1.5*)

The construction of the *Varttika*, holding *drstartha* and *adrstartha* as objects of perception and inference is also untenable for the following reason. The verifiables hereafter may be objects of inference here, but in the life hereafter, they too become objects of perception. Here too, as in the *Bhasya*, the *drstartha* and *adrstartha* turn out to be the objects of perception actual and possible, which is inconsistent with the absolute nature of the distinction as formulated in the *Sutra*.

If the view of the *Varttika* that the *Sutra* refers to the objects of perception and inference is accepted, then it simply serves to show the area of knowledge, where *sabdapramana* is translatable of perception and inference and rules out the possibility of the area where *sabdapramana* may be distinctly operative.

These incongruities in the *Nyaya* stand may be traced directly to the *Bhasya*, which interprets the *adrstartha*, 'the non-verifiable' as 'verifiable hereafter'. In fact the word *adrstartha* in the *Sutra*, signifies the absolute non-verifiable and not the possible verifiable as the *Bhasya* seems to suggest. In fact, the value judgements and the *a priori* truths



are the absolute non-verifiabiles suggested in the *sūtra* by the word *adr̥ṣṭārtha*.

2. Taking *Sastra* as the only valid source of verbal testimony, the *Mīmamsakas* define it as the knowledge which flows from the comprehension of the meaning of the words, and is about an object which is not accessible to other means of cognising (*sastram sabdaviññānadsannikṛte-rthe vijñānam*). Notably, this definition dispenses with the reliable person as the validating source of verbal testimony, and to this extent, has been relieved of its theological significance. The *Mīmamsa* view firmly holds, that value judgement (*vidhi*) is the only valid area for operation of *sabda-pramāṇa* and is akin to the modern view in holding that other means of cognising perception etc. can never be source of moral judgement. This is the third determination of the term.

3. The credit, however, goes to the later *Vedāntins* for offering a comprehensive definition of *sabdapramāṇa* which applies to the mass of sacred knowledge as well as to reliable reportings, and self-evident truths of linguistic analysis. That sentence is held to be respectable the intentional meaning of which is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge (*yasya vākyasya tātparyavisayibhūti-samsargo mānāntareṇa na bādhyate tadvākyaṃ pramāṇam*).

This definition, somewhat paradoxical, is too loose even for the *Vedāntin*, who upholds *sabdapramāṇa* simply to ensure validity of the truths of ethics and metaphysics. When such a knowledge is not derived from any source of knowledge other than *sabda*, how can it be supposed to be falsified by them. Obviously, the specification '*mānāntareṇa na bādhyate*' suggests that the definition intends to bring even the reportings by respectable media which are open to verification by perception etc. under *sabda-pramāṇa*.

It is further notable that the *Vedāntins* through the analysis of *Mahāvākyas* show that self-evident knowledge becomes available from the analysis of the meaning of words belonging to *sabdapramāṇa*. This may signify the fourth determination of the term. All these determinations are implicit in the two *Nyāya* aphorisms discussed above. However, as has been shown, their recognition was thwarted by the unperceptive interpretations that followed.



The aforesaid analysis serves to specify the scope of *sabdapramāṇa*, translative and originative as hinted in the *Nyaya* aphorisms, and may bear recapitulation as follows:-

1. The information from reliable persons including media reportings.
2. The knowledge of mythological entities like heaven etc.
3. The knowledge of value (duty etc.)
4. Knowledge of the necessary or self-evident truths entailed by the analysis of meaning.

Here 1 and 2 are translative, whereas 3 and 4 are originative in nature.

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2. *Nyaya-Bhāṣya*
3. *Nyaya-Varttika*
4. *Sabara-Bhāṣya*
5. *Vedānta-Paribhāṣa*.

## NOTES

1. *sakṣatkaranamarthasyaptih, taya pravartitah ityaptah* (*Nyaya-Bhāṣya* I. 1.7)
2. *rsyaryamlecchanam samanam laksanam. tathā ca sarveṣāṃ vyavaharah pravartante* (*Ibid*).



## A CRITIQUE OF HUME'S THEORY OF MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY

### INTRODUCTION

In the mainstream discussion on the problems of philosophy in modern times, the significance of David Hume is mainly seen as an epistemologist in general and as initiator of the consideration of the principle of causation in particular. However, it is also acknowledged that Hume's reflections on the nature of morality are seen in many ways to be profound and searching. Particularly his theory of moral sentiments has been significant from two points. From the critical point of view, Hume's reflections on moral sentiments have been an important counterpart to the theories of rationality founded on rational morality, as in Kant. This debate between moral-sense and moral-reason has been an important problematic of contemporary ethical and metaethical debates. But apart from this critical role, the theory of moral sense has also stimulated positive theories, particularly in aesthetics.

However, certain contemporary interpretations of Hume have suggested that the significance of Hume's moral philosophy, particularly, his theory of moral-sense, is not exhausted within the limits of moral philosophy alone. His theory of moral-sense and its implied description of human nature have relevance for the understanding of man's epistemological concerns as well. In this sense his moral theory does not only raise epistemological issues but it also subtly transforms our approach to epistemology itself. In this sense his moral philosophy is called a meta-epistemological position. It is this connection between Hume's moral theory and his epistemology which I propose to call his moral epistemology. Since the understanding, the validity and the limits of this perspective on epistemology require, as a preliminary step, a somewhat detailed and clear understanding of the theory of moral-sense of Hume, in this paper I will be mainly dealing with this issue; but the orientation of my discussion is towards the meta-epistemological significance of his theory which I propose to take up in a sequel to this article.



This article has three parts. The first part deals with Hume's theory of moral epistemology. In the second, various reactions, responses and criticisms levelled against Hume, are discussed. The last considers the outcome of the entire discussion.

## I

### HUME'S THEORY OF MORAL-EPISTEMOLOGY

Hume's views on morality and moral epistemology are indeed very fundamental and significant. Hume wanted to build his theory of morals on a sound and secure foundation. Now, if anyone wants to construct any theoretical model on a sound basis, he has to base this model upon a principle which is natural, impartial and also universal.

Hume wanted to build his model of morals on such a natural, impartial and universal principle. In so doing, he thought that within "Human Nature", one can find such a principle. According to Hume, human nature is the same in all human beings. The source of morality can be found within such a human nature. Morals are nothing but the fundamental qualities or faculties of human nature. In other words, morality is manifested through life-phenomena and life-phenomena themselves are the activities and behaviours of human beings. Hence, morality is exhibited through human action. Morality has two dimensions: one is its sociableness and the other human action. It is possible to decide the notion of morality by the human action. We come to understand the meanings of vice and virtue, good and bad, ethical and unethical only through an action. Thus, morality emerges out of human action. Human action is always situated within a social milieu; hence, morality is always understood within a social context. Social action requires social sanction and public conformity. Therefore, murder is a crime which has been recognized as a bad action and it is always discouraged. Helping those who are in need, is always recognized as a virtuous act because it is always conducive and helpful to the society and hence it is always encouraged. So, actions are social or sociable in the sense they are judged on the basis of norms and rules of the society.

From the above argument, although it is not so clear as to what is the source of morality, yet one may say that action plays a very



important role in morality. After this preliminary background in his *Treatise-III* and *Of the Principles of Morals*, Hume proceeds further to tackle the issue of the source of morality. Hume's entire argument has two phases. While, on the one hand, he gives the argument as to how the moral distinctions are not based on reason, on the other hand, he argues how moral distinctions are based upon moral sense or moral-sentiments. Let us, first, briefly examine these two phases of his argument.

#### (i) MORAL-DISTINCTIONS ARE NOT BASED ON REASON

Hume says, perceptions are very important in making philosophies and moral philosophy, in particular, is the area where perceptions do play a central role in understanding morality. Perceptions are of two types: one, they could be discerned in the form of ideas and, two, they could also be seen as impressions. As everybody knows, impressions are sensations and ideas are reasons. Now, Hume asks the question whether by means of our ideas or impressions we make the distinction between virtue and vice and treat an action either as praiseworthy or otherwise.

Further he says moral distinctions are not based upon reason but rather upon moral sense. (Here Hume's attitude seems to be negative and partial in the sense that he never argues in detail about the argument of moral distinctions based upon reason except in one or two small paragraphs (see, Book III, *Of Morals*, pt. I, pp. 456-457). If he had compared the two arguments - what would follow if morality is based upon reason and if it is not based upon reason but upon moral-sense - his view on morality would have become more penetrative, subtle and precise.

In order to support his main theme of how moral distinctions are not reason-based, he begins by dividing philosophy into two parts: one is speculative and the other as practical. Morality is always practised; hence it is not speculative and so not based upon reason. Morality is governed by action and passion. Further, morals have an influence on actions and affections; so morality is not based on reason either. The relationship between, morals and actions is reciprocal in character.

Morals exercise control upon passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason is basically inert or powerless. The rules of morality,



therefore, are not the rules of reason. How can an active principle be founded on an inactive principle? Human action is always active and reason is inactive. *Therefore human action cannot be founded on reason.* This is an important idea which Hume develops all through his works. Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth or falsehood are either relations of ideas or matters of fact. Now, whatever is not within the scope of this is not either true or false - and passions, volitions and actions do not come under the purview of this truth-falsity copula and hence are out of the scope of reason. Therefore, reason is wholly inactive and utterly different from such active things like conscience or the sense of morals.

Hume makes a very important claim of the distinction between the knowledge of the external world and morality. Accordingly, as we make a mistake in understanding the external object, this act cannot be called as immoral or amoral because moral conduct and the knowledge of the external world are quite distinct phenomena. But when a fundamental or natural human right is encroached upon, this is treated as a crime and penalty is imposed. So, knowledge of the external world is possible due to reason but with no impact upon human morality. Therefore, moral judgement is not based upon reason but upon something else - which is obviously a moral-sense or moral-sentiment.

Hume stipulates two conditions under which he wants to prove how morality is not based upon reason:- (A) Comparison cannot be made either internally alone or merely externally; it is always made between the internal and the external. This is a reasonable argument.

But it seems difficult to imagine how any relation can be discovered as holding between our passions or volitions on the one hand and external objects on the other such that such a relation might not belong either to these passions and volitions alone nor to the external objects alone with which passion or volitions are compared. (B) The second condition is difficult because we have to justify this system itself. We cannot establish and demonstrate the connection between a relation and will. In human nature no relation alone can ever produce any action -- however the relationship could be established with the help of experience and not reason.

Thus, it will be impossible to fulfill the first condition required by the system of external relational measures of right and wrong.



because it is impossible to show those relations, upon which such a distinction may be founded; and it is as impossible to fulfill the second condition because we cannot prove *a priori* that these relations, if they really existed and were perceived, would be universally enforceable and obligatory.

Matters of fact also cannot be based on reason. For example, vice cannot be found in any human action in the strict sense but it is there either in passions, motives or in volitions. This concept always escapes from the inquiry and we only start interpreting either passions, volitions etc.

So, to conclude this section one can say how Hume prepares a preliminary background on which he rests his main argument, i.e., morality is based on moral sentiments.

#### (ii) Moral Distinctions Derived from a Moral-Sense

Morality is not reason based. This is the first phase of Hume's argument. Rejection of one thing means implicitly acceptance of the other and that is what Hume is precisely doing by arguing how morality is derived from a moral sense. In the second phase he tries to put forth an idea that there is such a thing which actually regulates and influences human action. He says -

"... Since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion that we are able to mark the difference between them".<sup>1</sup>

In Hume's theory impressions are important for one can make a distinction between vice and virtue with their help. In short, impressions or sentiments are the genesis of the morals. If impressions are admitted then one has to forgo the ideas or reason. The importance of the impression is for the feelings they generate. Impressions cannot be judged but they are always felt. I think this is the most important claim Hume makes. This is the important qualification of the moral-sentiments. Feelings of pleasure arise from virtue and uneasiness is the result of a vice. But if one proceeds further, one may find that these impressions or moral sentiments are nothing but pains or pleasures.



To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no further, nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction.<sup>2</sup> Hume develops his argument of morality in quite a systematic manner. He shows how moral-sense or sentiment is the genuine source of morality by giving two opposite or antithetical ideas: we have already seen how morality is not based on reason; this is the first component of his argument for moral sentiments and he also shows how morality is not produced in the nature (external nature !). This second component is as follows:

If we assume that morality has originated in a natural way, then we have to know before hand what the term "nature" stands for and how it is distinguished from "unnatural". We cannot precisely define what is nature or natural. Now, on this background, if we try to know the nature of morality as the outcome or product of nature, then we will have a particular notion of morality. Now, first, if nature is understood to have the opposite of miracle, then both vice and virtue are equally natural. But in saying that virtue and vice are natural, we are not really claiming an extraordinary discovery.

In the second context, if the nature is also to be opposed to the rare and the unusual, then vice and virtue can be treated both to be natural and unnatural, which is most unphilosophical and hence cannot be accepted.

As regards the third context, nature could also not be opposed to artifice. For, in that case both vice and virtue would be equally artificial and so unnatural.

Therefore, Hume says, ultimately we have to fall back upon the original stage by saying that virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain.

The conclusion Hume draws, therefore, is that origin of morality could be found only in pleasure or in pain and not either in nature or in human thought (i.e., in his imagination).

This is the first phase of my inquiry. Now, in the next phase I will discuss reactions, responses and criticisms of this view of Hume.



## II

RESPONSES, REACTIONS AND CRITICISMS  
ON HUME'S THEORY OF MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY

So far, from the study of Hume's thought on 'Moral Epistemology', one gets the impression that reason does not have any decisive role to play in moral inquiry. Moral issues could be judged, understood and settled in terms of moral sentiments or judgements. But, then, the immediate question would be : Can morality and moral action be influenced by moral-sense alone and that reason, in any way, cannot participate in moral activities ? This is a very difficult question to answer and Hume is also aware of it. He even tried to improve his earlier position and support the view that both reason and sentiments concurrently cause the production of moral action.<sup>3</sup>

But there are also some positive criticisms on Hume's "Theory of Moral Epistemology", especially by Rachel Kydd and N. K. Smith which are quite illuminating.

Rachel Kydd<sup>4</sup> has said that in fact we come to judge that Hume allows far more greater power to reason than it is normally supposed. Hume says, moral conduct does depend on reason. Of course, what Hume wants to claim is that it is totally misconceiving in saying that our morality, our duty for example, depends entirely on reason. It is this which Hume questions.

Similarly N. K. Smith<sup>5</sup> also criticises Hume's moral epistemology by making some fruitful suggestions. He says, should judgements genuinely cognitive in character have to be recognized as entering into belief- as ultimately, by implication, Hume himself admits in the case of the capital position in his ethics, no less than in his general philosophy, will at once be endangered. For, as then follows - a further step than Hume has given any sign of taking--judgements cognitive in character have similarly to be allowed as entering into all judgements of moral approval and disapproval, i.e., if moral judgements involve judgements of apprehension as well as of appreciation, the whole question of the interrelations of feeling and reason -- so fundamental in his ethics, and from his ethics carried over into his general philosophy-- may have to be very differently viewed. The problem, too, of



moral obligio may, then, be found to demand a quite different answer from any other that Hume has been able to give. On these, as on other questions of theory, Hume's ethics is integral to his general philosophical outlook, and stands or falls together with it.

One fundamental criticism<sup>6</sup> against Hume's theory of morality is that he does not question the very large knowledge of morality itself. Without prior examination, he simply takes it for granted. Instead, he asks, "Whether it is by means of our ideas or impressions that we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy" (*Treatise*, p.456, Selby Bigge edition). Hume's answer, of course, is that it is by means of impressions, not ideas, that we make such distinctions and produce such pronouncements. In line with this, Hume never speaks of moral ideas. And if there are no ideas, then there are no such things as moral beliefs and hence no moral knowledge.

In the above arguments, nonetheless, the problem of moral obligation is not resolved. Especially when Kant handles the question of moral obligation, this criticism is becoming very sharp, pointed and vivid.

Apart from these criticisms, I find the following lacunae in Hume's theory of Moral Epistemology :-

- (1) According to Hume morality is not based on reason but upon action and passion. Furthermore, one also finds that on the one hand morality is based on action and passion and on the other hand morality influences actions and passions. So, there is a circularity in Hume's argument.
- (2) There is also another point which is noteworthy. The fact that Hume attributes a sort of dynamism to the notion of morality. But one may dispute how morality can be dynamic or active. Moral action is always dynamic and not morality as such. So, the conscience is not active. There is a confusion in Hume's mind in this regard.
- (3) There is also another problem in Hume's theory of morality<sup>7</sup>. He says that sentiments are very soft and gentle and that we are likely to mix them with ideas. Now, the question is : how this very weak form of morality becomes the guiding force for human action ?



*A Critique of Hume's Theory*

(4) If Hume's theory of moral epistemology is accepted, there arises a problem of "justice". How to interpret and understand justice? The concept of justice requires the element of reason or reasonableness and a component of reflection is to be admitted. Hence, justice cannot be understood or even practised, if we have only the notion of moral-sense at the expense of reason.

(5) The last thing I would like to say or suggest is that whatever Hume says, there is an element of sense in it but at the same time Hume's some of the statements and arguments seem to be quite contradictory and lacking in something. Hume initially rejects any role reason playing in moral inquiries. This is really a debatable issue. For, morality also requires reason in addition to moral sentiments. Mere moral-sense does not suffice. Now, it is necessary to identify in what way reason also participates in the moral enquiries. Putting it in other words, one must explore to what extent reason functions in moral fields. We have also to explore whether moral sense depends upon reason. In addition, the strengths and weaknesses of reason as well as "moral-sense" in the field of moral epistemology needs also to be looked into.

This concludes section-II and in the final section some concluding remarks are offered.

## III

## CONCLUSION

So far the discussion was centered around (in the last two sections) the notion of moral epistemology in the light of Hume and his critics. This is really the issue between ethics and meta-ethics in contemporary philosophy. Now, it is our further task to see whether we can gain something with the clash between the two positions previously discussed (i.e., the position of Hume and his critics).

From the discussions, one may think in a fresh way about the role and function of reason and moral-sentiments in the development of moral-epistemology. Now, the question is : Can reason and moral-sentiments in any way be connected with each other? To answer this question, we have further to deal with another question : i.e., whether



reason and moral-sense could be subsumed under yet another higher principle?

Principally there are two things which may perhaps throw light on the nature of moral-epistemology. If we take Hume's view strictly, we find that reason and moral sentiments are antithetical. But one may agree that both reason as well as moral-sentiments belong to consciousness or at least they relate to our awareness. In other words, we may find consciousness in both. So, both are not strictly antithetical but they are complementary. Now, this consciousness belongs to man. To put the claim in a stronger way is that consciousness is the very sign of man's existence.

But, again, man is the product of tradition, history and culture.

Both his consciousness as well as society or culture govern man's moral actions. Therefore, if we want to build an epistemological model of morality, we cannot and should not neglect consciousness and tradition.

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### NOTES

- 1) David Hume; *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, Of Morals, part I, Section-II, p.47.
- 2) *Ibid*, p.471.



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- 3) Now if we compare his Treatise -III, "Of Morals",... with, "An Inquiry Concerning the Principles Of Morals", we can see the shifts in his thinking.
- 4) R. Kydd; "Reason and Conduct" in "Hume's Treatise", see Chapter IV, *Empirical Reason and Conduct*, p.138.
- 5) N.K. Smith; *The Philosophy of David Hume*, p. 565f.
- 6) R.J. Fogelin's book review on the book, *Hume's Moral Epistemology*, by Jonathan Harrison, in *Nous*, Vol. XIII, Nov.1979.
- 7) David Hume; *Treatise-III*, p.470.

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## KANT AND THE FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY

### What is Faculty Psychology?

Faculty psychology was the dominant psychology of the Medieval period. It has originated in Plato's division of the soul into the appetitive, the spirited and the rational faculties. Although faculty psychology has various dimensions, in a more specific way, it is a theory of the mind or soul according to which there are distinct and independent faculties<sup>1</sup> by reference to which different functions of the mind are explained. There may be, for instance, the faculty of sensibility, of understanding, of volition and so on. Thus, according to faculty psychology, mind is a conglomeration of the different faculties. Faculty psychology is usually associated with the Soul Substance Theory of Mind, according to which the unity of the individual mind is constituted by a single, permanent and indivisible spiritual substance, though it is not an essential factor as is evident from the Kantian philosophy.

### Kant's Adoption of Faculty Psychology

Kant has adopted faculty psychology in formulations of his critical philosophy. His psychological standpoints are very clearly explained in 'Anthropologie in Pragmatischen Hinsicht' (1798) and 'Conflict of the Faculties' (1798). The threefold division of the faculties of Knowing, Feeling and Willing as worked out in the *Critique of Judgement* (1790) is comprehensively explained in the *Anthropologie*. Broadly speaking, the *Critique of Pure Reason* deals with the faculty of knowing, the *Critique of Practical Reason* deals with the faculty of willing and the *Critique of Judgement* deals with the faculty of judging. In this regard, Kant's contribution to psychology is important and lasting<sup>2</sup>.

### Kinds of Faculties

Besides the three main faculties of knowing, willing and feeling, there are some other sub-divisions. In all we find six different faculties<sup>3</sup>:



1. Sensibility
2. Faculty of concepts or understanding
3. Faculty of Judgement
4. Reason
5. Sensuous feeling of pleasure, pain and taste.
6. Desire and will.

This division is not standard and "there are as many faculties as there are kinds of representations"<sup>4</sup>. It is to be noted that these faculties are not individual (or indivisible) units but unitary groups. It is so because each faculty contains or is made up of other sub-faculties.

In the sphere of knowing Kant distinguishes the active and the passive sub-faculties of sense and understanding. But the division does not stop here. Kant always liked exactitude and led to investigate whatever aspect he touched to the minutest details. The sphere of sense includes imagination and intuition. Imagination is the power of envisaging sensuous images and consists in the power of presenting objects for intuition when they are not actually given. Intuition is direct presentation. Further, the senses are also distinguished as outer and inner. While the outer sense has many aspects-sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell-and involves the form of space, the inner sense is the consciousness of a time-order.

The faculty of will finds detail elaboration in Kant's ethical works, especially in the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Will (wille) refers to a faculty, potency or force in man which is involved in decision making. The will, according to Kant, is nothing but practical reason. It is a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws.

Feeling (Gefühl) is a conscious, subjective impression which does not involve cognition or representation of an object. Feelings are said to be of two kinds<sup>5</sup>, namely, pleasure and pain. They do not exist in objects. They only denote the state of the mind. According to Kant, pleasure is produced by the harmony of an object with the subjective conditions of life and consciousness. It is, therefore, life-promoting. But pain is, on the contrary, due to the awareness of disharmony of an object with the subjective conditions. It is, therefore, life-destroying.



The faculty of feeling has neither phenomena nor noumena under its domain. It does not express the conditions to which a kind of objects must be subject, but solely the subjective conditions for the exercise of the faculties. The higher form of the faculty of feeling denotes only the subjective and spontaneous harmony of our active faculties. When the faculty of feeling is grasped in its higher form, it is judgement which legislates in that faculty. Judgement is always a complex operation which consists in subsuming the particular under the general. Under the faculty of judgement intellect and will, knowing and willing are brought into a meaningful and harmonious relation.

In his analysis of mind Kant is said to be suffering from the "intellectualist prejudice<sup>6</sup> because of his thorough and excessive devotion to the faculty of knowing. The discussions concerning other faculties - willing and feeling - are not exhaustive and penetrating.

### **Influence of Wolff and Tetens**

Faculty psychology, which originated in the philosophy of Plato, reached to Kant via Christian Wolff and J.N. Tetens. Aristotle and Wolff adopted the twofold division of the mind, namely, cognition and appetite. The division of philosophy into theoretical and practical is based on this antithesis of cognition and application. As expected, the synthesis is provided by Wolff's successor J.N. Tetens. Tetens has given the equal rights to the faculty of feeling. Thus, we find that these thinkers paved the way for Kant's threefold division of the mind into knowing, willing and feeling<sup>7</sup>.

### **Rejection of Faculty Psychology by the Modern Psychologists**

The doctrine of the faculty psychology began to decline in the beginning of the nineteenth century. With Herbart (1776-1841) the mind or soul is unitary and indivisible. By denying analysis to psychology, Herbart combated the division of mind into separate faculties. According to him everything in our mind including the feelings, the desires, and the will arises out of presentations. There are no faculties, no innate ideas, no concepts *a priori*. Modern psychology regards the human mind as an organic unity of interdependent functions. There are no independent and separate faculties in the mind such as seem to be implied in Kant's philosophy. Modern psychology is concerned not with piece-



meal experiences but with the indivisible consciousness which is presupposed by them. Moreover, in modern ~~modern~~ time, there is very much emphasis on experimental method in psychology. It has further undermined Kant's position.

### Rejection of Faculty Psychology by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)

Herder, a naturalist among the Faith-Philosophers, has severely criticised Kant's faculty psychology. In the *Metacritique* (1799), he rejects Kant's distinction between sensibility and reason. Further, in the *Colligone* (1800) he rejects the separation of the beautiful from the true and the good.

Herder asserted that the compartmentalization of the mind is a 'philosophical nonsense'. It is highly abstract and artificial. Different mental activities - knowing, willing, feeling etc. - are unitary. In the last analysis "the inner man, with all his dark forces, stimuli, and impulses, is simply one"<sup>8</sup>. Herder was so obsessed with the notion of unity that he opposed every kind of division including between mind and the body.

Herder's refutation of faculty psychology is rooted in his concept of metaphysics and language. His metaphysics is based on the notion of 'Kraft'. It is a kind of primitive force or energy underlying every existence. It is to be presupposed in any interpretation of existence. But it cannot be explained rationally. 'Kraft' is rationally inexplicable, but ontologically indispensable. Different acts and expressions of men are unitary at their base because of this 'Kraft' that is present in every aspect of human life. There is no faculty in mind. The same force (i.e., Kraft) is active behind the so-called different faculties of the mind. In this aspect Herder's philosophy is very close to that of Bergson and Shri Aurobindo.

Herder's rejection of faculty psychology is based upon his conception of language also. According to him, man's power of reasoning does not operate in isolation with other capacities. "It is one and the same mind that thinks and wills, understands and perceives, exercises reason and has desire"<sup>9</sup>. Further, he says that the use of reason and the use of language are inseparably connected. Thinking is not possible without language. Reason is not innate in human being. It is developed by the training in the use of language.



Herder's theory of evolution and his spirit of pantheism are clearly against faculty psychology. If one and the same force is active behind the ascending evolution of every phenomenon, the question of duality does not arise at all. Differences may be only of stage and not of kind. Thought is only a higher stage of sensation. Reason is not productive, but only receptive faculty of knowing. The division of mind into different faculties arose because of the ignorance of the functioning of language.<sup>10</sup> Thought and will originate from the same ground.

But these objections are, as Falckenberg remarks, 'neither dignified in tone nor essentially of much importance'<sup>11</sup>. In fact, Herder misunderstood and misinterpreted Kant. He distorted his system because it was not compatible with his own views. But without any inherent contradiction, by mere dogmatic adherence to a pantheistic and evolutionary theory, the Kantian system cannot be rejected. Kant's view may not be compatible with that of Herder's, but it is no ground to reject it. My standpoint is not to say that the faculty psychology is valid, but only to say that Herder's arguments are not sufficient enough to reject it.

### An Appraisal of Faculty Psychology

Even if we reject faculty psychology, Kant's philosophy is not damaged. Kant was interested not in the constitution or structure of the different faculties, but in their functions. He was primarily interested in analysing different operations or activities of the mind. And these activities are not destroyed by the elimination of faculty psychology. What Kant says about various faculties can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the various functions of mind. Obviously these functions are analysed even by those systems - behaviourism, functional psychology etc - which reject faculty psychology. Thus, the Kantian philosophy, by and large, remains intact by the elimination of faculty psychology.

The viability of the Kantian position can be defended by the Hindu philosophy also. The maxim that work, knowledge and action each ceases after fulfilling its function and cannot arise again to perform another function establishes the view that there may be different forms of mental activities which cannot be brought under one principle<sup>12</sup>.

Faculty psychology has its pragmatic value. Even if it is not true, it is useful for the analysis of mind. The great German scholar Max



Muller accepted it. He accepted the three faculties of mind, namely, sense, reason and the faculty of the infinite or faith. He said that "Faculty, facultas, seems to me so good a word that, if it did not exist, it ought to be invented in order to express the different modes of action of what we may still be allowed to call our mind.... and those only who change the forces of nature into Gods or demons, would be frightened by the faculties...."<sup>13</sup>.

The division of the mind into different faculties may be fictitious or imaginary; it is to be done for the sake of analysis and understanding the different modes of action of our mind. Forms of psychology may change, but the matter remains. Faculty psychology and the modern psychology (or functional psychology) differ in their forms but not in their matter, as they both analyse the different functions of mind. Thus, the time and the labour are not lost completely in the formulation of faculty psychology.

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### NOTES & REFERENCES

1. "in the first sense, 'faculty' refers to the different relationships of a representation in general. But, in a second sense, 'faculty' denotes a specific source of representations". *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*; Gilles Deleuze, p.7; The Athlone Press, London, 1984.
2. "It was Kant's adoption of the major faculties of knowing, feeling and willing (Cognition, Affection and Conation, as they are commonly called today in scientific jargon), that has perpetuated this division through the text-books and curricula of the whole century."  
*A Hundred Years of Psychology*, J.C. Flugel, p.13; Gerald Duckworth & Co., London, 1964.
3. See Richard Falckenberg; *History of Modern Philosophy*, p.336; Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1977.



Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, p. 7; The Athlone Press, London, 1984.

In the *Anthropologie* we find another division, i.e.; pathological feelings and aesthetic feelings.

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## WITTGENSTEIN, ART AND RULE-FOLLOWING

This paper is concerned to discuss three problems relating to aesthetic appreciation from the Wittgensteinian perspective :

1. Is a distinctly strict definition of art possible?
2. Is it possible satisfactorily to follow certain rules while appreciating a work of art?
3. Are rules viable only under a logical framework, i.e., does a rule necessarily imply following a logical discourse?

Attempts to define art has been one of the major problems of Aesthetics. Any attempt for a technical definition of art is sure to fail because of the fact that we cannot reduce an open textured concept into a closed one. The reason is simple: 'art' is not a scientific term like 'density' which is the mass per unit volume of a substance. This vagueness or open texture character of art may be further illustrated thus. Two birds chirping at the far corner of a tree captures the attention of a poet. A flower may look beautiful in the eyes of two lovers, while a sickman may be indifferent towards it. A particular colour of a flower may be beautiful for me, while it may not be so for another individual. This seems to lead towards a subjective realm giving largely varied room for each individual to give entrance to his own interpretation. One may enjoy a particular writer or writings, for, the characters in it bear similarities to his own life. Again, a director may be satisfied with his play because the artists have fulfilled all the technical movements and gestures he wanted them to perform. In each of these cases, responses to enjoyment vary depending largely upon personal wants and attitudes. A closer look at and a careful investigation into the functions of the aforesaid cases and responses lead to a number of general conclusions like which of the above responses are to be called aesthetic enjoyment and which are not. In other words, can aesthetic enjoyment, as a definite objective state, be chosen out of the complex personal measures.



To answer this question, let me explain as to what I mean by objectivity. In the first place, it means shareability or communicability. A work of art when completed evades patronage of the artist, turns autonomous and becomes others' too in the sense that others can also understand and appreciate it. This element of understanding and appreciation are plausible only when the shareability of the ideas conveyed by the artist is made possible through a particular work of art. Thus, an element of communication takes place. Eventually, what the artist wants to convey through his work of art is largely appreciated by the spectator in identical ways. Secondly, shareability implies explanation. If something is shareable, it can be explained and explanation is possible only when the object of study is displayed publicly. Thirdly, the notion of objectivity is viable when there are some common elements between two objects. It amounts to saying that objectivity lies in commonness in the plurality of aesthetic appreciation or in the level of plurality of art objects. Finally, objectivity can be taken as the capacity of the art object to transcend here and now. That is how great works of art are immortal and relevant through ages.

Another important point I would like to make is - two theoretical distinctions between objectivity of a work of art and objectivity of appreciation of a work of art. Latter necessarily presupposes the former; that in order for an act of appreciation of a work of art to be objective, there has to be a objective character of a work of art. Though sounds circular, but of a different sort, objectivity of a work of art also presupposes objectivity of appreciation of a work of art. However, 'appreciation of work of art' may remain as a possibility. i.e., when an artist creates an art object, he presupposes the possibility of a state of affair of appreciating his work, though may be in the real case, it never comes true. In this paper, while I speak of objectivity, I am talking of objectivity of a work of art encompassing objectivity of (a possible) appreciation of a work of art.

While appreciating a particular work of art, certain commonalities<sup>1</sup> are enjoyed by the spectators, e.g. if every person appreciates Picasso's 'Guernica' and enjoys the same in identical ways, it means that there are certain commonalities in the appreciation of a work of art (But I do not in any way mean to say that to appreciate in similar pattern is the only authentic response in appreciation of a work of art). In view of the above consideration, it may be suggested that



communication is neither entirely subjective like spectators enjoying and interpreting in accordance with their imaginatively constructed personal worlds, nor is it entirely with the art object rendering the intention of the artist independent of the spectator. Rather, it is a process of reciprocity between the art object and the spectator. So far as art object is concerned, though complete in itself, is not divorced from the intention of the artist. Its interpretation lies, again, largely upon the subject (appreciator). Therefore, the entire process of aesthetic appreciation depends upon the spectators. However, aesthetic appreciation is made upon the art object within a given paradigm; consequently, to think of pure subjectivity and thereby rejecting the role of art object is not possible. Art object cannot be synonymous to natural object for it is a creation and not a mere givenness. If the above line of argument is plausible to the fact that art object renders certain ways of communication and identical appreciations from the spectators, then there arises a problem as to the possibility of arriving at one single universal definition of art. Also, we are faced with question like: What kind of communication is made possible through an art object? Can there be one single criterion and a single common character in all forms of art? Here I am looking for the generic term 'Art' for all kinds of art works like architecture, sculpture, music, painting, drama etc.

At this point it is reasonable to explain the notion of commonalities to avoid certain misunderstandings and possible misinterpretations. We may say - A is similar to B and B is similar to C. It does not in any way refer to as A is isomorphic to B and B is isomorphic to C. It is like saying A & B have certain commonality, B & C have certain other commonality and so on.<sup>2</sup> Again, we may say that there are certain similarities between A, B & C that can be talked of meaningfully whether I compare A with B, B with C or A with C. This need not be the case with the former where A is similar to B and B is similar to C, but A may or may not be similar to C. This is what Wittgenstein terms as 'family resemblance'.

My attempt in this paper would be with the former kind, i.e., to explore and find out some similarities with one form of art with another and further with a third kind. With this in mind, I am presupposing that one essential common characteristic for all art forms is not possible. The criterion for valid aesthetic explanation for Wittgenstein is that it should satisfy the person to whom an art object is presented. To



elaborate, Wittgenstein compares aesthetic explanation to supplying someone with an utterance. Sometimes, in the middle of a conversation, we come to a half and are unable to use an appropriate word. When it is uttered by someone we say- "Yes, that's what I wanted to say". But how do we know what is the correct word? Because it satisfies us. It sounds weird, Wittgenstein has more to say.

"As far as I can see the puzzlement I am talking about can be cured only by peculiar kind of comparisons. e.g. by an arrangement of certain material figures, comparing their effects on us. If we put in this chord, it does not have that effect; if we put in this chord, it does."<sup>3</sup>

The criterion to evaluate a work of art is through comparison. When an architect comments, "the door of the house is too high", this does not mean that if I lower it, he'll be satisfied. He may or may not be satisfied. Both possibilities are there. It is a criticism, and not a psychological prediction. I may not be able to see the highness of the door. It might seem quite perfect to me. But when it is lowered, I may realise that the door was really too high. Similar is the case with an artist who is not satisfied with his paintings. When he tries to improve upon it, he is not making a psychological experiment on himself, but is trying to make the picture more agreeable to himself bringing it closer to an ideal.

Though the solution of comparison sounds reasonable, yet there still remains some room left to think of subjectivity being present. Wittgenstein admits that fallibility is not synonymous with subjectivity. Cyril Barrett writes :

"The trouble about an aesthetic explanation is not that it is fallible but that there is no independent check to it. As Wittgenstein points out, it is like a verdict of a court of law. It is a matter of interpretation. Giving an aesthetic explanation is like trying to clear up the circumstances of the case, hoping that your interpretation will appeal to the judge not any interpretation will do. For one thing, it has to account for the acts. Moreover, although there are no independent checks to an aesthetic explanation, there are means of commanding it, namely comparing one work with another, altering the work etc. By these means, you can try to get the other persons to see what you see."<sup>4</sup>

Against this background, then, it is conceptually possible to arrive at one objective aspect of art through the process of comparison.



It may be helpful at this point to illustrate the notion of 'commonality' which is explained above. Let us call attention to the former kind where commonality is referred to comparing some qualities of A & B, some other qualities of B & C, but not the common nature belonging to A, B & C. What is apparent here is that there is no specified essence (nature) of art. But the only means to talk of objectivity is through 'family resemblance.' What we find is the resemblance of one form of art with another. By observing various kinds of individual similarities between one form of art with another, we formulate the concept of Art, a family, a genus. Though Art is a genus of a different kind, yet it is not to be confused with the general relationship between genus and species. It is a convention that we formulate to call these various forms of art objects as 'Art'. The name could have been different if we deemed it to be so, and also the concept. It means that concepts are not something inherent in the art object. It is a construction. This is where the freedom of interpretation/reinterpretation lies with the spectator in the change of time and cultural perspectives. It also stresses that Wittgenstein is more of a conventionalist giving priority to reality of space and time. Concepts are formulated and invented in a society to satisfy the particular wants of the society providing a better life and communication, and people, at large, start accepting it. Thus, concepts are created as a reflection of life, representing life in a symbolic way. e.g. Eskimos have several names of ice more than other people of any society. This is because of their acquaintance with it in various ways in their day to day life. These several uses lead to formulation of various concepts. In the same way, art has always been reflection of the way of life of the people. It projects a picture of life through the means of symbols. So, art is either reflection or picturing of objects of the world or the very form of life, or a possible human world of imagination. Picturing or reflection is possible through :

- (a) the existence of an object (outside).
- (b) activities, praxis or way of life of the people, i.e., the way we associate ourselves with the object.
- (c) an act of imaginative reconstruction in symbolic patterns.

Association of the three give rise to picturing or aesthetic creation. If there are no objects and particular life patterns, imagination of a possible life pattern is not possible. Picturing is possible further with association of objects in different ways and different possible ways.



If concepts are formulated through convention and people start accepting them, then there has to be a set of rules. To use a term one should know its application and the given set of rules. If we fail to follow the rules, then we fail to use the token meaningfully, thus leading to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. This is what Wittgenstein meant by 'language going on holiday'. We need to follow strictly the rules given to us. But the word 'strictly' must not be misunderstood. Rules are not formulated strictly, that this must be the case. But once the rule is framed, it becomes our obligation to follow it in order to communicate with others. This is what I mean by 'strict rule following'. Strictness, therefore, is in the rule following and not in rule formulation. But there is always a possibility of these rules being reobserved, renewed and reformulated. The looseness or 'rule-reformulation' has its way here. Once the existing rules are thrown out, new rules come up, thus creating new games.

Let us note here an interesting illustration of rule following and 'language going on holiday'. Any metaphor or simile has certain rules to be followed in order to make it intelligible. Their literary meaning is not what they convey. e.g., the statement 'it is raining cats and dogs'. To a person who has little acquaintance with such uses in English language will be completely at a loss with such metaphors. In this case, language has gone on holiday. Even this phrase 'language goes on holiday' must be understood through Wittgensteinian perspective. To avoid this holiday business, we should consider the context in which a particular set of tokens are used and the kind of rules which are to be followed.

Interestingly enough we cannot define these rules. It is like a game that we play. One may be able to state specifically the rules of football but one cannot define the game. It is a game that we play through seeing resemblance with one form of the game with another. Wittgenstein writes :

"someone says to me, 'show the children a game'. I taught gambling with dice and other says, 'I didn't mean that sort of game'. Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind when he gave the orders?"<sup>5</sup>

What do we mean when we say a game? Does alteration or exclusion of the form of game still keep the idea of game and how do



we know that 'dice' should not be included within the kinds of game taught to children. There is no hard and fast rule. Evaluation takes place only when the child is taught the game of dice. Thus, art is very much a game. There can be no strict rule. Morris Weitz acknowledges the same in the following way :

"The problem of nature of art is like that of the nature of game, at least in those respects, if we actually look and see what is that we call 'art', we will find no common properties-only strands of similarities. Knowing what art is, is not apprehending some manifest or latent essence but being able to recognize, describe and explain those things we call 'art' in virtue of these similarities."<sup>6</sup>

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we may state that it is not possible theoretically to define a work of art. How does a child start learning art appreciation? Not through theoretical definition or description. He starts comparing various art forms and shortly understands the family 'art' through particular resemblances.

It might well be thought that the understanding and interpretation of a work of art, in turn, makes other people intelligible of it, paving the way for rules becoming public. 'Public' here means the rules are no more personal to an individual, but communicated and shared by people at large. That is why Wittgenstein rejects any possibility of rules being private. For him, the moment one formulates such rule, interpret it and follow it, it no more remains private. However, there are possibilities of rules being forgotten. e.g. I may use a token 'X' for table and every time I want to write 'table', I write 'X'. Supposing that I forget the use of this token and start writing 'table' instead of 'X'. But the moment I remember the use of 'X', I start following the rule formulated earlier and overcome the mistakes. Here, 'I' have two functions :

- (a) as a rule maker.
- (b) as a rule follower or interpreter.

To be private refers to either (i) there is no rule at all, or (ii) even if there is one, I do not know it. But to formulate a rule and yet not knowing of it is simply not possible. The very idea of asserting something is associated with the following of certain rules. Therefore, when something is asserted or shown, it becomes public. When one



asserts a rule, one is acting as a rule maker as well as a rule follower. At least there are two persons (within a single individual) involved. So, the idea of private language is rendered impossible.

Let us now proceed to some formulations of Wittgenstein's 'Seeing-Aspect' where he refers to the 'duck-rabbit' illustration to manage if any rules are involved while seeing the picture either as a duck or as a rabbit. It is quite clear that I cannot see both duck and rabbit at the same time but only either of them in a given moment of time. Now, the question is it is a haphazard act or an act following a given set of rules. The argument given by Harry Blocker on non-following of rules on 'seeing-as' in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigation* needs attention. He writes :

"I trust everyone knows what I am referring to by 'seeing-as' phenomena. We've all seen pictures of schematic diagram of the staircase, which looks now like steps going down, or the duck-rabbit illustration, which looks now like a duck, now like a rabbit. Wittgenstein's remarks on 'seeing-as' can be conveniently summarized under four heads. The first is what Wittgenstein calls the ambiguity of what is seen in the case of seeing-as as opposed to cases of straight forward seeing. In the case of a triangular-shaped piece of wood one is entitled to assert what its visual shape is independently of how any given person sees it. In the case of the duck-rabbit illustration, the schematic cube diagram or any other of the innumerable examples of reversible figures on the other hand, one cannot state independently of how particular observers see it, what the visual shape, direction or character of the illustration is. Again, the correct description of visual shape of the triangular piece of wood is determined by established rules or conventions to which the individual must, in a certain sense, confirm; whereas in the case of duck-rabbit the only rule for the right description is simply some person's saying that's how he sees it - i.e., there is no rule at all."<sup>7</sup>

It cannot be doubted that seeing of either the duck or the rabbit depends entirely on the eyes of the persons seeing it, that there is no confirmed rule as to the case of the triangular piece of wood. There are no determined rules that the illustration is entirely of duck or of rabbit. But the person's seeing either of them does not mean that there is no rule at all. Rules may not necessarily be of a determined kind as in the case



of triangular piece of wood. The case of the duck-rabbit illustration is of a different kind, and possess a different rule. Whether I see it as duck or as rabbit, there are certain rules to be followed in order to see either of them as they are. It suggests, then, that there is a prior logical discourse of 'rule following' before I start following it. I can in no way see the duck as tiger or the rabbit as monkey.

It might be contended that a great deal of freedom lies in the spectators to interpret and reinterpret a particular work of art. But it cannot go beyond the logical boundary which lies in the backdrop of the work of art. This is where the freedom of imagination does not allow one to imagine a man as a table. If I know what a man is, I must know all the essential attributes of being a man. This in no way corresponds to the essential properties of a table. I quote Wittgenstein:

"If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in state of affairs. (Everyone of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object). A new possibility cannot be discovered later."

"If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties."<sup>8</sup>

So, any appreciation of a work of art necessarily presupposes following a set of rules which are meaningful under a logical boundary. One cannot exceed beyond that. If we do, we cannot appreciate the work of art. Rather, we misinterpret the work.

One cannot, therefore, discuss in any thoughtful way the nature of art without at the same time developing the string of questions leading to it, questions which turn out to be formulated through 'family resemblance'. I have made it clear that there can be no common similarities between two forms of work of art either. My contention, however, is that the answer to the question of the objectivity in art necessarily presupposes the obedience of certain rules to appreciate the way one does. Though these rules are not of a definite kind, yet must follow under the a priori logical framework of possible interpretations. The objectivity in art arises along a course of perspectives which glean a sense of the nature of art by coming to it, shall we say, from the spectators. To get our bearings on this approach, we have



attempted to explore the direction of Wittgenstein to present it as a free-floating hypothesis.

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### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Commonness here refers to the essence, possessed by the work of art which makes the spectators appreciate in the similar manner.
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## A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF KARL MANNHEIM'S VIEWS ON SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Sociology of knowledge emerged as a discipline with an identity of its own only after the translation of Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*. Mannheim's writings, especially his magnum opus *Ideology and Utopia*, constitute a landmark in the history of the subject. With their philosophical sensitivity, analytical rigour and sociological imagination, they provided a firm footing to the nascent discipline of sociology of knowledge.

According to Mannheim, sociology of knowledge "Seeks to analyse the relation between knowledge and existence... as historical - sociological research it seeks to trace the forms that relationship has taken in the intellectual development of mankind"<sup>1</sup>. This definition shows that the subject matter of sociology of knowledge lacks theoretical specificity. It is not possible to pin point its subject matters.

One of the important concepts that figures heavily in Mannheim's theory of sociology of knowledge is the concept of ideology; ideologies are mental fictions originating unconsciously in the minds of those who seek to stabilise a social order with the result that ideologies function as veils of the true nature of a given society. However, Mannheim maintains that though sociology of knowledge is closely related to theory of ideology, it should be distinguished from the latter. The theory of ideology aims to unmask the total mental structure of the asserting subject, by bringing to light the distortions characterising the mental structure of the subject. Sociology of knowledge is not interested in the distortion produced, but simply in the precise nature of the relation between existential condition and the knowing subject via ideology. It is due to this distinction in the perspective between the theory of ideology and sociology of knowledge that Mannheim advises



us to avoid the term ideology in the realm of the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim takes as axiomatic the fact of the heterogeneity to be philosophically irrelevant. However, for Mannheim the salient feature of human knowledge which ought to become the focal point in understanding the nature of knowledge is its heterogeneity as it is reflected in the variety of basic category of thought possessed and utilised by people in different social situations. In other words, the fact that people in different social situations characterised by position, group setting etc., think differently is, according to Mannheim, a matter of first rate importance demanding explanation and having far-reaching implications. The differences can be very fundamental. People belonging to different social groups often talk at cross purposes, because they differ in their total outlook. Even about concrete issues there seems to be interminable disagreement. The question is 'why'? According to Mannheim "for each of the participants the 'object' has a more or less different meaning because it grows out of the whole of their respective frames of reference, as a result of which the meaning of the object in the perspective of the other person remains at best in part, obscure"<sup>2</sup>. This implies the rejection of not only the idea of intersubjectivity but also that of commensurability. The very possibility of any rational discourse across different social settings is ruled out. It is made possible only within a group that shares what Mannheim characterises as perspectives by which he means 'the subject's whole mode of conceiving things as determined by historical and social setting'<sup>3</sup>. Perspective in this sense "signifies the manner in which one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in his thinking. Perspective, therefore is something more than a merely formal determination of thinking. It refers also to qualitative elements in the structure of thought, elements which must necessarily be overlooked by a purely formal logic"<sup>4</sup>.

In saying all these Mannheim seeks to give the impression that sociology of knowledge must treat the question concerning the validity of the cognitive claims as irrelevant. In the absence of a common framework and common object it does not make sense to speak of truth or falsity of a claim. However, Mannheim says that it would be incorrect to regard sociology of knowledge as giving no more than description of the actual conditions under which an assertion arises. He hopes that with more and more methodological refinements sociology of knowledge "reaches a point where it also becomes a critique by refining the scope



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and the limits of the perspective implicit in given assertions. The analysis characteristic of the sociology of knowledge is, in this sense, by no means irrelevant for the determination of the truth of a statement"<sup>5</sup>.

Though Mannheim's view concerning the specific task of sociology of knowledge recognises, to its credit, the active elements in knowledge, unlike the standard empiricist view it suffers from certain serious difficulties.

First of all there is the difficulty of reconciling his construal cognitive content in totally relativistic terms with his desire to include the question of truth value of a claim among the legitimate concerns of sociology of knowledge.

Secondly, if the perspective thesis is accepted, then one needs to answer the question "why does the 'same' object appear differently to one in a different position? Further, how can intersubjective communication be possible among different people situationally determined in different ways"?

All these questions remain formidable only if Mannheim is forced to embrace an undiluted relativism. But Mannheim not only does not maintain relativism but attempts to show that he can successfully circumvent the problem of relativism. First of all Mannheim clearly delineates some claims as immune to social causation and as content-free. These include mathematical, logical and (natural) scientific propositions. He claims that the solution to the problem of relativism is the most important aspect of his project of sociology of knowledge. Maintaining that his perspectivist view is compatible with the talk of objectivity he says, "objectivity is brought about by the transition of one perspective into the terms of another. It is natural that here we must ask which of the various points of view is the best. And for this too there is a criterion. As in the case of visual perspective, where certain positions have the advantage of revealing the decisive features of the object, so here pre-eminence is given to that perspective which gives evidence of the greatest comprehensiveness and the greatest fruitfulness in dealing with empirical materials"<sup>6</sup>. This sounds very close to pragmatism according to which postulation of 'object in themselves' or 'truth-in-itself' is not legitimate.



However, Mannheim is aware of the problems that can be created by relativism. At the same time he feels the need to treat the social determination of knowledge as the most seminal point for the very possibility of sociology of knowledge. He finds a way out in his notion of relativism. Contrasting relationism with relativism he says, "A modern theory of knowledge which takes account of the relational as distinct from the merely relative character of all historical knowledge must start with the assumption that there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing independently of the value and position of the subject and unrelated to the social context. What is intelligible in history can be formulated only with reference to problems and conceptual constructions which themselves arise in the flux or historical experience"<sup>7</sup>.

Crucial to Mannheim's attempt to do away with relativism is his contention that sociology of knowledge inquires into the nature of knowledge in relation to and not as relative to the totality of the social structure that characterises the actual life situations within which knowledge emerges. Elucidating his notion of relationism Mannheim says "when the urbanized peasant boy thinks of his relatives he relates them to a certain mode of interpreting the world which in turn is ultimately reduced to a certain structure which constitutes the situation. This is an instance of the relational procedure"<sup>8</sup>. According to Mannheim 'what the sociology of knowledge intends to be by its analysis is clearly brought out in the example of the peasant boy'<sup>9</sup>. The only difference is that sociology of knowledge follows a deliberate method. Knowledge is essentially social not just because the knowing subject belongs to a group. It is not simply that knowledge is essentially a social phenomenon because we as knowing subject belong to some social group or other. But, on the other hand, Mannheim says, "we belong to a group not only because we are born into it, not only because we profess to belong to it, not finally because we give it our loyalty and allegiance, but primarily because we see the world and certain things in the way it does"<sup>10</sup>.

However, Mannheim's view contains many loose ends, some of which can be brought to surface by contrasting his views with those of Marx. This contrast is important also because there is a wrong impression that Mannheim was a Marxist. Of course, Mannheim has



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borrowed many ideas of Marx. Abercrombie says "there are some closely connected respects in which Mannheim's borrowing from Marx are suspect"<sup>11</sup>. The concept of class, as employed by Mannheim no doubt brings him nearer to Marx, but Mannheim offers an account of social groups fundamentally based on the concept of similarity of location. In spite of giving a theory which can relate different groups Mannheim only gives a list of groups and their belief system, Marx, as Abercrombie says, "on the other hand locates class in a general theory of political economy"<sup>12</sup>. Secondly, Mannheim suggests that social classes are constituted by their place in political struggle. But the deficiency of Mannheim is that he did not give any explanation of the struggle itself. Such an explanation can be found in Marxism.

In spite of these and similar deficiencies Mannheim's work remains path-breaking, precisely because they were more than a prolegomena to an empirical sociology of knowledge. They contain the seeds of a full-blown epistemological view point which could later claim to be the alternative to the prevailing practices of the discipline of Epistemology. Subsequent to Mannheim's work, Sociology of Knowledge registered a phenomenal growth through the various reactions, for and against the views of Mannheim. But the greatest fillip to the sociology of knowledge came with the emergence of sociology of science. Till then it was believed that science which was widely recognised as the paradigm of our knowledge was considered to be immune to social factors, and that its explanation to be anything but sociology. When science itself was shown to be sociologically interpretable, it was but natural that sociology of knowledge gained greater credibility. However, sociology of science for a long time remained theoretically inconsequential and philosophically unchallenging. With the appearance of Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* the sociological approach to science entered the arena of controversy. In his work Kuhn "explains stability in science sociologically, in terms of the existence of potent mechanism of socialisation and social control".<sup>13\*</sup>

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13. "Thomas Kuhn" by Barry Barnes in *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences* edited by Skinner.

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## EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE : KIERKEGAARD AND HEGEL

Kierkegaard records a religious experience in 1838 which had a permanent effect on him. "There is an indescribable joy", he writes, "which is not a joy over this or that, but a cry from the fullness of soul.... from the depths of the heart."<sup>1</sup> Since the awakening of this religious experience in Kierkegaard's life, which happened during his University period, he was searching for a clearer relationship between philosophy and religion, between knowledge and faith. Kierkegaard's starting point was, "What am I to do?" He writes in *Philosophical Fragments* :

What I really lack is to be clear in my mind what I am to do, not what I am to know, except in so far as a certain understanding must precede every action... the thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die... What good would it do me to be able to develop a theory of the state and combine all the details into a single whole, and so construct a world in which I did not live, but only held up to the view of others... I am left standing like a man who has rented a house and gathered all the furniture and household things together, but has not yet found the beloved with whom to share the joys and sorrows of his life.<sup>2</sup>

Greek thinkers believed that philosophy starts with wonder-dispassionate curiosity about nature and man; and most traditional philosophers of the Western world seemingly agreed with this view. However, this is certainly true of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas for though they were passionately concerned with getting into a right relation with God, they were also interested in understanding what the fact of sin and the possibility of redemption tell us about the nature of God and man. Kierkegaard, however, was not a philosopher in this sense. For him the question was "what was he to do to lead a significant life?". In his most philosophical work, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* Kierkegaard observes that the function as well as the purpose of philosophy is not to instruct but to "edify", that is to improve us by transforming us into....<sup>3</sup> Then the point of view is passionate, not



neutral; practical, not speculative; subjective, not objective; existential, not speculative and systematic. He has a strong conviction that it is impossible to exist without passion (unless we understand the word "exist" in an ordinary sense of a so-called existence). The so-called existence is a life of daily routine, conforming to social norms that others have laid for us. But real existence differs qualitatively from the so-called existence; it is to struggle, to strain and to encounter life passionately; it is to make firm decisions and not to be carried away in the direction of the tide. Here, existence and selfhood become identical.

According to Kierkegaard, the self is not a preexisting, fully formed thing that can be discovered by looking in the right direction, like the continent of North America which was discovered by sailing in the right direction. In Hegelian terms too the self is not a substance but a subject. But Hegel's subject is a self-conscious knower, though it is a doer in the sense that it evolves in the dialectical process, whereas Kierkegaard's, a doer in the sense that it calls for a passionate encounter with itself. Further, Hegel held that things exist for minds as an object of knowledge, while Kierkegaard believed that things exist for agents to be encountered. Furthermore, Hegel had certainly included passion in his theory, that nothing great is accomplished without passion. It is passion that makes world historical individuals what they are, e.g. Julius Caesar who destroyed outdated society to create a new one. Though Kierkegaard held that creativity involves destruction of old social norms, he by no means felt that it was in fashioning it. However, Kierkegaard was a passionate advocate even in real life and not a neutral judge like Hegel. Hence, in the theory-praxis divide Kierkegaard scored effectively.

In spite of a fundamental disagreement with Hegel, Kierkegaard was Hegelian to start with. His thesis at the master's degree level, *The Concept of Irony* was very much influenced by Hegel's thought. Though later Kierkegaard became an anti-Hegelian, as a student he admired him specially for Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*. However, he felt that at a certain moment of history Hegel's pan-intelligence has to be opposed and that too by a man of brilliant intelligence. Hence, without false modesty, Kierkegaard, while writing about himself and his task, mentions in one of his journals, "It was intelligence and nothing else that had to be opposed. Presumably, that is why I, who had the job was armed with an immense intelligence."<sup>4</sup> Though Kierkegaard



made use of Hegel's method and his terminology, it was his reaction against Hegel's speculative philosophy which developed into an ontology of human existence.

Hegel believed in a universal reason. For him thoughts and feelings have meaning only because each thought, each feeling, is embedded in our personality, and human personality has meaning only because it functions in a certain period of history making a specific epoch in the world evolution. Therefore, in Hegel's view, to understand anything about oneself, one must go from the totality of oneself to the larger totality of human species, finally culminating in the Absolute Idea. Kierkegaard protested vehemently the Hegelian comprehensive "World-Mind" in which the individual disappears like a wave in the sea. Starting from a diametrically opposite view, Kierkegaard emphasised that the true existence of oneself is in the intensity of feeling. To consider oneself as merely a part of the whole, Kierkegaard felt, is to negate oneself. The existent individual, according to him, is the one who is in infinite relationship with himself and his destiny. For Hegel, the world is the necessary unfolding of the eternal idea, whereas for Kierkegaard these are real possibilities which presuppose the freedom of choice, making an individual what he is.

Here, then, are there two contrasting notions of what it is to exist. One equates existence with thinking; Descartes' "I think, therefore, I exist" which is typical of the point of view of an abstract philosophy. The other equates existence with the "predicament" of decisions, e.g. an individual desperately wants to do the right, but lacks the ability for making a choice. These two notions are contrasted by W.T. Jones in the following way. One is characteristic of an observer who contemplates the agony of decision from the neutral vantage point of a thinker, who dispassionately takes note of the blood, sweat and tears from outside. The other notion is characteristic of a participant, who shares in, and directly experiences, the agony of decision - he bleeds, sweats and weeps with the decider.<sup>5</sup> Thus, Kierkegaard rejects Hegel's abstract thought to support a concrete existing individual. He also rejects Hegel's speculative talk about Christianity mainly on the ground that he does not commit himself to Christianity. He feels that Christianity is not something to be talked about, but something to be lived by. Hence, he says: "Religion is subjectivity and inner transformation". For him the problem is not to speculate about Christianity but to be a christian.



Kierkegaard regarded such an external and detached point of view as easy and superficial. When Kierkegaard equated existence with the agony of being in a predicament, he was describing his own life-experience, which was characterised by conflict and division. He both loved and feared his father, hoped to marry Regine and wished to reject her. Indeed, Kierkegaard's approach to philosophy was rooted in the most direct lived-experience. He was not interested in any generalization, but only in elucidation of the predicaments of every man who honestly takes serious decisions. However, he did not merely want individuals to take decision seriously, but to relate the predicament of their decision to their religious beliefs.

To show the agony of decision. Kierkegaard brought in certain closely related, yet contrasting, themes: infinitude and finitude, eternity and temporality, possibility and actuality. He felt that, though we live in time, we have an idea of eternity. Life would be easy if we were merely animals living in time, yet not conscious of ourselves as temporal beings. However, since we are human and not animals, we know that we are going to die i.e., at some point, time will stop for us. Therefore, to live in time is to be aware of the limitations of what one can be and do; it is to know that there are many options and that, when we choose one option, we exclude others. The trouble, then, is that we can never be sure that what we have gained exceeds what we have lost; hence the agony of decisions.

What, then, is the remedy for this? According to Kierkegaard it is in becoming passionately committed to one's choice or decision. Then, from a psychological point of view, we may not concern ourselves with other options. At this moment the agony of decision disappears. Kierkegaard's point is that the act of which one becomes passionately committed to must be deliberately chosen. Would it then be the cure which Kierkegaard was longing for? No, he was not merely interested in mental health, but in salvation as well. This move from a psychological solution of despair to a religious response was fundamental to Kierkegaard because he was essentially a religious thinker.

Kierkegaard emphasises that every individual exists not as an idea, but as an existing spirit which he calls the inwardness of existence. He feels that a finished edifice of a static universal cannot explain the particular moment of a living individual. Hence, Kierkegaard argues



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that existence is actuality and speculation is possibility. These, then, are fundamentally different from one another. Existence, for Kierkegaard, is a continuous process and logic cannot grasp such a continuous process without converting it into concepts. Moreover, Kierkegaard holds that existential feelings cannot be derived from logical necessity, for necessities cannot be new but already existing. Thinking is a process, proceeding step by step, and the changing nature of individual existence cannot be grasped in such a process. Therefore, Hegel's mediation cannot grasp the change. Kierkegaard feels that it is this aspect of truth which Hegel failed to understand. For Hegel, to think is to bring out the truth of the object, and hence, to be real is necessarily to be rational. As against this, Kierkegaard was not interested in the problem of reality from Hegelian standpoint. Thus arises the need for Kierkegaard to distinguish between the subjective and the objective truth. This distinction, for Kierkegaard, was important because he held faith to be the essence of religion. Making a clear demarcation between faith and understanding, he places faith above understanding. Understanding involves a link to truth which faith lacks. Faith lacks connecting links, for it cannot be proved, substantiated or grasped by mind. Since he held that faith is incompatible with objective evidences, it was necessary for him to show that proofs for the existence of God are insufficient. Here Kierkegaard may resemble Kant who also invalidated proofs for God's existence. However, Kant criticised them on logical grounds while Kierkegaard tried to show that the mental state or attitude in which one is seeking to prove something is irreconcilable with religion. Kierkegaard was not interested in a theory of knowledge but exclusively in the moral and religious matters. Therefore, he tried to show that neither historical evidence nor philosophical speculation is possible way to Christianity.

As a critique of historicity, Kierkegaard shows the inadequacy of historical research in the realms of faith. Central to the Christian claims are its historical assertions that Jesus lived, was crucified, and so on. If one examines these claims objectively, then one is led to nothing more than mere probability:

When one raises the historical question of the truth of Christianity, or of what is and is not Christian truth, the Scriptures at once present themselves as documents of decisive significance. The historical inquiry, therefore, first concentrates upon the Bible .... (But) even



with the most Stupendous learning and persistence in research, and even if all the brains of all the critics were concentrated in one, it would still be impossible to obtain anything more than an approximation; and an approximation is essentially incommensurable with an infinite personal interest in an eternal happiness.

(But let us) assume that the critics have succeeded in proving about the Bible everything that any learned theologian in his happiest moment has ever wished to prove about the Bible. These books and no others belong to the canon; they are authentic; they are integral; their authors are trustworthy-one may well say, that it is as if every letter were inspired .....

Well, then, everything being assumed in order with respect to the Scriptures-what follows? Has anyone who previously did not have faith been brought a single step nearer to its acquisition? No, not a single step. Faith does not result simply from a scientific inquiry; it does not come directly at all. On the contrary, in this objectivity one tends to lose that infinite Personal interestendnes in passion which is the condition of faith.<sup>6</sup>

Kierkegaard, then, directed his attack against speculative version. His concern here was Hegel's attempt to bring Chirstianity (absolute truth) within the structure of his triadic system which Kierkegaard called philosophical theology. He felt that to try to make religious feeling "understandable" is to distort it by destroying its passionate inwardness.

Kant drrew a distinction between percepts and concepts, between direct experiential element and abstract element. Hegel developed this simple notion into more subtle one of immediacy and selfmediation, from the directness of feeling to the level of understanding. Kant and Hegel would have agreed with Kierkegaard that in this process of externalization something is lost, viz. immediacy. But they would have argued that something is gained as well, viz. comparison, evaluation, and interpretation. Kierkegaard hated balance and compromise, he considered these as attitudes associated with objectivity. Then one may ask whether he had not over emphasised the passionate element in cognition - he would reply that it is impossible to put too much emphasis on the passionate element.

### Existential Pathos and Logic

"If doubt be the presupposition of thinking, you clearly cannot move from doubt to beleif by logic" holds Keirkegaard, "Which is a



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process of linked, consistent, continuous thinking, step by step.”<sup>7</sup> Real shift in logic is impossible, for it only re-establishes what is presupposed in the beginning. Hence, one can only do it by the discontinuous process which Kierkegaard calls the “leap”. This is one’s own leap of faith.

Furthermore, Kierkegaard holds that, if the learner is in doubt, he does not possess any certain knowledge and has no means of recognizing the truth. If, from a completely ignorant stage, one recognises truth, then he contends that this shift is miraculous. Hence, Kierkegaard points out that religious learning is a miraculous achievement as against the Platonic view of recollection.

Johannes Climacus, the official spokesman of Kierkegaard, sums up these views in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* thus : a logical system of knowledge is possible, but an existential one is not. A logical system consists in a body of necessary truths derived logically from a set of concepts, existential; on the other hand, speaks of truths of the changing world and, hence, existential system cannot be constructed. Wherefore there can be no necessary truth about factual events.

Kierkegaard raises a question: how could one pass on to the sphere of necessity from the sphere of contingent by a fixed process of logic? Hegel supports his thesis by contending that the movement is due to negative power or the anti-thesis. Kierkegaard refutes this contention on the ground that in logic movement is impossible because the special feature of logic is that it is static and, hence, cannot pass on to becoming.

Truth, for Hegel, is immanent in Nature, History, and Thought. There is an inner power which is demonstrated in the other world, and, hence, truth is immanent in Hegel’s view. Kierkegaard criticises strongly the immanent position of Hegel. He argues thus: it is the mind which brings together the objective world and the conscious world. Even if it is possible for one to become pure thought, a person would not exist as an actual being but only as a being of thought, for by thought one is not creating a world, but only thinks of it. Kant too declared that the existence can never be conceptualised by reason. He says: “Being is evidently not a predicate”, because, first, if a thing is merely thought of



and then later thought of to exist, then the second concept really does not add any new character to the first. Kant gives an example of a hundred dollars. If one thinks of a hundred real dollars and of a hundred possible dollars, then his concept really is only of one hundred dollars. One hundred real dollars will make a person hundred dollars richer, while one hundred possible dollars leaves his financial position exactly where it was.

What, then, is the fundamental difference between Hegel's notion of being and Kierkegaard existence? While Hegel holds the principle of identity, Kierkegaard follows the principle of contradiction. But how? According to Hegel, there is no absolute contradiction which cannot be reconciled. Hegel's principle of identity means that a man can think out the truth and lead a smooth and progressing life. Kierkegaard denies it on the ground that there is no unity or compromise in which the *either/or* situation can be resolved in man's life, and, hence, the principle of contradiction. An individual encounters barriers and is tossed among limited choices. In such a situation, one cannot compromise between choices, but only choose either the one or the other. Kierkegaard feels that the choice in such a human situation is never between good and bad, rather between rival good, where one is bound to do some evil either way. Hence, Kierkegaard feels that the terror in confronting such a situation is so great that people fear and take shelter in the universal rule to save themselves from the principal task of choosing. Such moods like fear and trembling, anxiety, despair, etc. are part of life and Kierkegaard chooses to face them. These he calls negative emotions as against positive emotions like love, joy, etc. which are probably more damaging to the spirit.

"When I consider the brief span of my life", wrote Pascal, "swallowed up in the eternity before and behind it... [I] wonder to see myself here rather than there,.... now rather than then." It is this mystery for Kierkegaard which is responsible for plunging a person into pathos. Passion produces pathos, and to live passionately is to live pathetically.

Kierkegaard holds that an individual strives for perfect happiness. This striving in its intensity is the nucleus of human life. An individual encounters this ideal of perfection in the being called 'God'. Therefore, Kierkegaard ascribes an ontological status to pathos, rather than adopting a mere psychological or pessimistic view.



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For Kierkegaard the feeling of pathos is not due to the "fallen" situation of man as Heidegger calls it, but an involuntary separation from divine reality. Therefore, in whatever distress human existence may be there in the world, it always hopes for deliverance. The life of an individual is not a "frightfull maze" as Kafka calls it, but it does have a positive side. Hence, the basic hopelessness and absurdity, which some of the existentialists emphasise as the outcome of wordly existence, is rejected by Kierkegaard. This is mainly because of his theistic attitude. Hence, Kierkegaard is convinced that such an existential pathos cannot be solved by logic, for a human being exists by leaps of faith which are the ever-changing stages of transformation of one's individuality, and by existing thus one creates truth. All decisions about truth are rooted not in logic, but in the changing experiences of the individual.

To conclude, the aim of this paper is to show the fundamental difference between metaphysical speculation and existential relection. The speculative philosophers basically believe in the astounding powers of reason. Existentialists challenge this belief because they are well aware of the limits of logic. Kierkegaard holds that the life of faith of a religious person inspires the life of others, i.e. his faith in religious existence (which is the truth for Kierkegaard) is justified by his way of life. Therefore, Kierkegaard considers that converting individuals from ordinary state of existence to religious existence through reasoning is flimsy but through exemplary behaviour i.e. imbibing the values in the form of life, is more long lasting. Hence, Kierkegaard is not interested in arguing about Christianity, for by arguments one would do more damage to the existing position. Why? Through rational arguments even absurd position can be arrived at. He claims that existential situations cannot be dispensed with by the standards of logic. Thus, according to Kierkegaard, deep down in the human being there is a point which reflections cannot reach. This point is solely one's own authentic existence, which cannot be communicated.

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NOTES

1. T.H. Croxall., (Tr.), *Kierkegaard-Johannes Climacus*, p.35.
2. Cf., W.T. Jones, *A History of Western Philosophy*, 2nd ed., New York 1969, p.209.
3. *Ibid.*, p.213.
4. Soren, Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, (Tr.) Walter Lowrie, p.79.
5. W.T. Jones, *op. cit.*, p.216.
6. W.T. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp.230-31.
7. Cf., Ramakant Sirnari, *Reason in Existentialism*, p.28.
8. *Ibid.*, p.76.



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